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i . 
A B S T R A C T 
This t h e s i s attempts t o e s t a b l i s h a number of r e l a -
t i o n s h i p s between f i n a n c i a l growth and economic development 
and then t o analyse f i n a n c i a l and r e a l development i n 
Lebanon i n the context of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t i s the 
basic c o n t e n t i o n of the t h e s i s t h a t the f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e 
o f a country, c o n s i s t i n g of a number of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r -
mediaries generating f i n a n c i a l instruments, can a c t i v e l y 
i n f l u e n c e , i f not determine, the course of r e a l economic 
development i n the economy. I n Part I the analyses presented 
by Goldsmith, Gurley and Shaw, and McKinnon are examined t o 
see how the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between f i n a n c i a l growth and 
economic development have been i n t e r p r e t e d by these w r i t e r s . 
I t i s found t h a t even a synthesis of t h e i r views does not 
f u l l y comprehend the complexity o f the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
and some f u r t h e r measures of f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e are discussed 
i n Chapter Three. A combination o f the views i n Part I 
suggest an approach which i s adopted i n Part I I where 
f i n a n c i a l growth and development are analysed i n Lebanon 
from 1950 t o 1974. Part I I begins w i t h a d e t a i l e d a nalysis 
of the Lebanese economy w i t h s p e c i a l emphasis being l a i d 
on the f i n a n c i a l inadequacies of each economic sector. 
Secondly, i n Part I I a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f the growth 
and operation o f the f i n a n c i a l sector i s provided, along 
i i . 
w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f monetary c o n t r o l . I n Chapter Nine the 
various strands of the argument are brought together i n an 
attempt t o analyse the f i n a n c i a l d e f i c i e n c i e s of the 
Lebanese system, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h respect t o p r o j e c t e d 
growth t a r g e t s contained i n the l a t e s t n a t i o n a l plan. The 
s i t u a t i o n i n the Lebanon i s t h a t the t o t a l resources of 
the f i n a n c i a l sector are probably s u f f i c i e n t t o meet a l l 
development requirements, but these requirements are 
l a r g e l y long-term i n nature, w h i l s t funds deposited i n the 
f i n a n c i a l system are short-term i n nature. I n a d d i t i o n 
there i s a complicating f a c t o r i n t h a t a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n 
of these funds are denominated i n f o r e i g n currencies. Thus 
the t o t a l funds w i t h i n the f i n a n c i a l system ove r - s t a t e the 
extent t o which the f i n a n c i a l sector i s capable of 
increasing domestic c a p i t a l formation. 
1 1 1 . 
P R E F A C E 
The o r i g i n a l concept f o r t h i s t h e s i s came w h i l s t I 
was preparing a d i s s e r t a t i o n f o r my Masters' degree a t 
Indiana U n i v e r s i t y . W h i l s t the d i s s e r t a t i o n was o s t e n s i b l y 
about c e n t r a l bank c o n t r o l i n N i g e r i a , the long discussions 
I had w i t h Professor E. Wicker ranged over the whole 
problem of f i n a n c i a l growth and economic development. I 
took t h i s i n t e r e s t w i t h me t o Durham i n 1966 and generous 
f i n a n c i a l support from the Middle East Centre i n Durham 
U n i v e r s i t y allowed me t o v i s i t a number of Middle Eastern 
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Lebanon, t o gather m a t e r i a l on 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , between 1966 and 1970, from which 
I was able t o p u b l i s h a number of a r t i c l e s . I n 1970 I 
f e l t I had enough basic data t o form the backbone of a 
d o c t o r a l t h e s i s and the present t h e s i s i s the r e s u l t o f 
f i e l d w o r k conducted i n Lebanon since 1970. 
The people who have helped me throughout my work are 
too numerous t o mention, but I would l i k e t o acknowledge 
the considerable help given by Salim Hoss, f i r s t of the 
Control Commission and now d i r e c t o r o f the National Bank 
f o r I n d u s t r i a l and T o u r i s t i c Development; Mr. A.A. Badrud' 
Din of the Central Bank; P i e r r e Masaad of the C e n t r a l 
S t a t i s t i c a l Bureau, who f i r s t introduced me t o the hazards 
of i n t e r p r e t i n g Lebanese s t a t i s t i c s ; v i r t u a l l y every 
i v . 
major banker i n B e i r u t who at some time or other was 
plagued by my questions, but e s p e c i a l l y A l a s t a i r F a i r l i e 
o f Barclays Bank, who provided me w i t h a very comfortable 
room t o do my work i n and introduced me t o numerous people 
w i t h o u t whom t h i s work would not have been completed. I 
would l i k e t o extend f u r t h e r thanks t o many of the s t a f f 
of the American U n i v e r s i t y of B e i r u t , who at times thought 
me mad t o t r y and analyse how the banking system worked, 
but, nevertheless, argued c o n s t r u c t i v e l y ' w i t h me. 
I n Durham, I would l i k e t o thank numerous colleagues 
(past and present) who have read parts o f t h i s t h e s i s and 
were good enough t o comment extens i v e l y , and a t times 
s c a t h i n g l y , on my work. These include Walter Elkan, 
B e r t i e Hines, Denis O'Brien, Rodney Wilson, J u l i a n Bharier 
and John Hey. To Lovaine Ord I owe a s p e c i a l debt as she 
has, u n f l i n c h i n g l y , typed, re-typed and typed again more 
d r a f t s than I care t o mention. I n the f i n a l stages I 
would l i k e t o acknowledge the debt I owe t o E l i a s Ghantus, 
now a research student i n Durham, but someone w i t h an 
extensive knowledge of t h e Lebanese economy on whom I 
could always r e l y f o r h e l p f u l comments. I n a d d i t i o n I am 
g r a t e f u l t o him f o r h e l p i n g me w i t h the c o l l e c t i o n o f data, 
the t r a n s l a t i o n o f some arabic m a t e r i a l and the arrangement 
o f a seminar i n B e i r u t where I was able t o put my views 
before a group of experts from the United Nations O f f i c e 
V. 
i n B e i r u t . The c o n t i n u i n g support o f the Centre f o r 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies both i n terms o f 
f i n a n c i a l support and documentation i s g r a t e f u l l y 
acknowledged. I n p a r t i c u l a r I would l i k e t o thank Richard 
Lawless and h i s s t a f f i n the Documentation Centre f o r a l l 
t h e i r help. 
F i n a l l y I owe a great debt t o my w i f e , Rosalind, who 
encouraged me t o s t a r t t h i s work and encouraged me t o 
f i n i s h i t . When things d i d not seem t o be coming out I 
could always r e l y on her t o push me a b i t f u r t h e r towards 
the f i n i s h i n g post. 
John N. Bridge 
Durham 1975 
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P A R T I 
C H A P T E R C U E 
F i n a n c i a l Growth and Economic Development 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
. . . I t has become c l e a r since the 19 50's t h a t money, 
and not only money but also other f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u -
ments, "matter" i n the sense t h a t the course of r e a l 
economic development may be considerably influenced, 
even i f i t i s not b a s i c a l l y determined by a country's 
f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e and a c t i v i t i e s . . . 
Goldsmith's view of the r o l e o f the f i n a n c i a l sector 
i n the economic development process can be taken as a 
general statement about the i n t e n t of t h i s t h e s i s and also 
can be taken as an i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e substance of t h i s 
chapter. Gurley and Shaw i n p a r t i c u l a r are recognized as 
being instrumental i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the view put forward by 
Goldsmith. I n t h i s chapter the basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
the Gurley and Shaw model are introduced and extended 
beyond a d e s c r i p t i o n of f i n a n c i a l instruments and p o l i c i e s 
t o a more d e t a i l e d discussion of d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l 
i n termediaries w i t h i n the f i n a n c i a l sector. 
1. R.W. Goldsmith, "The Development o f F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s 
During the Post-War Period", Banco Nazionale d el Lavoro 
Quarterly Review, No. 97, June 1971, p.129. 
2. J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, Money i n a Theory of Finance, 
(Washington: Brjokings I n s t i t u t i o n 1960). 
2. 
To understand more f u l l y the r o l e of the f i n a n c i a l 
sector i n the process of economic development requires a 
p r i o r a nalysis of the r o l e of money i t s e l f i n a developing 
economy. T r a d i t i o n a l l y monetary and r e a l phenomena have 
been analysed separately. Thus i n a C l a s s i c a l system 
money i s introduced only as a medium of exchange and i s 
3 
not hypothesised t o have any in f l u e n c e on r e l a t i v e p r i c e s . 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of money i n t o macroeconomic models has 
been done i n two p a r t i c u l a r ways. Metzler, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
has shown t h a t where savings are dependent on r e a l wealth 
(here r e a l wealth i s composed of holdings of ph y s i c a l 
c a p i t a l and monetary assets), an exchange of one form of 
wealth f o r another can a f f e c t the community's t o t a l savings 
and hence, u l t i m a t e l y r e l a t i v e prices through changing 
4 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s , which a f f e c t the growth r a t e of output. 
Secondly, Gurley and Shaw have demonstrated t h a t i f money 
i s defined as c o n s i s t i n g of two elements: i n s i d e money 
(money based on p r i v a t e domestic primary s e c u r i t i e s ) and 
outside money (money chat i s backed by f o r e i g n or govern-
ment s e c u r i t i e s or gold; or f i a t money issued by the 
government), and i f the r a t i o of i n s i d e money t o outside 
3. P.S Laumas and K.A. Mohabbat, "Money and Economic Develop-
ment", In d i a n Economic Journal. Vol.XX, No's 4 and 5, 
April-June 1973, p.619. 
4. L.A. Metzler, "Wealth, Savings and the Rate of I n t e r e s t " 
Journal of P o l i t i c a l Economy. Vol. 59, A p r i l 1951, pp.93-116. 
3 . 
money can be changed by the government through an expansion 
of outside money, which does not induce an equi-proportionate 
change i n i n s i d e money, then again wealth holdings w i l l 
a l t e r a f f e c t i n g i n t e r e s t rates and thus i n f l u e n c i n g 
5 
r e l a t i v e p r i c e s . 
Bearing i n mind these r a t h e r fundamental r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between money, wealth and growth, i t i s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 
growth models have proceeded f o r so long as though money 
d i d not e x i s t . Hahn and Matthews i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n t o 
t h e i r monumental survey of growth economics i n 1960 
i s o l a t e d many f a c t o r s which they thought were important i n 
analysing growth processes; but f a i l e d t o mention money. 
". . .A f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e d model of growth requires 
t o be made up of a number of b u i l d i n g blocks. I t 
requires t o s p e c i f y functions r e l a t i n g t o the supply 
of labour, saving, investment, production, t e c h n i c a l 
progress and the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income, t o name only 
the most important . . . 
The problem has been t h a t many models of economic growth 
have adopted the standard c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of comparative 
s t a t i c models - t h a t i s t h a t t here i s a long-run invariance 
between the demand f o r r e a l money balances and t h e nominal 
q u a n t i t y of money, i . e . money i s n e u t r a l . By making t h i s 
assumption growth t h e o r i s t s can then proceed on the 
5. A.H. Meltzer "Money, In t e r m e d i a t i o n and Growth", Journal o f 
Economic L i t e r a t u r e , Vol. V I I , No. 1, March 1969, p.30. 
6. F.H. Hahn and R.C.O. Matthews, "The Theory of Economic 
Growth: a Survey", i n Surveys of Economic Theory; Vol. I I , 
(American Economic Association and the Royal Economic 
Society: Macmillan) 196 5, p.2. 
assumption t h a t monetary phenomena have no i n f l u e n c e on 
r e a l v a r i a b l e s . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t since Hahn 
and Matthews surveyed growth models, a considerable 
l i t e r a t u r e has developed on the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between money 
7 
and growth. However, the analysis of the process of 
economic development has, u n t i l r e c e n t l y , adopted the 
non-monetary view of growth, such t h a t considerable stress 
has been l a i d on the u t i l i z a t i o n of r e a l resources. Such 
a stress i s not s u r p r i s i n g . A wide range of development 
textbooks begin by discussing measurements of develop-
ments. Despite numerous caveats and enumeration of 
drawbacks, n a t i o n a l income data tends t o be put forward 
as a measure of economic development. National income 
data measures the money value of f i n a l output. By i t s 
very nature i t f a i l s t o measure the value (here defined i n 
s t r i c t l y economic output terms) of f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y . 
A f i n a n c i a l system which allows f i n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s 
t o occur w i l l only show up n a t i o n a l income accounts i n 
terms of the t o t a l employment and hence t o t a l expenditure 
generated i n t h a t sector. Thus the more i n t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t s 
of f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y are not measured. As Porter has 
commented, 
I n p a r t i c u l a r surveys by A.H. Meltzer, op. c i t . . and 
J.L. S t e i n , "Monetary Growth Theory i n Perspective", American 
Economic Review. Vol. LX, No. 1, March 1970, pp.85-106, 
p o i n t t o s i z e o f the l i t e r a t u r e i n t h i s f i e l d . 
5. 
" . . . ( T h e ) concern of underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s f o r 
the s i z e o f t h e i r banking system i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
comprehend. Banks make almost no d i r e c t a d d i t i o n t o 
n a t i o n a l output; and the product of banks, the a c t u a l 
and imputed deposit and checking services, are s u r e l y 
of low p r i o r i t y as consumer goods i n nations impoverished 
of food and c l o t h i n g . Of course, the concern o f the 
developing economies f o r the growth of t h e i r banking 
system i s not premised on any such narrow conception 
of the c o n t r i b u t i o n of banks. What i s recognized as 
r e l e v e n t i s the i n d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the growth 
of r e a l v a r i a b l e s which a growth i n monetary v a r i a b l e s 
can make. Exactly what the connection i s between 
these two sets of v a r i a b l e s i s not always so c l e a r l y 
recognized . . . 
I t i s hoped t h a t the arguments presented i n the next t h r e e 
chapters w i l l go some way t o making these connections more 
recognizable. However, i f n a t i o n a l income data becomes the 
basic way o f measuring economic development, then i t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t so much emphasis has been placed on 
increasing f a c t o r inputs as a means of a c c e l e r a t i n g economic 
development. As Laumas and Mohabbat have commented, 
" . . . The process of economic development, i t i s 
w i d e l y believed, i s e s s e n t i a l l y a r e a l phenomenon. 
The increase i n r e a l resources and t h e i r e f f e c t i v e 
u t i l i z a t i o n determines the r a t e of economic progress. 
This view does not seem t o adequately stres s the 
importance of money i n economic development. 
Experience does not warrent such an emphasis on the 
r e l a t i v e r o l e s of r e a l and monetary f a c t o r s . . . 1 , 9 
This same theme was developed more fo r c i b l y e a r l i e r by 
Gurley and Shaw when they s t a t e d , 
8. R.C. Porter, "The Promotion of the 'Banking Habit 1 and 
Economic Development", Journal o f Development Studies, 
Vol. 2, No. 4, J u l y 1966, p.346. 
9. P.S. Laumas and K.A. Mohabbat, op. c i t . , p.619. 
6. 
" . . . Economic development i s commonly discussed 
inVterms of wealth, the labour f o r c e output and 
income. These r e a l o r "goods" aspects of develop-
mentxhave been the centre o f a t t e n t i o n i n economic 
l i t e r a t u r e t o the comparative neglect o f f i n a n c i a l 
aspects. Yet development i s associated w i t h debt 
issue a t some points i n the economic system and 
corresponding accretions of f i n a n c i a l assets 
elsewhere. I t i s accompanied too by the 1 i n s t i t u - ; 
t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f saving and investment' t h a t 
d i v e r s i f i e s channels f o r the flow of loanable funds 
and m u l t i p l i e s v a r i e t i e s o f f i n a n c i a l claims and i n 
other terms of t r a d i n g i n loanable funds. Develop-
ment involves finance as w e l l as goods."1° 
The analysis so f a r seems t o suggest t h r e e l i n e s o f 
approach. F i r s t l y , a discussion of the r o l e of the money 
commodity i n the development process i s necessary. Secondly, 
a discussion o f the ways i n which the generation o f f i n a n c i a l 
instruments a f f e c t s the savings investment process and 
u l t i m a t e l y the r e a l r a t e of growth of output, and, t h i r d l y , 
a discussion of t h e ways i n which s p e c i f i c f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s may i n f l u e n c e economic development. These 
three aspects are now considered i n more d e t a i l s and a 
number of r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f the basic analysis are presented 
i n chapter Two and chapter Three. 
For t h e purposes of t h i s study a f i n a n c i a l system i s 
defined as c o n t a i n i n g a l l those i n s t i t u t i o n s which deal, 
i n one way or another, w i t h f i n a n c i a l instruments, i . e . 
10. J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, " F i n a n c i a l Aspects of Economic 
Development", American Economic Review, Vol. ZLV, No. 4, 
September 1955, p. 515. 
c l a i m s held by i n d i v i d u a l s or groups i n the economy a g a i n s t 
other i n d i v i d u a l s or groups. Such cla i m s may be a g a i n s t , 
f o r example, governments ( f i a t money) , p r i v a t e companies, 
(shares) or i n d i v i d u a l s ( l o a n s ) . Thus a f i n a n c i a l system 
co n t a i n s a wide range of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s a l l 
involved i n the b a s i c f u n c t i o n of i n t e r p o s i n g themselves 
between u l t i m a t e savers and u l t i m a t e i n v e s t o r s . 
Money and Development 
Shaw i n introducing the concept of f i n a n c i a l deepening 
as an element i n a c c e l e r a t i n g the growth of r e a l output 
comments t h a t , 
" . . . Some development theory seems to be designed 
f o r a b a r t e r world . . .H 
He goes on to argue t h a t the r o l e of fina n c e i s often, a t 
best, seen i n a p a s s i v e l i g h t and a t worst i s ignored 
a l t o g e t h e r . Our d i s c u s s i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
money and development begins by looking b r i e f l y a t the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a b a r t e r economy and goes on t o explore 
the b e n e f i t s and problems t h a t money bestows on exchange 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s as an economy moves out of a b a r t e r s i t u a t i o n . 
E.S. Shaw, F i n a n c i a l Deepening i n Economic Development,-
(London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press 1973) p.4. 
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I n a b a r t e r economy trade takes p l a c e between 
commodities i n r e a l terms. I n other words commodities 
are valued i n terms of each other. I t was a simple b a r t e r 
system l i k e t h i s t h a t P a t i n k i n analysed to d i s c o v e r the 
e f f e c t s t h a t the i n t r o d u c t i o n of money would have on such 
a system. 
I n a pure tatonnement b a r t e r system, exchange takes 
place when a l l excess demands f o r goods and a l l excess 
s u p p l i e s of goods can be simultaneously s a t i s f i e d . An 
exchange economy of t h i s s o r t can use any of the goods 
bar t e r e d as a medium of exchange. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , no ione 
commodity needs to be chosen as a medium of exchange. I t 
i s always p o s s i b l e to conceive of one-to-one t r a d i n g of 
one commodity a g a i n s t another. However, t h i s r e q u i r e s 
t h a t separate t r a d i n g conventions must e x i s t f o r each t r a d e . 
I f d i r e c t t r a d i n g of one commodity fo r another i s allowed, 
then, f o r n commodities, %n (n - 1) t r a d i n g arrangements w i l l 
13 
be necessary. I f a s i n g l e commodity i s used as a medium 
of exchange the number of t r a d i n g arrangements i s reduced 
to n - 1. I f we take an example where n = 100 then the 
t r a d i n g arrangements i n the d i r e c t trade s i t u a t i o n amount 
12. D. Pa t i n k i n , Money. I n t e r e s t and P r i c e s . 2nd ed. (Harper 
and Row, 1965). 
13. T h i s i s the approach adopted by R. Clower i n h i s introduc 
t i o n to Monetary Theory (Penguin Modern Economic Readings 
1969) p.11. The formula i s derived from the sum of the 
f i r s t n - 1 i n t e g e r s f o r n commodities; t h a t i s assuming 
the nth commodity does not trade w i t h i t s e l f . 
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to 4,9 50, whereas i f one commodity i s used as a medium of 
exchange the number of t r a d i n g arrangements i s reduced to 
99. Therefore the use of one commodity as a means of 
exchange i n b a r t e r exchange can be r a t i o n a l i z e d purely i n 
terms of the reduction of t r a d i n g c o s t s per trade 
P a t i n k i n has argued t h a t by introducing f i a t money as 
the nth good i n the s e t of tradeable goods the b a r t e r 
economy can be defined as a monetary economy. P a t i n k i n 
proceeds i n the following manner. Each i n d i v i d u a l i s 
assumed to be maximising a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n of the following 
form: 
Subject to the budget c o n s t r a i n t 
n 
P. (d. . - s. .) + Kj - H j = 0, (2) 1=1 i ID ID 
Where s^.. and d^ _. represent i n i t i a l and d e s i r e d q u a n t i t i e s 
of goods, w i t h M^j and Mj representing i n i t i a l and d e s i r e d 
q u a n t i t i e s of commodity money. At an e q u i l i b r i u m vector 
of p r i c e s , P, a l l excess demands and s u p p l i e s a r e i d e n t i -
c a l l y equal to zero. I n t h i s world i n d i v i d u a l consumers 
do not c o n t r a c t to hold s u r p l u s e s or d e f i c i t s f o r the 
14 
f u t u r e . Clower has argued t h a t the c h o i c e s presented 
i n the budget c o n s t r a i n t (2) do not c o n s t i t u t e the c o r r e c t 
c h o i c e mechanisms f o r a monetary economy. I f a l l excess 
14. The a n a l y s i s presented here follows t h a t presented by R. Clower 
"A Reconsideration of the Micro-foundations of Monetary Theory" 
Western Economic J o u r n a l Vol. 6, No. 1, Dec. 1967, pp.439-369. 
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demands and s u p p l i e s a r e i d e n t i c a l l y equal a t an equi-
l i b r i u m vector of p r i c e s then n o t i o n a l and e f f e c t i v e excess 
demands must a l s o be e q u a l . ^ T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t any good 
off e r e d f o r s a l e i s a t the same time a source of e f f e c t i v e 
purchasing power over another good. However, money 
interposes between goods i n the exchange process i n a 
monetary economy such that a n o t i o n a l demand for a 
commodity can only become e f f e c t i v e through the a b i l i t y to 
pay i n terms of money. Thus the a c q u i s i t i o n of money 
becomes a precondition f o r commodity exchange. This p r i o r 
a c q u i s i t i o n i s not an e x p l i c i t part of the budget c o n s t r a i n t 
provided by P a t i n k i n . For, indeed, i f the nth commodity, 
money, i s d e s i r e d by only one i n d i v i d u a l then the medium 
of exchange flows to one i n d i v i d u a l ; but trade i s s t i l l 
p o s s i b l e i n the n - 1 commodities. Presumably some other 
commodity can now be chosen as the money commodity and 
trade w i l l take p l a c e . Assuming t h a t the money commodity 
i s again only demanded by one i n d i v i d u a l then i n the l i m i t 
the economy i s reduced to two commodities, which i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a b a r t e r economy not a monetary economy. 
This i s , of course, an argument by way of a reductio ad 
absurdum. I t assumes t h a t each t r a n s a c t o r consumes some 
of a l l the goods i n order to r u l e out corner s o l u t i o n s . 
I t i s arguable t h a t e m p i r i c a l l y t h i s s o l u t i o n would be 
u n l i k e l y . However, as the questioning i n t h i s type of 
A.G. Hines, On the R e a p p r a i s a l of Kevnesian Economics, 
(Martin Robertson 1971) p.16. 
model i s l a r g e l y a p r i o r i , the procedure adopted i s a 
v a l i d way of -dealing w i t h the matter. 
The a n a l y s i s presented by Clower im p l i e s two things 
which are r e l e v a n t to the more s p e c i f i c a n a l y s i s of t h i s 
t h e s i s . F i r s t l y , the int r o d u c t i o n of money i n t o an economy 
has the e f f e c t of reducing both t r a n s a c t i o n and w a i t i n g 
c o s t s of exchange and, t h e r e f o r e t h e r e i s a general gain 
to s o c i e t y through the process of monetization and 
secondly, as money interposes i t s e l f between the demand 
fo r goods and the supply of goods, n o t i o n a l and e f f e c t i v e 
excess demands may not n e c e s s a r i l y be equal which i n i t s 
turn may lead to the u n d e r - u t i l i z a t i o n of r e a l resources. 
Here i t i s being suggested t h a t the r e a l growth r a t e of 
output may be influ e n c e d by the ways i n which demands a r e 
made known i n the economy. T h i s point i s merely e s t a b l i s h e d 
here; but i s covered i n more d e t a i l when d i s c u s s i n g the 
impact of money on the savings/investment process. 
We can r e v e r t back to the simple c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
the exchange economy to see how d e f i c i t s and surplu s e s 
may a r i s e w i t h i n the t r a d i n g period. I n d i v i d u a l s hold 
money as cash balances i n order to consume commodities a t 
a p a r t i c u l a r point i n the futur e . The tatonnement process 
ensures t h a t a l l t r a d i n g c o n t r a c t s a r e e q u i l i b r i u m ones 
and i t a l s o determines a unique d i s t r i b u t i o n between r e a l 
balances and commodities f o r each i n d i v i d u a l f o r t h a t 
week. Although the c o n t r a c t i n g process a t the beginning 
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of the week determines the t o t a l l e v e l of consumption w i t h i n 
the week, i t does not determine at what points during the 
week a l l c o n t r a c t s a r e a c t u a l l y s e t t l e d . The f a c t t h a t 
p h y s i c a l buying and s e l l i n g at an e q u i l i b r i u m s e t of 
r e l a t i v e p r i c e s may be d i s t r i b u t e d randomly over the 
tr a d i n g period ( i n t h i s c a s e one week) provides the 
r a t i o n a l e f o r the holding of r e a l cash balances. I t a l s o 
implies t h a t temporary d e f i c i t s and su r p l u s e s may occur 
during the t r a d i n g period. I n t h i s c a s e the d e f i c i t s and 
sur p l u s e s a r e unplanned i n t h a t they occur as a r e s u l t of 
the ways i n which t r a d e takes p l a c e during the week and 
do not occur as part of the plans of the t r a n s a c t o r a t 
the beginning of the week. I f i t i s assumed t h a t one of 
the prime purposes of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i s to 
accumulate deposits from su r p l u s groups and to d i s t r i b u t e 
loans to d e f i c i t groups, then i t i s p o s s i b l e to conceive 
of a f i n a n c i a l system developing i n t h i s simple exchange 
economy. 
The strength (or weakness) of t h i s argument r e s t s 
very much on how a d e f i c i t or surplus i s defined. D e f i c i t s 
and s u r p l u s e s which occur w i t h i n the t r a d i n g week can be 
described as being temporary i n nature i n t h a t they a r e 
b a s i c a l l y unplanned. Although they may be unplanned they 
c o n s t i t u t e a c o n s i d e r a b l e problem f o r the i n d i v i d u a l 
t r a d e r . One of the p r i n c i p l e problems of exchange i n a 
b a r t e r economy i s t h a t t h e r e needs to be simultaneous 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of wants. I t i s no use going to market w i t h 
bananas to exchange f o r apples, i f the person holding 
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apples wants pears. I n t h i s case a t l e a s t t h ree t r a d e r s 
ar e required to e f f e c t the exchange. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
a money commodity i s supposed to e r a d i c a t e these problems 
of m u l t i l a t e r a l trade; but i n f a c t a d i f f e r e n t problem 
a r i s e s i n the use of a money commodity. Unless a l l 
buying and s e l l i n g p atterns can be p e r f e c t l y synchronized 
i n the t r a d i n g week an i n d i v i d u a l , a t any one moment i n 
the week, may have an excess demand for cash balances. 
T h i s i s because i n t h i s model the execution of c o n t r a c t s 
i s a random v a r i a b l e and i n d i v i d u a l s presumably a t t a c h 
d i s u t i l i t y to the i n a b i l i t y to pay on demand.^ The excess 
demand f o r cash balances w i l l be equal to the excess 
supply of goods which have been s o l d under c o n t r a c t ; but 
not yet c o l l e c t e d . Therefore e q u i l i b r i u m a t the end of 
the t r a d i n g period does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply e q u i l i b r i u m 
throughout the period. I f d e f i c i t s and s u r p l u s e s of t h i s 
nature occur w i t h i n the t r a d i n g period then i t i s p o s s i b l e 
f o r a f i n a n c i a l system to develop. I n other words, 
i n d i v i d u a l t r a d e r s w i t h an excess supply of r e a l balances 
and t r a d e r s w i t h an excess demand f o r r e a l balances may 
be simultaneously s a t i s f i e d by a simple borrowing/lending 
system. 
Within the c o n f i n e s of the weekly t r a d i n g period the 
lending/borrowing process w i l l presumably be r e s t r i c t e d to 
Here consumers d e r i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n ( u t i l i t y ) from not only 
spending money; but a l s o holding i t . 
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c a l l loans. However, t h i s process i n i t s e l f e s t a b l i s h e s 
a r a t i o n a l e f o r a f i n a n c i a l intermediation process to 
develop. I t doesn't a t the moment, imply anything about 
the f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
Such a system, to accommodate random payments w i t h i n 
the period of the week, i s not e x p l i c i t l y covered by 
Pa t i n k i n . P a t i n k i n defines an e q u i l i b r i u m l e v e l of r e a l 
cash balances as one which i s "adequate" to cover t o t a l 
expenditures w i t h i n the t r a d i n g week. But t h i s adequacy 
i s defined i n terms of t o t a l expenditure and not i n terms 
of the incidence of payments and r e c e i p t s w i t h i n the 
tr a d i n g week. I n f a c t P a t i n k i n r e s e r v e s the e x p l i c i t 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of d e f i c i t s and su r p l u s e s to a s i t u a t i o n 
where the i n d i v i d u a l ' s economic horizon i s extended from 
a week to a month. I n t h i s c a s e expenditure plans a r e 
made f o r a four week period, assuming t h a t income i s 
replenished a t the beginning of each week. I t i s p o s s i b l e 
fo r the i n d i v i d u a l to plan over the whole period and, what 
i s more important, a d j u s t h i s consumption patterns, as 
information i s made a v a i l a b l e a t the beginning of each week. 
Though the i n d i v i d u a l ' s income i s f i x e d i n terms of h i s 
i n i t i a l endowments, he can change h i s consumption patte r n s 
on a week to week b a s i s by e i t h e r running down h i s money 
balances or purchasing a new commodity i n the system - a 
bond. The process of d i s s a v i n g by an i n d i v i d u a l means t h a t 
expanditure i s i n excess of income, and t h e r e f o r e the 
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i n d i v i d u a l w i l l borrow. T h i s borrowing i s done by i s s u i n g 
a bond. The bond represents a promise to pay a f i x e d sum 
of money a t some future date, plus an i n t e r e s t charge. 
I f we assume that there i s no r i s k of d e f a u l t , then the 
i n t e r e s t r a t e represents the reward to the buyer of the 
bond of foregone consumption. I t i s important to n o t i c e 
i n t h i s a n a l y s i s that the emergence of a bond market i s 
dependent upon the simultaneous emergence of c r e d i t o r s 
and debtors i n the market. For t h i s to occur we have to 
assume t h a t expectations about the future a r e not held 
e q u a l l y by a l l consumers or e l s e we have to s p e c i f y t h a t 
consumers have d i f f e r e n t t a s t e s f o r f u t u r e and present 
consumption. I f a l l consumers were to behave i n the same 
way then the two s i d e s of the bond market would not emerge. 
So f a r our a n a l y s i s has allowed us to c o n s i d e r two 
s i t u a t i o n s . One where unplanned d e f i c i t s and s u r p l u s e s 
may occur w i t h i n the t r a d i n g week, and one where planned 
d e f i c i t s and s u r p l u s e s may occur when the economic horizon 
i s extended over a number of weeks. As f a r as P a t i n k i n ' s 
a n a l y s i s i s concerned these two s i t u a t i o n s a r e c l e a r l y 
i d e n t i f i a b l e s e p a r a t e l y ; but as f a r as the a n a l y s i s of 
f i n a n c i a l intermediation i s concerned they a r e equivalent 
s i t u a t i o n s . A f i n a n c i a l system i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h 
providing f i n a n c i a l instruments which are capable of 
17. More s p e c i f i c a l l y the i n t e r n a l r a t e of discount f o r eadh 
consumer may be d i f f e r e n t . Time d i f f e r e n c e s can be 
r a t i o n a l i s e d purely i n terms of the " l i f e s t y l e " , as pro-
posed by M. Friedman, "The Optimum Quantity of Money", i n 
The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other E s s a y s . (London: 
Macmillan 1969) p.26. 
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simultaneously s a t i s f y i n g debtors and c r e d i t o r s and t h i s 
p r o v i s i o n can be made i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether the d e f i c i t s 
and s u r p l u s e s a r e unplanned or planned. The only d i s -
t i n c t i o n to be made r e l a t e s to the amount of information 
which may be a v a i l a b l e to f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . I f 
unplanned d e f i c i t s and s u r p l u s e s occur, i t i s p o s s i b l e 
t h a t i n s u f f i c i e n t information may be generated i n the 
market making f i n a n c i a l intermediation d i f f i c u l t . When 
d e f i c i t s and s u r p l u s e s a r e planned then we can assume t h a t 
consumers make t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s known, thus a l l o w i n g a 
, f i n a n c i a l system to emerge. C l e a r l y the function of 
, f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n t h i s c a s e i s to a c t as a 
"bridge" between d e f i c i t and surplus u n i t s . T h i s defines 
the function of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ; but not n e c e s s a r i l y 
the r a t i o n a l e . I t i s c l e a r t h a t a l l i n d i v i d u a l s who 
r e c e i v e income could a c t as t h e i r own i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and 
a l l consumers could seek funds i n d i v i d u a l l y . The r a t i o n a l e 
i s r e a l l y defined i n terms of the opportunity c o s t s of 
buying and s e l l i n g s e c u r i t i e s by the i n d i v i d u a l . I n 
other words, f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s e s t a b l i s h a compara-
t i v e advantage over other u n i t s i n the economy i n the 
p r o v i s i o n of f i n a n c i a l instruments. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s an 
important one f o r the theory of f i n a n c i a l intermediation, 
as i t i m p l i e s t h a t f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s , over time, 
are a b l e to develop a body of information which makes them 
s u p e r i o r to i n d i v i d u a l s i n f i n a n c i a l exchanges. The point 




t h e r e i s a c o s t involved i n a c q u i r i n g information about 
market co n d i t i o n s and r e l a t i v e p r i c e s . T h i s c o s t can be 
minimized i f a commodity i s a v a i l a b l e w i t h p a r t i c u l a r 
t e c h n i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , such as n o n - p e r i s h a b i l i t y , and 
low marginal c o s t s of a c q u i r i n g information, i . e . w ith a 
u n i t of account information f o r a number of commodities i s 
standardized. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of money i s 
very important i n monetary economics and l e d Brunner 
and Meltzer to conclude; 
" . . . Money i s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r the s p e c i a l i s e d 
market s k i l l s t h a t a r e part of a t r a n s a c t o r stock of 
knowledge or 'human w e a l t h 1 . Resources a l l o c a t e d to 
search and the maintaining of market information can 
be r e a l l o c a t e d once money i s used as medium of 
exchange. Trade and the market system expand, and 
the economy becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y monetized. More and 
b e t t e r q u a l i t y information becomes a v a i l a b l e w i t h 
the expansion of the market and the op p o r t u n i t i e s f o r 
d i v i s i o n of labour that lead to the development of-
p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a n s a c t o r s such as brokers and s p e c i a l -
i s t s . . . 18 
Thus monetization i t s e l f can generate b e n e f i t s i n th a t i t 
r e a l l o c a t e s resources to more productive uses and, by 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a common u n i t of account, f a c i l i t a t e s t r a d e . 
We now need to see how f u r t h e r b e n e f i t s may be derived 
from monetization through the development of a f i n a n c i a l 
intermediary system. 
K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer, "The Uses of Money: Money i n 
the Theory of Exchange Economy", American Economic 
Review, Vol. LXI, No. 5, December 1971, p.804. 
18. 
F i n a n c i a l Intermediation 
The payment f o r goods inv o l v e s the i n d i v i d u a l t r a n s -
a c t o r i n holding cash balances. Presumably i n d i v i d u a l s 
w i l l wish to minimize t h e i r cash holdings a t any one time 
s u b j e c t to the c o n s t r a i n t t h a t a l l d e s i r e d t r a n s a c t i o n s 
can take p l a c e . Given t h i s type of s i t u a t i o n a simple 
borrowing/lending system may develop as has been i n d i c a t e d 
a l r e a d y . T h i s simple point can now be extended, along 
19 
the l i n e s i n d i c a t e d by Gurley and Shaw. 
F i r s t l y we need to define the various types of 
spending u n i t s which may e x i s t i n the economy. Those u n i t s 
w i t h balanced budgets w i l l not generate a demand f o r or 
supply of f i n a n c i a l instruments, s i n c e t h e i r t o t a l expendi-
t u r e equals t h e i r t o t a l r e c e i p t s over time. However 
d e f i c i t budget u n i t s and sur p l u s budget u n i t s w i l l generate 
a demand f o r finance, s i n c e i n the f i r s t c a s e expenditure 
i s i n excess of r e c e i p t s c r e a t i n g a demand f o r finance and 
i n the second case r e c e i p t s a r e i n excess of expenditure 
c r e a t i n g a supply of f i n a n c e . T h i s simple breakdown i n t o 
types of spending u n i t s does not provide an immediate 
need f o r f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . Indeed d e f i c i t u n i t s 
may finance t h e i r excess expenditure today from excess 
r e c e i p t s yesterday and v i c e v e r s a f o r s u r p l u s u n i t s . I n 
J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, " F i n a n c i a l Aspects of Economic 
Development", OP. c i t . 
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t h i s case f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t y i s e x t e r n a l to the spending 
u n i t i n t h a t f i n a n c i a l resources necessary to maintain an 
excess of expenditure over r e c e i p t s a r e demanded from 
outside of the spending u n i t . However t h i s demand f o r 
finance may be s a t i s f i e d through d i r e c t lending from the 
surplus u n i t s ( d i r e c t e x t e r n a l finance) or i n d i r e c t l y 
( i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l finance) through f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . 
D i r e c t e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e r e l i e s on information about surplus 
budget u n i t s being immediately a v a i l a b l e to d e f i c i t budget 
u n i t s . I n a d d i t i o n there w i l l be search and t r a n s f e r 
c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d i r e c t e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e . We have 
alre a d y seen t h a t the e x i s t e n c e of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s 
can be r a t i o n a l i s e d by the comparative advantage they 
e s t a b l i s h over other economic u n i t s i n the p r o v i s i o n of 
f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s . Thus as an economy becomes more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d i t would be expected t h a t i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l 
finance would tend to predominate over d i r e c t e x t e r n a l 
finance. T h i s i s the r e s u l t found by Gurley and Shaw f o r 
the United Stated s i n c e 1900. They found from 1900-1930 
the proportion of i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e to t o t a l 
e x t e r n a l finance increased, although t h e r e were c y c l i c a l 
f l u c t u a t i o n s during the period. Thus the Gurley and Shaw 
a n a l y s i s r a t i o n a l i s e s the prime a c t i v i t i e s of f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s as being the gathering of loanable funds 
from surplus u n i t s i n exchange f o r t h e i r own i n d i r e c t 
debt. T h i s a n a l y s i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , has nothing to say 
about balanced budget u n i t s . T h i s , i n f a c t , seems to be 
a weakness i n the a n a l y s i s . From what has been s a i d 
already i n t h i s chapter the s i g n i f i c a n c e of balanced budget 
u n i t s depends very much on how one defines the time period 
over which the budget i s balanced. I f the r e l e v a n t time 
period i s one month or one year, then a balanced budget 
at the end of t h i s time period does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply 
a balanced budget throughout the period. Indeed a n a l y s i s 
of the t r a n s a c t i o n s demand for money would suggest t h a t , 
i n the c a s e of a spending u n i t r e c e i v i n g a f i x e d income 
a t the beginning of each month and d i s b u r s i n g i t a l l 
during the month, the r o l e of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s 
must not be ignored. As Baumol has pointed out, i f an 
i n d i v i d u a l t r a n s a c t o r i s able to a s s e s s the opportunity 
c o s t s of holding cash, as a g a i n s t holding i n t e r e s t - e a r n i n g 
a s s e t s , and the p o t e n t i a l "brokerage" fees ( i . e . the c o s t s 
of s h i f t i n g from i n t e r e s t - e a r n i n g a s s e t s to c a s h ) , then i t 
i s p o s s i b l e f o r the t r a n s a c t o r to minimize h i s cash holdings 
a t any one point during the t r a n s a c t i o n s p e r i o d . 2 0 Baumol's 
a n a l y s i s suggests t h a t the average t r a n s a c t i o n s cash 
balance f o r the i n d i v i d u a l should be one h a l f of the s i z e 
of the optimum holding per time period. T h i s a n a l y s i s 
suggests t h a t spending u n i t s t h a t have inter-temporal 
W.J. Baumol, "The T r a n s a c t i o n s Demand for Cash: An Inventory 
T h e o r e t i c Approach", Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of Economics. V o l . 66, 
November 1952, pp. 545-556. 
balanced budgets may have excess cash holdings during any 
one period. These excess cash holdings have no u t i l i t y 
attached to them, i n t h a t they a r e i n excess of any 
demands put upon them. I n t h i s case t h e r e may be c r e a t e d 
a temporary supply of funds which w i l l a c t as an i n c r e a s e 
i n loanable funds i n the f i n a n c i a l system as a whole. 
Thus balanced budget u n i t s may i n f l u e n c e the f i n a n c i a l 
system. T h i s i s a point not considered by Gurley and 
Shaw. 
An i n t e r e s t i n g point t h a t can be developed out of 
t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t as the procedures f o r wage or s a l a r i e s 
payments become more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d t h e r e w i l l be a 
tendency f o r f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s to become a r e p o s i -
t o r y f o r short term funds. T h i s expansion i n t o t a l 
deposits, although short-run i n i t i a l l y , can become a 
permanent i n c r e a s e i n deposits i f wage and s a l a r y earners 
by and l a r g e accept the new convention. T h i s means t h a t 
spending u n i t s t h a t might be c l a s s e d as balanced budget 
u n i t s i n f a c t may a c t i v e l y i n f l u e n c e the s i z e of the 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r . 
So f a r we have seen t h a t the process of exchange i n 
a monetary economy imp l i e s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a t some time 
should have recourse to a simple borrowing/lending 
mechanism. I n a d d i t i o n i t has been demonstrated t h a t the 
lending/borrowing mechanism w i l l be provided by f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i f they can e s t a b l i s h a comparative advantage 
over i n d i v i d u a l s . Once t h i s comparative advantage has 
been e s t a b l i s h e d Gurley and Shaw argue t h a t t o t a l debt i n 
r e l a t i o n to income and wealth w i l l r i s e f a s t e r than under 
a regime of d i r e c t or i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e . They go on to 
conclude t h a t , 
" . . . I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of saving and i n v e s t -
ment quickens the growth r a t e of debt r e l a t i v e to 
the growth r a t e of income and wealth . . ."21 
The c o n c l u s i o n from t h i s statement must be t h a t a l a c k of 
i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l finance w i l l e f f e c t the growth r a t e of 
output, s i n c e a system r e l y i n g s o l e l y on d i r e c t i n t e r n a l 
or e x t e r n a l finance i s faced w i t h a number of c o n s t r a i n t s , 
such as the generation of i n s u f f i c i e n t funds f o r investment 
p r o j e c t s ( i n the i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e s i t u a t i o n ) and the 
accumulation of u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d i r e c t debt by s u r p l u s 
budget u n i t s ( i n the d i r e c t e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e s i t u a t i o n ) 
i f d e f i c i t budget u n i t s c o n t i n u a l l y a c q u i r e i n c r e a s i n g 
q u a n t i t i e s of loanable funds. Of course the steady 
accumulation of u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d debt may only occur a t 
an i n c r e a s i n g c o s t to borrowers which may i n h i b i t i n v e s t -
ment, thus a negative feed-back e f f e c t on output i s 
22 
c r e a t e d . Thus, bearing i n mind the a t t i t u d e s of s u r p l u s 
J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, op. c i t . , p.519. 
R.J. Morrison, " F i n a n c i a l I n t e r m e d i a r i e s and Economic 
Development", Scandanavian Economic H i s t o r y Review, 1967, 
pp.56-70. 
budget u n i t s and assuming that investment i s responsive 
to some degree to changes i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s , the r o l e of 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s becomes c l e a r . I t i s , 
" . . . t h a t they enable surplus u n i t s to d i v e r s i f y 
t h e i r p o r t f o l i o s by o f f e r i n g t h e i r own (the f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ) i n d i r e c t debt i n p l a c e of the d i r e c t 
debt which they (the surplus u n i t s ) had formerly been 
accumulating. Thus by t a k i n g the d i r e c t debt of 
d e f i c i t budget u n i t s , f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s , 
undertaking i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l finance, exert a down-
ward pressure on i n t e r e s t r a t e s and enhance the 
borrowing and lending of loanable funds". 2-* 
Th i s downward pressure on i n t e r e s t r a t e s d e r i v e s from 
the c o s t savings which accrue to a f i n a n c i a l intermediary 
as t o t a l debt i n c r e a s e s . The margins between the r a t e s of 
i n t e r e s t on deposits with the intermediary and i t s own 
loans w i l l represent two things (a) the d i r e c t c o s t of 
accumulating funds and c o n t r a c t i n g loans; here there i s a 
notion of search c o s t s and a r i s k c o s t of d e f a u l t by the 
borrower, and (b) a n o t i o n a l p r o f i t margin f o r the 
intermediary. I f we assume p e r f e c t c a p i t a l markets, as 
Gurley and Shaw do, then (b) simply becomes long-run 
normal p r o f i t s . From t h i s base we can argue that as the 
t o t a l flow of funds to the intermediary i n c r e a s e s the 
average c o s t per u n i t of currency deposited w i l l d e c l i n e , 
i . e . f i x e d c o s t s become l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t and there a r e 
economies of s c a l e i n v a r i a b l e c o s t s . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t 
the margin between lending and borrowing r a t e s can narrow 
R.J. Morrison, OP. c i t . , pp.57-58. 
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and, t h e r e f o r e , the process of intermediation proceeds 
at a f a s t e r r a t e than a system of d i r e c t or i n t e r n a l 
finance simply because there a r e c o s t savings a v a i l a b l e 
to the intermediary which a r e not a v a i l a b l e i n the d i r e c t 
or i n t e r n a l finance s i t u a t i o n as Gurley and Shaw de s c r i b e 
them. 
We can now r e l a t e t h i s d i s c u s s i o n about f i n a n c i a l 
intermediation to the growth of r e a l output. The n a t u r a l 
linkage between the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r and the r e a l s e c t o r 
i s through the saving/investment process. T h i s process 
has two as p e c t s . F i r s t l y , savings represents non-
consumption today and investment represents i n c r e a s e d con-
sumption tomorrow. So changes i n savings and investment 
represent a r e - s t r u c t u r i n g of the community's demand f o r 
r e a l resources over time. Not only do changes i n savings 
and investment a f f e c t the r e a l s e c t o r , the changing 
demands w i l l have f i n a n c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i n a monetary 
economy. An i n d i v i d u a l who decides to save a c e r t a i n 
proportion of h i s c u r r e n t income w i l l do so mainly i n the 
form of a c q u i r i n g f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s or b u i l d i n g up h i s cash 
balances. I n the former t h i s a c t of saving w i l l a f f e c t 
the f i n a n c i a l system. An i n d i v i d u a l or corporate body 
tha t decides to i n v e s t w i l l c r e a t e a demand f o r loanable 
funds, again a f f e c t i n g the f i n a n c i a l system. T h i s i s a 
c r u c i a l though often overlooked point when co n s i d e r i n g 
the demand f o r investment. I n p r a c t i c e the demand f o r 
25. 
c a p i t a l goods represents a w i l l i n g n e s s on the part of the 
demander to exchange c a p i t a l goods f o r money. Therefore, 
i f the demand f o r c a p i t a l goods i s to be made e f f e c t i v e 
i t i n volves a p r i o r a c q u i s i t i o n of funds. Unless t h i s 
a c q u i s i t i o n i s i n t e r n a l or d i r e c t , then the f i n a n c i a l 
system i s influenced. Thus when loanable funds a r e 
acquired through i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l sources, then an 
increased demand for p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l has a d i r e c t counter-
part i n the market f o r loanable funds and hence i n f l u e n c e s 
the f i n a n c i a l system. T h i s describes what can be termed 
the minimum e f f e c t . A more s u b s t a n t i a l e f f e c t i s p o s s i b l e 
i f d i r e c t e x t e r n a l or i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e u n i t s use the 
f i n a n c i a l system. The importance of t h i s l a t t e r e f f e c t 
l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t i f business firms merely use the 
f i n a n c i a l system i n a short-term sense and they do not 
c o n t r a c t any s i g n i f i c a n t debt w i t h the f i n a n c i a l system, 
then there w i l l be a tendency f o r the f i n a n c i a l system to 
accumulate short-term l i a b i l i t i e s , which w i l l r e q u i r e a 
high l e v e l of l i q u i d a s s e t s as backing thus i n h i b i t i n g 
f i n a n c i a l growth i n long-term markets. T h i s means th a t a 
f i n a n c i a l system i n terms of i t s t o t a l a s s e t s or l i a b i l i t i e s 
may seem to be important i n terms of the r a t i o of i t s 
a s s e t s to G.N.P., but i s i n f a c t i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms 
of providing f i n a n c i a l instruments to d e f i c i t u n i t s . 
T h i s i s an important point which w i l l be developed f u l l y i n 
Part I I of t h i s t h e s i s when d i s c u s s i n g the case of Lebanon. 
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Broadly speaking the i n t e r j e c t i o n of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r -
mediaries i n the saving/investment process w i l l r e s u l t i n 
the f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s purchasing primary s e c u r i t i e s 
from i n v e s t o r s and i s s u i n g f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s to s a v e r s . 
The growth of the i s s u e of primary s e c u r i t i e s can thus 
be taken as one measure of the extent to which an economy 
has been influenced by f i n a n c i a l intermediation. Gurley 
and Shaw suggest t h a t primary s e c u r i t y i s s u e s as a 
percentage of G.N.P. t y p i c a l l y f a l l w i t h i n the range of 
1-2% f o r poor ( l e s s developed) c o u n t r i e s and 10-15% f o r 
24 
r i c h (developed) c o u n t r i e s . 
Looking at f i n a n c i a l intermediation s e c u l a r l y then 
broad trends suggest that as income and wealth grow so does 
25 
the r a t e of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t accumulation. What has not 
been e s t a b l i s h e d so f a r i s whether f i n a n c i a l a s s e t 
accumulation i s both a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n 
f o r r e a l output growth. The i m p l i c a t i o n of much of Gurley 
and Shaw's a n a l y s i s i s that the development of a f i n a n c i a l 
system i n v o l v i n g an i n c r e a s i n g volume of i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l 
finance w i l l a c c e l e r a t e the growth r a t e of output above 
the r a t e which would have p r e v a i l e d had a s i t u a t i o n of 
24. J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, " F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e and Economic 
Development", Economic Development and C u l t u r a l Change. 
Vol. 15, No. 3, A p r i l 1967, p.259. 
2 5. These s o r t s of trends are suggested by R.W. Goldsmith i n 
F i n a n c i a l . S t r u c t u r e and Development (New Haven and London: 
Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press 1909) and a r e d i s c u s s e d more f u l l y 
i n chapter 2. 
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only d i r e c t i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l finance p r e v a i l e d . 
However, as Morrison suggests, 
" . . . This model (Gurley and Shaw's) has two b a s i c 
but c r u c i a l premises. I t assumes a c e r t a i n l e v e l of 
development and i t assumes the e x i s t e n c e of p e r f e c t 
c a p i t a l markets. The importance of these assumptions, 
and e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r , i s that they are necessary 
to a s s u r e s i g n i f i c a n t adjustment to marginal changes 
in the r a t e of i n t e r e s t . . . Therefore the general 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the model to economies i n an early-
stage of development becomes somewhat dubious . . ."^ D 
The e x i s t e n c e of p e r f e c t c a p i t a l markets assures the 
appropriate adjustments w i l l take p l a c e to d i f f e r i n g volumes 
of i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t i e s . As Morrison points out, t h i s type 
of adjustment mechanism may not be f e a s i b l e i n rudimentary 
c a p i t a l markets c h a r a c t e r i z e d by imperfect information. 
One way to a d j u s t the Gurley and Shaw model to take 
account of Morrison's c r i t i c i s m s i s to hypothesise a dual 
economy s i t u a t i o n , as suggested by Bennett, w i t h a t r a d i -
t i o n a l s e c t o r which i s b a s i c a l l y s e l f - f i n a n c e d with a 
preponderence of i n t e r n a l finance and a modern 'progressive' 
s e c t o r where a s h i f t to i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l finance encourages 
27 
the growth of f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s . T h i s economic dualism 
approach to f i n a n c i a l intermediation i s appealing as i t 
allows the combination of the b a s i c p o s t u l a t e s of the 
26. R.J. Morrison, op. c i t . , p.58. 
27. R.L. Bennett, The F i n a n c i a l S ector and Economic Development 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1965) e s p e c i a l l y pp.22-25. 
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Gurley and Shaw model along with a r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l 
of the economic f a c t s of low income c o u n t r i e s ; and i t i s 
t h i s approach which i s developed i n chapters Two and Three and 
app l i e d i n Part I I of the t h e s i s . 
The arguments so f a r provide a r a t i o n a l e f o r the 
development of a f i n a n c i a l system and f o r the development 
of f i n a n c i a l instruments. Nothing has been s a i d so f a r 
about f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . I n f a c t we may f i n d i t very 
d i f f i c u l t or even impossible to s p e c i f y a given s e t of 
f i n a n c i a l instruments and a corresponding f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e . L et us consider t h i s problem i n a b i t more 
d e t a i l . 
The F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e 
Arguing on a p r i o r i grounds i t i s c l e a r t h a t f o r any 
given l e v e l of r e a l output we can conceive of an optimal 
f i n a n c i a l system (that i s optimal i n terms of s i z e and 
f u n c t i o n s ) . I t i s not c l e a r however, t h a t the optimum 
functions ( i n terms of c r e d i t s granted) w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y 
correspond w i t h a unique f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . I n other 
words a s p e c i f i c s e t of f i n a n c i a l f unctions may be c a r r i e d 
out by a number of d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Therefore, even i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to s p e c i f y c o r r e c t l y 
the optimal functions of a f i n a n c i a l system i n r e l a t i o n to 
any given l e v e l of r e a l output, i t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y 
p o s s i b l e to s p e c i f y , uniquely the types of i n s t i t u t i o n s 
which w i l l perform these functions. I n p r a c t i c e the prob-
lem may be even more complicated. I t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n general can provide a range 
of f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s based upon a s p e c i f i c holding of 
a s s e t s . I f the r a t e s of r e t u r n on p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t s a r e 
such as to make c e r t a i n a s s e t s p e r f e c t s u b s t i t u t e s f o r 
each other, then the p r o v i s i o n of f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s may 
be achieved through d i f f e r i n g p o r t f o l i o s . Although the 
s e r v i c e s o f f e r e d by the f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s through 
these p o r t f o l i o s may be i d e n t i c a l the a c t u a l combination of 
a s s e t s held may be d i f f e r e n t and may a f f e c t other markets 
i n various ways. T h i s shows that although an optimum may 
be defined f o r the f i n a n c i a l system, i n r e s p e c t of a 
given l e v e l of r e a l output, i n terms of i t s s t r u c t u r e and, 
s e p a r a t e l y , i n terms of i t s functions, i t may not n e c e s s a r i l y 
be p o s s i b l e to define them simultaneously. 
I f the foregoing arguments a r e accepted then our 
a n a l y s i s of any f i n a n c i a l system can be, a t best, only 
p a r t i a l . We can view the problem as one where a given 
t o t a l volume of f i n a n c i a l instruments i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a 
given r e a l growth r a t e , but i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with d i f f e r e n t 
f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s (because some f i n a n c i a l instruments 
may be p e r f e c t s u b s t i t u t e s f o r each other as f a r as the 
borrower i s concerned; but not as f a r as the lender i s 
concerned). Thus i d e n t i c a l a s s e t s may be held e x c l u s i v e l y 
by d i f f e r e n t i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . As Hines has pointed out, 
" . . . We might . . . f i n d t h a t there i s no one to one 
correspondence between the inter-connected s e t of r e a l 
v a r i a b l e s and the corresponding f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . . ."28 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we can view the problem from a given f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e and see what f i n a n c i a l instruments are generated 
and how these instruments are r e l a t e d to r e a l growth. T h i s 
second approach i s perhaps more pragmatic, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y 
more u s e f u l from an e m p i r i c a l point of view, s i n c e we can 
take the f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e we observe as given i n terms 
of providing f i n a n c i a l instruments to d e f i c i t u n i t s . T h i s 
i s an important point which w i l l develop a t a l a t e r stage 
w i t h s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o the Lebanon. 
The arguments presented so f a r can be summarized as 
follows. I n a monetary economy the process of r e a l growth 
n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s the growth of a f i n a n c i a l system. T h i s 
a s s e r t i o n i s based on the f a c t t h a t a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s i n 
organized markets i n a monetary economy are f a c i l i t a t e d 
through a medium of exchange. T h i s medium of exchange 
needs the e s s e n t i a l property of u n i v e r s a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y . 
Beyond t h i s the a c t u a l nature of the money commodity i s l e s s 
important. As Clower s t a t e s , 
" . . . The t e c h n i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of commodities 
chosen to serve as 'money' ar e of minor economic 
A.G. Hines, On The Re - a p p r a i s a l of Keynesian Economics, 
(London: Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd., 1971) p.55. 
importance; what matters i s the e x i s t e n c e of s o c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s condoned by e i t h e r custom or law t h a t 
enable i n d i v i d u a l s to trade e f f i c i e n t l y i f they 
follow c e r t a i n r u l e s - i n p a r t i c u l a r the r u l e t h a t one 
commodity traded i n every exchange should be s o c i a l l y 
sanctioned as an exchange i n t e r m e d i a r y . " 2 9 
Therefore the accumulation of cash balances i s a necessary 
p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r r e a l exchange. However, the processes of 
exchange are not n e c e s s a r i l y p e r f e c t l y synchronized and, 
the r e f o r e , a t any one moment i n time d e f i c i t and s u r p l u s 
groups may e x i s t i n the economy. 
These d e f i c i t and surplus groups may be able to 
accommodate each other, i n a f i n a n c i a l sense, to allow f o r 
a s i t u a t i o n where r e a l i s e d expenditure i s i n excess of 
r e a l i s e d income f o r d e f i c i t groups and r e a l i s e d income i s 
i n excess of r e a l i s e d expenditure f o r s u r p l u s groups. 
From t h i s we can develop a f u r t h e r argument t h a t t h i s 
process of f i n a n c i a l exchange w i l l be f a c i l i t a t e d through 
the development of a f i n a n c i a l intermediary system, s i n c e 
such a system w i l l , i n the long run, be able to e s t a b l i s h 
a comparative advantage over i n d i v i d u a l t r a d i n g u n i t s i n 
the p r o v i s i o n of f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s . Through the r o l e of 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s as i s s u e r s of i n d i r e c t debt, the 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r becomes an i n t e g r a l part of the s a v i n g / 
investment process and hence becomes r e l a t e d to the r e a l 
growth r a t e of output. However, how r e a l output i s 
R. Clower, Readings i n Monetary Theory, Penguin Modern 
Economics Readings (London: Penguin Books 1969) p. 13. 
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influenced w i l l be dependent on the range of f i n a n c i a l 
instruments generated by the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r and the 
s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the s e c t o r . I t i s to 
these two matters that chapter Two addresses i t s e l f . 
C H A P T E R T W O 
The Determinants of F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e and Development 
Chapter One demonstrated t h a t the process of economic 
development has both a r e a l aspect and a f i n a n c i a l (monetary) 
aspect. I t was a l s o suggested t h a t the i n s t i t c t i o n a l i s a -
i 
t i o n of f i n a n c i a l processes w i l l a c c e l e r a t e the growth r a t e 
of debt r e l a t i v e to the growth r a t e of income and wealth. 
The r e l a t i v e l y f a s t e r growth r a t e of debt i s dependent 
upon the emergence of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s capable of 
a c t i n g i n an intermediary c a p a c i t y between savers and 
i n v e s t o r s . T h i s chapter examines a number of separate 
determinants of f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e and the ways i n which 
f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s may i n f l u e n c e development. 
F i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e i s b a s i c a l l y determined by a 
combination of f i n a n c i a l instruments and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u -
t i o n s . 1 According t o Goldsmith the most important r e l a t i o n -
s h i p s to c o n s i d e r a r e the r a t i o of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s to t o t a l 
t a n g i b l e a s s e t s ; the d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s and 
R.W. Goldsmith, F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e and Development, S t u d i e s 
i n Comparative Economics No. 9, (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y 
Press 1969) p.26. 
l i a b i l i t i e s as between d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l instruments 
and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of these f i n a n c i a l instruments between 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . These stock r e l a t i o n s h i p s and 
t h e i r flow counterparts s e p a r a t e l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y w i l l 
g i v e measures of the f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e of the economy. 
Equally,, over time, measures of the r a t i o between i s s u e s 
of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s by f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and i s s u e s 
of a s s e t s by n o n - f i n a n c i a l u n i t s w i l l g i v e an i n d i c a t i o n 
2 
of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the f i n a n c i a l process. 
We need to examine these b a s i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n more 
d e t a i l i n order to a r r i v e a t some general q u a n t i t a t i v e 
r u l e s f o r a n a l y s i n g f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s . 
The r a t i o of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s to t o t a l t a n g i b l e a s s e t s 
T h is b a s i c r a t i o i s described by Goldsmith as the 
3 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s r a t i o ( F .I.R.) . He s t a t e s t h a t 
t h i s r a t i o i s , 
T h i s type of measure i s s i m i l a r to the one adopted by 
Gurley and Shaw i n measuring the growth of i n d i r e c t 
e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e i n the U.S.A. See J.G. Gurley and 
E.S. Shaw, " F i n a n c i a l I n t e r m e d i a r i e s and the Saving-
Investment Process", J o u r n a l of Finance. V o l . 11, March 
1956, pp.257-276. No n - f i n a n c i a l u n i t s i n t h i s context 
are, t h e r e f o r e , u n i t s involved i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e 
or, obviously, i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e . 
R.W. Goldsmith, OP. c i t . , p.26. 
" . . . obtained by d i v i d i n g the t o t a l ( p a r t l y d u p l i -cated) value of a l l f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s i n e x i s t e n c e a t 
one date by the t o t a l value of t a n g i b l e a s s e t s plus 
net foreign balances, i . e . by n a t i o n a l wealth . . ." 4 
The F.I.R. i s used by Goldsmith to c h a r a c t e r i z e f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s - b a s i c a l l y a low F.I.R. w i l l i n d i c a t e a f i n a n c i a l 
system i n the e a r l y stages of development and a high F.I.R. 
w i l l i n d i c a t e a very s o p h i s t i c a t e d f i n a n c i a l system, demon-
s t r a t i n g a f u l l range of f i n a n c i a l instruments and i n s t i -
t u t i o n s . I n t h i s l a t t e r c a s e the F.I.R. may take a value 
i n excess of un i t y , i . e . t o t a l f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s exceed 
n a t i o n a l wealth (income), w h i l s t i n the former case the 
F.I.R. may take a value nearer one-quarter or one-half. 
What i s being measured here i s the t o t a l s i z e of the 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r , i n terms of the t o t a l stock of i n d i r e c t 
s e c u r i t i e s (to use Gurley and Shaw's term) i n r e l a t i o n to 
the t o t a l stock of wealth - defined v a r i o u s l y as we w i l l 
see l a t e r on. Therefore the F.I.R. measures f i n a n c i a l 
s t r e n g t h i n terms of the more r a p i d growth of the f i n a n c i a l 
s e c t o r v i s a v i s the r e a l s e c t o r . I n order to a s s e s s the 
value of t h i s s o r t of measure i n d e s c r i b i n g f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s we need t o examine i n more d e t a i l the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p between t a n g i b l e wealth and f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s both from 
a t h e o r e t i c a l point of view (or perhaps more a c c u r a t e l y a 
conceptual point of view) and from a q u a n t i t a t i v e point of 
view. 
R.W. Goldsmith, i b i d , p.27. 
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There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t from an h i s t o r i c a l point 
of view a low F.I.R. c h a r a c t e r i z e d a number of economies 
» 
i n Western Europe i n the eighteenth and nineteenth c e n t u r i e s . 
T h i s stage of f i n a n c i a l development saw the gradual r e p l a c e -
ment of m e t a l l i c money by what Goldsmith terms ' s c r i p t u a l ' 
money (bank notes and demand deposits) and the i n c r e a s i n g 
importance of commercial banks as f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . 
I n a d d i t i o n t h i s period i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by predomin-
a n t l y small family-owned businesses, where i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e 
E 
was pre-eminent. Given t h i s s i t u a t i o n how do f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s a c c e l e r a t e the r a t e of development. Morrison 
suggests t h a t , as r e p o s i t o r i e s of loanable funds, they can 
overcome f i n a n c i a l b ottlenecks which would e x i s t i n the 
i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e s i t u a t i o n . 5 A s i m i l a r observation has 
been made by Cameron who suggests t h a t the emergence of 
commercial banks w i l l allow firms to s w i t c h from i n t e r n a l 
f inance to i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l finance and hence a c c e l e r a t e 
r e a l development.^ Cameron uses a simple example to 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s point. Let us suppose a f i r m earns 15% 
p r o f i t on annual turnover. Let us f u r t h e r suppose t h a t 50% 
of gross p r o f i t s a r e r e t a i n e d as working c a p i t a l (Cameron 
suggests t h a t the 50/50 s p l i t t i n g of p r o f i t s was common 
during the e a r l y stages of i n d u s t r i a l development i n 
5. R.J. Morrison, " F i n a n c i a l I n t e r m e d i a r i e s and Economic 
Development: the Belgian Case", Scandanavian Economic ; 
H i s t o r y Review, 1967, p.59. 
6. R. Cameron (ed.) Banking i n the E a r l y Stages of I n d u s t r i a l -
i z a t i o n . (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press 1967) pp.11-12. 
3 7. 
7. i Europe) . I f a f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n i s a b l e to provide 
short-term loans to r e p l a c e i n t e r n a l working c a p i t a l , then 
the proportion of gross p r o f i t s going i n t o investment w i l l 
i n c r e a s e . T h i s i s assuming t h a t there a r e v i a b l e i n v e s t -
ment p r o j e c t s a v a i l a b l e to the f i r m and t h a t the r a t e of 
ret u r n on these investment p r o j e c t s i s g r e a t e r than o r a t 
l e a s t equal to the c o s t of borrowing short-term funds. 
Quite c l e a r l y a dearth of investment p r o j e c t s w i l l not al l o w 
development to a c c e l e r a t e , so f i n a n c i a l innovation ( i n 
terms of commercial bank intermediation) i s a necessary 
but not s u f f i c i e n t conditon f o r a c c e l e r a t i n g development. 
Th i s l i n e of argument pre-supposes t h a t the appropriate 
innovative s k i l l s i n a Schumpeterian sense a r e a v a i l a b l e to 
f u l l y u t i l i z e the funds. T h i s i s why f i n a n c i a l intermedia-
t i o n of t h i s s o r t i s described by Bennett as "inno v a t i v e 
„ 8 finance". 
The a c t u a l f i n a n c i a l innovations may be very v a r i e d ; 
but as Smith suggests, they can have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on 
economic development. 
" . . . F i n a n c i a l innovations can make f i n a n c i a l 
instruments or markets more a t t r a c t i v e and a c c e s s i b l e 
t o p o t e n t i a l customers, changes i n c o n t r a c t terms t h a t 
make mortgage c r e d i t more a t t r a c t i v e to home buyers, 
changes i n s e r v i c e s o f f e r e d by a f i n a n c i a l i n s t i -
t u t i o n t h a t make i t more convenient, the shortening of 
7. R. Cameron, I b i d . , p.12. 
8. R.L. Bennett, The F i n a n c i a l Sector and Economic Development 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press 1965) p.24. 
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the i n t e r e s t payment period on savings instruments, or 
the development of a good secondary market are examples 
of innovations of t h i s type. A l l of t h e s e changes 
r e s u l t i n s h i f t s i n the demand or supply schedules and 
i n the amount demanded or supplied a t given r a t e s . . " 9 
The i n t e r e s t i n g point to be developed out of the 
preceding argument i s that banks may a s s i s t firms i n expanding 
investment without a c t u a l l y c o n t r a c t i n g medium-term or 
long-term loans w i t h the firm. Morrison's a n a l y s i s of 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n Belgium i n the 1830's emphasises 
a number of the points presented i n t h i s a n a l y s i s . Here 
the innovative aspect of finance i s s t r e s s e d i n the r o l e 
of two s p e c i f i c f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n the period. A 
b r i e f statement on the development of these two i n t e r m e d i a r i e s 
w i l l help to i l l u s t r a t e how the innovations occurred. I n 
1822 the Soci£te Generale de Belgigue was founded as a ' 
commercial bank. I t was empowered to accept deposits, 
i n s u r e currency, discount b i l l s , make advances, deal i n 
s e c u r i t i e s e t c . - i n f a c t a l l the functions we recognize 
i n a commercial bank today. The second bank, the Banque de 
Belgique was founded i n 183 5 and l i k e the S o c i e t e Generale 
was authorized to f u n c t i o n as a commercial bank. Between 
them these two banks had by 183 8 acquired d i r e c t p a r t i c i -
pation i n 55 societies anonvmes (Limited l i a b i l i t y companies) 
w i t h a t o t a l c a p i t a l i z a t i o n of over 154 m i l l i o n francs.''" 0 
9. P.F. Smith, Economics of F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s and Markets 
(Homewood: Richard D. I r w i n I n c . , 1971) p.262. 
10. R.J. Morrison, op. c i t . , pp.63-64. 
The f a c t t h a t these two banks and others were very w i l l i n g 
to lend to corporate e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h i s period r e s u l t e d i n 
a rapid expansion of output during the 183 0's. The 
innovations from a f i n a n c i a l point of view c o n s i s t e d i n the 
d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the s o c i e t e s anonymes. leading to 
the firms developing e s t a b l i s h e d l i n e s of c r e d i t w ith the 
f i n a n c i a l intermediary. Secondly the banks e s t a b l i s h e d new 
deposit f a c i l i t i e s l i k e the savings account which r a p i d l y 
increased t h e i r deposit base. (The S o c i e t e Generale 
experienced more than a doubling of savings deposits 
between 183 5 and 183 8 ) . However, i n 183 8 the expansion was 
abruptly h a l t e d by the suspension of payments by the Banque 
de Belgique. T h i s f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s was brought about by 
three f a c t o r s : (a) intense competition between the two 
banks mentioned, r e s u l t i n g i n (b) c o n s i d e r a b l y i l l i q u i d i t y 
i n both banks' p o r t f o l i o s , and (c) a g e n e r a l depression i n 
economic a c t i v i t y . The c r u c i a l point to develop from t h i s 
a n a l y s i s i s t h a t although i t i s reasonable to assume t h a t 
the F.I.R. i n c r e a s e d during t h i s p e r i od of Belgium's h i s t o r y , 
confidence i n both the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and f i n a n c i a l 
instruments lagged behind. T h i s means t h a t a simple 
i n c r e a s e i n the F.I.R. should not be taken immediately as 
an i n d i c a t i o n of i n c r e a s i n g f i n a n c i a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . What 
i s equally important i s t h a t the new methods of f i n a n c i n g 
become t o t a l l y acceptable to corporate e n t e r p r i s e s . Thus 
our simple example of a f i r m switching from i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e 
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to e x t e r n a l finance would i n d i c a t e an i n c r e a s e i n the 
F.I.R. but may not immediately i n d i c a t e t h a t a new stage 
of f i n a n c i a l development has been reached, as implied by 
Goldsmith. 
E q u a l l y broad d e f i n i t i o n s of f i n a n c i a l instruments 
and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s assumes a c e r t a i n homogeneity 
from a t y p o l o g i c a l point of view. T h i s type of assumption 
i s e s s e n t i a l to Goldsmith i f he wishes to compare f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s a c r o s s c o u n t r i e s by comparing F . I . R . ' s . I n : 
f a c t , f o r an i n d i v i d u a l country, we may be concerned w i t h 
d e s c r i b i n g s p e c i f i c f i n a n c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s unique to 
that country which make broad comments about f i n a n c i a l 
development l e s s a p p l i c a b l e . As K l e i n has commented 
for the I n d i a n case, when d i s c u s s i n g the s t r u c t u r e of an 
econometric model of I n d i a , 
" . . . Money and c r e d i t phenomena must be included i n 
a way t h a t r e f l e c t s I n d i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s . T his may 
w e l l t u r n out to be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the monetary 
s t r u c t u r e of models i n other economies . . .H 
Taking t h i s point of view a b i t f u r t h e r , i t would seem to 
imply t h a t no one s e t of equations d e s c r i b i n g money and 
c r e d i t phenomena can be a p p l i e d a c r o s s the board to a 
wide range of economies. Thus a general theory of f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e i s going to be very d i f f i c u l t to achieve, 
c e r t a i n l y v i a an a n a l y s i s of F . I . R . ' s . 
L.R. K l e i n , "What Kind of Macroeconomic Modelling f o r 
Developing Economies", The Econometric Annual of the Indian 
Economic Jou r n a l . Vol. X I I I , No. 3, 1966, p.324. 
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I n a d d i t i o n , as i s pointed out by Goldsmith, the 
extent of government p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the economy w i l l 
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i n f l u e n c e f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . We may observe a 
d e c l i n i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n made to the t o t a l volume of 
f i n a n c i a l instruments by commercial banks as S t a t e f i n a n c i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s i n c r e a s e t h e i r i s s u e s of f i n a n c i a l instruments 
r e l a t i v e l y to commercial banks. 
A second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n d i v i d u a l f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , which may be extremely d i f f i c u l t to quantify, 
but may be important from a s t r u c t u r a l point of view, i s 
the personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s developed between borrowers 
and o f f i c i a l s of the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n f a c t the 
t r a i n i n g of personnel may be a very important element i n 
the continuing development of the f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
An i n a b i l i t y to deal w i t h consumers' demands completely, 
even though f i n a n c i a l resources are a v a i l a b l e , w i l l l e a d 
to a sub-optimal r a t e of f i n a n c i a l accumulation. I n 
a d d i t i o n the l e v e l of e x p e r t i s e w i t h i n f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u -
t i o n s w i l l u l t i m a t e l y be r e f l e c t e d i n peoples' confidence 
i n the i n s t i t u t i o n . Poor management may l e ad to l i q u i d i t y 
problems which may encourage people to d i v e r s i f y t h e i r bank 
p o r t f o l i o s to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent to p r o t e c t themselves 
a g a i n s t l o s s . 
12. R.W. Goldsmith, l o c . c i t . . p.36. 
13. A s p e c i f i c example of t h i s i s given i n , J . Bharier, "Need 
f o r Reform - I r a n " , World Bank Survey, The F i n a n c i a l Times 
May 1972. 
42. 
Unfortunately the q u a l i t y of management w i t h i n 
i n d i v i d u a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i s very d i f f i c u l t to 
quantify. Presumably the diminishing importance of 
s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the i s s u e of new f i n a n c i a l 
instruments over time may i n d i c a t e poor management; but a 
d e c l i n e of t h i s s o r t could be explained i n other ways. 
The F.I.R. w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d not only by the t o t a l 
volume of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s and the i n f l u e n c e s we have 
developed over the l a s t few pages; but a l s o by the ways 
i n which t o t a l t a n g i b l e a s s e t s a r e defined. Goldsmith 
defines these as n a t i o n a l wealth, which he equates w i t h 
n a t i o n a l output. I n t h i s way the F.I.R. becomes a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between a stock and a flow or a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between two flows i f the a d d i t i o n s to the f i n a n c i a l stock 
alone are considered. I n a d d i t i o n t h e r e i s the very 
d i f f i c u l t s t a t i s t i c a l problem of assembling long-run data 
on n a t i o n a l output. I f the F.I.R. i s to be used as a measure 
of rudimentary f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , f o r i n s t a n c e those i n 
medieval Europe, then appropriate measures f o r n a t i o n a l 
output i n t h i s p e r i od a r e necessary to make the measure 
meaningful. I n p r a c t i c e i t i s only p o s s i b l e to co n s i d e r 
developments i n Europe and North America s i n c e the middle 
of the nineteenth century and f o r many developing c o u n t r i e s 
probably only f o r a l i m i t e d period i n the twentieth century, 
due to the poor data on n a t i o n a l output and on f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e p r i o r to these periods. T h i s means t h a t 
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d e s c r i p t i o n s of rudimentary f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s i n Europe 
must, at the best, be c o n j e c t u r a l and, a t the worst, 
misleading. The F.I.R. attempts to be a measure by which 
d i f f e r e n t types of f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e can be ranked and 
compared. However, the measure s u f f e r s from the problems 
of long-run c o n s i s t e n c y of data and a c c u r a t e comparisons 
of data a c r o s s c o u n t r i e s . I t seems t h a t on the q u a n t i t a t i v e 
aspects along the F.I.R. i s a d i f f i c u l t measure to use to 
define types of f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . E q u a l l y from a 
conceptual point, i t i s doubtful whether f i n a n c i a l s t r e n g t h 
can simply be gauged i n terms of the r a t i o of t o t a l 
f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s to n a t i o n a l wealth. At l e a s t the time 
p r o f i l e of a l l f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s would have to be con-
s i d e r e d as we w i l l see i n the next s e c t i o n . 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s between d i f f e r e n t 
f i n a n c i a l instruments 
The t o t a l stock of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s c o n s i s t s of a 
range of f i n a n c i a l instruments. Goldsmith suggests t h a t 
we need to d i s t i n g u i s h between two b a s i c types of i n s t r u -
ment - c l a i m s and equity s e c u r i t i e s . Claims may be a g a i n s t , 
" . . . domestic f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , claims a g a i n s t 
domestic non f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r s and claims a g a i n s t 
f o r e i g n e r s . . ."14 
R.W. Goldsmith, OP. c i t . . p.8. 
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On the other hand e q u i t i e s are, 
" . . . the evidence of f r a c t i o n a l ownership i n the 
net worth of a business e n t e r p r i s e . Net worth, i n 
turn, i s defined as the d i f f e r e n c e between the sum 
of a u n i t ' s r e a l and f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s and i t s 
l i a b i l i t i e s . . . " ^ 
For the U.S.A. f o r 1963 Goldsmith found t h a t approximately 
75% of a l l f i n a n c i a l instruments a r e claims and of these 
40% are i s s u e d by f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Thus i n looking 
a t f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s we are concerned w i t h the t o t a l 
i s s u e of cla i m s by f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to 
the i s s u e of a l l f i n a n c i a l instruments. The i n c r e a s i n g 
r o l e of the f i n a n c i a l system i n f i n a n c i n g economic a c t i v i t y 
would then show up i n the more r a p i d growth i n the net 
i s s u e of cla i m s by f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n r e l a t i o n 
to other i n s t i t u t i o n s i s s u i n g c l a i m s , e.g. households. 
Gurley and Shaw have been instrumental i n a n a l y s i n g 
the growth of f i n a n c i a l instrument i s s u e s and the e f f e c t s 
these i s s u e s have on economic development. E q u a l l y they 
point to the simple f a c t t h a t p r i m i t i v e f i n a n c i a l arrange-
ments may depress economic a c t i v i t y . 
" . . . the l e v e l of economic a c t i v i t y and the r a t e of 
i t s expansion a r e depressed by p r i m i t i v e f i n a n c i a l 
arrangements t h a t l i m i t each spending u n i t ' s expendi-
t u r e e s s e n t i a l l y to i t s income.16 
They go on to e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of primary 
15. R.W. Goldsmith, I b i d . . p.8l<? 
16. J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, Money i n a Theory of Finance, 
(The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , Washington D.C. 1966) p. 56. 
s e c u r i t i e s ( i n t h i s case s e c u r i t i e s i s s u e d by businesses 
and bought by consumers) w i l l a l low f o r the emergence of 
spending u n i t s capable of i n v e s t i n g i n excess of t h e i r 
own savings and of spending u n i t s lending t h e i r saved 
income by purchasing primary s e c u r i t i e s . I n i t i a l l y the 
development of primary s e c u r i t i e s i s seen as a d i r e c t one 
between firms and consumers. I f f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s 
accumulate the savings of su r p l u s consumer u n i t s and i s s u e 
t h e i r own s e c u r i t i e s which a r e bought by firms, then another 
dimension i s added to the argument. I n t h i s c a s e i n d i r e c t 
s e c u r i t i e s have been added. The development of t h i s s o r t 
of indirect finance means th a t f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s w i l l 
accumulate a p o r t f o l i o of s e c u r i t y i s s u e s , and w i l l become 
more important i n terms of the t o t a l outstanding c l a i m s 
i n the economy. The c r u c i a l question we need to ask i s 
whether i t makes any d i f f e r e n c e t o f i n a n c i a l growth how 
t h i s p o r t f o l i o i s composed? The a n a l y s i s of F.I . R . ' s i s 
b a s i c a l l y an ex post one. I t i s p o s s i b l e to observe an 
i n c r e a s i n g r a t i o of primary s e c u r i t i e s to G.N.P. over 
time f o r a l a r g e number of c o u n t r i e s and from these 
observations i t i s p e r f e c t l y v a l i d to conclude t h a t as 
c o u n t r i e s i n c r e a s e t h e i r per c a p i t a incomes t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
systems become more d i v e r s e and s o p h i s t i c a t e d . The problem 
w i t h t h i s s o r t of a n a l y s i s t h a t i t cannot i s o l a t e the 
c a u s a t i v e and responding f a c t o r s , i . e . does a higher l e v e l 
of G.N.P. generate more f i n a n c i a l i s s u e s , or does a growing 
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f i n a n c i a l system generate higher l e v e l s of G.N.P., nor can 
i t say what would have happened under d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l 
regimes. I t i s t h i s second problem that we now need to 
look a t i n more d e t a i l . 
As the cash s e c t o r of the economy becomes more impor-
tant, the use of commercial banking f a c i l i t i e s becomes more 
widespread and f o r a very wide range of c o u n t r i e s i t has 
been found that the r a t i o of savings and time deposits to 
17 
G.N.P. and per c a p i t a G.N.P. r i s e s as G.N.P. i n c r e a s e s . 
At t h i s stage a higher degree of s p e c i a l i s a t i o n begins to 
develop between savers and i n v e s t o r s . Savers deposit 
funds with commercial banks and i n v e s t o r s draw on these 
deposits w i t h the banks. The banks, i n part, bridge the 
a l t e r n a t i v e time horizons of savers and i n v e s t o r s . I f 
we assume, i n general, t h a t savers have a s h o r t e r time 
horizon than i n v e s t o r s , then the commercial banks by 
being able to r e p l e n i s h deposits withdrawn by some 
sav e r s w i t h new deposits from other savers can extend 
loans to i n v e s t o r s of a longer duration than would be 
p o s s i b l e i n the absence of such an intermediary. However 
J.G. Gurley, " F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e s i n Developing Economies", 
i n F i s c a l and Monetary Problems i n Developing S t a t e s , 
(Proceeding of the T h i r d Rehovoth Conference, e d i t e d by 
D. K r i v i n e ) pp.102-103. Gurley c i t e s data f o r 70 c o u n t r i e s 
from 1953-1961 where the equation i s T/GNP = -3.528 + .980 GNP/N 
(.102) 
Where T = time and savings deposits, 
N = t o t a l population. 
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commercial banks are a l s o holders of money balances, which 
means t h a t there i s a l i q u i d i t y c o n s t r a i n t on the time ! 
p r o f i l e of the bank's p o r t f o l i o . I t i s t h i s r e s t r a i n t 
which tends to c r e a t e more s p e c i a l i s a t i o n i n the f i n a n c i a l 
market. Other f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s may develop which 
o f f e r a longer time horizon to i n v e s t o r s at the expense of 
c r e a t i n g more i l l i q u i d i t y amongst s a v e r s . I n v e s t o r s f o r t h e i r 
p a r t i s s u e primary s e c u r i t i e s to acquire t a n g i b l e a s s e t s , 
and the f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i s s u e i n d i r e c t f i n a n c i a l 
a s s e t s to s a v e r s . So f a r we have not considered the i s s u e 
of government debt. The government may finance i t s own 
a c t i v i t i e s i n t h r e e ways; t a x a t i o n , the p r o f i t s from i t s 
own economic e n t e r p r i s e s or by borrowing. The government 
may borrow by i s s u i n g primary s e c u r i t i e s which a r e purchased 
by f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s or it:', may c r e a t e i t s own 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and draw d i r e c t l y on the funds of 
s a v e r s . I n e i t h e r case the government i s now i n a p o s i t i o n 
to i n f l u e n c e the f i n a n c i a l system. I n general terms a 
s h i f t by the government from one form of wealth holding to 
another, i . e . the purchasing of s e c u r i t i e s from the p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r i n exchange f o r money, w i l l a f f e c t the community's 
18 
savings and the r a t e of i n t e r e s t . This i s dependent 
upon changes i n the q u a n t i t i e s of p r i v a t e l y held s e c u r i t i e s 
18. L. Metzler, "Wealth, Saving and the Rate of I n t e r e s t " , 
J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Economy. Vol. 59, A p r i l 1951, pp.93-116. 
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r a t h e r than a change i n the quantity of money. A change 
i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s may r a i s e or lower the growth r a t e of 
output. This view supports the general c o n c l u s i o n s of 
Gurley and Shaw when they s t a t e that a change i n the r a t i o 
of i n s i d e to outside money w i l l a f f e c t the r e a l r a t e of 
i n t e r e s t and consequently the choice between present and 
19 
future consumption and the growth r a t e of output. Quxte 
c l e a r l y t h ere are a number of e f f e c t s which w i l l be 
generated by t h i s i n i t i a l disturbance, which w i l l lead to 
adjustments among i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . For in s t a n c e i n the 
case c i t e d here an i n c r e a s e i n the stock of nominal money 
he l d by the pu b l i c w i l l l e a d to a f o r c i n g up of the p r i c e 
l e v e l to a point where d e s i r e d and a c t u a l holdings of 
cash balances are equal. A l t e r n a t i v e l y a d e s i r e on the 
part of the p u b l i c to reduce deposits w i l l l e a d to banks 
e i t h e r holding excess r e s e r v e s or reducing r a t e s of 
20 
i n t e r e s t on loans and hence income. 
The d i s c u s s i o n so f a r impl i e s that as an economy 
moves from one where s c r i p t u a l money i s predominant to one 
where, through f i n a n c i a l intermediation, a wide range of 
f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s a r e c r e a t e d then the 
19. J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, Money i n a Theory of Finance, 
Washington: Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n 1960). 
20. J . Tobin, "Commercial Banks as Cre a t o r s of Money", i n 
Banking and Monetary S t u d i e s . D. Carson (ed.) (Homewood 
I l l i n o i s , Richard D. I r w i n , 1963). 
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impact of such a f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e on r e a l development 
becomes more complicated. Out of the numerous e f f e c t s 
generated by t h i s s o r t of change we need to concentrate 
on two i n p a r t i c u l a r . F i r s t l y , the impact of i n c r e a s i n g 
i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t y i s s u e s on the saving/investment process 
and secondly, how a l a c k of investment demand may i n f l u e n c e 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n and types of i n d i r e c t debt i s s u e d . 
I t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted t h a t domestic savings can 
a c t as an important c o n s t r a i n t on the r a t e a t which 
c a p i t a l accumulation takes place i n a developing economy. 
Therefore, means of m o b i l i z i n g savings and u t i l i z i n g more 
e f f i c i e n t l y the e x i s t i n g l e v e l of savings are an important 
aspect of the development process. Not only i s the t o t a l 
volume of savings important, but a l s o the l o c a t i o n of 
savings deposits and the time preferences of i n d i v i d u a l 
s a v e r s . L o c a t i o n i s important i n the sense t h a t i f 
information i s not a v a i l a b l e to i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t o r s on 
l i k e l y sources of funds, because of p h y s i c a l d i s t a n c e s 
between savers and i n v e s t o r s 'then the f i n a n c i n g of 
investment w i l l not take p l a c e . Equally, i f the time 
preferences r a t e s of s a v e r s a r e high, i n t h a t long-term 
saving i s accorded a low p r i o r i t y , then t h i s w i l l shorten 
the o v e r a l l time i>rofile of the p o r t f o l i o of investment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s . As was a s s e r t e d i n chapter One, the develop-
ment of banks i n ;i s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s can have the e f f e c t 
of bridging d i s t a n c e s ( p h y s i c a l l y ) between the i n d i v i d u a l s 
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and a l s o c a n have t h e e f f e c t of e x t e n d i n g t h e time p r o f i l e 
of i n v e s t m e n t , by s u b s t i t u t i n g s h o r t - t e r m s a v i n g s f o r 
l o n g - t e r m l o a n s , s u b j e c t t o a l i q u i d i t y c o n s t r a i n t d e t e r m i n e d 
by t h e t u r n o v e r r a t e of bank d e p o s i t s . 
From t h e p o i n t o f view of s a v i n g s , t h e emergence of 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s may i n c r e a s e t h e t o t a l volume o f 
s a v i n g s o r may u t i l i z e more e f f e c t i v e l y t h e e x i s t i n g 
volume. The mere p r e s e n c e of a banking i n s t i t u t i o n may 
encourage s a v i n g s . As L e w i s p o i n t s out, 
" . . . E x p e r i e n c e shows t h a t t h e amount o f s a v i n g s 
depends p a r t l y on how w i d e s p r e a d t h e s e f a c i l i t i e s 
a r e ; i f t h e y a r e pushed r i g h t under t h e i n d i v i d u a l s 
nose, . . . p e o p l e s a v e more t h a n i f t h e n e a r e s t 
. . . . 9 1 
s a v i n g s i n s t i t u t i o n i s some d i s t a n c e away . . . 
However, s u c h an encouragement t o s a v i n g s may be a once-
a n d - f o r - a l l move and t h i s may not g e n e r a t e a c o n t i n u a l 
i n c r e a s e i n s a v i n g s . I n d e e d t h e p r e s e n c e o f s a v i n g s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s may encourage p e o p l e t o s a v e l e s s . I f we 
assume t h a t t h e r i s k o f t o t a l l o s s i s r e d u c e d i f s a v i n g s 
a r e t r a n s f e r r e d from a t i n box t o a b a n k i n g a c c o u n t , t h e n 
t h i s may c a u s e p e o p l e t o a l l o c a t e a s m a l l e r p r o p o r t i o n o f 
22 
t h e i r d i s p o s a b l e income t o s a v i n g s t h a n h i t h e r t o . Thus 
i t would be unwise t o assume t h a t t h e mere p r e s e n c e o f 
s a v i n g s i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r t h e t o t a l 
W.A. L e w i s , The Theory of Economic Growth, (London: 
George A l l e n and Unwin 1963) p.229. 
R.C. P o r t e r , "The Promotion o f t h e 'Banking H a b i t 1 and 
Economic Development", J o u r n a l o f Development S t u d i e s , 
V o l . 2, No. 4, J u l y 1966, pp.346-366. 
volume of s a v i n g s i n t h e economy. What, s a v i n g s i n s t i t u -
t i o n s can do i s t o p r o v i d e a more e c o n o m i c a l means of 
t r a n s f e r r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about, t h e t o t a l volume o f s a v i n g s 
a v a i l a b l e t o p o t e n t i a l i n v e s t o r s t h a n i f i t were l e f t 
t o each s a v e r t o s e e k out an i n v e s t m e n t o u t l e t f o r h i s 
23 
funds. As Brunner and M e l t z e r imply and C l o w e r makes 
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e x p l i c i t , t h e i n c r e a s e d i n f o r m a t i o n g e n e r a t e d by t h e 
c r e a t i o n of s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s r e l e a s e s p r o d u c t i v e 
r e s o u r c e s f o r o t h e r u s e s . Hence s a v i n g s i n s t i t u t i o n s 
c a n economise on i n d i v i d u a l s ' t ime by p r o v i d i n g s p e c i a l i s e d 
s e r v i c e s . Thus i t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r f i n a n c i a l i n t e r -
m e d i a t i o n t o be e f f e c t i v e i f t h e e x i s t i n g volume of 
s a v i n g s i s d i s t r i b u t e d o p t i m a l l y i n terms o f a l l known 
i n v e s t m e n t p r o j e c t s , assuming s u c h a d i s t r i b u t i o n was not 
f e a s i b l e p r e v i o u s l y f o r t h e r e a s o n s a l r e a d y mentioned. As 
P o r t e r has commented, 
". . „ A g r e a t e r number o f bank o f f i c e s c a n mean a 
g r e a t e r f r a c t i o n of t h e n a t i o n s s a v i n g i s c h a n n e l l e d 
i n t o i n v e s t m e n t through t h e m e d i a t i o n o f t h e b a n k i n g 
s y s t e m which, i n t u r n , may l e a d t o a more e f f i c i e n t 
a l l o c a t i o n o f i n v e s t m e n t p r o j e c t s . I n c o u n t r i e s 
w i t h o u t a w e l l - o r g a n i z e d market f o r i n v e s t a b l e funds 
t h e r e may be a m u l t i t u d e o f p a r t i a l l y o r even 
c o m p l e t e l y , independent markets . . . 
A s i m i l a r i d e a t o t h i s i s development by McKinnon who 
K. Brunner and A.H. M e l t z e r , "The Uses o f Money: Money i n 
t h e Theory of an Exchange Economy", Am e r i c a n Economic 
Review, V o l . L X I , No. 5, December 1971, p.804. 
R. Clower ( e d . ) , R e a d i n g s i n Monetary Theory, Penguin Modern 
Economics Readings (London: Penguin Books 1969) pp.13-14. 
R.C. P o r t e r , op. c i t . , p.3 52 . 
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d i s c u s s e s t h e problem o f f r a g m e n t a t i o n i n t h e domestic 
c a p i t a l market. As McKinnon p o i n t s out, 
". . . f r a g m e n t a t i o n i n t h e c a p i t a l market c a u s e s t h e 
mi s u s e o f l a b o u r and lan d , s u p p r e s s e s e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l 
development and condemns i m p o r t a n t s e c t o r s o f t h e 
economy t o i n f e r i o r t e c h n o l o g i e s . . . ^ 6 
The c o n c e p t o f t h e "fragmented economy" i s o b v i o u s l y 
i m p o r t a n t i n t h i s c o n t e x t . F r a g m e n t a t i o n e x i s t s when, 
" . . . f i r m s and h o u s e h o l d s a r e so i s o l a t e d t h a t t h e y 
f a c e d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t i v e p r i c e s f o r l a n d , l a b o u r 
c a p i t a l and produced commodities and do not have 
a c c e s s t o t h e same t e c h n o l o g i e s . . .27 
T h i s means t h a t d i f f e r e n t groups w i t h i n a s o c i e t y may be 
r e s p o n d i n g t o d i f f e r e n t s e t s of r e l a t i v e p r i c e s f o r 
i d e n t i c a l r e a l r e s o u r c e s and t h i s w i l l c a u s e a m i s a l l o c a -
t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s f o r t h e c o u n t r y a s a whole. The 
f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m h e r e a c t s a s a f i l t e r f o r i n f o r m a t i o n 
about a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s and t h e t o t a l volume of f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t r u m e n t s a v a i l a b l e , and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e f i n a n c i a l 
s y s t e m a s s u c h c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and u s e o f 
r e a l r e s o u r c e s . 
The growth o f f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s r e s p o n d i n g t o 
t h e g r a d u a l m o n e t i z a t i o n o f t h e economy and t h e move away 
from d i r e c t i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y 
imply t h a t i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e w i l l i n c r e a s e i n 
r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e . Thus, as G u r l e y and Shaw have p o i n t e d 
26. R . I . McKinnon, Money and C a p i t a l i n Economic Development, 
(Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n 1973) p.5. 
27. R . I . McKinnon, dp. c i t . , p.5. 
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out, t h e r a t i o o f i n d i r e c t e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e t o d i r e c t 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e i s an i n d i c a t o r of f i n a n c i a l 
2 8 
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n an economy. However, s u c h a r a t i o a s 
t h i s t e n d s not t o e mphasise t h e t i m e p r o f i l e of i n d i r e c t 
s e c u r i t y i s s u e s i n t h e economy. 
" . . . I n d i r e c t s e c u r i t i e s . . . a r e c l a i m s on 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e monetary 
sy s t e m . T h e s e s e c u r i t i e s t a k e t h e form o f c u r r e n c y , 
bank d e p o s i t s , s h a r e s and even bonds. F i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s s t a n d between u l t i m a t e b o r r o w e r s and 
u l t i m a t e l e n d e r s t o a c q u i r e t h e p r i m a r y s e c u r i t i e s 
o f t h e former and t o p r o v i d e i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t i e s t o 
t h e l a t t e r . . .29 
T h i s b a s i c d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e r o l e o f i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t y -
i s s u e s i n f i n a n c i a l development by O t t , f o l l o w i n g t h e G u r l e y 
and Shaw a n a l y s i s , has n o t h i n g t o s a y about t h e d i s t r i b u -
t i o n o f t o t a l c l a i m s a s between v a r i o u s t y p e s o f i n d i r e c t 
s e c u r i t i e s i s s u e s . Q u i t e c l e a r l y a f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m b a s e d 
p r i m a r i l y on c u r r e n c y and bank d e p o s i t s i s a v e r y d i f f e r e n t 
s y s t e m t o one b a s e d on t h e s e and o t h e r l e s s l i q u i d i s s u e s , 
l i k e bonds and s h a r e s . W h i l s t O t t goes on t o d e s c r i b e t h e 
p a t t e r n o f i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t y i s s u e s i n J a p a n from 1878-1958, 
no c o n c l u s i o n s a r e drawn about t h e p o s s i b l e i m p a c t s o f 
d i f f e r e n t " h y p o t h e t i c a l " c o m p o s i t i o n s o f i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t y 
i s s u e s , e x c e p t t h a t a f a i r l y o b v i o u s d i s t i n c t i o n i s made 
28. J.G. G u r l e y and E.S. Shaw, " F i n a n c i a l A s p e c t s o f Economic 
Development, American Economic Review, V o l . XLV, No. 4,; 
September 19 55, pp. 515-53 8. 
29. D.J. O t t , "The F i n a n c i a l Development of Japan, 1878-1958", 
J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Economy, V o l . 69, 1961, p.123. 
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between "monetary" i n t e r m e d i a r i e s (Bank of Japan, 
c o m m e r c i a l banks and s a v i n g s banks) and "non-monetary it 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ( s p e c i a l i s t banks, i n s u r a n c e companies, 
c o - o p e r a t i v e s , e t c . ) . 30 Again, t h e i m p l i c a t i o n h e r e , as 
i n s e c t i o n one of t h i s c h a p t e r , i s t h a t b road measures o f 
f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e b a s e d s i m p l y on i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t y 
i s s u e s , s a y l i t t l e about t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f s u c h a 
f i n a n c i a l system. I t . has a l r e a d y been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
f o r a t o t a l volume o f s a v i n g s t o become more e f f e c t i v e 
t h e f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r y must i s s u e i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t i e s 
w h i c h have a long m a t u r a t i o n p e r i o d t h a n t h e p r i m a r y 
s e c u r i t i e s p a i d i n t o t h e f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m . T h i s i s 
e s s e n t i a l i f s h o r t - t e r m s a v i n g d e p o s i t s a r e t o be con-
v e r t e d i n t o l o n g e r - t e r m i n v e s t m e n t p r o j e c t s . Now i f t h e 
i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t i e s g e n e r a t e d by t h e f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m do 
not a c q u i r e t h i s s o r t of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , t h e n t h e e f f e c t i v e -
n e s s o f s u c h a s y s t e m i s d i m i n i s h e d . Thus t h e ti m e p r o f i l e 
o f i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t y i s s u e s i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t when l o o k i n g 
a t t h e t o t a l volume o f f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s i n t h e f i n a n c i a l 
s y s t e m and t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n between f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u m e n t s . 
T h i s a d d i t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n i s r e c o g n i z e d by G o l d s m i t h when 
he s a y s , 
" . . . The same t o t a l amount o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u m e n t s , 
even i f i t r e f l e c t s t h e same f i n a n c i a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s 
r a t i o , may have q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t economic s i g n i f i -
c a n c e and may a f f e c t economic growth d i f f e r e n t l y 
depending on i t s c o m p o s i t i o n - f o r i n s t a n c e t h e s h a r e 
o f debt and e q u i t y i n s t r u m e n t s , o f s h o r t - and l o n g - t e r m 
debt i n s t r u m e n t s , o f m a r k e t a b l e i n s t r u m e n t s , and o f 
D.J. Ott, op. c i t . , p. 130. 
more or less r i s k y and p r i c e f l u c t u a t i n g i n s t r u -
ments . . .31 
So the t o t a l volume of f i n a n c i a l assets i s only one part 
of the complicated p i c t u r e . Equally important i s the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i n a n c i a l assets between f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i n a n c i a l assets between f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s 
Comparing the range o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n -
developed and developing c o u n t r i e s today, one obvious 
f e a t u r e manifests i t s e l f : the a c t u a l range or types of 
in t e r m e d i a r i e s tends t o be greater i n developed c o u n t r i e s . 
This i s a f a i r l y obvious observation and the phenomenon 
r e s u l t s from the demand f o r more s p e c i a l i s e d lending 
i n s t i t u t i o n s as development proceeds. The specialisms 
might range from preferences f o r geographical areas 
( a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t banks), preferences f o r longer-term 
lending ( i n d u s t r i a l banks, b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s , etc) 
preferences f o r d i v e r s i f y i n g r i s k ( u n i t t r u s t s , insurance 
funds e t c . ) . Therefore, over time, we would expect the 
range o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t o broaden as the demands 
put upon the f i n a n c i a l system become more intense and 
R.W. Goldsmith, l o c . c i t . , p.27. 
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s p e c i a l i s e d . I t must be emphasised here t h a t t h i s s o r t 
of argument i s demand o r i e n t a t e d . Quite c l e a r l y govern-
ments can create new lending i n s t i t u t i o n s and hence 
expand the supply of i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t i e s on the 
argument t h a t , 
" . . . the need f o r s p e c i a l i s e d agencies f o r the 
finance of investment cannot s a f e l y be l e f t t o the 
processes of slow e v o l u t i o n . What i n e a r l i e r genera-
t i o n s could have been allowed t o develop over scores, 
i f not hundreds, of years must now of necessity be 
created i n a much short e r space of time . . .32 
Thus a f i n a n c i a l system may be "imposed" i n the sense 
t h a t d i r e c t s t i m u l a t i o n t o i t s development may be given by 
the government. Apart from t h i s s o r t o f s t i m u l a t i o n the 
arguments developed by Gurley and Shaw and Goldsmith do 
suggest t h a t as the r a t i o of f i n a n c i a l assets t o t a n g i b l e 
wealth increases over time, the range of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i -
t u t i o n s also increases. This i s , p r i m a r i l y , because 
the demands from investors and the requirements of savers 
become more s p e c i a l i s e d . From an i n v e s t o r s p o i n t of view 
the r e are considerable advantages t o be gained from the 
development of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s s p e c i a l i s i n g i n , say, 
the f i n a n c i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r sector o f i n d u s t r y , since 
h i g h l y s p e c i a l i s e d knowledge can be b u i l t up w i t h the i n t e r -
mediary which can a s s i s t the i n v e s t o r i n t h i s decision-
t a k i n g . Equally f o r the saver a wider range of f i n a n c i a l 
E. Nevin, C a p i t a l Funds i n Underdeveloped Countries, (London 
Macmillan and Co. L t d . , 1963) pp.73-74. 
i n s t i t u t i o n s provide savings f a c i l i t i e s of varying r i s k 
and time preference and hence choice i s extended. These 
short comments on the b e n e f i t s t o savers and investors 
implies a c e r t a i n two-way r e l a t i o n s h i p between savers and 
investors and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t i s the desire o f 
savers t o d i v e r s i f y t h e i r p o r t f o l i o s , which w i l l create 
more s p e c i a l i s e d savings i n s t i t u t i o n s and i t i s the d e s i r e 
of investors t o seek more s p e c i a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l assistance 
which w i l l lead t o more s p e c i a l i s e d lending i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Thus the a t t i t u d e s of savers and i n v e s t o r s t o the f i n a n c i a l 
system w i l l i n f l u e n c e i t s development. E a r l i e r i n t h i s 
chapter the question of i n n o v a t i v e finance was discussed. 
This concept suggests t h a t f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s can be 
innovators i n the sense t h a t they o f f e r new services t o 
investors or even p a r t i c i p a t e d i r e c t l y i n the investment 
process. The extent t o which t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i s important 
w i l l be dependent on the l e g a l s t r u c t u r e of i n d u s t r y i n 
the country concer.ned. Equally savers may not use f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s even though they may be aware of t h e i r 
advantages - t h e r e may be something of a " c u l t u r e - b l o c " 
operating here. 
However, 
". . . I f the f i n a n c i a l investiveness of the community 
( i n c l u d i n g i t s capacity and readiness t o adopt 
f i n a n c i a l innovations p r a c t i c e d elsewhere) keeps on 
generating new forms of f i n a n c i a l assets and new 
f i n a n c i a l arrangements, the f r o n t i e r of i n t e n s i v e 
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f i n a n c i a l growth keeps on s h i f t i n g outward over time 
. . ."33 
Gupta's use of the term " i n t e n s i v e f i n a n c i a l growth" can 
be likened t o the concept of " f i n a n c i a l deepening" adopted 
34 . 
by Shaw, since both terms r e f e r t o the r e l a t i v e l y f a s t e r 
growth of the f i n a n c i a l sector over the r e a l sector as 
development proceeds. I f innovations i n t h e f i n a n c i a l 
sector do not occur then the r e s u l t i n g f i n a n c i a l system 
mey be termed shallow (Shaw) or regressive (Gupta). 
Shaw's concept of f i n a n c i a l deepening i s important 
i n the context of the foregoing arguments, since i t i s 
the process of f i n a n c i a l deepening (the more r a p i d growth 
of monetary assets over r e a l assets) which puts f i n a n c i a l 
development i n t o a dominant place i n development theory. 
This i s a theme we w i l l r e t u r n t o i n Chapter Three. 
Thus the type of f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e which develops 
w i t h i n an economy w i l l be dependent p a r t l y on the " f i n a n c i a l 
investiveness" of the community and p a r t l y on the demands 
by inve s t o r s f o r more s p e c i a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l assistance and 
the desire of savers t o d i v e r s i f y t h e i r own p o r t f o l i o s , 
both i n terms of r i s k and i n terms of time preference. This 
i l l u s t r a t e s the nature of the two-way r e l a t i o n s h i p r e f e r r e d 
33. S. Gupta, " F i n a n c i a l Progress, Banking Expansion and Saving", 
Ind i a n Economic Journal, Vol. XX, No's 4-5, April-June 1973, 
p.562. 
34. E.S. Shaw, F i n a n c i a l Deepening i n Economic Development (New 
York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press 1973). 
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t o e a r l i e r . 
The discussion so f a r suggests t h a t the size and 
functions of the f i n a n c i a l system w i l l depend on the 
demands put upon i t by the r e a l sector and the extent t o 
which the f i n a n c i a l sector i t s e l f has any innovative 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w i t h i n i t . Emphasis has been l a i d i n t h i s 
chapter on one p a r t i c u l a r approach t o analysing f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s and the concomitant e f f e c t s on economic 
development. This approach, v i a an analysis of t o t a l 
f i n a n c i a l assets and t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n , seems t o sub-
or d i n a t e a number of s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s which may be very important i n the development 
context. I t i s t o the question of these f u r t h e r character-
i s t i c s t h a t chapter Three addresses i t s e l f . 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
• 
The F i n a n c i a l Sector and the Financing of Economic Development 
The preceding two chapters have attempted t o i l l u s t r a t e 
the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s between f i n a n c i a l growth and economic 
development and t o analyse s p e c i f i c measures of f i n a n c i a l 
growth. Taking Goldsmith's measures of f i n a n c i a l growth, 
then a s i t u a t i o n where the F.I.R. i s i n excess of u n i t y 
implies an economy moving i n t o the fu l l y - d e v e l o p e d stage. 
However, using Shaw's concept of shallow finance suggests 
t h a t the t o t a l volume of f i n a n c i a l assets, alone, cannot 
determine f i n a n c i a l growth. I t i s the d i v e r s i f i e d nature 
of f i n a n c i a l assets which i s also important. This chapter 
attempts t o b r i n g these two approaches together and also 
introduces a new dimension t o the argument: a s i t u a t i o n 
where f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s acquire assets i n more than one 
currency. I t w i l l be demonstrated t h a t when t h i s dimension 
i s added then even a synthesis of the Goldsmith and Shaw 
views do not adequately describe f i n a n c i a l growth or 
f i n a n c i a l deepening. 
The emphasis so f a r has been on an analysis of the t o t a l 
volume of assets and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of these assets 
amongst f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , as i n d i c a t o r s of f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e . However, f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e may be characterised 
i n a number of a l t e r n a t i v e ways. Kurosaki's analysis of 
finance i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s points t o at l e a s t s i x 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t might be important: ( i ) the existence 
of a non-monetary sector; ( i i ) the d e f i n i t i o n of organized 
and unorganized money markets; ( i i i ) the importance of 
trade i n the f i n a n c i a l system; ( i v ) the development of 
c a p i t a l markets; (v) the seasonal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
finance; ( v i ) the d u a l i t y of the i n t e r e s t r a t e structure.'*' 
By examining these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n t u r n we can e s t a b l i s h 
a number of other f a c t o r s which might i n f l u e n c e f i n a n c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e . 
1. The Size of the Non-monetary Sector 
I t appears t o be g e n e r a l l y assumed t h a t as economies 
become more s p e c i a l i s e d i n t h e i r productive a c t i v i t i e s and 
i n t h e i r t r a d i n g arrangements, then the use of a s p e c i f i c 
money commodity becomes adopted and exchange takes place 
i n terms o f t h i s commodity r a t h e r than i n terms of the 
2 
goods themselves. Hence the use of notes and coins i s 
adopted and from t h i s develops a banking system, since 
H. Kurosaki, " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Finance i n Underdeveloped 
Countries", Developing Economics, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1963. 
R. Clower, I n t r o d u c t i o n t o , Readings i n Monetary Economics, 
(Penguin Modern Economics 1969) pp.13-14. 
excess cash balances can now be deposited i n the banking 
system t o be recycled f o r investment purposes. However 
the emergence of a money commodity i s dependent on the p r i o r 
emergence of exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I f u n i t s i n s o c i e t y 
are s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n production and consumption and 
are s u f f i c i e n t l y i s o l a t e d f o r s p e c i a l i s a t i o n i n production 
not t o occur, then the need f o r a money commodity does not 
a r i s e . T y p i c a l l y the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector i n many developing 
c o u n t r i e s i s characterized i n t h i s way. Peasant farmers 
are b a s i c a l l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and what t r a d i n g there i s i s 
done on a b a r t e r basis. Thus the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector i s 
non-monetized. This i n i t s e l f creates a stumbling block t o 
development since i t does not allow f o r the easy t r a n s f e r 
of c a p i t a l out of the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector t o other sectors, 
since t h i s c a p i t a l i s denominated i n r e a l goods. The s i z e 
of the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector i n t o t a l output terms and the 
extent of i t s monetization i s going t o i n f l u e n c e t h e extent 
t o which f i n a n c i a l assets c i r c u l a t e w i t h i n any one country. 
Taking an extreme p o i n t , i t i s possible t o envisage a dual 
economic system i n existence, possessing a monetized sector 
Q 
and a non-monetized sector, w i t h no f i n a n c i a l "bridge" 
operating between the two. One t y p i c a l measure of the 
degree of monetization i s the r a t i o of currency t o G.N.P., 
and f o r many developing c o u n t r i e s i t has been observed t h a t 
t h i s r a t i o tends t o decrease as more s o p h i s t i c a t e d c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t i e s become a v a i l a b l e i n r u r a l areas. However, an 
increasing r a t i o of currency t o G.N.P. might also i n d i c a t e 
increasing monetization i n t h a t currency may be r e p l a c i n g 
r e a l goods i n economic exchanges. Comparative data prepared 
by Korum i n d i c a t e s both of these trends f o r a selected 
number of middle-eastern countries,"^ which makes such a 
measure very d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e r p r e t . C e r t a i n l y the s i z e 
of the non-monetized sector and i t s geographical i s o l a t i o n 
from other sectors i n the economy can act as a considerable 
drag on f i n a n c i a l development and thus on r e a l output 
growth; but t h i s c o n s t r a i n t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o 
q u a n t i f y i n any meaningful way. 
2. Organized and Unorganized Money Markets 
" . . . The organized sector i n the developing 
c o u n t r i e s does not represent an organic e n t i t y . 
Organized and unorganized money markets e x i s t i n 
these c o u n t r i e s . The existence of unorganized money 
markets i s an obstacle t o economic development, 
since they do not help i n the accumulation of c a p i t a l 
funds, n e i t h e r can t h e i r f i n a n c i a l assets be used and 
invested i n those areas where the need of development 
i s greatest . . . The existence of such unorganized 
money markets means a narrowness of the organized 
money market."^ 
The existence of a number of money markets through which 
i n d i v i d u a l s operate leads t o fragmentation i n the process 
S. Korum, " F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e , Economci Growth and 
Monetary Policy i n Turkey", i n Central Banking. Monetary 
Policy and Economic Development, (CENTO Symposium held i n 
I z m i r , Turkey, A p r i l 1971) p.124. 
S. Korum, op. c i t . , p.124. 
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of c a p i t a l accumulation and t o a slower r a t e of c a p i t a l 
accumulation than would e x i s t i f u n i f i c a t i o n of money 
markets was f e a s i b l e . The more r a p i d r a t e of c a p i t a l 
accumulation generated through u n i f i c a t i o n w i l l then help 
t o accelerate the r a t e of economic development assuming 
t h a t investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s are a v a i l a b l e . As McKinnon 
po i n t out; 
" . . . The . . . u n i f i c a t i o n of the c a p i t a l market, 
which sharply increases rates of r e t u r n t o domestic 
savers by widening e x p l o i t a b l e investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s , 
i s e s s e n t i a l f o r e l i m i n a t i n g other forms of f r a g -
mentation . . . ^  
Bearing these general points i n mind, i t has t o be 
conceded t h a t t h i s type of fragmentation i s very d i f f i c u l t 
t o c h a r a c t e r i z e and q u a n t i f y . One i n d i c a t o r which has been 
used e x t e n s i v e l y i s the t o t a l money supply. The existence 
of a banking system, and the use of t h i s system by i n d i v i d u a l 
depositors i n d i c a t e s some s p e c i f i c type of o r g a n i z a t i o n , 
and i f the r a t i o of t o t a l bank deposits t o the money supply 
increases a t a r a t e g reater than the r a t e of growth o f 
r e a l income, then i t can be assumed t h a t more people are 
depositing savings i n t o t h i s organized system.^ Thus the 
organized money markets grow at the expense of unorganized 
5. R.I. McKinnon, Money and C a p i t a l i n Economic Development 
(The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , Washington D.C., 1973) p.9. 
6. I f deposits kept pace w i t h the growth i n r e a l income, and 
the marginal propensity t o save was constant, then an 
increasing r a t i o of deposits t o t o t a l money supply would not 
necessarily i n d i c a t e t h a t more use was being made of the 
banking system, i . e . more use, i n terms of more people. 
money markets and a greater volume of monetary assets i s 
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channelled through these markets. Organized money markets 
also reduce the costs of inform a t i o n and r i s k t o the 
i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t o r . Where unorganized markets e x i s t the 
costs of searching f o r loanable funds may be p r o h i b i t i v e 
as i t may r e q u i r e the accumulation of in f o r m a t i o n on a 
number of organized markets. Presumably i n an organized 
Q 
market t h i s search cost w i l l be reduced. Equally the 
transferance of resources from unorganized t o organized 
markets w i l l have the e f f e c t of increasing the e f f i c i e n c y 
of any given t o t a l of these monetary resources, i n t h a t 
knowledge about the range of p o t e n t i a l investors w i l l be 
greater i n the organized market and, hence, the r i s k 
involved w i t h respect t o each i n v e s t o r w i l l be reduced. 
3. Trade and F i n a n c i a l Development 
I n a survey of middle eastern banking conducted by 
Ronall i n 1962, i t was reported t h a t i n many cases, over 
t w o - t h i r d s of a l l loans by commercial banks were d i s -
9 
t r i b u t e d t o the trade sector. This s o r t of d i s t r i b u t i o n 
U. Tun Wai, " I n t e r e s t Rates i n the Organized Money Markets 
of Underdeveloped Countries", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund 
S t a f f Papers. Vol. V, No. 2, August 1956, p.249, 
This p o i n t i s established more f o r m a l l y i n Chapter One. 
J.O. Ronall, "Recent Banking Developments i n the Middle 
East", The Bankers Magazine, Vol.CXCIII, No. 1418, May 1963, 
p.419. 
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i s not d i f f i c u l t t o explain and i s , i n f a c t , repeated i n 
other developing areas of the world. Trade loans tend t o 
be short-term and the s e c u r i t y a v a i l a b l e i n terms of the 
throughput of goods i s q u i t e considerable. I f t h i s i s 
compared w i t h investment w i t h i n the nascent i n d u s t r i a l 
sector of a developing country, where t h e r i s k s of d e f a u l t 
may be considerably higher then i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 
commercial banks should have t h i s preference f o r tr a d e 
l o a n s . 1 0 From a borrowing p o i n t of view, the emphasis on 
commercial loans i s als o important. I n i t i a l l y deposits 
i n t o the banking system tend t o be short-term i n character, 
as people use the banks as a r e p o s i t o r y f o r short-term 
surplus funds, and t h e r e f o r e t h i s i s complemented by a 
gene r a l l y short-term loans p o r t f o l i o . Ronall's observation 
about the s t r u c t u r e of t o t a l loans r e f e r r e d t o 1962; but 
more than a decade l a t e r the s i t u a t i o n i s not much d i f f e r e n t , 
f o r a number of selected c o u n t r i e s as can be seen from 
Table 3.1. 
As Table 3.1. shows, the importance of the commercial 
sector, i n these selected middle eastern c o u n t r i e s , i n 
terms of the use of commercial banks has not diminished 
C.V. Brown reported t h a t indigenous banks i n Ni g e r i a 
a n t i c i p a t e d up t o a 2 5% d e f a u l t r a t e on i n d u s t r i a l loans 
i n N i g e r i a i n the 19 50s and e a r l y 1960s. See C.V. Brown, 
The Nigerian Banking System, U n i v e r s i t y of Glasgow S o c i a l 
and Economic Studies, New Series No. 8 (London: George 
A l l e n and Unwin 1966), Chapter 3. 
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Table 3.1. The percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans t o the 
commercial sector i n selected Middle Eastern 
c o u n t r i e s , 1960 and 1973 
Country 1960 1973 
I r a n 77 44 
Lebanon 40 53 
Libya 48 40 
Sudan 80 57 
Syria 64 79 
Turkey 39 68 
Sources: 1. For 1960 data see J.O. Ronall, op. c i t . 
2. Sudan, Bank of Sudan, T h i r t e e n t h Annual Report, 
December 1972. 
I r a n , Bank Markazi, Annual Report, 1973 - t h i s 
gives data f o r p r i v a t e sector commercial loans 
only. 
Syria., Banque Centrale de Syrie, Economic 
B u l l e t i n , June 1974. 
Turkey^ Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merhez Bankasi, 
A y l i k Buiten, December 1973. 
Lebanon, Banque du Liban, Annual Report, 1973. 
Notes: The f i g u r e f o r Sudan i n 1960 contained export 
f i n a n c i n g f o r c o t t o n and gum. The f i g u r e f o r 1973 
i s not as comprehensive. 
over the l a s t decade. This c o n t i n u i n g bias towards commercial 
loans i s not s u r p r i s i n g . As Nevin has commented; 
" . . . c e r t a i n l i m t e d sectors of the economy ( t y p i c a l l y 
the export of primary produce) w i l l hold out s u f f i c i e n t 
p r o f i t expectation t o ensure t h a t adequate finance i s 
forthcoming from banks and other sources; f o r the 
re s t of the economy, however, p r o f i t outcomes are so 
unc e r t a i n and f a r - d i s t a n t t h a t p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i s 
r e l u c t a n t t o flow i n t o i t of i t s own v o l u t i o n . . . 
11. E. Nevin, C a p i t a l Funds i n Underdeveloped Countries, (London: 
Macmillan and Co. Ltd. , 1961) p.74. 
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.Thus the c o n t i n u i n g importance of commercial loans i s one 
i n d i c a t o r of the lack of p e n e t r a t i o n of the commercial 
banks i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l sector. I n some sense a type 
of v i c i o u s c i r c l e works here. The i n d u s t r i a l sector, 
i n order t o grow, requires e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l assistance. 
This assistance i s not forthcoming as the i n d u s t r i a l 
sector i s regarded as being too r i s k y i n terms of the time 
p r o f i l e of*loans required. Hence the p o t e n t i a l of the 
i n d u s t r i a l sector i s not r e a l i z e d . The f i n a n c i n g o f 
in d u s t r y requires loans which are a t l e a s t medium-term 
i n nature and i s , t h e r e f o r e , very much dependent on the 
emergence of a long-term c a p i t a l market t o provide these 
fac i l i t i e s . 
4. The Development of C a p i t a l Markets 
The increased use of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s brings 
about what P a t r i c k r e f e r s t o as an "improvement i n the 
12 
composition of wealth". This improvement occurs as 
a given volume o f f i n a n c i a l assets are u t i l i z e d more 
e f f i c i e n t l y through the reduction of u n c e r t a i n t y and the 
increased flow of i n f o r m a t i o n between savers and i n v e s t o r s . 
This means t h a t a given volume of t a n g i b l e wealth can 
become more productive, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y f o r a given volume 
H.T. P a t r i c k , " F i n a n c i a l Development and Economic Growth 
i n Underdeveloped Countries", Economic Development and 
C u l t u r a l Chancre, Vol. 14, January 1966, pp.181. 
of investment a lower volume of t a n g i b l e wealth i s necessary. 
Taking t h i s second p o i n t f u r t h e r , the surplus wealth 
invested i n t o the f i n a n c i a l system may increase investment 
over a longer time period, as P a t r i c k notes; 
" . . . newly developed access t o funds on reasonable 
terms from f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s can induce or 
encourage entrepreneurs t o expand t h e i r horizon of 
conceivable o p p o r t u n i t i e s . . ."13 
Thus the re-investment of the surplus t a n g i b l e wealth can 
have the e f f e c t o f extending the time horizon of investment 
and thus can help t o s t i m u l a t e the growth of longer-term 
c a p i t a l markets. Such a development i s , however, dependent 
on the reduction i n u n c e r t a i n t y i n f i n a n c i a l markets and 
the concomitant reduction i n e f f e c t i v e i n t e r e s t r a t e s , 
thus making v i a b l e i n a present value sense, more and more 
investment p r o j e c t s . 
The degree t o which long-term c a p i t a l markets e x i s t 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r country i s one measure of the extent t o 
which medium and long-term finance i s a v a i l a b l e t o the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t . Perhaps more t o the p o i n t , i t i s the 
absence of long-term c a p i t a l markets which has encouraged 
the development of s p e c i a l i s e d i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
investment banks. The c r e a t i o n of such i n s t i t u t i o n s i s 
u s u a l l y due t o pressure from two s p e c i f i c sources. F i r s t l y 
many governments i n developing c o u n t r i e s f e e l t h a t they 
cannot w a i t f o r such i n s t i t u t i o n s t o develop n a t u r a l l y as 
the f i n a n c i a l system evolves. Secondly, the sectors of the 
H.T. P a t r i c k , op. c i t . , p.185. 
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economy i n need of s p e c i a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l assistance o f t e n 
do not have the conventional c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of high 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y and low r i s k t o a t t r a c t commercial bank funds. 
As Nevin concludes, 
". . . a n economy i s under-developed p r e c i s e l y because 
the g reater p a r t of i t s productive capacity has not 
proved an a t t r a c t i v e investment f o r p r i v a t e funds; 
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o channel funds i n t o those sectors 
have t h e r e f o r e f a i l e d t o evolve from the spur of 
o r g i n a r y market forces. Hence i f the savings a v a i l a b l e 
t o the community . . . are t o be used t o a t t a i n 
maximum growth i n the economy, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
framework t o a s s i s t and s t i m u l a t e the flow must be 
d e l i b e r a t e l y created and supported by the government 
of the t e r r i t o r y concerned. To leave t h i s task t o 
unassisted market forces i s t o incur a serious r i s k 
t h a t i t w i l l not be performed except a f t e r i n t o l e r a b l e 
delay . . . " 14 
Thus the c r e a t i o n of s p e c i a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
under some governmental or i n t e r n a t i o n a l patronage, i s , i n 
i t s e l f , an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e p o t e n t i a l d e f i c i e n c i e s of 
n a t u r a l f i n a n c i a l growth. 
5. The Seasonal C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Finance 
The existence of large a g r i c u l t u r a l sectors, i n output 
and employment terms, and i n d u s t r i e s processing a g r i c u l t u r a l 
goods i n many developing c o u n t r i e s means t h a t c e r t a i n 
seasonal f l u c t u a t i o n s are l i k e l y t o occur i n the f i n a n c i a l 
sector. The annual or bi-annual sale of crops w i l l boost 
cash reserves w i t h i n the banks, which w i l l then be 
g r a d u a l l y depleted over the growing season. This seasonable 
v a r i a b i l i t y i n cash flow probably means t h a t cash reserves 
have t o be kept a r t i f i c i a l l y high a t c e r t a i n periods i n the 
E. Nevin, op. c i t . , p.74. 
y e a r ; t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e loans made a v a i l a b l e by t h e banks. 
A number o f s p e c i f i c examples o f t h i s seasonal 
v a r i a b i l i t y i n cash s u p p l i e s i s g i v e n by Jucker-Fleetwood 
f o r s i x A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . ^ The m o n o c u l t u r e a g r i c u l t u r a l 
systems, e s p e c i a l l y i n Ghana, meant t h a t annual f l u c t u a t i o n s 
i n t h e money s u p p l y c o u l d be as g r e a t as 40% ( i n t h e case 
o f Ghana) i n t h e e a r l y 1960's. Thus seasonal f l u c t u a t i o n s 
i n cash m i t i g a t e a g a i n s t t h e o p t i m a l u t i l i z a t i o n o f funds 
i n medium and l o n g - t e r m markets. These seasonal c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c s w i l l presumably become l e s s i m p o r t a n t as t h e con-
t r i b u t i o n o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , i n r e l a t i v e , terms, 
t o n a t i o n a l o u t p u t d e c l i n e s . However, i n t h e e a r l y stages 
o f development, seasonal f l u c t u a t i o n s i n f i n a n c i a l t r a n s -
a c t i o n s may be an i m p o r t a n t e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e l e v e l s o f 
cash balances h e l d by t h e commercial banks. 
6. The D u a l i t y o f t h e I n t e r e s t Rate S t r u c t u r e 
J u s t as money markets may be "organized",' "unorganized" 
o r "fragmented", so a d u a l system o f i n t e r e s t r a t e s may be 
an i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f such markets. A l t h o u g h 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t r a t e s do e x i s t i n h i g h l y developed 
money and c a p i t a l markets, t h e y n o r m a l l y r e f l e c t t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e t i m e p r e f e r e n c e s o f i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t o r s and 
E. Jucker-Fleetwood, Money and Finance i n A f r i c a , Basle 
Centre f o r Economic and F i n a n c i a l Research. S e r i e s B, No. 6 
(London: George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1964) pp.74-82. 
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t h e r i s k s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t s . I n l e s s w e l l 
developed markets d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t r a t e s may r e f l e c t n o t 
o n l y t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f funds b u t t h e fragmented n a t u r e 
o f f i n a n c i a l markets, where t h e e x i s t e n c e o f i m p e r f e c t 
i n f o r m a t i o n may mean t h a t d i f f e r e n t p r i c e s e x i s t f o r a 
s i n g l e monetary a s s e t . I t i s t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h 
fragments t h e f i n a n c i a l system such t h a t no one i n t e r e s t 
16 
r a t e r e f l e c t s t h e community's c o l l e c t i v e t i m e p r e f e r e n c e . 
As Bennett p o i n t s o u t , 
" . . . The f i n a n c i a l markets i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
economy a r e h i g h l y p e r s o n a l i z e d , so t h a t changes i n 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s on borrowed funds w o u l d be i n e f f e c t i v e 
as s t i m u l a n t s t o i n c r e a s e d s a v i n g s o r r e d i r e c t i o n o f 
t h e uses o f p a s t s a v i n g s . Each i n t e r e s t e d household 
has a p a r t i c u l a r f i r m o r group o f f i r m s and a 
p a r t i c u l a r f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n t o w h i c h i t s s a v i n g s 
are made a v a i l a b l e . Each f i r m has p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t e d households and a p a r t i c u l a r f i n a n c i a l 
17 
i n s t i t u t i o n f r o m w h i c h i t can o b t a i n funds . . . ' 
Thus a whole range o f i n t e r e s t r a t e s may e x i s t i n s m a l l 
" p e r s o n a l i z e d " and s e p a r a t e markets. Thus any a n a l y s i s o f 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s conducted i n terms o f u n c e r t a i n t y a l o n e w i l l 
o n l y be a b l e t o a s s i m i l a t e h a l f t h e problem. There may be 
p e r f e c t c e r t a i n t y i n each s e p a r a t e market, y e t d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s f o r i d e n t i c a l a s s e t s may e x i s t because o f 
t h e . g e o g r a p h i c a l i s o l a t i o n o f each market and because o f 
16. R . I . McKinnon, l o c . c i t . , p.16. 
17. R.L. Bennett, The F i n a n c i a l S e c t o r and Economic Development, 
( B a l t i m o r e : The John Hopkins Press 1965) pp.24-25. 
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i t s unique s e t o f p a r t i c i p a n t s , as observed by Bennett. 
Of course t h e most obvious case o f d u a l i t y i n i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s i s t h a t between " o f f i c i a l " C e n t r a l Bank and commercial 
bank r a t e s and t h o s e r a t e s charged by money l e n d e r s . Again 
t h e d i f f e r e n t r a t e s e x i s t , n o t because o f any s p e c i f i c 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e as s e t s b e i n g o f f e r e d ; b u t because 
o f t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f th o s e r e q u e s t i n g l o a n s , i n terms 
o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e view l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s have o f t h e i r 
a b i l i t y t o repay t h e l o a n . A p a r t i c u l a r l y good example o f 
t h e w o r k i n g o f such markets i s g i v e n by F r y f o r A f g h a n i s t a n . 
A l t h o u g h much o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n concerns t h e r o l e o f t h e 
money bazaars i n f i n a n c i n g f o r e i g n t r a d e , some o f t h e p o i n t s 
made a r e germaine t o t h i s d i s c u s s i o n on i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s . One o f t h e g r e a t a t t r a c t i o n s o f t h e bazaar i s t h a t 
an i n d i v i d u a l t r a d e r can g e t a l o a n whenever he r e q u i r e s 
one and w i t h v e r y l i t t l e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t y . The' 
l a c k o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t y , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e 
r e g u l a t e d i n t e r e s t r a t e s w i t h i n t h e f o r m a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r , 
has meant t h a t i n t e r e s t r a t e s i n t h e bazaar have tended 
t o d e c l i n e as t h e r a t e s i n t h e f o r m a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r have 
r i s e n , t h u s r e p r e s s i n g f i n a n c i a l g r o w t h . T h i s p o i n t s t o 
a n o t h e r aspect o f t h i s d u a l i t y o f i n t e r e s t r a t e s . The 
c o n t r o l o f i n t e r e s t r a t e s by t h e C e n t r a l Bank may have t h e 
M.J. F r y , Kabul and Kandahar Money Bazaars: T h e i r Role i n 
A f g h a n i s t a n ' s F o r e i g n Trade, ( K a b u l : U n i t e d S t a t e s Agency 
f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development, June 1973). 
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e f f e c t o f d i v e r t i n g resources from t h e commercial banks i n t o 
t h e bazaars. For i n s t a n c e , i n t e r e s t r a t e s on loans i n 
A f g h a n i s t a n have always d i s c r i m i n a t e d i n f a v o u r o f t h e 
p u b l i c s e c t o r ( 2 % - 5% i n t h e 1960's) a g a i n s t t h e p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r ( 6 % - 8% i n t h e 1960's). T h i s has t h e e f f e c t o f 
e i t h e r d r i v i n g o u t p r i v a t e s e c t o r i n v e s t m e n t o r c a u s i n g 
investment i n h i g h e r r i s k a c t i v i t i e s t o occur i n t h e p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r . 
I n t e r e s t r a t e s have an i m p o r t a n t r o l e t o p l a y i n a 
d e v e l o p i n g economy. As Chandavakar p o i n t s o u t , 
" . . . i n t e r e s t r a t e s can be viewed as i n s t r u m e n t s 
f o r more e f f e c t i v e m o b i l i z a t i o n o f savings ( d e p o s i t 
r a t e s ) t h r o u g h t h e o f f e r o f r e a l i s t i c r a t e s on 
monetary s a v i n g s , such as t i m e and savings d e p o s i t s , 
c l a i m s on f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and government 
s e c u r i t i e s . S i m i l a r l y , i n t e r e s t r a t e s can be viewed 
as a s o c i a l r a t e o f d i s c o u n t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e optimum 
a l l o c a t i o n o f s a v i n g s between consumption and i n v e s t -
ment and as a r a t i o n i n g d e v i c e f o r e f f i c i e n t a l l o c a -
t i o n among a l t e r n a t i v e forms o f i n v e s t m e n t . . ."19 
The m o b i l i z a t i o n o f s a v i n g s i n t o f o r m a l markets, i n c r e a s i n g 
i n f o r m a t i o n and r e d u c i n g m a r g i n a l c o s t s , reduces r a t e s o f 
i n t e r e s t and r a i s e s t h e m a r g i n a l e f f i c i e n c y o f c a p i t a l . 
Thus t h e d u a l i t y o f t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e s t r u c t u r e i s i n 
i t s e l f a drag on f i n a n c i a l g r o w t h . 
A.G. Chandavakar, "Some Aspects o f I n t e r e s t Rate P o l i c i e s 
i n Less Developed Economies: The Experience o f S e l e c t e d 
A s i a n C o u n t r i e s " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund S t a f f Papers, 
V o l . 18, No. 1, March 1971, pp.49-50. 
The arguments p r e s e n t e d under t h e p r e c e d i n g s i x 
headings i n d i c a t e t h a t f i n a n c i a l g r o w t h may be c o n s t r a i n e d 
by a wide range o f f a c t o r s , some more t a n g i b l e t h a n o t h e r s . 
The measures o f f i n a n c i a l g r o w t h used b o t h by G o l d s m i t h and 
Shaw comprehend some o f t h e s e f a c t o r s ; b u t c e r t a i n l y n o t 
a l l o f them. Q u i t e c l e a r l y n o t a l l t h e s e f a c t o r s o p e r a t e 
w i t h equal f o r c e i n every c o u n t r y ; b u t i n t h e case o f 
Lebanon t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o suggest t h a t many 
o f t h e s e f a c t o r s may be i m p o r t a n t . I n P a r t I I evidence w i l l 
be p r e s e n t e d on t h e degree o f m o n e t i z a t i o n i n t h e economy, 
t h e o p e r a t i o n o f u n o r g a n i z e d markets; t h e heavy c o n c e n t r a -
t i o n i n t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r on commercial l o a n s ; t h e absence 
o f a medium- and l o n g - t e r m c a p i t a l market and t h e d u a l i t y 
o f t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e s t r u c t u r e . Seasonal f l u c t u a t i o n s i n 
f i n a n c e i s p r o b a b l y t h e o n l y f a c t o r w h i c h i s not i m p o r t a n t 
i n Lebanon. The presence o f t h e s e f a c t o r s , i t w i l l be 
argued, has i n h i b i t e d t h e development o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u -
ments f o r i n d u s t r i a l development. Thus, a l t h o u g h t h e r a t i o 
o f f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s t o n a t i o n a l income i n Lebanon i s w e l l 
i n excess o f u n i t y , t h e whole f i n a n c i a l system has p l a y e d 
l i t t l e p a r t i n t h e domestic f i x e d c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n . 
A p a r t from t h e f a c t o r s mentioned above t h e presence o f 
f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t s and f o r e i g n banks i n t h e f i n a n c i a l 
system has a l s o been d e c i s i v e . 
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F o r e i g n Currency D e p o s i t s and F o r e i g n Banks 
W h i l s t t h e presence o f f o r e i g n banks i n many d e v e l o p i n g 
c o u n t r i e s i s c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z a b l e , i t i s more d i f f i c u l t t o 
i d e n t i f y t h e ways i n w h i c h f o r e i g n banks u n i q u e l y a f f e c t 
f i n a n c i a l g r o w t h . The development o f f o r e i g n b a n k i n g i n 
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s has no s i n g l e f a c t o r b e h i n d i t . 
C e r t a i n l y i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t r a d e between Western 
Europe and A f r i c a , South America and A s i a s t i m u l a t e d t h e 
g r o w t h o f f o r e i g n banks i n many c o u n t r i e s t o f a c i l i t a t e 
payments between raw m a t e r i a l s u p p l i e r s and t h e i n d u s -
20 
t r i a l i s i n g markets o f Europe. I n a d d i t i o n f o r e i g n banks 
t h r o u g h t h e i r e x p e r t i z e and overseas f i n a n c i a l b a c k i n g 
have been a b l e t o secure d e p o s i t s a t source f o r r e p a t r i a -
t i o n t o overseas money markets such as London. Thus a 
t r a d i t i o n a l view o f f o r e i g n banks would be t h a t t h e y have 
l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n t h e domestic economy o t h e r t h a n e n s u r i n g 
t h a t new d e p o s i t s become a v a i l a b l e from t h e domestic 
economy w h i c h can t h e n be used more p r o d u c t i v e l y i n overseas 
markets. T h i s view i s w e l l e x e m p l i f i e d i n t h e comments 
made by Mars o f f o r e i g n banks ( " e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l " banks 
as he c a l l e d them) i n N i g e r i a a t t h e end o f t h e Second 
Wor l d War, 
20. W h i l s t t h e f i n a n c i n g o f t r a d e was n o t t h e o n l y reason f o r 
t h e g r o w t h o f f o r e i g n banks i t was a v e r y i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r . 
See D. J o s l i n , A Century o f Banking i n L a t i n America, 
(London: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press 1963) p.18. 
" . . . Since i n t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l banks would be 
p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e i n t e r n a l , development o f 
th e c o u n t r y , t h e y would be more eager t o c r e a t e con-
d i t i o n s e n a b l i n g them t o l e n d t o A f r i c a n s t h a n t h e 
e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l banks. These n a t u r a l l y c o n c e n t r a t e 
on e x t e r n a l t r a d e ; and, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e 
i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f e x i s t i n g i n v e s t -
ments i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, t h e y a r e p r o b a b l y more 
anxious t o p r e s e r v e t h e p r e s e n t i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e 
o f Great B r i t a i n , by r e t a i n i n g c o l o n i a l markets f o r 
B r i t i s h e x p o r t goods, t h a n t o develop secondary 
i n d u s t r i e s i n N i g e r i a and elsewhere . . . 2 ^ 
I n e v i t a b l y a l l f o r e i g n banks have c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h 
t h e i r own c o u n t r i e s o f o r i g i n . For i n s t a n c e , many o f t h e 
f o r e i g n banks o f B r i t i s h o r i g i n m a i n t a i n t h e i r head o f f i c e s 
i n London and t h e s e banks a r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e B r i t i s h 
b a n k i n g system t h r o u g h j o i n t ownership. E q u a l l y , B r i t i s h 
b a n k ing t r a d i t i o n s and t h e use o f t h e London money market 
f o r s h o r t - t e r m funds w i l l i n f l u e n c e t h e way i n w h i c h f o r e i g n 
banks o p e r a t e i n overseas t e r r i t o r i e s . The d e s c r i p t i o n : 
g i v e n by Mars o f developments i n N i g e r i a c o u p l e d w i t h 
s i m i l a r comments f r o m many o t h e r c o u n t r i e s would suggest 
t h a t f o r e i g n banks w i l l o n l y have a s u p e r f i c i a l e f f e c t , a t 
most, on f i n a n c i a l g r o w t h i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . The 
emphasis on t h e f i n a n c e o f t r a d e and t h e use o f overseas 
money markets r e a l l y p u t f o r e i g n banks i n an encla v e 
s i t u a t i o n , t h u s t h e i r e f f e c t s on domestic developments were 
J. Mars, "The Monetary and Banking System and Loan Market 
o f N i g e r i a " i n M i n i n g . Commerce and Fin a n c e i n N i g e r i a -
t h e second p a r t o f a s t u d y e n t i t l e d The Economics o f a 
T r o p i c a l Dependency by P.A. Bower, A.J. Brown, C. Laubscher, 
J. Mars and S i r A. Pirn (London: Faber and Faber L i m i t e d , 
1948) p.208. 
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bound to be l i m i t e d . Many of t h e s t u d i e s r e l a t e d t o t h e 
development of f o r e i g n banks t e n d t o emphasise t h e p o i n t 
t h a t as d o m e s t i c monetary c o n t r o l s become more r e s t r i c t i v e 
( t y p i c a l l y t h i s i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a 
C e n t r a l Bank) and as t h e s i z e of t h e d o mestic market grows 
t h e n f o r e i g n banks t e n d t o l o s e t h e i r e n c l a v e s t a t u s and 
become more i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e d o mestic economy. However 
t h i s t y p e of argument s u g g e s t s t h a t f o r e i g n banks do not 
p r o v i d e i n n o v a t i v e f i n a n c e , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e term has 
a l r e a d y been used i n t h i s t h e s i s . I n o t h e r words t h e y a r e 
r e s p o n d i n g t o p r e s s u r e s put upon them by l e g a l and c o m m e r c i a l 
developments. T h i s view c o n t r a s t s r a t h e r s t r o n g l y w i t h 
t h a t of G o l d s m i t h when he s a y s o f t h e r o l e of f o r e i g n banks, 
" . . . T h e r e i s no doubt t h a t t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n of 
f i n a n c i a l t e c h n o l o g y , as w e l l as t h e more f a r - r e a c h i n g 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new i n s t i t u t i o n s by f o r e i g n e r s has 
p l a y e d a l a r g e p a r t i n t h e f i n a n c i a l development o f 
most c o u n t r i e s . . . . T h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t . . . 
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t by f o r e i g n e r s of c o m m e r c i a l banks, 
and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t of c e n t r a l banks, has been t h e 
most i m p o r t a n t s i n g l e i n f l u e n c e . . ."23 
22. The l i t e r a t u r e on f o r e i g n banking, e s p e c i a l l y i n A f r i c a , i s 
q u i t e l a r g e and a sample, w h i c h s u b s c r i b e s to t h i s view, 
would i n c l u d e , C.V. Brown, op. c i t . , W.T. Newlyn, Money i n 
an A f r i c a n C o n t e x t , S t u d i e s i n A f r i c a n Economics No. 1 
( N a i r o b i : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1 9 67); A. Basch, F i n a n c i n g 
Economic Development, (New Y o r k : The M a c m i l l a n Company 
19 6 4 ) ; E . E . J u c k e r - F l e e t w o o d , Money and F i n a n c e i n A f r i c a , 
op. c i t . 
23. R.W. Gol d s m i t h , F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e and Development, S t u d i e s 
i n C o m p a r a t i v e Economics No. 9, (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s 1969) pp.360-361. 
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Goldsmith goes on to admit that the volume of evidence 
on i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s and the data f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
comparisons i s very l i m i t e d . However, he suggests t h a t 
f o r e i g n banks became predominant i n the nineteenth century 
fo r the reasons advanced e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter and more 
r e c e n t l y have tended to d e c l i n e i n absolute importance 
as domestic f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have developed. The 
suggestion here i s t h a t the mere presence of f o r e i g n banks 
has done something to s t i m u l a t e domestic f i n a n c i a l growth, 
as Goldsmith goes on to suggest, 
" . . . Foreign banks have i n most c o u n t r i e s played a 
d e c i s i v e r o l e i n introducing deposit and investment 
banking and i n nursing i t over i t s f i r s t d i f f i c u l t 
stages of adaptation to an environment d i f f e r i n g very 
much from t h a t of the Western European homeland. 
Secondly commercial banks have i n many of these 
c o u n t r i e s e x e r c i s e d a f a r - r e a c h i n g i n f l u e n c e on 
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l development, i n p a r t i c u l a r 
on for e i g n t r a d e and thus have i n d i r e c t l y extended the 
i n f l u e n c e of f o r e i g n shareholders and managers f a r 
beyond the immediate sphere of the a c t i v i t i e s of 
f o r e i g n banks . . .24 
The t h r u s t of Goldsmith's arguments concerns the r o l e of 
the t r a n s f e r e n c e of f i n a n c i a l technology; a t r a n s f e r e n c e , 
he suggests, achieved f a r more e a s i l y than the t r a n s f e r e n c e 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l t echnologies. F i n a n c i a l 
e x p e r t i s e , however, can be double-edged. There i s no 
doubting the f a c t t h a t personnel employed i n f o r e i g n banking 
concerns w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y , i n the f i r s t stages, hold 
over 
a comparative, i f not absolute, advantage f t h e i r domestic 
R.W. Goldsmith, OP. c i t . , pp.366-367. 
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counterparts. I f t h i s i s coupled w i t h the l a r g e overseas 
f i n a n c i a l backing a v a i l a b l e to f o r e i g n banks, then the 
average and marginal c o s t s of operating branches i n 
developing c o u n t r i e s w i l l be l e s s f o r fo r e i g n banks than 
25 
domestic banks. So foreign banks come i n t o a s p e c i f i c 
country w i t h a comparative advantage over l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
T h is advantage d e r i v e s from t h e i r g l o b a l s i z e and from the 
general l e v e l of e x p e r t i s e i n the banks. Now i t could be 
argued t h a t t h i s i s a d e s i r a b l e development i n t h a t 
competition between banks w i l l r a i s e the e f f i c i e n c y of 
a l l of them and l o c a l banks w i l l b e n e f i t from the examples 
"set by f o r e i g n banks. However, the following question c o u l d 
be posed - why does the fo r e i g n bank enter the market i n 
the f i r s t p l ace? - almost c e r t a i n l y not to provide s m a l l 
s c a l e loans to merchants and craftsmen but r a t h e r to capture 
deposits a t source f o r re-investment i n Europe and America. 
Thus the f o r e i g n bank element can c o - e x i s t w i t h the l o c a l 
bank element and y e t not a s s i s t i n i t s i n t e r n a l development. 
T h i s i s obviously i n c l i n i n g to the enclave view of f o r e i g n 
banking developments. 
I f f o r e i g n banks concentrate on t r a d e f i n a n c e and the 
r e p a t r i a t i o n of excess funds to overseas money markets, 
then indigenous banks a r e l e f t to deal w i t h the problems 
Th i s i s assuming t h a t a l e a r n i n g by doing process i s i n 
operation, w i t h the fo r e i g n banks operating on a lower 
portion of the l e a r n i n g curve. 
8 1 . 
of the emerging demands f o r i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
c r e d i t s d o m e stically. I f the u s u a l l y l u c r a t i v e and s h o r t -
term commercial loans are denied to them, then l o c a l banks 
are very e a s i l y i n danger of developing, a h i g h - r i s k , 
i l l i q u i d and u n d i v e r s i f i e d p o r t f o l i o of loans. T h i s point 
i s emphasised here s i n c e i t c o n s t i t u t e s the b a s i s f o r a 
wider range of arguments i n Part I I on Lebanese banking 
developments. I n Part I I i t i s contended t h a t i n Lebanon 
the f i n a n c i a l system has been dichotomized w i t h f o r e i g n and 
indigenous banks adopting s e p e r a t e l y the functions 
described b r i e f l y above. 
I t i s a p i t y , i n a sense, t h a t Goldsmith t e l l s us 
nothing, e x p l i c i t l y , about what he means by the term 
" f i n a n c i a l technology", s i n c e i t would h e l p i n understanding 
why he t h i n k s i t i s so important and why i t has had the 
p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s a s s e r t e d f o r i t . Presumably the entry 
of a f o r e i g n bank into a f i n a n c i a l system introduces banking 
p r a c t i c e s p o s s i b l y a l i e n to the e x i s t i n g indigenous banks. 
The very success of the for e i g n bank, which, i n c i d e n t a l l y , 
may have nothing to do w i t h the technologies employed by 
i t , may encourage l o c a l banks to emulate i t . T h is might 
involve s p e c i f i c r e - t r a i n i n g programmes f o r personnel or 
the adopting of s p e c i f i c methods of banking p r a c t i c e , 
i . e . accounting methods, the use of c e r t a i n types of 
c o l l a t e r a l , methods to encourage i n c r e a s e d savings through 
bank de p o s i t s . I n a l l these c a s e s i t i s p o s s i b l e to 
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hypothesise that the f o r e i g n bank has a s t i m u l a t i n g e f f e c t 
on l o c a l banks, i n t h a t the f i n a n c i a l technology embodied 
i n the f o r e i g n bank i s somehow passed on. But i s f i n a n c i a l 
technology a f r e e good? - presumably not. I f a f o r e i g n 
bank enters the market i t w i l l attempt to maintain any 
advantage i t has by r e s t r i c t i n g information and w i l l not 
a c t i n the p h i l a n t h r o p i c way suggested above. Thus new 
f i n a n c i a l technology may be embodied i n the f o r e i g n bank 
but not passed on, unless domestic monetary c o n t r o l i s 
s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to be able to standardize procedures 
between banks. Thus monetary c o n t r o l may be important i n 
reducing the dichotomy i n lending and borrowing p r a c t i c e s 
mentioned e a r l i e r . T h i s i s a point we w i l l r e t u r n to i n 
more d e t a i l i n chapter E i g h t . 
I t must a l s o be recognized t h a t i n a developing 
f i n a n c i a l system a f o r e i g n bank may be a very a t t r a c t i v e 
magnet f o r domestic funds. I n d i v i d u a l s a v e r s , q u i t e r i g h t l y , 
w i l l assume t h a t the f o r e i g n bank i s l a r g e r and more f i r m l y 
secured than-the newly-emerging l o c a l banks and hence w i l l 
deposit t h e i r funds i n the f o r e i g n bank. Even higher 
i n t e r e s t on deposits o f f e r e d by l o c a l banks may not have 
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the e f f e c t of s h i f t i n g funds. Then the higher i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s o f f e r e d by l o c a l banks have to be o f f s e t by loans 
A s p e c i f i c example f o r Lebanon i n the 1930's i s given i n 
S.B. Himadeh, The Monetary and Banking System of S y r i a . 
( B e i r u t : American Press, 193 5) p.180, where l o c a l bank 
deposit r a t e s were some 50% hi g h e r than f o r e i g n bank 
deposit r a t e s . 
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27 w i t h a high expected r a t e of r e t u r n and hence a high r i s k . 
Such a process as t h i s i s not l i k e l y to s t i m u l a t e the 
growth of indigenous banks and w i l l , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , 
suppress them. 
F i n a l l y i n t h i s chapter we need to turn our a t t e n t i o n 
to the e f f e c t t h a t foreign currency deposits have on 
f i n a n c i a l growth. Goldsmith's d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e of 
f o r e i g n banks makes no mention of f o r e i g n currency d e p o s i t s . 
T h i s i s probably not s u r p r i s i n g , s i n c e most of h i s a t t e n t i o n 
was being focussed on A f r i c a , L a t i n America and some p a r t s 
of Europe. Here foreign banks were securing domestic 
currency deposits i n the main. I n the Middle E a s t today 
and e s p e c i a l l y i n Lebanon, the s i t u a t i o n i s somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t . S t a t e s r e c e i v i n g o i l revenues normally r e c e i v e 
them i n e i t h e r s t e r l i n g or d o l l a r s . I n a d d i t i o n many 
trade t r a n s a c t i o n s take p l a c e d i r e c t l y i n a f o r e i g n currency, 
r a t h e r than through the intermediation of the domestic 
currency. T h i s means t h a t banks have c o l l e c t e d deposits 
denominated i n other c u r r e n c i e s than l o c a l c u r r e n c i e s . We 
w i l l go on to show, i n chapter Seven, t h a t i n Lebanon 
forei g n currency deposits now account f o r over 6096 of t o t a l 
bank d e p o s i t s . The presence of t h e s e s o r t s of deposits i n 
a banking system have a number of e f f e c t s . F i r s t l y , the 
a b i l i t y to f i n a n c e domestic a c t i v i t i e s i s r e s t r i c t e d s i n c e 
t h e r e i s a f o r e i g n exchange r i s k involved i n expanding 
domestic c r e d i t on the b a s i s of f o r e i g n currency deposits. 
Here r i s k i s measured i n the u s u a l way f o r p o r t f o l i o a n a l y s i s 
as the standard d e v i a t i o n or v a r i a n c e of the p o s s i b l e outcomes. 
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What domestic c r e d i t expansion t h e r e i s w i l l presumably have 
an exchange r i s k premium attached to i t , which w i l l r a i s e 
the c o s t of loans to the domestic economy. Secondly, many 
foreig n currency deposits may be short-term i n nature i n 
that, as f o r e i g n currency deposits, they are deposited 
i n M i d d l e E a s t e r n Banks w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t they be 
moved into European and American money markets as soon as 
p o s s i b l e . Thus middle eastern banking systems, and t h i s i s 
c e r t a i n l y r e l e v a n t i n Lebanon, simply become short-term 
r e p o s i t o r i e s f o r fo r e i g n currency d e p o s i t s . T h i s f o r c e s 
many banks t o hold cash and l i q u i d r e s e r v e s w e l l beyond 
the l e v e l t h a t would be necessary i n a s i n g l e currency case 
Again, the many problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e f i n i n g l i q u i d i t y 
i n these c a s e s a r e d e a l t w i t h i n chapter Seven. T h i r d l y the 
presence of fo r e i g n currency deposits make monetary c o n t r o l 
more d i f f i c u l t . Domestic monetary p o l i c i e s a f f e c t i n g the 
l i q u i d i t y of the banking s e c t o r may have a fo r e i g n exchange 
e f f e c t , i n t h a t depositors, i n many cas e s not n a t i o n a l s of 
the c o u n t r i e s concerned, move t h e i r d eposits i n response to 
the monetary c o n t r o l . F o r i n s t a n c e any l e g i s l a t i o n by the 
C e n t r a l Bank i n Lebanon to t r y and reduce the turn-over on 
for e i g n currency deposits, t r a d i t i o n a l l y reported as being 
higher than t h a t on domestic currency deposits, p o s s i b l y t o 
encourage more domestic c r e d i t expansion,could have the 
e f f e c t of causing the withdrawal of f o r e i g n currency d e p o s i t s . 
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Thus t h e presence o f f o r e i g n banks and t h e denomina-
t i o n o f d e p o s i t s i n f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s add f u r t h e r 
dimensions t o t h i s g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between f i n a n c i a l g r o w t h and economic development. 
G e n e r a l l y speaking w h i l s t f o r e i g n banks have t h e a f f e c t o f 
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g " t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r t h e y a l s o 
i n t r o d u c e t h e dichotomy between commercial and i n d u s t r i a l 
f i n a n c e w h i c h tends t o dis a d v a n t a g e t h e indigen o u s banks. 
Secondly t h e presence o f f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t s means, 
i n g e n e r a l terms, t h a t t h e t o t a l volume o f bank d e p o s i t s 
i n t h e f i n a n c i a l system p r o b a b l y o v e r - e s t i m a t e t h e domestic 
c r e d i t expansion a b i l i t y o f t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r , s i n c e 
banks w i l l have a tendency n o t t o become " f u l l y loaned-up" 
i 
on t h e i r f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t s . 
G o l d s m i t h , i n r e v i e w i n g t h e g r o w t h o f f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and new f i n a n c i a l i s s u e s i n f o u r t y - s i x 
developed and d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s i n t h e p e r i o d 1949-1967, 
came t o many c o n c l u s i o n s about t h e way t h e f i n a n c i a l system 
was r e l a t e d t o n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t ; b u t t h e f o l l o w i n g con-
c l u s i o n i s a v e r y i m p o r t a n t one i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e 
arguments p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r . He argues t h a t , 
" . . . i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s and h i s t o r i c a l a c c i d e n t s 
p l a y a c o n s i d e r a b l e r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g b o t h t h e l e v e l 
o f t h e r a t i o o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t o n a t i o n a l 
p r o d u c t and s t i l l more so i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e 
t o t a l a s s e t s o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s among t h e main 
t y p e s o f them . . . The i n f l u e n c e o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
o r a c c i d e n t a l f a c t o r s appears t o be even more p r o -
nounced among l e s s developed c o u n t r i e s and i t w o u l d 
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r e q u i r e a c o u n t r y - b y - c o u n t r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e i r 
f i n a n c i a l development t o be a b l e t o e x p l a i n t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e s . . .28 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s c o u n t r y - b y - c o u n t r y approach w h i c h 
w i l l be adopted i n P a r t I I , where t h e development o f t h e 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r i n Lebanon i s documented and t h e g r o w t h 
o f t h e s e c t o r i s r e l a t e d t o economic development i n t h e 
c o u n t r y . 
R.W. Goldsmith, "The Development o f F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s 
D u r i n g t h e Post-War P e r i o d " , Banco N a z i o n a l e d e l Lavoro 
Q u a r t e r l y Review. No. 97, June 1971, pp.172-173. 
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A P r o f i l e o f the Lebanese Economy 19 50-1974 
The t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between f i n a n c i a l growth 
and economic development developed i n Part I can now be 
extended and a p p l i e d t o the Lebanese economy. To under-
stand f u l l y the f a c t o r s which have i n f l u e n c e d f i n a n c i a l 
growth i n Lebanon and the f a c t o r s which have determined the 
r a t e o f economic development, i t i s necessary t o p rov ide a 
c l e a r d e s c r i p t i o n o f recent developments i n t he Lebanese 
economy. This chapter i s concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h the 
s t r u c t u r a l changes t h a t have occurred i n the components o f 
n a t i o n a l ou tpu t i n Lebanon between 1950 and 1974. The 
choice o f 19 50 i s somewhat a r b i t r a r y , bu t i t does c o i n c i d e 
w i t h the f i r s t appearance o f some basic aggregate s t a t i s t i c s 
on the economy and w i t h t he beginning o f the emergence o f 
the banking system t h a t e x i s t s i n Lebanon today. 
P a r t i c u l a r emphasis i s placed i n t h i s chapter on the 
apparent i n s t a b i l i t y c rea ted by the r e l a t i v e l y smal l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d u s t r y t o n a t i o n a l o u t p u t . 
I n a d d i t i o n the p r o v i s i o n o f f i n a n c i a l serv ices and the 
l e v e l o f government expenditures are h i g h l i g h t e d as p o t e n t i a l 
obstacles t o more r a p i d and d i v e r s i f i e d development i n the 
f u t u r e . This chapter a l so serves as a genera l i n t r o d u c t i o n 
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t o the more d e t a i l e d ana lys i s o f t h e growth and development 
of the f i n a n c i a l sec tor conta ined i n the f o l l o w i n g f i v e 
chapters . 
A somewhat g l i b view o f Lebanese economic development 
would suggest t h a t the n a t i o n a l charac te r o f the Lebanese 
combined w i t h c e r t a i n geographical and h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s 
has produced a predominant ly t r a d i n g economy, w i t h con-
s ide rab le emphasis being placed on qu ick r e t u r n s . A l t e r -
n a t i v e l y the apocryphal s t o r y o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic 
expert v i s i t i n g Lebanon i n the 1950's who was reputed t o 
have sa id , ' I d o n ' t know how i t ( the economy) works; bu t 
i t does, so leave i t a l o n e ' , a l so i n d i c a t e s t h a t not on ly 
i s the economy geared t o qu ick r e t u r n s , but anyone a t t emp t ing 
t o analyse i t i s doomed t o f a i l u r e . ^ " This view probably 
had some t r u t h i n i t when basic aggregate economic data 
was t o t a l l y u n a v a i l a b l e ; but now some data i s a v a i l a b l e 
which makes some ana ly s i s o f recent t rends p o s s i b l e . 
However, t h e r e i s a need t o be m i n d f u l o f the f o l l o w i n g 
comment i n a handbook produced f o r t he American govern-
ment on Lebanon i n 1968, 
This s t o r y i s r epor ted i n one form i n C P . Kindleberger , 
Economic Development. 2nd e d i t i o n (Tokyo: McGraw H i l l Book 
Co. I n c . , 1956) p . 2 3 1 . 
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" . . . Ana lys i s o f the economy i s hampered by a lack 
o f e s s e n t i a l s t a t i s t i c s . The l a s t popu la t ion census 
was taken i n 19.32. The on ly o f f i c i a l set o f n a t i o n a l 
accounts was completed i n 1967 f o r t h e year 1964. 
Balance o f payments i n f o r m a t i o n i s publ i shed w i t h 
severa l years ' delay. These and o the r publ ished 
statements are l a r g e l y based on es t imates , because 
basic data are not being c o l l e c t e d . The economic 
s t a t i s t i c s are t h e r e f o r e t o be considered on ly as 
approximat ions ."2 
I t i s t r u e t h a t the data a v a i l a b l e does not permit o f 
i n t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s ; but what i s a v a i l a b l e i s very u s e f u l 
i n i n d i c a t i n g broad t rends and changes i n economic a c t i v i t y . 
The ana lys i s presented i n t h i s chapter w i l l concentra te on 
a pe r iod o f r a p i d economic growth, over the l a s t twenty-
f i v e years . 
Lebanon w i t h a land area o f 10,400 square k i lome t re s 
occupies a s l i g h t l y unusual p o s i t i o n i n the present Middle 
East . I t s long h i s t o r y has brought t oge the r numerous 
m i n o r i t y groups, bo th r e l i g i o u s and e t h n i c a l . The moun-
ta inous t e r r a i n has a l lowed these m i n o r i t y groups t o s u r v i v e 
t o the present day and t o main ta in t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
The count ry i s l a r g e l y dominated by C h r i s t i a n and Muslim 
groups, who, a l though supposedly represen t ing 50% o f the 
t o t a l popu la t i on each, are i n f a c t fragmented i n t e r n a l l y . 
Between these two major groupings are one o r two d i s t i n c t 
m i n o r i t y groups; the most impor tant be ing the Druzes (about 
H.H. Smith, ( E d i t o r ) , Area Handbook f o r Lebanon, DA Pamphlet 
No. 550-24 (Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 
1969) pp.213-214. 
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6% of the p o p u l a t i o n ) . The r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the 
major r e l i g i o u s groups i s an impor tant element i n p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e and the Lebanese p o l i t i c a l system has evolved i n such 
a way as t o p rov ide r ep resen ta t ion on the basis o f r e l i g i o u s 
groups r a t h e r than p o l i t i c a l views. A f u r t h e r impor tant 
i n f l u e n c e on Lebanese l i f e i s the very l a rge number o f 
emigrants l i v i n g i n o ther pa r t s o f the w o r l d . I t has been 
est imated t h a t more Lebanese l i v e ou t s ide Lebanon than 
i n s i d e . I f t h i s i s t r u e , the t o t a l number o f emigrants 
probably exceeds 3 m i l l i o n . These emigrants c o n t r i b u t e t o 
the Lebanese economy through remit tances and t h e i r d i r e c t 
contac ts w i t h the count ry tend t o c rea te a cosmopoli tan 
atmosphere not found t o the same ex ten t i n o ther Arab 
c o u n t r i e s . U n l i k e o ther Arab c o u n t r i e s , Lebanon i s h i g h l y 
urbanized, has almost no a r i d wasteland, and nomadic groups 
are v i r t u a l l y n o n - e x i s t a n t . 
From an economic s t and-po in t Lebanon, u n l i k e many o f 
i t s Arab neighbours, possesses no o i l , a l though i t i s 
3 
the terminus f o r two major p i p e l i n e s . 
The development o f the Lebanese economy has t r a d i -
t i o n a l l y been determined by the development o f the t r a d i n g 
sec to r . The geographica l l o c a t i o n o f Lebanon, a t the 
eastern end o f the Mediterranean between the consumer 
The Aramco p i p e l i n e , which runs th rough Saudi-Arabia f rom 
Dhahran t o Sidon and the I r a q i Petroleum Company (IPC) l i n e 
f rom K i r k u k t o T r i p o l i . 
markets o f Europe and the raw m a t e r i a l sources o f the 
Middle East and I n d i a , has meant t h a t a cons iderab le 
"entrepot" t r ade has developed. 
Considerable impetus t o Lebanese economic develop-
ment was g iven by World War I I when A l l i e d spending i n 
Lebanon s u b s t a n t i a l l y increased f o r e i g n currency reserves= 
When the s t a t e o f I s r a e l was c rea ted i n 1948, Lebanon 
became the n a t u r a l Mediterranean o u t l e t f o r the Arab w o r l d . 
For ins tance the I r a q i Petroleum Company p i p e l i n e t o i t s 
o r i g i n a l western t e r m i n a l a t H a i f a ceased t o be used a f t e r 
1948 and, ins tead , the o u t l e t switched t o T r i p o l i . These 
f a c t o r s , among o thers , l ed t o r a p i d development i n the 
Lebanese economy. 
Another s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e o f Lebanese economic develop-
ment has been the lack o f government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the 
economy. A t y p i c a l remark i n t h i s respect i s the one made 
by the F .A.O. i n 19 59 when they sa id , 
"The Lebanese economy i s as c lose t o a c l a s s i c a l 
l a i s s e z - f a i r e model as one can expect i n the modern 
w o r l d " . 4 
This ana lys i s o f the Lebanese economy begins w i t h a 
d e t a i l e d d i scuss ion o f the n a t i o n a l income data t h a t are 
a v a i l a b l e and the s e c t o r a l breakdown o f t h i s data . Secondly 
F .A.O. Mediterranean Development P r o j e c t , Lebanon, Country 
Report (Rome 1959) Chap. I , p . 6 . 
an at tempt i s made t o assess the importance o f the t r ade 
sec tor t o general economic development. 
N a t i o n a l Income 
U n t i l r e c e n t l y the Lebanese government presented no 
systematic accounts o f n a t i o n a l income. The researcher i n 
Lebanon has had t o r e l y on ad hoc est imates o f n a t i o n a l 
income, which tend t o be very incomplete i n themselves. 
One o f the f i r s t a t tempts a t e s t ima t ing Lebanon's n a t i o n a l 
income was done by Badre i n 1956 . 5 U l t i m a t e l y t h i s se r i es 
was extended t o cover a pe r iod f rom 19 50 t o 1958. A t the 
same t ime the American Embassy issued a se r i e s running ; f rom 
1954 to,1957 and 1959 t o 1962. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o compare 
the r e s u l t s and the methods employed i n these two s e r i e s . 
The two se r ies d i f f e r e d both i n the absolute l e v e l o f 
n a t i o n a l income and the ra tes of growth o f income p r e d i c t e d . 
For ins tance , Badre's f i g u r e s gave a compounded r e a l growth 
r a t e o f n a t i o n a l income o f j u s t over 6% f rom 1954-19 57, 
whereas the American Embassy f i g u r e s gave a growth r a t e o f 
14%i Over the longer pe r iod est imated by Badre the growth 
r a t e dropped t o 5.5% and the American Embassy f i g u r e s gave 
a r a t e , f o r t he same p e r i o d , o f 4 .1%. I t i s q u i t e c l e a r 
t h a t some adjustment i n the Embassy f i g u r e s took p l a c e ' i n 
19 59, and, t h e r e f o r e , the o v e r a l l growth r a t e i s probably 
A.Y. Badre, "The N a t i o n a l Income o f Lebanon", Middle East 
Economic Papers. ( B e i r u t : Economic Research U n i t , American 
U n i v e r s i t y o f B e i r u t ) 1956. 
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meaningless. As the Embassy f i g u r e s were prepared and 
c i r c u l a t e d on a p r i v a t e bas is i t has not been poss ib le t o 
explore these incons i s t enc ies any f u r t h e r . 
Badre's est imates were based on e s t ima t ing the net 
product value a t f a c t o r cos t o f t he economy, which was 
d i v i d e d i n t o t en sec to r s . Badre admi t ted t h a t the value 
added approach was not easy t o apply i n the s e rv i ce sec tors 
and, t h e r e f o r e , a ' d i s t r i b u t i v e shares approach' ( to use 
h i s own words) was used. This means t h a t bo th output and 
income methods o f e s t ima t ing n a t i o n a l income were combined 
t o de r ive the r e s u l t s . I n essence these methodological^ 
problems are a r e f l e c t i o n o f the tremendous lack o f j 
s t a t i s t i c s , bo th a t t h a t t ime and now. The researcher, 
t o a c e r t a i n ex t en t , has t o choose h i s methods o f a n a l y s i s 
t o s u i t the data a v a i l a b l e . 
The Department o f S t a t i s t i c s i n the M i n i s t r y o f Planning 
prepared a new assessment i n 1964. There was a t t h a t t ime 
an at tempt t o draw toge ther the e x i s t i n g se r ies a v a i l a b l e 
i n c l u d i n g a se r ies o f estimates drawn up by the M i n i s t r y 
6 . . . o f Finance i t s e l f . Since 1964 the Bureau o f S t a t i s t i c s i n 
the M i n i s t r y o f Planning has been respons ib le f o r the 
p roduc t ion o f n a t i o n a l income data on an annual b a s i s . The 
most recent f i g u r e s and the previous se r i e s are summarized 
i n Table 4 . 1 . Perhaps the most s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e o f t h e 
M i n i s t r y o f Finance, Expose des M o t i f s de l a L o i de Finances 
pour 1 'Exercise 1966. ( B e i r u t : Presses de l a D i r e c t i o n 
Cent ra le de S t a t i s t i q u e s au M i n i s t e r s du P l an ) . 
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Table 4 . 1 . N a t i o n a l Income Est imates ; 1950-1973 
( i n m i l l i o n s Lebanese pounds) 
A. Badre American M i n i s t r y o f M i n i s t r y o f 




19 53 1, 168 
19 54 1,256 1,197 
1955 1,375 1,338 
19 56 1,417 1,622 
19 57 1,503 1,797 
1958 1,325 
1959 1,490 
1960 1, 562 
1961 1,610 1,789 
1962 1,650 1,868 
1963 1,951 







1971 4, 991 
1972 5,405 
1973 5, 724 
Sources : A. Badre. op. c i t . . 1950-1958. 
M i n i s t r y o f Finance, OP. c i t . . 1961-1964. 
M i n i s t r y o f Plannina. Les Comptes Economiques 
Notes: 
American Embassy, p r i v a t e l y c i r c u l a t e d data . 
Arab Economist. March 1974. 
a) Badre's est imates are a t 1954 p r i c e s . 
b) Both sets o f m i n i s t r y f i g u r e s are a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s . 
c) The f i g u r e s f o r 1969-1973 are est imated f rom data o f 
G.D.P. r a t h e r than n a t i o n a l income d i r e c t . Thus the 
N a t i o n a l Income f i g u r e s are G.D.P. - net p rope r ty 
f r o m abroad - c a p i t a l consumption. 
d) The 1973 f i g u r e i s an es t imate . 
var ious est imates i s the s u b s t a n t i a l l y h igher f i g u r e put 
fo rward by the M i n i s t r y o f P lanning . One poss ib le explana-
t i o n o f t h i s i s t h a t the M i n i s t r y o f Planning probably has 
more complete i n f o r m a t i o n i n terms o f e s t i m a t i n g s e c t o r a l 
output and i n terms o f coverage, than those who t r i e d t o 
est imate n a t i o n a l income p r e v i o u s l y . One i n t e r e s t i n g 
f e a t u r e o f t he M i n i s t r y o f Planning f i g u r e s i s t h a t use 
i s made o f the value-added approach suggested by Badre i n 
h i s i n i t i a l work. Badre's estimates were a t 1954 p r i c e s . 
The f i g u r e s provided by the M i n i s t r y o f Finance and the 
M i n i s t r y o f Planning are a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s . There i s no 
c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f the p r i c e base used by the American' 
Embassy; bu t t he d i s p a r i t i e s w i t h Badre 's e a r l y est imates 
suggest t h a t these es t imates , t o o , were a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s . 
The incons i s t enc ie s i n the data noted i n Table 4 . 1 . and 
the shor t p e r i o d covered by the f i g u r e s do not a l l o w f o r a 
r i go rous ana lys i s o f the i n f o r m a t i o n . Even a c a l c u l a t i o n 
o f per c a p i t a income i s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o pe r fo rm, 
s ince the on ly o f f i c i a l census i n Lebanon took place i n 
1932. Attempts t o update t h i s census have been thwar ted 
by the f e a r t h a t such a census would h i g h l i g h t an a c t u a l 
discrepancy i n the a l l eged r a t i o between Muslims and 
C h r i s t i a n s , which i s the most predominant f a c t o r i n the 
s t r u c t u r e o f power i n Lebanese p o l i t i c s . Consequently the 
present p o p u l a t i o n f i g u r e s are based p a r t l y on ex t r apo l a -
t i o n s o f the 1932 census and r ev i s ed est imates based on a 
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p a r t i a l sampling exerc ise , conducted through the o f f i c i a l 
r e g i s t e r s o f b i r t h s and deaths. On t h i s bas is the government 
es t imate o f popu la t i on i n 1950 was 1.28 m i l l i o n , g i v i n g a 
per c a p i t a income o f LL800 or approximate ly $250. The 
1968 popu la t i on est imate put the t o t a l popu la t ion a t 2.4 
m i l l i o n . This gave a per c a p i t a income i n 1968 o f LL1,608 
or approximate ly $510. The es t imate f o r 1973 was 2.6 
m i l l i o n which g ives a per c a p i t a income l e v e l o f L L 2 , 2 0 l o r 
7 
$846. The genera l cos t o f l i v i n g has been est imated t o 
8 . 
have r i s e n by about 33% f rom 1950 t o 1972. The v a l i d i t y 
o f t h i s index w i l l be discussed l a t e r ; bu t , assuming t h a t 
i t i s b road ly c o r r e c t , t h i s means t h a t r e a l growth i n 
n a t i o n a l income has been a t the r a t e o f 7.5% per annum 
since 19 50. I n per c a p i t a terms the r a t e has been a p p r o x i -
i ! 9 . . . mately 5.0%. On the su r face these f i g u r e s are impress ive 
as they suggest Lebanon has been exper ienc ing f a i r l y r a p i d 
growth f o r the l a s t twenty years and a l so compares very 
7. The convers ion o f these per c a p i t a f i g u r e s i n t o U.S. d o l l a r s 
i s based on the average monthly exchange r a t e f o r t he year 
i n ques t i on . The n a t i o n a l income es t imate o f LL5,724 
m i l l i o n used f o r the 1973 f i g u r e i s as y e t u n o f f i c i a l . 
8. Badre 's est imates o f n a t i o n a l income inc lude a d i scuss ion 
o f t rends i n r e t a i l p r i c e s f rom 1950 t o 1958. Since then 
data has been a v a i l a b l e r e l a t i n g t o a genera l r e t a i l p r i c e 
index th rough the Bureau o f S t a t i s t i c s . The index has 
1966 = 100, and December 1972 = 114.8. ( B u l l e t i n S t a t i s t i q u e 
Mensuel) . 
9. Estimates presented by the UNCTAD S e c r e t a r i a t t o the UNCTAD 
Conference i n C h i l e i n 1972 suggested the annual r a t e o f 
growth o f G.D.P. between 1960 and 1965 was 4.4% and between 
1965 and 1970 2.6%. 
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f avou rab ly w i t h the r a p i d growth ra tes r e g i s t e r e d by many 
A f r i c a n and Asian coun t r i e s i n the 1960 's . One q u a l i f i c a -
t i o n t h a t can be made here i s t h a t more ex tens ive s t a t i s t i -
c a l coverage l a t e r i n the pe r iod under study has meant t h a t 
n a t i o n a l income estimates have probably become more accurate , 
which means the e a r l i e r f i g u r e s cou ld e a s i l y be under-
es t imated . I f t h i s i s t r u e then the s t a t i s t i c a l growth 
ra tes achieved are g rea t e r than the " t rue" ra tes by the 
degree o f i n i t i a l unde r - e s t ima t ion . 
Al though i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o place too much 
r e l i a n c e on the n a t i o n a l income data t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e , the 
data i s very u s e f u l i n g i v i n g some broad ideas o f the con-
t r i b u t i o n s o f var ious sec tors t o n a t i o n a l income. The 
a v a i l a b l e s t a t i s t i c s show t h a t the major c o n t r i b u t i o n t o 
n a t i o n a l income comes f rom the s e rv i ce sec to r , which 
accounted f o r more than 62% o f gross domestic product i n 
1972. A c l e a r e r breakdown i s g iven i n Table 4 . 2 . The 
se rv ice sec tor i s d e f i n e d t o i nc lude t r a n s p o r t and com-
municat ions , commerce and t r ade , f i n a n c e , r en t and lodg ing 
and o the r s e rv i ce s . For comparison the f i g u r e s Badre 
computed f o r 1950 are g i v e n . 
Table 4.3 a l so i n d i c a t e s the broad s t r u c t u r a l changes 
i n the sources o f G.D.P. t h a t have taken place s ince 1968. 
The most s t r i k i n g change s ince 1950 has been the 
d e c l i n e i n the c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t he a g r i c u l t u r a l sec to r and 
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present t ime the a g r i c u l t u r a l sec tor c o n t r i b u t e s a p p r o x i -
mately 9% t o n a t i o n a l output and y e t almost 50% o f the 
t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n are dependent on incomes generated by 
a g r i c u l t u r a l ou tpu t . Al though t h e i r r e spec t ive volumes o f 
ou tput have r i s e n i n recent years , the a g r i c u l t u r a l and 
i n d u s t r i a l sectors have f a i l e d t o keep pace w i t h t h e 
c o u n t r y ' s r a t e o f economic growth . Taking the e a r l i e s t 
est imates o f n a t i o n a l income a g r i c u l t u r e c o n t r i b u t e d 20% 
t o G.D.P. i n 1950; 18% i n 19 55; 15% i n 1960; 12% i n 1968 
and 8.6% i n 1971,. a l though i t appears t o have r i s e n s l i g h t l y 
i n 1972 (as t h i s i s a p r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e , i t may be an 
o v e r - e s t i m a t e ) . 
I n d u s t r i a l ou tpu t has not dec l ined q u i t e so seve ra ly . 
i 
I n 1950 i n d u s t r i a l ou tput c o n t r i b u t e d 14% t o G.D.P. The 
f i g u r e was down t o 13% i n 1955, 12% i n 1960 and up again 
t o 13% i n 1968 and up again t o 14% by 1972. Al though the 
f i g u r e s f o r the a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l sectors are 
not e n t i r e l y r e l i a b l e , they do g i v e a genera l p i c t u r e o f 
t he Lebanese economy as be ing a predominant ly s e rv i ce one. 
W i t h i n the se rv ice sec to r as a whole commerce and t r ade 
are by f a r the most impor tant elements. I n f a c t a grea t 
deal o f i n d u s t r i a l p roduc t ion i s dependent on imports which 
makes t r ade doubly impor t an t . 
One f i n a l p o i n t t o be made b e f o r e l e a v i n g t h i s ana ly s i s 
o f n a t i o n a l income data concerns the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
income. I n e v i t a b l y one i s up aga ins t a s p a r c i t y o f 1 
10*. 
s t a t i s t i c s . The on ly est imates a v a i l a b l e date back t o 
those i n 1952 prepared by the American U n i v e r s i t y o f B e i r u t . 
Needless t o say, s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the economic, 
s o c i a l and demographic composi t ion o f t he c o u n t y have 
made these est imates even less r e l i a b l e . I n the c i r cum-
stances i t seems a r a t h e r f r u i t l e s s exerc ise t o reproduce 
the 1952 es t imates . 
However, i t i s pos s ib l e t o i n t e r p r e t the n a t i o n a l 
income data a b i t more c l o s e l y f o r evidence o f the d i s t r i -
b u t i o n o f income. I f we assume t h a t the 72% o f n a t i o n a l 
ou tput generated by the t e r t i a r y sec tor i n 1971 i s l a r g e l y 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the 300,000 workers o f f i c i a l l y employed i n 
t h i s sec tor , i . e . , t he re are no major leakages o f income 
through f o r e i g n ownership o r through ownership by i n d i v i d u a l s 
i n o ther sec tors , then some LL3,300 m i l l i o n i s a t t r i b u t a b l e 
t o the people employed i n t h i s sec tor - g i v i n g a per c a p i t a 
ou tpu t i n excess o f LL11,000 per year . On the o the r hand 
per c a p i t a ou tput i n a g r i c u l t u r e , i n terms o f those o f f i c i a l l y 
recognized as being employed i n a g r i c u l t u r e , amounts t o j u s t 
over LL3,000. I f account i s then taken o f the very l a rge 
casual labour f o r c e i n t h i s sec tor , then per c a p i t a ou tpu t 
f a l l s very s i g n i f i c a n t l y and i n terms o f the t o t a l popula-
t i o n t o be supported by t h i s ou tpu t , per c a p i t a ou tput f a l l s 
t o about LL310. This i s very much i n l i n e w i t h two World 
Bank est imates i n 1967 and 1969 where est imates o f average 
a g r i c u l t u r a l wages were put at about LL3 50. 
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10 
A S e c t o r a l A n a l y s i s of National Income 
Having looked at the main trends i n n a t i o n a l income 
over the l a s t twenty years i t i s now necessary to look i n 
more d e t a i l a t the s e c t o r s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e to t h i s n a t i o n a l 
income. I n t h i s a n a l y s i s emphasis w i l l be placed on the 
growth c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of each s e c t o r and the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p of the s e c t o r to the economy as a whole. I n t h i s way 
i t i s hoped t h a t some a t t e n t i o n can be focussed, p a r t i c u -
l a r l y on the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n 
the s e c t o r . I t w i l l be shown t h a t the types of f i n a n c e 
a v a i l a b l e to the i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r s have 
s e r i o u s l y i n h i b i t e d t h e i r growth. I t w i l l be demonstrated 
among other things t h a t the present f i n a n c i a l system i n 
Lebanon has r e a l growth i n h i b i t i n g f e a t u r e s i n i t . T h i s 
i s why i t i s important a t t h i s stage to i d e n t i f y the 
various f i n a n c i a l sources a v a i l a b l e to each s e c t o r . 
Before d i s c u s s i n g each s e c t o r i n d e t a i l , a few 
p r e l i m i n a r y remarks of a general nature a r e e s s e n t i a l -
( i n t h i s a n a l y s i s the s e c t o r s o u t l i n e d i n Table 4.2 have 
been aggregated i n t o four: a g r i c u l t u r e , industry, s e r v i c e s 
and t r a d e ) . The Lebanese economy has evolved i n such a 
S i m i l a r c a l c u l a t i o n s a r e made by R.A. M a l l e t i n Seventy 
Years of Money Muddling i n Lebanon. ( B e i r u t : Aleph Press 
1973). 
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way that w e l l over two t h i r d s of the t o t a l output of the 
nation comes from the s e r v i c e s e c t o r . We normally a s s o c i a t e 
such a s i t u a t i o n with a highly developed economy r a t h e r 
than one i n the e a r l i e r stages of development. The prepon-
derance of the s e r v i c e s e c t o r i n Lebanon i s the r e s u l t of 
a combination of f a c t o r s . The geographical p o s i t i o n of 
Lebanon has always meant t h a t there has been a great 
r e l i a n c e on t r a d e ; and i n a d d i t i o n i t has developed 
s e r v i c e s providing f o r the neighbouring Arab c o u n t r i e s . 
A g r i c u l t u r e and Industry have developed w i t h i n the n a t u r a l 
r e s t r a i n t s s e t by the country i t s e l f ; c l i m a t e , n a t u r a l 
i 
resources and n a t u r a l communication l i n k s . T his has 
n e c e s s a r i l y imposed a l i m i t on development as Lebanon i s 
a small country with few n a t u r a l resources, poor communi-
ca t i o n l i n k s from north to south and e a s t to west and a 
c l i m a t e which has n e c e s s i t a t e d a great d e a l of i r r i g a t i o n . 
W h i l s t i t could be argued t h a t development i n Lebanon simply 
r e f l e c t s the p r i n c i p l e of comparative advantage, i t has a t 
the same time c r e a t e d an imbalance, w i t h a considerable 
r e l i a n c e on overseas trade a t the expense of domestic 
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l output. I n a d d i t i o n the a g r i -
c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s have not received the support 
of the government i n the way t h a t the s e r v i c e s e c t o r has. 
The f a c t t h a t S y r i a and Lebanon formed a customs union p r i o r 
to March 19 50 has obviously had some i n f l u e n c e on the devel-
opment of separate i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s ; but even a f t e r 195b 
104. 
the r o l e of the Lebanese government i n development has been 
minimal. Government expenditure has, f o r the most part, 
been concentrated on the development of a i r p o r t s , ports, 
telephone s e r v i c e s and road s e r v i c e s r a t h e r than, f o r 
instance, i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s . I n a d d i t i o n government 
p o l i c i e s of providing no t a r r i f p r o t e c t i o n f o r home produced 
goods and having a completely f r e e exchange r a t e have 
tended to s t i f l e the development of the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . 
The a t t i t u d e of the Lebanese government to economic 
development i s a very important one i n that there has been 
a tendency f o r the government, u n t i l r e c e n t l y , to remain 
al o o f from the economy. 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p of the Lebanese government to the 
i 
economy i s a d i f f i c u l t one to des c r i b e yet i t i s a very 
important element i n the economic development of the 
country. I t i s perhaps best summarized i n a report by the 
IRFED mission to Lebanon i n 1 9 6 3 . ^ 
"Les operations qui s'y re'alisent, s i e l l e s , ne 
peuvent e t r e n i analysees n i compta b i l i s ^ e s , c a r 
l e u r c a r a c t e r e p r i n c i p a l e s t d'etre s e c r e t e s , sout 
nombreuses et porteuses de r i c h e s s e , d'une r i c h e s s e 
t o ujours renouvele'e p u i s q u ' e l l e s doivent r e u s i r en 
quelques heures, quelques semaines ou quelques mois, 
l e long terme et l e moyen terme semblant i c i sans 
inte*r£t" . 
D i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n economic a c t i v i t y by the government 
i s r e l a t i v e l y minor. Public s e c t o r expenditure i n 1972 
I n s t i t u t de Formation en Vue de Development, Le Liban 
Face a son Development (Etude IRFED), ( B e i r u t : Imprimerie 
Catholique, 1963). 
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amounted to 8.6% of t o t a l gross n a t i o n a l expenditure. The 
f i g u r e s f o r 1965 to 1970 i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s share i n 
economic a c t i v i t y has remained almost constant (196 5: 9.9%; 
1966: 9.8% 1967: 10.5%; 1968: 10.1%; 1969: 10.5% 
1970: 10.1%). This general aloofness to economic a c t i v i t y 
i s slowly changing. A s e r i e s of development plans culminating 
i n the most recent S i x Year Plan (1972-1977) intend to 
in c r e a s e r a p i d l y the t o t a l volume of pub l i c spending. For 
instance the new plan expects t o t a l p u b l i c investment to 
reach LL1 (740 m i l l i o n by 1977. Th i s i s an annual average 
of LL300 m i l l i o n , which i s to be compared w i t h a l e v e l of 
publ i c investment of LL120 m i l l i o n i n 1971, which, i n i t s e l f 
was a drop of 30.6% over the 1970 t o t a l . These f i g u r e s 
would suggest t h a t planning i n t e n t i o n s may not be r e a l i z e d 
i n t h e r period i n question. A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of 
t h i s Plan i s provided l a t e r i n t h i s chapter. 
The present s i t u a t i o n i s such t h a t government i n f l u e n c e 
on a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l development, both d i e c t l y 
and i n d i r e c t l y i s minimal. T h i s type of philosophy has 
meant t h a t a g r i c u l t u r e and ind u s t r y i n p a r t i c u l e i r , have 
developed w i t h i n the n a t u r a l r e s t r a i n t s s e t by t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e environments and have not, u n t i l r e c e n t l y , been 
the s u b j e c t of much government a s s i s t a n c e . With t h i s 
o v e r r i d i n g view i n mind the i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s can now be 
examined i n more d e t a i l . 
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The A g r i c u l t u r a l Sector 
The c o n t r i b u t i o n of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r to t o t a l 
n a t i o n a l output has s t e a d i l y d e c l i n e d t i l l i n 1972 i t 
accounted fo r 9.9% of G.D.P. However the t o t a l volume of 
people employed in a g r i c u l t u r e has not v a r i e d ; such t h a t 
nearly 20% of the t o t a l working population a r e employed 
in the s e c t o r , and over 50% of the t o t a l population a r e 
dependent on a g r i c u l t u r a l output. Herein l i e s the funda-
mental problem of t h i s s e c t o r . I t i s h i g h l y labour i n t e n s i v e 
and i n terms of output i s the l e a s t e f f i c i e n t of the four 
major s e c t o r s . T h i s i n e f f i c i e n c y a r i s e s from a number of 
separate i s s u e s . The f i r s t i s the system of land tenure 
and the extent of c u l t i v a t i o n i n the country. Out of a 
t o t a l land area of 1,017,000 hectares i t has been estimated 
12 
t h a t 530,000 hectares are c u l t i v a b l e . I n 1965 the a c t u a l 
area c u l t i v a t e d was 260,000 hect a r e s , representing 49.1% 
of the p o s s i b l e t o t a l . T h i s gave, i n 1965, 0.13 h e c t a r e s 
per c a p i t a , which could r i s e to 0.266 hec t a r e s i f a l l 
c u l t i v a b l e land was u t i l i z e d . Bearing i n mind t h a t n u t r i t i o n 
experts i n Lebanon estimate t h a t 0.5 hectares per head i s 
necessary to provide an adequate food supply f o r the nation, 
then the need f o r expanding food production becomes very 
important indeed, i f Lebanon wishes to reduce i t s dependence 
M. Iskandar, (ed.) The Green Plan; A General E v a l u a t i o n of 
Performance, (Middle Eas t Economic Consultants 1972) p.9. 
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on imported f o o d s t u f f s . Estimates put forward by the F.A.O. 
suggest that one a g r i c u l t u r a l worker and h i s family can be 
supported by e i t h e r 1 hectare of i r r i g a t e d land or 5 
hectares of n o n - i r r i g a t e d land. I n Lebanon, i n 1970, th e r e 
were 50,000 hec t a r e s of i r r i g a t e d land and 210,000 h e c t a r e s 
of n o n - i r r i g a t e d land. On the F.A.O. c r i t e r i o n t h i s land 
can support 92,000 a g r i c u l t u r a l earners. The o f f i c i a l t o t a l 
in 1972 was, i n f a c t , 115,000, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t some 
23,000 workers were t h e o r e t i c a l l y unemployed, with the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of perhaps 50,000 f a m i l i e s r e c e i v i n g an 
inadequate r e t u r n from a g r i c u l t u r e . 
Of the t o t a l c u l t i v a t e d area, some 82% i s owned by 
those farming i t . However, t h i s f i g u r e gives a f a l s e 
p i c t u r e of land ownership s i n c e 88% of a l l p l o t s have an 
average s i z e of only 2.4 hectares and only o n e - f i f t h of a l l 
farmers own farms of more than 100 h e c t a r e s . The g e n e r a l l y 
small s i z e of i n d i v i d u a l p l o t s means that farmers f i n d i t 
d i f f i c u l t to b e n e f i t from attempts to mechanize a g r i c u l -
t u r e and i r r i g a t e the land. There have been c o n s i d e r a b l e 
changes i n land tenure over the l a s t twenty y e a r s . The 
s i t u a t i o n t h a t p r e v a i l e d i n the 1950's where the short 
tenancy system predominated, w i t h the tenancy often only 
being agreed by custom g i v i n g the tenant no s e c u r i t y of 
tenure, has given way to an i n c r e a s e i n d i r e c t ownership, 
but t h i s move has done nothing to c o n s o l i d a t e land holdings. 
G. Hakim, "Land Tenure Reform", Middle E a s t Economic Papers. 
Vol. I , p.78, 1964. 
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Although there has been a s h i f t to i n d i v i d u a l ownership, 
there i s s t i l l evidence of the e f f e c t s of the old tenure 
system. Revolts i n 1970 on the northern borders of 
Lebanon by peasant farmers a g a i n s t the " s e i g n o r a l " demands 
of the absentee landlords i n d i c a t e s t h a t a f e u d a l i s t i c 
system s t i l l operates i n parts of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r / 
Thus the present s t r u c t u r e of land ownership i s a great 
d i s i n c e n t i v e to higher y i e l d s ( i n c r e a s i n g the share to the 
landlord i n the case of t e n a n c i e s ) and a l s o a tremendous 
ob s t a c l e to comprehensive i r r i g a t i o n schemes. 
A second major i s s u e i n the development of the a g r i -
c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , and one which w i l l be emphasised i n l a t e r 
comments, i s the forms and extent of f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
a v a i l a b l e to the s e c t o r . Of the numerous schemes operated 
on a p r i v a t e and a government b a s i s two are worth con-
s i d e r i n g i n d e t a i l : i ) the Green Plan f o r promoting 
increa s e d a g r i c u l t u r a l output, and i i ) the Banque de 
Cre'dit A g r i c o l e , I n d u s t r i a l et F o n c i e r (B.C. A. I . F . ) , which 
was designed s p e c i f i c a l l y to meet the medium and long-
term f i n a n c i a l needs of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . 
The Green Plan was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1964 as an autono-
15 
mous a u t h o r i t y f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l development. The 
14. The Times, November 12th, 1970. 
15. Republic of Lebanon, Plan Vert, (Summary Report, U n i v e r s i t y 
of Durham Middle E a s t Documentation C e n t r e ) . 
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o v e r a l l operation of the Green Plan i s supervised by the 
Mi n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e and a l s o the M i n i s t r y of Finance, 
which has to approve the budget f o r the Plan. The t o t a l 
budget for a twenty year period, approved i n 1965, was 
LL70 m i l l i o n (LL30 m i l l i o n to be spent i n the f i r s t ten 
years and LL40 m i l l i o n to be spent i n the l a t t e r ten y e a r s ) . 
Of the many o b j e c t i v e s of the Plan the main ones seemed to 
be: i ) to r e c l a i m neglected and fa l l o w land, i i ) the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of roads and small r e s e r v o i r s f o r i r r i g a t i o n , 
i i i ) the production and d i s t r i b u t i o n of seedlings, i v ) the 
establishment of a continuing r e s e a r c h programme which 
would u l t i m a t e l y a c t as a consultancy s e r v i c e to farmers, 
and v) the expansion of land under a f f o r e s t a t i o n . These 
p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e s had a f i n a n c i a l counterpart i n t h a t 
the Plan was authorized to make c o n t r i b u t i o n s towards 
s p e c i f i c land reclamation schemes, f o r instance, and was 
a l s o authorized to make a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery a v a i l a b l e 
on a pooled and s u b s i d i z e d b a s i s . 
I n i t i a l l y farmers p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the Plan's 
a c t i v i t i e s paid between 15% and 20% of the t o t a l c o s t . 
This c o n t r i b u t i o n was complemented by a loan from the 
Plan, repayable from the s i x t h y e a r of the loan, a t a r a t e 
of i n t e r e s t of 1% per annum. The loan was secured by the 
mortgaging of the land i n favour of the government. T h i s 
M. Iskandar, l o c . c i t . , p.15. 
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system operated i n 196 5 and 1966; but was a l t e r e d in 1967 
when the mortgage guarantee system was dispensed with. 
Broadly speaking, under the new r e g u l a t i o n s farmers can 
borrow up to LL100,000 and t h e i r own c o n t r i b u t i o n a t no 
time exceeds 39% and can f a l l as low as 18% on a loan of 
LL2,000. T h i s more f l e x i b l e system encouraged more 
farmers to use the Plan f a c i l i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y those 
involved i n joint-ownership of land, where the e a r l i e r 
mortgage requirement had made land reclamation d i f f i c u l t . 
Between 1965 and 1973 some 1,183 v i l l a g e s r e c e i v e d 
a s s i s t a n c e from the Plan, many b e n e f i t t i n g two or th r e e 
times. The t o t a l number of farmers b e n e f i t t i n g from the 
scheme amounted to 24,145. The t o t a l value of loans 
advanced by 1973 had r i s e n to LL44,960,532, with farmers' 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s amounting to about 2 8% of the t o t a l loans. 
I n p a r t i c u l a r the loans were concentrated i n three main 
areas, i ) land reclamation, i i ) r e s e r v o i r c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
and i n ) w a l l c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
The Green Plan has had the e f f e c t of developing the 
underlying i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . 
The r e l a t i v e ease with which loans are advanced plus the 
ex i s t e n c e of t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e has meant t h a t i t s 
s e r v i c e s have been r a p i d l y absorbed i n t o the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
17. Green Plan, Annual Report 1970, (Green Plan O f f i c e , B e i r u t ) , 
and Arab Economist, Vol. VI, No. 62, March 1974, p.15. 
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s e c t o r . 
The a c t i v i t i e s and success of the Banque de C r e d i t 
A g r i c o l e , I n d u s t r i a l et F o n c i e r (B.C A. I . F . ) i n f i n a n c i n g 
a g r i c u l t u r a l development are f a r more d i f f i c u l t to a s s e s s . 
B a s i c a l l y farmers can finance t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s through 
personal savings or family t i e s , through the commercial 
banks or through B.C.A.I.F. The commercial banks have, 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y , tended to lend to the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r 
on a short-term b a s i s only. The majority of loans tend 
to be f o r a maximum of a year and, the r e f o r e , farmers tend 
to use these c r e d i t s f o r cu r r e n t production only. Medium 
and long-term f i n a n c i a l plans have to be met through aA 
agency l i k e B.C.A.I.F.. B.C.A.I.F. was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
1955 w i t h an o r i g i n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the government i n 
40% of the c a p i t a l of LL5 m i l l i o n . I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s 
o r i g i n a l c a p i t a l a government-guaranteed loan of LL65 
m i l l i o n was secured from the Banque de S y r i e et du Liban 
at a r a t e of i n t e r e s t of 2% f o r four y e a r s . The working 
c a p i t a l of the Bank was expanded i n 1960 by a LL15 m i l l i o n 
loan from the Development Loan Fund a t 4%%. Of the t o t a l 
working c a p i t a l of LL85 m i l l i o n , 40% was p r o v i s i o n a l l y 
a l l o c a t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e , 40% to i n d u s t r i a l development 
and 20% to h o t e l development. As i t does not accept 
deposits i n the normal way from the p u b l i c , i t s a b i l i t y 
to c r e a t e c r e d i t s i s dependant on the t o t a l f i n a n c e made 
a v a i l a b l e by the government. I n a d d i t i o n there has been 
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a tendency f o r B.C.A.I.F. to demand c o l l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y 
very much i n excess of the value of the loan, which has 
18 
discouraged borrowers. Thus only r e l a t i v e l y prosperous 
landowners can take advantages of the bank's s e r v i c e s . 
These r e s t r i c t i o n s have meant that the t o t a l loans by 
B.C.A.I.F. to the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r have never been 
important i n comparison w i t h commercial bank loans. I t has 
been estimated the B.C.A.I.F. only accounts f o r 16% of a l l 
19 
loans to the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . F o r 1972 t h i s would 
suggest t h a t t o t a l loans by B.C.A.I.F. to a g r i c u l t u r e 
probably amounted to about LL9 m i l l i o n , which i s a t about 
the same r a t e as the Green Plan. The t o t a l loans of 
B.C.A.I.F. reported to the World Bank i n 1967 f o r the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r amounted to LL36.8 m i l l i o n , which i s 
con s i d e r a b l y higher than the f i g u r e quoted. However, some 
of the loans i n t h i s higher f i g u r e i n c l u d e loans to food 
processing i n d u s t r i e s , which should s t r i c t l y be included 
i n the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . However, i t has to be admitted 
t h a t there i s some dispute as to how much B.C.A.I.F. has 
loaned to the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , and the data t h a t i s 
a v a i l a b l e does not allow f o r a c o n c l u s i v e answer. B.C.A.I.F. 
has tended to loan money a t a f i x e d r a t e of 5.5%, which i s 
much l e s s than commercial bank r a t e s (10-12%) and p r i v a t e 
18. H.H. Smith, (ed), OP. c i t . . p.228. 
19. The Arab Economist, May 1973, No. 52, p.10. 
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moneylenders' r a t e s (as high as 10% per month), which 
can be an important source of finance i n some i s o l a t e d 
a r e a s . An i n t e r e s t i n g study into problems faced by farmers 
i n a c q u i r i n g c r e d i t i n Northern Lebanon h i g h l i g h t s a 
number of the points a l r e a d y made. 2 0 T h i s study i n v e s t i -
gated three v i l l a g e s and interviewed fourteen farmers and 
found t h a t of f i f t e e n loans outstanding at the time of the 
survey, twelve were provided by moneylenders or r e l a t i v e s . 
B.C.A.I.F. accounted f o r two loans and a commercial bank 
fo r one. Although the r a t e of i n t e r e s t o f f e r e d by 
B.C.A.I.F. was 5.5% and th a t by moneylenders ranged 
from 24% to 70%, moneylenders were p r e f e r r e d because of 
t h e i r proximity and because of the minimal c o l l a t e r a l 
required. 
T h i s serves to emphasise a number of points made i n 
chapter Three. F r y ' s a n a l y s i s of the moneylenders i n 
Afghanistan suggested that a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ease may pre-
dominate over a c t u a l loan c o s t s , such t h a t moneylenders 
being c l o s e , geographically, to p o t e n t i a l borrowers tend 
21 
to succeed where formal f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s do not. 
20. R. Sadaka, C. Loomis and D. Taylor, "A Study of the Problems 
of obtaining C r e d i t and Using i t Productively on Some Farms 
i n the Northern Bega's" Mimeo Pamphlet No. AES-1, ( F a c u l t y 
of A g r i c u l t u r a l Sciences, American U n i v e r s i t y of B e i r u t ) 
June 1966. 
21. M.J. Fry, Kabul and Kandahar Money Bazaars: T h e i r Role 
i n Afghanistan's Foreign Trade, (Kabul: United S t a t e s 
Agency f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development, June 1973. 
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Thus the spreading of bank branches i n t o r u r a l areas, as 
22 23 
suggested by Porter and Lewis may be more important 
than the t o t a l volume of funds a v a i l a b l e through the 
banking agency. I n t h i s case B.C.A.I.F. i s not 
important because i t has no extensive 'branch' system and 
seems to demand e x c e s s i v e c o l l a t e r a l a g a i n s t the loan. 
The f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r 
i s a p t l y summarized in a U.S. government report on Lebanon, 
as follows: 
"The l a c k of c r e d i t on reasonable terms has been 
detrimental to the e f f i c i e n c y of farm operations, 
because i t has i n h i b i t e d land improvement and the 
use of productivity-enhancing m a t e r i a l s such as 
s e l e c t e d seeds, f e r t i l i z e r s and p e s t i c i d e s " . 2 4 
Some progress has been made w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the 
comprehensive s e r v i c e s o f f e r e d by the Green Plan. However 
the f i n a n c i a l f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e to a g r i c u l t u r e a r e 
going to depend upon the c r e a t i o n of medium and long-term 
f i n a n c i a l f a c i l i t i e s w i t h i n the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r as a 
whole and the extent to which the government i s prepared 
to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s s o r t of a c t i v i t y . One encouraging 
aspect of a g r i c u l t u r a l development i s the gradual develop-
ment of the water resources of the L i t a n i r i v e r i n the 
22. R.C. Porter, "The Promotion of the 'Banking Habit' and 
Economic Development", Jou r n a l of Development Studies. 
Vol. 2, No.4, J u l y 1966, pp.346-366. 
23. W.A. Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, (London: 
George A l l e n and Unwin 1963) p.229. 
24. H.H. Smith, (ed.), loc c i t . , p.228. 
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Southern Bega'a V a l l e y . Two i r r i g a t i o n schemes, one below 
and one above the Karaoun Dam now have the p o t e n t i a l to 
i r r i g a t e over 40,000 hectares of land. Two c o n s t r a i n t s on 
t h i s development have been the topography of the land and 
the very fragmented land ownership system. L i t t l e can be 
done about the f i r s t point, but as regards the second 
point an e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y of land c o n s o l i d a t i o n may lead 
to a more e f f i c i e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n of water. I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g to note i n t h i s context t h a t over 15% of p u b l i c 
investment under the S i x Year Plan i s a l l o c a t e d to a g r i -
c u l t u r a l and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s . 
The I n d u s t r i a l S ector 
I n 1964 manufacturing industry contributed 13% of 
n a t i o n a l output. S i n c e then i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n has f l u c t u a t e d 
between 12 - 14%. I f the c o n s t r u c t i o n s e c t o r i s included 
i n the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r then the t o t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n r i s e s 
to over 17%. At the same time the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r 
employs about 15% of the t o t a l work f o r c e . I n d u s t r i a l 
exports c o n t r i b u t e approximately 18% to t o t a l exports and 
account fo r 12% of t o t a l output i n the s e c t o r . Of 6,500 
i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s r e g i s t e r e d i n 1971, 2,600 employed 
l e s s than four persons and only 140 more than f o r t y 
persons. On average t h e r e a r e l e s s than 12 workers per 
firm and the c a p i t a l employed per worker i s l e s s than 
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LL1,000. The main exceptions to t h i s s i t u a t i o n are two 
o i l r e f i n e r i e s , two cement f a c t o r i e s and new LL100 m i l l i o n 
f e r t i l i z e r p l a n t . I t i s planned to add a t h i r d o i l r e f i n e r y 
and other l a r g e s c a l e f a c t o r i e s f o r the production of 
paper, cement, newsprint and t e l e v i s i o n s . Nevertheless, 
the predominant f e a t u r e of Lebanese i n d u s t r y i s the small 
s i z e of i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r p r i s e s and the low l e v e l of c a p i t a l 
u t i l i z a t i o n per head. I n t h i s respect Lebanon compares 
somewhat unfavourably w i t h some of her Middle E a s t e r n 
neighbours. For i n s t a n c e workers per establishment a r e 
26 
as high as 23 i n Egypt and 59 i n I r a q . 
The 1964 i n d u s t r i a l census i s the most recent survey 
of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y i n Lebanon. T h i s census h i g h l i g h t s 
the points made alre a d y about the average s i z e of estab-
lishments and the average c a p i t a l i z a t i o n per worker. I n 
a d d i t i o n , as might be expected, the c o n t r i b u t i o n of l a r g e 
firms to t o t a l output i s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y l a r g e . 51.4% 
of a l l establishments (out of a t o t a l of 2,099) employ l e s s 
than nine people and, i n t o t a l , account f o r only 8.8% of 
a l l s a l e s . On the other hand 5% of t o t a l establishments 
employ over f i f t y people and account f o r 59% of a l l s a l e s . 
Of t o t a l s a l e s of LL550 m i l l i o n i n 1964, the food 
25. "The I n d u s t r i a l s i t u a t i o n i n Lebanon", i n S t a t e of Kuwait, 
M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , Conference on I n d u s t r i a l 
Development i n the Arab Countries, March 1966, Vol. 2, 
pp.63-64. 
26. "The I n d u s t r i a l S i t u a t i o n i n Lebanon", op. c i t . , p.64. 
processing i n d u s t r i e s accounted f o r LL16 5 m i l l i o n . I f the 
co n t r i b u t i o n s of o i l r e f i n i n g (LL76 m i l l i o n ) ; t e x t i l e s 
(LL36 m i l l i o n ) and cement and c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s 
(LL44 m i l l i o n ) a r e added to t h i s then i t can be seen t h a t 
these four i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s account f o r nearly 60% of a l l 
i n d u s t r i a l s a l e s . I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s concentration over 
68% of a l l establishments are located i n the B e i r u t area. 
T o t a l r e g i s t e r e d employment i n the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r rose 
from 44,984 i n 1964 to an estimated 95,500 by 1970, and 
was probably i n excess of 100,000 by 1974. This t o t a l does 
not include the l a r g e number of i t i n e r a n t workers from 
S y r i a , who often work i n sm a l l e r i n d u s t r i a l establishments. 
Two important s t i m u l i to i n d u s t r i a l development must 
be i n f r a s t r u c t u r e developments and i n c r e a s i n g investment. 
As regards i n f r a s t r u c t u r e developments, the guarantee of 
constant e l e c t r i c i t y i s an important f a c t o r , s i n c e many 
l a r g e r f a c t o r i e s a t the moment r e l y on t h e i r own generators 
r a t h e r than the u n c e r t a i n p u b l i c supply. Improvement i n 
e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l i e s i s going to depend to a c e r t a i n 
extent on the improvement of h y d r o - e l e c t r i c f a c i l i t i e s i n 
the Bega's V a l l e y . By 1971 over 52% of a l l e l e c t r i c i t y 
generated came from h y d r o - e l e c t r i c sources. 
The majority of Lebanese industry i s privately-owned; 
the S t a t e tobacco monopoly being the only major exception. 
Some i n d u s t r i e s , e.g. beer, cement, f e r t i l i z e r s , a r e p a r t l y 
owned by foreign companies. I n general, however, investment 
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has to be i n terms of s m a l l - s c a l e indigenous e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Given the small s i z e of i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s and t h i s ownership 
pattern, one of the p r i n c i p l e sources of i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c e 
i s i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e . There does not seem to be any s i g -
n i f i c a n t dependence on e x t e r n a l medium-term and long-term 
finanee = The p r i n c i p l e sources of e x t e r n a l i n d u s t r i a l 
27 
finance a r e B.C.A.I.F. and the commercial banks. The 
commercial banks as a whole granted c r e d i t s to the 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i n 1968 to the extent of LL368 m i l l i o n ; 
but t h i s only represented about 12% of t o t a l commercial 
bank advances i n t h a t year. By 1971 t o t a l c r e d i t s granted 
had r i s e n to LL435 m i l l i o n (16.6% of t o t a l advances i n ; 
t h a t year) and by 1973 to LL760.2 m i l l i o n (20% of t o t a l 
advances). I f c r e d i t s granted to c o n s t r u c t i o n are included 
then n e a r l y 30% of a l l advances go to i n d u s t r i a l 
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a c t i v i t i e s . 
The c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t B.C.A.I.F. has made i s much 
more d i f f i c u l t to a s s e s s . Average lending to i n d u s t r y 
by B.C.A.I.F. i n recent y e a r s has been estimated to be of 
the order to LL5 m i l l i o n per year, which i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t 
29 
i n comparison w i t h commercial bank lending. 
27. R a i s i n g money through a share i s s u e i s d i f f i c u l t , e s p e c i a l l y 
for new firms, s i n c e new e n t e r p r i s e s wishing t o r a i s e c a p i t a l 
through a share i s s u e are r e s t r a i n e d by a Lebanese Law which 
r e q u i r e s the company to p u b l i s h balance sheets f o r two 
years before the i s s u e . 
28. More d e t a i l s of the s e c t o r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans i s given 
i n Chapter Seven. 
29. P r i v a t e l y secured information. The c o n t r i b u t i o n of B.C.A.I.F. 
only represents 1%% of the loans granted by commercial banks. 
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Commercial bank lending to the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r 
has been r i s i n g s l i g h t l y between 1966 and 1973. I n 1966 
12% of a l l advances went to industry. By the beginning 
of 1973 t h i s had r i s e n to nearly 20%. There was an 
absolute drop i n lending from 1968 to 1969; but the general 
upward trend i s encouraging i n t h a t what l i m i t e d i n d u s t r i a l 
development t h a t has occurred does not seem to have been 
ad v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by e x i s t i n g c r e d i t arrangements. However 
t h i s i s only a short-term expansion and t h e r e i s no guarantee 
t h a t a more r a p i d advance i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y w i l l be 
accommodated by the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r . The Six-Year Plan 
(1972-19 77) envisages an expansion of 9% - 10% per annum 
in i n d u s t r i a l investments. To achieve t h i s t h ere must be 
e i t h e r c o n s i d e r a b l e government p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h i s 
investment or the commercial banking s e c t o r must meet t h i s 
demand f o r medium-term and long-term finance or e l s e they 
w i l l not be involved i n t h i s s o r t of development. As 
Hoss s t a t e s , 
" . . ., Lebanon's future growth i s l i k e l y to p l a c e 
a g r e a t e r accent on industry than has been the case 
i n the past. Hence, i f the banks are confined too 
s t r i c t l y to the short-term end of the market, t h e i r 
r o l e i n the country's f u t u r e development w i l l be 
impaired."30 
Evidence i n support of t h i s statement i s provided by the 
f a c t t h a t t o t a l deposits w i t h the commercial banks rose ; 
30. S. Hoss, "The Banking System s i n c e 1966", The Banker. 
November 1972, p.71. 
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by 54% between 1966 and 1970 but t o t a l domestic bank 
c r e d i t only rose by 10%. 3 ^  Thus the banks, by con f i n i n g 
themselves to short-term lending a r e unable to f u l l y 
u t i l i z e t h e i r resources i n the r a t h e r narrow i n t e r n a l 
market. The very r a p i d i n c r e a s e s i n the commercial banks 
foreign a s s e t s during the same period does i n d i c a t e where 
the surplus went to. The Lebanese Government i s now 
c o n s i d e r i n g amending the Money and C r e d i t Act to allow 
the c e n t r a l bank to grant c r e d i t s to banks a g a i n s t medium-
term i n d u s t r i a l paper i n cases of need. T h i s type of 
development may encourage more a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by 
the commercial banks in i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g . At the 
moment the commercial banks are not w i l l i n g nor are they 
s u i t a b l y equipped to meet any r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n 
programme. 
The extent to which r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n can occur 
i s dependent not only on f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n s but a l s o on 
the s t r u c t u r e of the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i t s e l f . I t has 
already been mentioned that the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r c o n s i s t s 
predominantly of small family b u s i n e s s e s . Such a s t r u c t u r e 
cannot b e n e f i t from the obvious economies of s c a l e 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h many i n d u s t r i a l products. T h i s means t h a t 
Lebanese i n d u s t r i a l products often cannot compete s u c c e s s -
f u l l y w i t h imported goods thus s t i f l i n g any growth p o t e n t i a l 
S. Hoss, op. c i t . , p.71 
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in the s e c t o r . I t has been f u r t h e r suggested that some 
i n d u s t r i e s e s t a b l i s h e d i n Lebanon to provide not only f o r 
domestic markets, but other Arab markets have been s t i f l e d 
by r e s t r i c t i v e t a r i f f systems adopted by some Arab 
32 
c o u n t r i e s . 
Government l e g i s l a t i o n has r e c e n t l y attempted to 
a s s i s t t h i s process of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n by proposing the 
establishment of a M i n i s t r y of In d u s t r y . Other l e g i s l a -
t i o n has granted tax exemptions to c e r t a i n new i n d u s t r i e s 
whose products were not manufactured i n Lebanon p r i o r to 
1971. Unfortunately the tax exemptions only apply i f the 
annual s a l a r y b i l l i s i n excess of LL200,000, which i s 
c l e a r l y w e l l above the s o r t of wage b i l l a small family 
establishment would be faced with. T h i s type of l e g i s -
l a t i o n i s probably w e l l intentioned but s e r i o u s l y misses 
the mark. 
A more s e r i o u s t h r e a t to i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n plans i n 
the near f u t u r e i s the co n s i d e r a b l e commercial lobby both 
i n parliament and w i t h i n the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r which 
b e l i e v e s t h a t i n d u s t r y and commerce a r e by nature r i v a l s . 
The very c o n s i d e r a b l e c r i t i c i s m of the proposed M i n i s t r y 
of Industry by commercial lobbies seem to underline t h i s 
33 
point. 
32. R.A. Mallat, op. c i t . , p.31. 
33. The Arab Economist, No. 52, May 1973, p.20. 
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Development i n the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i s g e n e r a l l y 
r e s t r a i n e d by the la c k of c a p i t a l on the f i n a n c i a l s i d e 
and a dearth of raw m a t e r i a l s and s k i l l e d labour on the 
r e a l resource s i d e . So f a r the government has paid very 
l i t t l e part i n promoting i n d u s t r i a l development. I n f a c t 
the l i b e r a l trade p o l i c i e s pursued by the government have, 
by and large, r e s t r a i n e d the development of the i n d u s t r i a l 
sector, as the government has not been w i l l i n g to extend 
p r o t e c t i o n to new i n d u s t r i e s by r a i s i n g t a r r i f s on c e r t a i n 
imports. 
I n c o n c l u s i o n the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r needs to expand 
i t s own output at l e a s t as r a p i d l y as the o v e r a l l growth 
of the economy. I f i t s growth i s slower t h i s means t h a t 
an i n c r e a s i n g volume of imports of manufactured goods w i l l 
be necessary to maintain consumption a t a l e v e l c o n s i s t e n t 
w ith the o v e r a l l growth of the economy. To compound t h i s 
problem a stagnant i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r means th a t the export 
of manufactured goods i s not able to r i s e to meet, the 
e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g demand fo r imports. T h i s can lead to 
s t r u c t u r a l weaknesses i n the balance of payments, which 
w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . 
One of the f a c t o r s which could c o n t r i b u t e to i n d u s t r i a l 
expansion i s the p r o v i s i o n of a v i a b l e medium-term and 
long-term f i n a n c i a l market. The e x i s t i n g arrangements a r e 
t o t a l l y inadequate i n terms of the requirements of i n d u s t r y 
and i n the long run the l a c k of these p r o v i s i o n s may r e t a r d 
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the general growth of the economy. 
One p o s i t i v e move to f i l l i n t h i s gap i n the p r o v i s i o n 
of medium- and long-term finance has been the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of the Development Bank for Tourism and Industry; 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1973 w i t h a c a p i t a l of LL60 m i l l i o n and a 
51% government p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n i t s f i r s t year of 
operations over LL10 m i l l i o n has been advanced (75% to 
tourism and 2 5% to i n d u s t r y ) . 
Of course i t could be argued t h a t i t i s not f i n a n c i a l 
p r o v i s i o n which i s inadequate, but r a t h e r a l a c k of 
f e a s i b l e and well-prepared investment p r o j e c t s r e q u i r i n g 
f i n a n c i a l support. Even i f t h i s i s the case, i t could be 
argued t h a t the banking system could take the i n i t i a t i v e 
and provide investment p r o j e c t consultancy s e r v i c e s to 
i n d u s t r i a l customers: there seems to be no signs of 
such "innovative finance" at present. 
The S e r v i c e Sector 
Tourism and banking make the most s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i -
butions to n a t i o n a l output w i t h i n the s e r v i c e s e c t o r . 
Both a c t i v i t i e s a r e important f o r other reasons as w e l l . 
Tourism i s a major source of f o r e i g n exchange earnings and 
banking i s important i n terms of the f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s 
provided to other s e c t o r s i n the economy; a s e r v i c e not 
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f u l l y accounted for i n the n a t i o n a l output framework, as 
34 
was pointed out xn chapter One. 
The t o t a l number of overseas v i s i t o r s to Lebanon i n 
1973 was approximately 1,000,000 (that i s excluding about 
1,200,000 S y r i a n a r r i v a l s which, i n some case s , may be 
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t o u r i s t s but are normally c l a s s e d as i t i n e r a n t workers). 
The f i g u r e f o r 1972 was the highest for the 19 50-1973 period 
Apart from a severe drop i n numbers i n 1967 ( l a r g e l y due 
to the I s r a e l i - A r a b war), t h e r e has been a steady i n c r e a s e 
i n numbers s i n c e 1960. However, from 1960 to 1966 the 
average annual growth i n t o u r i s t numbers was 20%, but 
s i n c e 1968 t h i s growth r a t e has dropped to about 10%. 
Although t o t a l t o u r i s t numbers have r i s e n again s i n c e 1967, 
the composition of these numbers has changed. For i n s t a n c e 
the t o t a l number of American T o u r i s t s to Lebanon dropped 
from 93,000 i n 1966 to 67,000 i n 1969, although i t has 
now r i s e n again to 94,000 i n 1973. A s i m i l a r trend a p p l i e s 
to European t o u r i s t s . T r a d i t i o n a l l y American and European 
t o u r i s t s , although small i n numbers, have been the biggest 
spenders and consequently t o u r i s t r e c e i p t s do not appear 
to have expanded as r a p i d l y as t o u r i s t numbers. 
The r a p i d expansion i n t o u r i s t numbers recorded i n 
the e a r l y p a r t of the 1960's meant t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n boom was stimulated, e s p e c i a l l y i n the 
34. See page 5. 
3 5. B u l l e t i n S t a t i s t i g u e Mensuel, December 1973. 
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b u i l d i n g of new ho t e l s but a l s o i n entertainment f a c i l i t i e s 
i n general. The t o t a l number of s t a r r e d h o t e l s i n B e i r u t 
rose from 51 i n 1961 to 80 i n 1968 and i n the mountain area 
behind B e i r u t the number of s t a r r e d h o t e l s rose from 181 
in 1961 to 209 i n 1968. The boom i n h o t e l b u i l d i n g was 
part of a general c o n s t r u c t i o n boom which h i t a peak i n 
1966. Table 4.4 gives one i n d i c a t o r of t h i s boom, i . e . 
the number of c o n s t r u c t i o n permits i s s u e d i n B e i r u t from 
1960-70. The i s s u i n g of a permit does not i n d i c a t e t h a t 
b u i l d i n g w i l l take place. I t merely represents a d e s i r e 
to b u i l d . I n t h i s sense Table 4.4 represents a s o r t of 
ex ante demand f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . I t does not 
i n d i c a t e the a c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t took place. However 
i t i s u s e f u l i n i n d i c a t i n g the broad trend throughout the 
period. 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the ra p i d growth i n t o u r i s t numbers 
up to 1966 c r e a t e d a lagged response i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
industry, w i t h c o n s t r u c t i o n h i t t i n g a peak i n 1966 when 
the I n t r a bank f a i l e d and, l a t e r the A r a b - I s r a e l i war 
in 1967, s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced t o u r i s t numbers. For 
t h i s reason i n p a r t i c u l a r tourism has become an important 
but v o l a t i l e element i n n a t i o n a l output. 
There a r e two aspects of t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n boom t h a t 
are i n t e r e s t i n g . The f i r s t i s t h a t a very high proportion 
of a l l b u i l d i n g permits are f o r h o t e l s , o f f i c e accommoda-
t i o n and f l a t s . T his means th a t the general l e v e l of 
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Table 4.4: Construction Permits I s s u e d i n B e i r u t 1960-1970 
Year No. of permits Area ( i n square metres) 
1960 1,226 704,200 
1961 982 664,850 
1962 869 572,200 
1963 1,071 797,3 80 
1964 1,088 73 2,2 50 
196 5 1,181 1,016, 750 
1966 1, 192 1,243,000 
1967 651 714,000 
1968 647 674,000 
1969 623 630,000 
1970 523 580,000 
Source: R e c u e i l de S t a t i s t i q u e s L i b a n a i s e s . M i n i s t e r e du 
Plan, D i r e c t i o n C e n t r a l de l a S t a t i s t i q u e , 1970. 
p r o s p e r i t y and the growth of tourism i s very important. 
Secondly, a great deal of f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r con-
s t r u c t i o n comes from the banking s e c t o r . Many commercial 
banks i n Lebanon have become involved i n f i n a n c i n g h o t e l 
and o f f i c e development. T h i s type of f i n a n c i n g i s normally 
not a major element i n the p o r t f o l i o of a B r i t i s h bank; 
but i n Lebanon commercial banks have been involved i n t h i s 
type of long-term finance to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent. I n 
recent y e a r s something l i k e 10% of a l l commercial bank 
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loans have gone to the c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y . These loans 
a r e u s u a l l y h i g h l y i l l i q u i d i n that they are not redeemable 
t i l l the b u i l d i n g i s complete and w i t h the cut back i n 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s i n c e 1966 t h i s s i t u a t i o n has become something 
of an embarrassment to some l o c a l banks. I t i s p r i m a r i l y 
the indigenous commercial banks that are involved i n t h i s 
type of finance. The e x p a t r i a t e banks have not involved 
themselves and hence have been l e s s a f f e c t e d by f l u c t u a -
t i o n s i n the t o u r i s t and c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r i e s . 
The long-term prospects f o r tourism are u n c e r t a i n . 
The experiences of 1967 and the open h o s t i l i t i e s between 
the Lebanese government and the P a l e s t i n i a n refugees i n 
1972 and 1973 suggest t h a t when there i s open c o n f l i c t i n 
the Middle E a s t then t o u r i s t numbers do d e c l i n e . There-
f o r e the extent to which the A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t and 
a n c i l l a r y c o n f l i c t s i n v o l v i n g P a l e s t i n i a n refugees are 
l i v e or dormant w i l l determine to a l a r g e extent the v i a -
b i l i t y and growth of the t o u r i s t s e c t o r . 
A report on the T o u r i s t I n d u s t r y prepared i n 1963 
s t a t e d that, 
" . . . Lebanon has n a t u r a l tourism a s s e t s and other 
advantages which o f f e r r i c h prospects of tourism 
becoming i t s major s i n g l e industry and the l a r g e s t 
and most s t a b l e c o n t r i b u t o r to i t s balance of 
payments . . ."36 
Transport and Tourism Te c h n i c i a n s Ltd., Survey of Lebanon's 
T o u r i s t Industry; Part I . Recommended Development 
Programme, 2nd e d i t i o n , May 1963, p.A-3. 
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Ten years l a t e r t h i s view s t i l l i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e 
importance i n planning t o u r i s t f a c i l i t i e s , although i t 
has to be recognized t h a t p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l events have 
thwarted any systematic development of the t o u r i s t 
i n d u s t r y over the l a s t decade. 
There are i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t the banking and insurance 
s e c t o r i s not as h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h i s type of e x t e r n a l 
f a c t o r . Banking and insurance s e r v i c e s c o n t r i b u t e about 
5% to n a t i o n a l output; but th&se s e r v i c e s have a more 
fundamental importance than i s i n d i c a t e d by t h i s percentage. 
I t i s estimated that banking and insurance f a c i l i t i e s a r e 
s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l developed to encourage both net c a p i t a l 
inflows (estimated a t approximately $lOOm. at the present 
37 
time) and net earnings on banking and insurance s e r v i c e s . 
Therefore, the r e a l b e n e f i t s of banking and insurance 
f a c i l i t i e s may show up more c l e a r l y i n the balance of 
payments' accounts than the n a t i o n a l income accounts. 
Where banking and insurance f a c i l i t i e s are important 
i s i n providing the most e f f i c i e n t (from a c o s t and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n point of view) f i n a n c i a l system c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h a given growth i n r e a l output. I n t h i s context the 
a b i l i t y of the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r to finance a g r i c u l t u r a l 
and i n d u s t r i a l development i s of paramount importance. 
T h i s f i n a n c i a l aspect of development i s very important 
P r i v a t e l y secured information. 
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and i n d i c a t i o n s have already been given of the f i n a n c i a l 
needs of the a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s . 
The Trade Sector 
T h i s s e c t o r a l a n a l y s i s of the components of n a t i o n a l 
income concludes by looking at the trade s e c t o r . The most 
s i g n i f i c a n t element i n the Lebanese balance of payments i s 
the very l a r g e and growing d e f i c i t on v i s i b l e t r a d e . T h i s 
i s shown i n Table 4.5. 
Such a d e f i c i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g . Only 2 5% of t o t a l 
output i s generated by the i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s e c t o r s and t h e r e f o r e the economy has to r e l y h e a v i l y on 
imports of i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods. 
A summary of the balance of payments fo r 1960-1969 i s 
contained i n Table 4.6. I n a d d i t i o n , i n Table 4.7, a 
d i f f e r e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n i s given f o r the y e a r s 1969-1973. 
These two p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e a p e r f e c t example of the 
problems involved i n s t a n d a r d i s i n g data i n Lebanon. Table 
4.6 presents the o f f i c i a l accounts, compiled by the 
M i n i s t r y of Planning. An o f f i c i a l p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
balance of payments was f i r s t achieved i n 1966 and the 
f i g u r e s p r i o r to 1966 are based on estimates prepared by 
the American U n i v e r s i t y i n B e i r u t . The v i s i b l e t r a d e 
data i n Table 4.6 do not correspond d i r e c t l y w ith the 
130. 
Table 4.5 Import and Export of Goods. 1960-1973* 




























































* I n c l u d i n g some t r a n s i t items and re-exports. 
** P r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e s . 
Sources: Banque du Liban, Rapport sur 1'Exercise, 1967, 
M i n i s t e r e du Plan, B u l l e t i n S t a t i s t i q u e Mensuel, 
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p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Table 4.5, s i n c e some t r a n s i t items and 
re-exports a r e deducted from the f i g u r e s i n Table 4.5 to 
give the v i s i b l e trade balance. S i n c e 1969 balance of 
payments accounts have been published by the C e n t r a l Bank, 
o s t e n s i b l y from data compiled by the M i n i s t r y of Planning? 
but a number of i n d i v i d u a l items have been aggregated to 
make d i r e c t comparisons almost impossible. Nevertheless, 
the i n c r e a s i n g trade d e f i c i t noted i n Table 4.5 i s a l s o 
brought out by the f i g u r e s presented i n Table 4.6 and 
Table 4.7. 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e s of Tables 4.6 and 4.7 
apart from the v i s i b l e trade d e f i c i t are the rapid expansion 
i n t o u r i s t r e c e i p t s during the decade and the continuing 
surplus on c a p i t a l account. The balance of payments accounts 
a l s o show t h a t Lebanon has, throughout the decade (apart 
from 1965 and 1966) had an o v e r a l l s u r p l u s on c a p i t a l and 
cu r r e n t accounts, combined. 
The v a r i a t i o n s i n o f f i c i a l r e s e r v e s do not n e c e s s a r i l y 
correspond w i t h movements i n the o v e r a l l balance. T h i s i s 
l a r g e l y due to the great d i f f i c u l t y i n c a t e g o r i z i n g a 
number of c a p i t a l and i n v i s i b l e trade flows. For i n s t a n c e 
remittances may be c l a s s i f i e d as c a p i t a l inflows i f there 
i s no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of the source and p o t e n t i a l use 
The very l a r g e e r r o r s and omissions items f o r 196 5 and 1966 
probably i n d i c a t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t r a n s f e r r i n g the 
estimated data pre-1966 to the o f f i c i a l format f o r 1966 
onwards. Thus the recorded o v e r a l l d e f i c i t s i n these two 
years should be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h some c a u t i o n . 
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o f t h e funds. T h i s w i l l have t h e t e n d e n c y t o e x a g g e r a t e 
any a d v e r s e b a l a n c e on c u r r e n t a c c o u n t . E q u a l l y s u p p l i e s 
o f f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y may be i n c r e a s e d t h r o u g h s h o r t - t e r m 
c a p i t a l movements b e n e f i t t i n g from t h e f r e e l y - f l o a t i n g 
f o r e i g n exchange market, w h i c h a r e not r e c o r d e d i n t h e 
b a l a n c e o f payments a c c o u n t s . Whatever t h e t r u e p i c t u r e 
i s , t h e C e n t r a l Bank has a c c u m u l a t e d f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y 
r e s e r v e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , a s c a n be s e e n from T a b l e 4.8. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e s c r i b e a c c u r a t e l y 
t h e o b l i g a t i o n s w h i c h s h o u l d be s e t a g a i n s t t h e s e a s s e t s . 
We c a n assume t h a t bank d e p o s i t s denominated i n f o r e i g n 
c u r r e n c i e s a r e c o v e r e d by t h e c o m m e r c i a l banks' f o r e i g n 
c u r r e n c y r e s e r v e s ; but we c a n n o t assume t h e same f o r 
f o r e i g n d e p o s i t s denominated i n L e b a n e s e pounds. I n t h i s 
c a s e t h e C e n t r a l Bank may f i n d i t s own r e s e r v e s d i m i n i s h e d 
i f t h e r e was a s u b s t a n t i a l w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e s e l a t t e r 
d e p o s i t s . However, i t i s v e r y l i k e l y t h a t f o r e i g n d e p o s i t s 
denominated i n L e b a n e s e pounds p r o b a b l y do not a c c o u n t f o r 
more t h a n 5% o f t o t a l d e p o s i t s , w h i c h would i n d i c a t e , a t 
t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , a f i g u r e o f LL290 m i l l i o n . 
Thus Lebanon's e x t e r n a l payments p o s i t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o a s s e s s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e t r a d e d e f i c i t has been 
amply c o v e r e d by i n v i s i b l e e a r n i n g s and t h e f o r e i g n 
exchange h o l d i n g s o f t h e C e n t r a l Bank; b u t i n t h e f u t u r e 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s e e w h e t h e r t h e l e v e l o f i n v i s i b l e 
e a r n i n g s c a n be m a i n t a i n e d i f t o u r i s m i s i n f l u e n c e d by 
CO ro r- in rH r - l 
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13 6. 
e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l e v e n t s s u c h as t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t 
and whether t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r c a n c o n t i n u e t o i n c r e a s e 
i t s c a p a c i t y f o r e a r n i n g f o r e i g n exchange. I n t h e l o n g -
run t h i s t y p e o f s i t u a t i o n may put c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e 
on t h e Lebanese pound, a l t h o u g h i t has t o be conceded t h a t 
d u r i n g 1974 t h e L e b a n e s e pound has b e n e f i t t e d from s h o r t -
term c a p i t a l movements i n t o Lebanon, m a i n l y from o i l 
s t a t e s i n t h e Middle E a s t . A l t e r n a t i v e l y t h e i m p o s i t i o n 
o f s t r i c t e r import c o n t r o l s may be r e q u i r e d . I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o s e e what e f f e c t s t h e s e moves would have. T h e r e i s v e r y 
l i t t l e development o f i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n i n d u s t r i e s i n 
Lebanon a t t h e p r e s e n t time, t h e r e f o r e any changes i n 
import p r i c e s c a n be e x p e c t e d t o have l i t t l e e f f e c t on 
import demand. Any improvement i n e x p o r t e a r n i n g s must 
come from t h e s e r v i c e s e c t o r . T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t 
Lebanon c a n d e v e l o p i n d u s t r i e s c a p a b l e t o making any 
impact i n t h e e x p o r t f i e l d and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e s u c c e s s o f 
t h e L e b a n e s e economy must r e s t on i n c r e a s i n g e a r n i n g s from 
t o u r i s m . U l t i m a t e l y t h e s u c c e s s f u l development o f t h e 
Lebanese economy may r e s t on a d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y o f 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , e n c o u r a g i n g i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
a c t i v i t i e s , t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e economy's dependence on b a s i c 
i m p o r t s . 
13 7. 
Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s 
T h i s s e c t o r a l a n a l y s i s o f n a t i o n a l income has h e l p e d 
t o h i g h l i g h t , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e f i n a n c i a l d e f i c i e n c i e s 
w i t h i n each s e c t o r . W i t h i n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l 
s e c t o r s t h e o b v i o u s need i s f o r a s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n 
medium-term and long - t e r m c r e d i t s . The marked r e l u c t a n c e 
o f e x i s t i n g c o m m e r c i a l banks t o e n t e r t h i s f i e l d of f i n a n c e 
would seem t o imp l y t h a t some form o f development bank i s 
p r o b a b l y n e c e s s a r y . I n November 1971 t h e L e b a n e s e Govern-
ment announced p l a n s f o r a new Development Bank w i t h a 
paid - u p c a p i t a l o f L L 6 0 m i l l i o n , w i t h a 51% government 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Development banks have been e s t a b l i s h e d 
b e f o r e (an i n d u s t r y and t r a d e bank was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1969 
w i t h l i t t l e s u c c e s s ) and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e i r e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y w i l l become o p e r a t i o n a l . 
However t h i s move by t h e government does seem t o i n d i c a t e 
t h a t t h e y r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e s h o r t a g e 
o f medium-term and l o n g - t e r m f i n a n c e , w h i c h i s n e c e s s a r y 
f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l development, and t h a t 
t h i s s h o r t a g e i s not b e i n g met i n any way by t h e c o m m e r c i a l 
banks. 
The o b v i o u s s e n s i t i v i t y o f t h e s e r v i c e s e c t o r t o 
p o l i t i c a l and o t h e r e v e n t s might s u g g e s t t h a t a more 
" b a l a n c e d " development o f t h e L e b a n e s e economy might be 
d e s i r a b l e . I n t h i s c o n t e x t b a l a n c e d development would 
impl y an i n c r e a s i n g s h a r e i n n a t i o n a l o u t p u t f o r t h e 
138. 
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r s . K h a l a f d e s c r i b e s t h e 
Le b a n e s e economy a s " l o p s i d e d " i n t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
39 
n a t i o n a l income i s u n s y m m e t r i c a l . W h i l s t K h a l a f goes on 
t o argue t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income i s v e r y 
much i n l i n e w i t h r e s o u r c e endownments i n Lebanon, i t i s 
a l s o r e a s o n a b l e t o a r g u e t h a t s u c h a d i s t r i b u t i o n may expose 
t h e Lebanese economy unduely t o e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s . 
K h a l a f examines a number o f s u c h e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s i n 
d e t a i l and comes t o t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n , 
" . . . c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t r a d e , and m a i n l y r e g i o n a l 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n , was found t o r e d u c e Lebanon's a b i l i t y 
t o i s o l a t e i t s e l f from o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s and t o 
r e n d e r t h e t r a d e s e c t o r more v u l n e r a b l e t o p o l i c y 
measures o f n e i g h b o u r i n g c o u n t r i e s , a s s u c h t o be a 
p o s s i b l e s o u r c e o f p r e c a r i o u s n e s s and i n s t a b i l i t y . . . 4 C 
He a l s o i s o l a t e s i n c r e a s i n g dependence on s e r v i c e s and 
c a p i t a l movements a s p o s s i b l e s o u r c e s o f i n s t a b i l i t y . T h i s 
would seem t o s u g g e s t t h a t developments i n t h e L e b a n e s e 
economy must be aimed a t r e d i s t r i b u t i n g n a t i o n a l o u tput a s 
between s e c t o r s . T h i s means t h a t i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
o u t p u t must grow a t a f a s t e r r a t e t h a n s e r v i c e o u t p u t : 
something t h a t has not happened o v e r t h e p a s t t w e n t y - t h r e e 
y e a r s 1 
The L e b a n e s e S i x - Y e a r Development P l a n 1972-1977 does 
i n d i c a t e t h a t a more r a p i d growth i n i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e 
39. N.G. K h a l a f , Economic I m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e S i z e o f N a t i o n s , w i t h 
S p e c i a l R e f e r e n c e t o Lebanon, ( L e i d e n : E . J . B r i l l , 1971) 
p.157. 
40. N.G. K h a l a f , op. c i t . , p.234. 
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w i l l o c c u r i n t h e p l a n n i n g p e r i o d a s compared w i t h s e r v i c e 
s e c t o r growth. A g r i c u l t u r a l output i s p l a n n e d t o grow a t 
41 
5% per annum and i n d u s t r i a l output a t 10% per annum. 
S e r v i c e s e c t o r growth i s p l a n n e d a t 6.7% p e r annum. T o t a l 
i n v e s t m e n t d u r i n g t h e p l a n n i n g p e r i o d w i l l amount t o 
LL7,200 m i l l i o n , o f w h i c h L L 1 ; 7 4 0 m i l l i o n w i l l come from 
42 
t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r . Thus o v e r 7 5% o f t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t i s 
p lanned t o come from t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r , a l t h o u g h t h e P l a n 
g i v e s no i n d i c a t i o n o f i t s s e c t o r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n . A l t h o u g h 
t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r i n v e s t m e n t programme i s s m a l l i n terms o f 
t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t i t s t i l l r e p r e s e n t s a d o u b l i n g o f i n v e s t -
ment o v e r t h e 1964-1969 p e r i o d . G i v e n t h e p r e s e n t s e c t o r a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f n a t i o n a l output, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s e e how 
t h e r a p i d e x p a n s i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l o u tput c a n be a c h i e v e d . 
A l though t h e P l a n s e e s an a d j u s t m e n t t a k i n g p l a c e i n t h e 
s e c t o r a l s h a r e s i n n a t i o n a l output, t h e p r e s e n t predominance 
of t h e s e r v i c e s e c t o r does not seem l i k e l y t o be a f f e c t e d 
d u r i n g t h e p l a n n i n g p e r i o d , s i n c e t h e b u l k o f i n v e s t m e n t 
and consumption i s a l r e a d y i n t h e s e r v i c e s e c t o r and t h e 
P l a n g i v e s no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n about how any s w i t c h i n g o f 
consumption and i n v e s t m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s might o c c u r . 
A l t h o u g h t h e p r e s e n t S i x - Y e a r P l a n does show t h a t t h e 
L e b a n e s e government i s aware of t h e economic problems 
41. T h i s compares w i t h a c t u a l growth o f 2.5% f o r a g r i c u l t u r e 
and 7.5% f o r i n d u s t r y i n t h e 1964-1969 p e r i o d . 
42. I n 1969 p r i c e s . 
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f a c i n g t h e n a t i o n , t h e p o l i c i e s adopted i n t h e P l a n a r e 
p r o b a b l y not s t r o n g enough t o g e n e r a t e any major s h i f t i n 
economic a c t i v i t y d u r i n g t h e p l a n n i n g p e r i o d . 
What i s f a r more s e r i o u s i s t h a t t h e P l a n g i v e s s c a n t 
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f i n a n c i n g a s p e c t s o f i n v e s t m e n t . An 
e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e P l a n c a r r i e d out by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
Economic and S o c i a l O f f i c e i n B e i r u t (U.N.E.S.0.B.) came 
t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , 
". .. . The t r e a t m e n t o f i n v e s t m e n t f i n a n c i n g i n t h e 
P l a n i s r a t h e r i n a d e q u a t e . I n v e s t m e n t s by t h e p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r , by autonomous b o d i e s and by m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , 
w h i c h a c c o u n t f o r 84 p e r c e n t o f t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t , 
a r e a c c o r d e d no more t h a n two s e n t e n c e s i n t h e p l a n 
document . . . ^ 
Thus t h e P l a n i n t e n d s t o r e l y v e r y h e a v i l y on t h e e x i s t i n g 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r , w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y s t a t i n g what t h a t 
r e l i a n c e w i l l be o r w i t h o u t a n a l y s i n g t h e b e h a v i o u r o f t h e 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r t o s e e w h e t h e r i t i s c a p a b l e o f g e n e r a t i n g 
new f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u m e n t s a t t h e r a t e r e q u i r e d by t h e P l a n . 
I d e a l l y a f u l l y d e v e l o p e d f i n a n c i a l p l a n i s an e s s e n t i a l 
p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e p l a n n i n g o f r e a l r e s o u r c e developments. 
A s e c t o r a l breakdown o f i n v e s t m e n t and s a v i n g s i s n e c e s s a r y 
i n o r d e r f o r t h e f i n a n c i a l p l a n n e r t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r 
c o n s i s t e n c y e x i s t s between t h e s e s e c t o r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s and 
t h e t o t a l i n p u t s ( s a v i n g s ) and t o t a l o u t p u t s ( i n v e s t m e n t ) 
U n i t e d N a t i o n a l Economic and S o c i a l O f f i c e i n B e i r u t , 
The L e b a n e s e S i x - Y e a r Development P l a n 1972-1977: An 
E v a l u a t i o n . O c c a s i o n a l Paper No.2, ( B e i r u t : U.N.E.S.O.B. 
March 1973) p.14. 
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o f t h e f i n a n c i a l system. 44 Even i n t h e a b s e n c e o f s o p h i s t i -
c a t e d f i n a n c i a l p l a n n i n g o f t h i s s o r t , i t i s c e r t a i n l y 
t e n a b l e t o a r g u e t h a t t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f i n v e s t m e n t t a r g e t s 
w i t h i n t h e t o t a l P l a n w i l l be a s s i s t e d by more d e t a i l e d 
knowledge o f t h e ways i n w h i c h t h e f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m works. 
Lebanese economy, t h e next f i v e c h a p t e r s a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e 
t h i s more d e t a i l e d knowledge and w i l l a t t e m p t t o h i g h l i g h t 
s p e c i f i c d e f i c i e n c i e s w i t h i n t h e f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m w h i c h 
may a d v e r s e l y i n f l u e n c e t h e i n v e s t m e n t programme w i t h i n 
th e S i x - Y e a r P l a n . 
11 kg round of r e c e n t developments i n t h e 
M.J. F r y , " F i n a n c i a l A n a l y s i s and Economic P l a n n i n g : 
A p p l i c a t i o n s t o t h e T u r k i s h Economy", ( P r i v a t e l y c i r c u l a t e d 
p a p e r ) . 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
The Development o f t h e Banking S e c t o r 
The arguments d e v e l o p e d i n P a r t I and i n C h a p t e r F o u r 
p r o v i d e an a p p r o p r i a t e background a g a i n s t w h i c h t o d e s c r i b e 
t h e developments, f u n c t i o n s and s h o r t c o m i n g s o f t h e f i n a n c i a l 
s e c t o r and t h e r o l e of monetary c o n t r o l i n t h e f i n a n c i a l 
s e c t o r . T h i s c h a p t e r p r e s e n t s a f a i r l y b r i e f h i s t o r y o f 
developments i n t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r , p r i m a r i l y s i n c e 1950, 
and l a y s p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on developments s i n c e 1960. 
T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l show t h a t t h e f o r e i g n banks i n Lebanon 
have a l w a y s had an i m p o r t a n t p a r t t o p l a y i n t h e b a n k i n g 
s t r u c t u r e - an i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h has t e n d e d t o i n c r e a s e o v e r 
t i m e . The d e s c r i p t i o n o f b a n k i n g developments i s d e l i b e r a -
t e l y k e p t b r i e f . A number o f books have been w r i t t e n 
d e s c r i b i n g b a n k i n g developments i n Lebanon, n o t a b l y t h o s e 
1 2 3 4 by A s f o u r , Hanna, Himadah, and Y a f i , and t h i s 
c h a p t e r does not a t t e m p t t o r e p e a t , i n however a condensed 
1. A. A s f o u r , Commercial Banking i n Lebanon, ( B e i r u t : A m e r i c a n 
U n i v e r s i t y o f B e i r u t 1 9 5 9 ) . 
2. A. Hanna, Banking and t h e Economic O r g a n i z a t i o n o f Lebanon, 
( B e i r u t : Dar Al-Founoun P r e s s , 1 9 5 3 ) . 
3. S.B. Himadeh, Monetary and Banking System o f S y r i a , ( B e i r u t : 
A m e r ican P r e s s 193 5 ) . 
4. T. Y a f i , The Monetary and Banking System o f Lebanon, Ph.D. 
d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f W i s c o n s i n 1959, (Ann A r b o r ; 
M i c h i g a n : U n i v e r s i t y M i c r o f i l m s I n c . ) 
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form, t h e developments d e t a i l e d i n t h e s e books. What t h i s 
c h a p t e r does a t t e m p t t o do i s t o d i s t i l l many o f t h e p o i n t s 
made about e a r l y b a n k i n g developments i n Lebanon, so t h a t 
t h e s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s o n l y a r e p r e s e n t e d . Where e a r l y 
developments have d i c t a t e d t h e p r e s e n t p a t t e r n o f t h e 
ba n k i n g s e c t o r t h e n due emphasis i s a p p l i e d . 
" . . . The growth o f t h e L e b a n e s e b a n k i n g s e c t o r 
i s v e r y r e c e n t . I t s h i s t o r y goes back o v e r a few 
decades o n l y . One can, however, t r a c e t h e e x i s t e n c e 
o f banks back t o t h e seco n d h a l f o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y . But t h e s e w ere m a i n l y f o r e i g n . They 
f i n a n c e d f o r e i g n t r a d e , l e a v i n g d o m e s t i c t r a d e t o 
t h e few s m a l l l o c a l banks and d i s c o u n t h o u s e s . . ." 
T h i s b r i e f s t a t e m e n t by A s s e i l y a p t l y summarises t h e m a j o r 
p o i n t s t o be dev e l o p e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r . 
Lebanon a s a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y was r e c o g n i z e d a s a 
s t a t e w i t h i n t h e Ottoman E m p i r e by t h e P r o t o c o l o f September 
6 t h , 1864, w h i c h c r e a t e d an independent f i s c a l regime i n 
t h e Mount Lebanon a r e a . At t h i s t i m e c o n s i d e r a b l e F r e n c h 
c a p i t a l was b e i n g i n v e s t e d i n Lebanon, w h i c h was f u r t h e r 
encouraged by t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e Suez C a n a l . A number 
o f companies were formed i n t h i s p e r i o d t o d e v e l o p b o t h 
p o r t f a c i l i t i e s and r a i l w a y f a c i l i t i e s . F o r i n s t a n c e among 
t h e f o u n d e r s o f t h e T u r k i s h Company o f t h e P o r t Quays and 
Warehouses of B e i r u t i n 1888 were t h e I m p e r i a l Ottoman 
A.E. A s s e i l y , C e n t r a l B a n king i n Lebanon, ( B e i r u t : Khayat 
P u b l i s h i n g Company 1967) p.28. 
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Bank, Banque du P a r i s e t des Pays-Bas and Comptoir N a t i o n a l 
d'Escompte de P a r i s . The I m p e r i a l Ottoman Bank a l s o 
d e v e l o p e d a number of b r a n c h banks i n c i t i e s s u c h a s 
T r i p o l i , S a i d a and Z a h l e . T h i s bank was r e c o g n i z e d by t h e 
T u r k i s h T r e a s u r y a s t h e s t a t e bank and B e i r u t was t h e 
bank's most i m p o r t a n t f o r e i g n ( i . e . o u t s i d e T u r k e y ) b r a n c h . 
B e i r u t , a t t h a t time, was an i m p o r t a n t t r a d e c e n t r e and t h e 
p r i n c i p a l f u n c t i o n o f t h e I m p e r i a l Ottoman Bank was t o 
f i n a n c e t r a d e . However, i t a l s o performed a n o t h e r v e r y 
i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n . I t was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n n e g o t i a t i n g 
l o a n s on a number o f European money markets f o r a number 
o f p r o j e c t s i n Lebanon. F o r i n s t a n c e a 4% l o a n was 
n e g o t i a t e d f o r t h e P o r t o f B e i r u t Company i n 1899 and a 
number of l o a n s ( 3 % i n 1894; 4% i n 1901; 4% i n 1905 and 
4% i n 1909) were n e g o t i a t e d f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a 
r a i l w a y network between B e i r u t and o t h e r major c e n t r e s 
s u c h a s Damascus, Hauran, Hamah, Aleppo and t h e c r e a t i o n 
o f a l i n k t o t h e , t h e n , i n c o m p l e t e I s t a n b u l - B a g h d a d l i n e . 
I n t h i s p e r i o d , p r i o r t o t h e f i r s t w o r l d war, t h e r e 
were i n B e i r u t , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e I m p e r i a l Ottoman Bank, 
t h e D e u t s c h e P a l e s t i n a Bank, t h e D e u t s c h e O r i e n t Bank 
7 
(both German) and t h e Banque de S a l o n i q u e ( F r e n c h ) . T h e r e 
Anon, " F o r e i g n Banks i n Lebanon -
The Banker, p.84. 
S.B. Himadeh, op. c i t . , p.30. 
O r i g i n s and Growth", 
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i s v e r y l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n o f l o c a l b a n k i n g e n t e r p r i s e s 
f o r t h i s p e r i o d . As t h e e x p a t r i a t e banks ten d e d t o 
f i n a n c e t r a d e and took l i t t l e p a r t i n i n d u s t r i a l and 
a g r i c u l t u r a l f i n a n c i n g i t c a n be assumed t h a t what l i t t l e 
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l f i n a n c e t h e r e was was p r o v i d e d 
by l o c a l banks o f one s o r t o r a n o t h e r . I t has been 
e s t i m a t e d t h a t 7 5 % o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n were engaged i n a g r i -
c u l t u r e a t t h i s t i m e and, t h e r e f o r e , when i n need o f funds, 
f a r m e r s would n o r m a l l y r e s o r t t o money l e n d e r s , s i t u a t e d 
8 
l o c a l l y ; o f t e n p a y i n g e x o r b i t a n t i n t e r e s t r a t e s . 
W i t h v e r y l i t t l e i n d i g e n o u s b a n k i n g development, 
Lebanon was p l a c e d i n a d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n a t t h e end o f 
t h e f i r s t w o r l d war when t h e d e f e a t o f Germany and T u r k e y 
meant t h e c l o s u r e and w i t h d r a w a l o f most o f t h e e x p a t r i a t e 
banks. T h i s l e f t a v o i d w h i c h was not e a s i l y f i l l e d . 
The b e g i n n i n g o f t h e F r e n c h mandate a t t h e end o f t h e 
f i r s t w o r l d war meant t h a t b a n k i n g development now r e l i e d 
on F r e n c h i n i t i a t i v e . The Banque de S y r i e e t du L i b a n took 
o v e r t h e e l e m e n t a r y c e n t r a l b a n k i n g f u n c t i o n s f o r m e r l y 
v e s t e d i n t h e I m p e r i a l Ottoman Bank's f u n c t i o n s s u c h a s 
s o l e note i s s u e r . V a r i o u s o t h e r F r e n c h banks f o l l o w e d 
t h i s i n i t i a t i v e and a few l o c a l banks were e s t a b l i s h e d , 
s u c h as Banque G. T r a d and Co., Banque Sabbagh and Banque 
A.E. A s s e i l y , op. c i t . , p.28. 
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Thome. The p a t t e r n o f development seemed t o be f o r t h e 
l o c a l banks t o f i n a n c e d o m e s t i c t r a d e and f o r t h e f o r e i g n 
banks t o c o n c e n t r a t e on i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e . I n a d d i t i o n 
l o c a l banks a l s o began t o d e a l i n mortgage f i n a n c e ; an 
a s p e c t w h i c h i s s t i l l i m p o r t a n t today. 
Because l o c a l and e x p a t r i a t e banks p u r s u e d t h e s e 
s e p a r a t e f u n c t i o n s , i t meant t h a t t h e y were a b l e t o p r o s p e r 
s i d e by s i d e . Normally t h e l o c a l banks might have been 
e x p e c t e d t o be u n a b l e t o Compete e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h t h e 
e x p a t r i a t e banks; but t h i s was not t h e c a s e i n Lebanon. 
The l o c a l banks were w e l l known t o l o c a l m e rchants and 
t h e y r e l i e d on t h e i r good name t o a t t r a c t d e p o s i t s away 
from t h e e x p a t r i a t e banks. J u d g i n g by t h e number o f banks 
t h a t s u r v i v e d t h i s e a r l y p e r i o d o f development one c a n 
c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e y must have been s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t r a c t i n g 
d e p o s i t s . 
The p o s t - f i r s t w o r l d war p e r i o d a l s o brought about a 
number of changes i n L e b a n e s e c u r r e n c y a r r a n g e m e n t s . The 
T u r k i s h l i r a was r e p l a c e d by t h e L e b a n e s e - S y r i a n pound and 
t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i s s u i n g o f t h i s new c u r r e n c y 
was v e s t e d i n t h e Banque de S y r i e e t du L i b a n , a t t h a t 
t i m e a F r e n c h s u b s i d i a r y of t h e Ottoman Bank and t h e 
Banque de P a r i s e t des P a y s - B a s . The i n i t i a l r a t e was 
s e t a t 20 F r e n c h f r a n c s t o t h e L e b a n e s e - S y r i a n pound. 
S e c u r i t y f o r t h e i s s u e was p r o v i d e d by a s t o c k o f g o l d and 
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9 f r a n c r e s e r v e s . 
A wide v a r i e t y o f b a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s were e s t a b -
l i s h e d i n Lebanon d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f t h e F r e n c h Mandate 
(1920-1941). T y p i c a l o f t h i s development were banks s u c h 
a s C r e d i t F o n c i e r d ' A l g e r i e e t de T u n i s i e (1924)^"°; 
Compaigine A l g e r i e n n e de C r e d i t e t de Banque (1927) ; 
12 
Banco d i Roma (1926) ; Banque M i s r " ( E g y p t i a n 1929) and 
t h e Arab Bank ( J o r d a n i a n 1943.) . 
A l t h o u g h t h e r e was t h i s c o n s i d e r a b l e development o f 
f o r e i g n b a n k i n g e n t e r p r i s e s , l o c a l banks were s t i l l a b l e 
to p r o s p e r . 
One p a r t i c u l a r t y p e o f b u s i n e s s w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
l o c a l banks from t h e e x p a t r i a t e banks was mortgage f i n a n c e , 
and t h e use o f l a n d and b u i l d i n g s a s c o l l a t e r a l f o r 
borrowing r e q u i r e m e n t s . I n Lebanon l a n d i s one o f t h e 
c h i e f a s s e t s h e l d by many p e o p l e and n a t u r a l l y merchants, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , wanted t o f i n a n c e t h e i r t r a d e by u s i n g t h e i r 
r e a l e s t a t e a s s e c u r i t y f o r t h e l o a n . T h i s t y p e o f borrow-
i n g p r o c e d u r e was b a s i c a l l y a l i e n t o t h e F r e n c h banks i n 
9. More d e t a i l s o f t h e s e a r r a ngements a r e p r o v i d e d l a t e r i n 
t h i s c h a p t e r , when t h e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e Banque de S y r i e 
edn L i b a n a r e d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l . 
10. Now c a l l e d S o c i e t e C a n t r a l e de Banque. 
11. Now c a l l e d Banque F r a n c o - L i b a n a i s e . 
12. Now c a l l e d Banque M i s r - L i b a n . 
148. 
Lebanon and t h u s t h e l o c a l banks were a b l e t o d e v e l o p 
t h i s t y p e of f i n a n c e w i t h o u t coming i n t o d i r e c t c o m p e t i -
t i o n w i t h t h e e x p a t r i a t e banks. I n f a c t t h e f o r e i g n and 
l o c a l banks t e n d e d t o h e l p r a t h e r t h a n h i n d e r each o t h e r . 
The l o c a l b a n k e r s o f t e n found t h e y had an e x c e s s i v e 
number o f p o t e n t i a l b o r r o w e r s and v e r y l i m i t e d funds t o 
meet t h e demand. The f o r e i g n banks, b e c a u s e o f t h e i r 
r e l u c t a n c e t o l e n d t o l o c a l t r a d e r s , found t h e y were accumu-
l a t i n g funds w i t h few b o r r o w i n g o u t l e t s . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n 
i t was n a t u r a l f o r a r u d i m e n t a r y i n t e r - b a n k l o a n market 
t o d e v e l o p where t h e f o r e i g n banks became n e t l e n d e r s t o 
t h e l o c a l banks, who t h e n u s e d t h e i r i n c r e a s e d r e s e r v e s t o 
s a t i s f y t h e l o c a l demand f o r l o a n s . The h i g h r a t e s o f 
i n t e r e s t c h a r g e d by t h e l o c a l banks e n s u r e d t h a t t h e y 
c o u l d pay a r a t e o f i n t e r e s t on t h e i n t e r - b a n k l o a n and 
a l s o make a p r o f i t . 
By t h e l a t e 1930's Himadeh has e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e r e 
were about t h i r t y i n d i g e n o u s f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ; 
f i f t e e n o f w h i c h would be r e g a r d e d a s banks i n t h a t t h e y 
a c c e p t e d p r i v a t e d e p o s i t s and c r e a t e d l o a n s . The r e m a i n d e r 
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f u n c t i o n e d more l i k e d i s c o u n t h o u s e s . 
When t h e F r e n c h mandate ended and Lebanon g a i n e d 
independence i n 1948, t h e new government i n t r o d u c e d no 
S.B. Himadeh, l o c . c i t . , pp.173-174. 
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l e g i s l a t i o n t o c o n t r o l t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e c o m m e r c i a l 
banks. T h i s meant t h a t anyone was f r e e t o open a bank and 
o p e r a t e i t i n any way he w i s h e d , a s l o n g a s he a b i d e d by 
t h e "Code de Commerce". C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e were no r e g u -
l a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g minimum r e s e r v e r a t i o s , p u b l i c a t i o n o f 
b a l a n c e s h e e t s , minimum c a p i t a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . I n t h i s 
l a i s s e z f a i r e c l i m a t e i t was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t a l a r g e 
number of banks s e t up o f f i c e i n B e i r u t . T h i s i s not t o 
s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e was a sudden e x p a n s i o n i n t h e demand 
f o r l o a n s . Many v e r y s m a l l banks were e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h i s 
time, o f t e n b a s e d on f a m i l y f u n d s . I n f a c t i t has been 
s u g g e s t e d t h a t some b u s i n e s s m e n who w ere not c o n s i d e r e d 
c r e d i t - w o r t h y by t h e e x i s t i n g banks s e t up t h e i r own banks 
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t o s a t i s f y t h e i r own f i n a n c i a l demands. The f a c t t h a t 
no r e g u l a t i o n s e x i s t e d t o c o n t r o l t h i s t y p e o f b a n k i n g 
development meant t h a t v i r t u a l l y anyone c o u l d move i n t o 
t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r . 
C o n s i d e r a b l e impetus was g i v e n t o t h e s e developments 
by t h e net i n f l o w o f r e f u g e e c a p i t a l from n e i g h b o u r i n g 
Arcib s t a t e s s e e k i n g some s o r t o f r e f u g e from t h e p o l i t i c a l 
and s o c i a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e s e a r e a s and, a l s o , from 
s u r p l u s c a p i t a l g e n e r a t e d by t h e r e c e n t oil-boom w i t h i n t h e 
r e g i o n . A number o f t h e i n d i g e n o u s banks e s t a b l i s h e d a t 
A.E. A s s e i l y , l o c . c i t . , pp.31-32. 
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t h i s t ime d i d s u r v i v e t h e e a r l y y e a r s and went on t o 
p r o s p e r i n t h e l a t e 1950's. P r i n c i p l e among t h e s e banks 
were I n t r a Bank (19 5 1 ) ; S o c i e t e B a n c a i r e du L i b a n ( 1 9 4 6 ) ; 
Banque A l - A h l i ( 1 9 5 3 ) ; Banque du L i b a n e t d'Outre Mer (1951) 
and Banque L i b a n a i s e pour l e Commerce (19 50: a t t h e p r e s e n t 
t ime t h e l a r g e s t i n d i g e n o u s b a n k ) . 
T h i s g e n e r a l l a i s s e z f a i r e c l i m a t e i n t h e b a n k i n g 
s e c t o r c o n t i n u e d t o a t t r a c t i n a number o f f o r e i g n banks, 
many of whom were a n x i o u s t o g a i n a f o o t h o l d i n t h e M i d d l e 
E a s t e r n a r e a t o b e n e f i t from t h e n e t c a p i t a l f l o w s mentioned 
e a r l i e r . Some of t h e e a r l i e r e x p a t r i a t e banks t o be 
e s t a b l i s h e d were t h e Algemene Bank ( 1 9 5 4 ) , and t h e Banque 
B e l g o - L i b a n a i s e ( 1 9 5 3 ) . I n some c a s e s f o r e i g n banks 
bought i n t o e x i s t i n g l o c a l banks, e.g. Banque G. T r a d 
merged w i t h C r e d i t L y o n n a i s i n 19 51, and more r e c e n t l y t h i s 
has been a v e r y c o n v e n i e n t way f o r f o r e i g n banks t o e n t e r 
t h e L e b a n e s e b a n k i n g s e c t o r a s w i l l be s e e n l a t e r i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r . 
Banking development i n t h e 19 50's was v e r y r a p i d 
indeed. The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e was o f many s m a l l l o c a l banks 
b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d and a fewer, b u t l a r g e r , number o f 
e x p a t r i a t e banks who a p p e a r e d i n t h i s p e r i o d t o be 
i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r r e l a t i v e s h a r e o f t h e market. A l t h o u g h 
t h e number o f i n d i v i d u a l banks i n c r e a s e d r a p i d l y , t h e number 
of banks w h i c h began t o d e v e l o p a s y s t e m o f b r a n c h e s was 
v e r y s m a l l i n d e e d . I n f a c t t h e r e was v e r y l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e 
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t o d e v e l o p b r a n c h e s . The m a j o r i t y o f any bank's b u s i n e s s 
would be i n B e i r u t and t h e v e r y h i g h c o s t o f b u i l d i n g l a n d 
p r o b a b l y made t h e m a r g i n a l c o s t o f a b r a n c h bank much more 
t h a n any p o t e n t i a l r evenue from i n c r e a s i n g t h e volume o f 
d e p o s i t s . Some banks e s t a b l i s h e d s m a l l b r a n c h e s i n B e i r u t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h o t e l l o b b i e s , e t c . Even by 1973 t h e r e was 
o n l y one bank w h i c h c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d a s h a v i n g an 
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e x t e n s i v e b r a n c h network. Banking development i n t h e 
1950's and t h e e a r l y 1960's was h e a v i l y c o n c e n t r a t e d i n 
B e i r u t and t h e u n i t bank was t h e most common form o f 
i n s t i t u t i o n . 
W h i l s t t h e a l m o s t c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e o f r e g u l a t i o n s 
c o n c e r n i n g b a n k i n g development o b v i d u s l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o 
t h i s v e r y r a p i d growth o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n o t h e r 
p o w e r f u l element i n t h i s development was t h e Banking 
S e c r e c y Law o f 19 56. 
" B e c a u s e o f i t s g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n and o f i t s 
l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l regime, Lebanon may become, w i t h i n 
a s h o r t p e r i o d o t t i m e , t h e b a n k e r o f t h e Arab s t a t e s 
and t h e r e f u g e o f f o r e i g n c a p i t a l . I n o r d e r t o 
s e c u r e f o r Lebanon t h i s p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n , a 
b a n k i n g s e c r e c y s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d s i m i l a r t o 
what e x i s t s i n S w i t z e r l a n d . . . " 
Thus runs t h e preamble t o t h e Banking S e c r e c y Law o f 19 56, 
s e t t i n g out t h e L e b a n e s e government's m o t i v e s f o r e s t a b -
l i s h i n g a code o f s e c r e c y . ^ Above a l l t h i s law e n couraged 
15. The Development Bank - now known a s t h e C o n t i n e n t a l D e velop-
ment Bank, h a v i n g been a c q u i r e d by C o n t i n e n t a l I l l i n o i s 
Bank. The bank has 33 b r a n c h e s . 
16. The A r t i c l e s o f t h e Law a r e s e t out i n Appendix 1. 
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t h e i n f l o w o f f o r e i g n funds. The law s t i p u l a t e s t h a t a l l 
banks a r e s t r i c t l y f o r b i d d e n from r e v e a l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n 
about t h e funds of t h e i r c u s t o m e r s t o any p e r s o n o r a u t h o r i t y 
u n l e s s a u t h o r i z e d by t h e c u s t o m e r c o n c e r n e d o r l e g a l h e i r s . 
T h e r e a r e no l o o p h o l e s t o t h i s law, and, i n t h i s s e n s e , i s 
much more r i g o r o u s t h a n t h e b a n k i n g s e c r e c y laws i n 
S w i t z e r l a n d t h a t do a l l o w t h e S w i s s F e d e r a l Government t o 
o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n on c e r t a i n a c c o u n t s . T h e r e i s no doubt 
t h a t t h e c o m p l e t e anonymity a c h i e v e d by t h i s law was 
c r u c i a l i n t h e development o f b a n k i n g i n t h e y e a r s a f t e r 
19 56. P i e r r e Edde, t h e n P r e s i d e n t o f t h e B a n k e r s A s s o c i a -
t i o n , w r o t e i n 1963, 
"The a f f e c t s o f t h e Banking S e c r e c y Law a r e i n f a c t 
f e l t beyond t h e f r o n t i e r s o f Lebanon and r e a c h a l l 
t h o s e who t r u s t o u r la w s , t h e i r m a i n t e n a n c e and 
s t a b i l i t y ; . . . Th a t t r u s t h a s i n c r e a s e d o u r 
economic r e s o u r c e s and h a s c o n t r i b u t e d t o our 
development and p r o s p e r i t y " . 1 7 
The anonymity a t t a c h e d t o i n d i v i d u a l a c c o u n t s encouraged 
Arab c o u n t r i e s t o d e p o s i t money i n t h e Lebanon. One c o n s e -
quence of t h i s development has been a r a p i d growth i n 
t o t a l bank d e p o s i t s and an even more s p e c t a c u l a r growth i n 
d e p o s i t s denominated i n f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s . The p r e s e n c e 
o f f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t s ( e s t i m a t e d t o be a s h i g h a s 
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6 5% o f t o t a l bank d e p o s i t s ) i s a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e 
17. P. Edde, L e t t e r a d d r e s s e d t o t h e M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e , March 
1963 . 
18. See C h a p t e r Seven. 
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l i m i t e d i n v e s t m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s a v a i l a b l e i n many o f t h e 
s m a l l o i l s t a t e s , where o i l r o y a l t i e s t e n d t o be c h a n n e l l e d 
i n t o f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e s s u c h a s B e i r u t . I n a d d i t i o n 
f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y r e s e r v e s a r e h e l d i n B e i r u t i n o r d e r t o 
f i n a n c e t h e v e r y l a r g e m u l t i - n a t i o n a l element i n t r a d e . 
B e i r u t i s u s e d a s an e n t r e p o t from a l a r g e p a r t o f a r a b 
t r a d e i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t and, t h e r e f o r e , f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y 
d e p o s i t s have been a c c u m u l a t e d i n B e i r u t t o h e l p t o 
f i n a n c e t h i s t r a d e . 
A l l t h e s e f a c t o r s c o n s p i r e d t o produce a s i t u a t i o n 
when i n 1960 t h e number o f i n d i v i d u a l banks i n Lebanon had 
r i s e n t o 60. Of t h e s e banks 44 were "Approved banks"; 
t h a t i s t h e i r g u a r a n t e e s were a c c e p t a b l e t o l o c a l and 
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c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s . By t h i s p e r i o d Lebanon had 
d eveloped t h e most s o p h i s t i c a t e d b a n k i n g s y s t e m i n t h e 
a r a b M i d dle E a s t , i . e . , e x c l u d i n g I s r a e l , and i n some 
r e s p e c t s c o u l d a l m o s t be compared w i t h b a n k i n g systems i n 
20 . . . . W e s t e r n Europe. I t a l s o s h a r e d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h 
Hong Kong o f h a v i n g t h e l a r g e s t number o f s e p a r a t e banks 
p e r c a p i t a i n t h e w o r l d . 
The amount o f i n t e r - b a n k c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h i s p e r i o d 
was f a i r l y l i m i t e d . I n 1943 t h e Bangue de S y r i e e t du 
L i b a n s e t up a C l e a r i n g O f f i c e t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e s e t t l e -
ment o f i n t e r - b a n k c l a i m s , and i n 1953 t h e same bank 
19. J.O. R o n a l l , "Recent Banking Developments i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t " , 
The B a nkers Magazine, V o l . C X C I I I , No.1418, May 1963, pp.407-409. 
20. J.O. R o n a l l , op. c i t . , p.407. 
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e s t a b l i s h e d a C r e d i t R i s k O f f i c e , w h i c h had t h e i n t e n t i o n 
o f p r o v i d i n g a s y s t e m whereby member banks c o u l d exchange 
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e c r e d i t o f t h e i r d e b t o r s . The f i r s t 
i n s t i t u t i o n was s u c c e s s f u l i n t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l banks 
became members. The second i n s t i t u t i o n was l e s s s u c c e s s f u l 
a s a number o f l a r g e r banks were r e l u c t a n t t o i m p a r t i n f o r -
mation, w h i c h might put them i n an awkward p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s 
t h e Banque de S y r i e e t du L i b a n , w h i c h was not o n l y a bank 
of i s s u e , but a l s o a p r i v a t e c o m m e r c i a l bank competing 
21 
d i r e c t l y w i t h o t h e r banks. 
I n 1959 t h e A s s o c i a t i o n o f L e b a n e s e Banks was s e t up 
w i t h t h e a g r e e d aims o f c r e a t i n g more c o o p e r a t i o n between 
banks, i n d e v e l o p i n g common r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s i n t h e 
p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and a l s o p r o t e c t i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e 
22 
b a n k i n g p r o f e s s i o n i t s e l f . 
A p a r t from t h e s e forms o f c o o p e r a t i o n , most banks 
o p e r a t e d i n a v e r y i n d i v i d u a l f a s h i o n , u n f e t t e r e d by 
s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t i o n s and h a v i n g t h e a b i l i t y t o i n d u l g e i n 
s p e c u l a t i v e v e n t u r e s and unorthodox p r a c t i c e s , i n c l u d i n g 
23 
i n v e s t m e n t i n r e a l e s t a t e and e q u i t i e s . T h i s t y p e o f 
a c t i v i t y p a r t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e l i q u i d i t y c r i s e s 
e x p e r i e n c e d by some banks between 1966 and 1969, w h i c h a r e 
d e t a i l e d i n C h a p t e r E i g h t . 
21. T. Y a f i , op. c i t . . pp.86-93. 
22. Banque de S y r i e e t du L i b a n , Assemblee O r d i n a i r e G e n e r a l e , 
E x e r c i s e 19 59, p.6. 
23. S. Hoss, "The B a n king System S i n c e 1966", The Banker, p.63. 
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The y e a r 1960 c a n be t a k e n a s a c o n v e n i e n t b r e a k p o i n t 
i n t h e development o f t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r . The tremendous 
e x p a n s i o n i n b a n k i n g a c t i v i t y up t o t h i s d a t e had c r e a t e d 
one o r two u n d e s i r a b l e s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h have been r e f e r r e d 
t o a l r e a d y . I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e L e b a n e s e government became 
c o n c e r n e d o v e r t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f v e r y many s m a l l banks, 
who, i n o r d e r t o compete f o r d e p o s i t s , were o f f e r i n g h i g h 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s on demand d e p o s i t s and, t h e r e f o r e , had t o 
f i n a n c e h i g h l y s p e c u l a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t s i n o r d e r t o show a 
p r o f i t . I n t e r e s t r a t e s on demand d e p o s i t s were a s h i g h a s 
5% and 6% d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . A b a n k i n g f a i l u r e due t o 
unwise i n v e s t m e n t s would o b v i o u s l y have r e p e r c u s s i o n s on 
t h e whole o f t h e L e b a n e s e b a n k i n g system, a p a r t from 
r u i n i n g an i n d i v i d u a l bank. B e a r i n g i n mind i t s need t o 
p r o t e c t t h e p o s i t i o n o f B e i r u t a s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l 
c e n t r e , t h e L e b a n e s e government d e c i d e d t o f r e e z e a l l 
a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r bank i n c o r p o r a t i o n s , a p a r t from t h o s e 
a l r e a d y b e i n g p r o c e s s e d . T h i s was done i n March 1961 and 
had t h e e f f e c t o f c r e a t i n g a moratorium w i t h i n w h i c h t h e 
government c o u l d l e g i s l a t e f u r t h e r i f i t w i s h e d t o do s o . 
I n f a c t most o f t h e government's i n t e n t i o n s became c l e a r 
o n l y i n 1963 w i t h t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f The Monetary and 
C r e d i t A c t , w h i c h not o n l y l a i d down t h e a r t i c l e s o f o r g a -
n i z a t i o n f o r t h e new c e n t r a l bank; b u t a l s o s t i p u l a t e d t h e 
r e g u l a t i o n s w h i c h would h e n c e f o r t h a p p l y t o c o m m e r c i a l banks 
156. 
24 o p e r a t i n g m Lebanon. i n p a r t i c u l a r , s e c t i o n I I I o f t h e 
A c t ( a r t i c l e s 128-131) l a i d down t h e c o n d i t i o n s of e s t a b -
l i s h m e n t f o r c o m m e r c i a l banks and t h e s e were s u c h t h a t no 
c o m m e r c i a l bank c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d i n Lebanon w i t h o u t 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e c e n t r a l bank. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o 
note t h a t t h e word " c o n s u l t a t i o n " was u s e d r a t h e r t h a n a 
s t r o n g e r word l i k e " p e r m i s s i o n " . The Monetary and C r e d i t 
A c t was p u b l i s h e d i n 1963 and t h e C e n t r a l Bank was e s t a b -
l i s h e d i n 1964. T h e r e f o r e , a l t h o u g h t h e government had 
e x p r e s s e d i t s i n t e n t i o n t o c o n t r o l b a n k i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n 
1960, t h e s e i n t e n t i o n s were not made e f f e c t i v e i n any s e n s e 
u n t i l 1964 and, i n f a c t , i t c o u l d be a r g u e d t h a t t h e 
C e n t r a l Bank was not a b l e t o e x e r c i s e any a u t h o r i t y o v e r 
t h e b a n k i n g s y s t e m u n t i l 1967, i . e . a f t e r t h e c r i s i s o f 
c o n f i d e n c e b r ought t o a head by t h e I n t r a Bank c r a s h i n 
Octo b e r 1966. T h i s meant t h a t t h e r e was an i n t e r i m p e r i o d 
o f about f o u r y e a r s when b a n k i n g a c t i v i t y was under s c r u t i n y , 
b u t not y e t s u b j e c t t o s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s . Thus t h e growth 
of b a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h i s p e r i o d from 1960-1964 con-
t i n u e d and i n f a c t a c c e l e r a t e d . Of t h e t o t a l o f 110 
25 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s r e g i s t e r e d i n 1968, 4 had been 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1961; 9 i n 1962; 16 i n 1963 and 8 i n 1964. 
24. The Monetary and C r e d i t A c t 1963. D e c r e e No. 13 513 P u b l i s h e d 
i n t h e O f f i c i a l G a z e t t e No. 62 o r 5.8.63. ( E n g l i s h t r a n s -
l a t i o n by M.H. S a l l o u m ) . 
25. The term ' f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n ' r e f e r s not o n l y t o r e g i s t e r e d 
banks, but a l s o t o i n v e s t m e n t companies and d i s c o u n t h o u s e s . 
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Thus 3 4 % o f a l l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were c r e a t e d i n 
t h i s p e r i o d . 
The w a r n i n g s g i v e n by t h e L e b a n e s e government i n 1960 
and t h e l e g i s l a t i o n w h i c h became e f f e c t i v e i n 1964 were 
unable t o s t o p t h i s s p e c t a c u l a r growth. From a f i g u r e o f 
60 banks i n 1960, t h e t o t a l r o s e t o 82 i n 1964, h i t t i n g a 
peak of 88 banks i n 1967 and 1968. However o f t h e 88 banks 
r e g i s t e r e d i n 1968 o n l y 73 were d e s c r i b e d a s a c t i v e , w i t h 
t h e r e m a i n i n g number under government s u p e r v i s i o n o r i n 
26 
v o l u n t a r y l i q u i d a t i o n . T h i s l e v e l o f 73 banks has been 
h e l d c o n s t a n t up t o 1973. 
The number o f f o r e i g n banks i n c r e a s e d r a p i d l y i n t h e 
e a r l y 1960's, w i t h t h e a d v e n t o f some m a j o r American banks 
( F i r s t N a t i o n a l C i t y Bank; Bank o f A m e r i c a and Chase 
Manhattan Bank) and banks s u c h a s Bank S a d e r a t ( I r a n i a n ) ; 
L i t e x Bank ( B u l g a r i a n ) ; Arab A f r i c a n Bank ( E g y p t i a n ) ; 
Bank of Nova S c o t i a ( C anadian) and Habib Bank ( P a k i s t a n ) . 
By 1973, 3 8 f o r e i g n banks had d i r e c t i n t e r e s t s i n Lebanon, 
27 
e i t h e r a s banks o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f f i c e s . 
An o v e r r i d i n g f e a t u r e o f a l l t h e banks d u r i n g t h i s 
p e r i o d was t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i t y . T h i s i s d e r i v e d from two 
26. Annual f i g u r e s f o r t h e t o t a l number o f r e g i s t e r e d banks a r e 
g i v e n i n , Banque du L i b a n , Rapport s u L'annee. 
27. I n t h i s l a t t e r c a t e g o r y come B a r c l a y s Bank I n t e r n a t i o n a l ; 
D e u t s c h e Bank; D r e s d n e r Bank; S t a t e Bank o f I n d i a ; Bank o f 
Tokyo, t o name a few, s e e A s s o c i a t i o n des Banques du 
L i b a n , Rapport Annuel 1973 and Appendix 2. 
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main s o u r c e s . F i r s t l y , u n t i l 1960 i n d i v i d u a l banks had no 
need t o p u b l i s h any b a l a n c e s h e e t s o r a c c o u n t s of t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s meant t h a t i n d i v i d u a l banks were v e r y 
guarded i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e t o o t h e r banks. S e c o n d l y , p r i o r 
t o 1964, no c e n t r a l bank e x i s t e d i n Lebanon. One c o n s e -
quence of t h i s was t h a t no o r g a n i z e d c a l l money market 
e x i s t e d , a l t h o u g h t h e r e was a r u d i m e n t a r y i n t e r - b a n k l o a n 
market, d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r . The Banque de 
S y r i e e t du L i b a n (BSL) a c t e d a s a c e n t r a l c l e a r i n g house 
and i s s u e r o f c u r r e n c y p r i o r t o 1964. An a c c o u n t o f i t s 
a c t i v i t i e s p r i o r t o 1964 g i v e some i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e 
n a t u r e of c o n t r o l s w h i c h e x i s t e d i n t h e p r e - C e n t r a l Bank 
e r a . The BSL, a F r e n c h bank, was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1919 and 
im m e d i a t e l y took o v e r t h e f u n c t i o n o f n o t e i s s u e from t h e 
Ottoman bank. The p r i v i l e g e t o i s s u e c u r r e n c y was 
f o r m a l l y r e c o g n i z e d i n a c h a r t e r o f 1924 and s u b s e q u e n t l y 
renewed u n t i l 1 s t A p r i l 1964, when t h e r i g h t e x p i r e d and 
t h e Banque du L i b a n , t h e new c e n t r a l bank, took o v e r t h i s 
f u n c t i o n . Up t o 1964 BSL had p u r s u e d t h e f o l l o w i n g c e n t r a l 
b a n k i n g a c t i v i t i e s ; i t was a bank o f i s s u e , t h e govern-
ment bank and b a n k e r t o t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r . A s e p a r a t e 
i s s u e department was e s t a b l i s h e d t o d e a l w i t h t h e f i r s t 
f u n c t i o n . One i n t e r e s t i n g a s p e c t o f t h i s i s s u e f u n c t i o n 
i s t h a t t h e g o l d c o v e r f o r t h e L e b a n e s e pound r o s e a s h i g h 
a s 9 2 % i n 1961. The g o l d c o v e r s p e c i f i e d i n t h e 1924 
c h a r t e r was 45%. I n 193 7 t h i s dropped t o 10%, w i t h t h e 
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m a j o r i t y o f r e s e r v e s h e l d i n f r e n c h f r a n c s and f r e n c h 
s e c u r i t i e s . A new Monetary Law o f 1949 r e q u i r e d t h e c o v e r 
on t h e note i s s u e t o be a t l e a s t 50% g o l d and f o r e i g n 
c u r r e n c i e s e a s i l y c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o g o l d . A f a v o u r a b l e 
number o f b a l a n c e o f payments y e a r s i n t h e 1950's meant 
t h a t t h e BSL had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u r c h a s e gold, t h u s 
b u i l d i n g t h e g o l d c o v e r up t o i t s e x t r a o r d i n a r y l e v e l by 
1961. T h i s t r e n d h a s been c o n t i n u e d i n more r e c e n t y e a r s 
a s c a n be s e e n from T a b l e 5.1 
T a b l e 5.1: G o l d c o v e r o f t h e f i d u c i a r y i s s u e : 1964-1973 
( i n m i l l i o n s L e b a n e s e pounds) 
Y e a r G o l d and C o n v e r t i b l e 
C u r r e n c i e s 
F i d u c i a r y -
I s s u e 
G o l d 
C o v e r 
1964 465 533 8 7 % 
1965 481 571 84% 
1966 497 574 8 7% 
1967 631 730 86% 
1964 702 801 8 8 % 
1969 775 910 8 5 % 
1970 767 898 8 5% 
1971 743 872 8 5% 
1972 83 5 981 8 5 % 
1973 93 5 1068 87% 
S o u r c e : B u l l e t i n S t a t i s t i q u e Mensuel. 
Notes: The f i g u r e s r e l a t e t o t h e h o l d i n g s i n J a n u a r y o f 
e a c h y e a r , e x c e p t f o r 1964 and 196 5 where t h e month 
us e d was A p r i l . The monthly v a r i a t i o n s a r e 
s u f f i c i e n t l y s l i g h t t o j u s t i f y t h i s p r o c e d u r e . 
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T h i s v e r y h i g h g o l d c o v e r f o r t h e f i d u c i a r y i s s u e has been 
v e r y i m p o r t a n t i n t h e development o f t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r . 
Gold, u n t i l r e c e n t l y , was s t i l l u s e d a s a major t r a d i n g 
medium i n t h e Middle E a s t and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g o l d c o v e r 
f o r t h e L e b a n e s e pound was so h i g h c r e a t e d a g e n e r a l a i r o f 
c o n f i d e n c e , w h i c h encouraged c a p i t a l i n f l o w s i n t o L e b a n e s e 
banks from o t h e r a r a b a r e a s o f t h e M i d d l e E a s t . 
T e c h n i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e BSL a c t e d a s a bank o f 
i s s u e f o r b o t h Lebanon and S y r i a f o r a l a r g e p a r t o f i t s 
h i s t o r y . When t h e i s s u i n g c h a r t e r o f 1924 e x p i r e d i n 1937, 
t h e BSL c o n c l u d e d two s e p a r a t e agreements w i t h t h e 
L e b a n e s e R e p u b l i c (May 29th, 193 7) and t h e S y r i a n R e p u b l i c 
( F e b r u a r y 2 5th, 193 8) w h i c h c o n t i n u e d u n t i l 19 56 i n t h e 
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c a s e of S y r i a and 1964 i n t h e c a s e o f Lebanon. A l t h o u g h 
t h e BSL had j u r i s d i c t i o n i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s , t h e f o l l o w i n g 
a c c o u n t o f i t s a c t i v i t i e s a p p l i e s e x c l u s i v e l y t o Lebanon. 
A second f u n c t i o n o f t h e BSL was t o a c t a s b a n k e r t o 
t h e government. Most o f t h e L e b a n e s e government's funds 
were d e p o s i t e d w i t h t h e BSL p r i o r t o 1964, and t h e r a t e s 
p a i d by BSL on t h e s e p u b l i c d e p o s i t s g e n e r a l l y t e n d e d t o 
f o l l o w t h e r a t e s o f t h e Banque de F r a n c e , t h u s e m p h a s i s i n g 
t h e c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e L e b a n e s e banks and t h e 
f r e n c h f i n a n c i a l system. The BSL a l s o l o a n e d money t o 
The L e b a n e s e and S y r i a n c u r r e n c i e s were g r a d u a l l y s e p a r a t e d 
from 193 8. S y r i a n bank n o t e s were f i n a l l y t a k e n o u t o f 
c i r c u l a t i o n i n Lebanon i n 1948, a t t h e same t i m e a s L e b a n e s e 
pounds were withdrawn i n S y r i a . T h i s l e a d t h e way t o t h e 
c r e a t i o n o f two s e p a r a t e monetary s y s t e m s . 
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p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s i n Lebanon. The BSL was a l s o i n v o l v e d 
i n any i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h e L e b a n e s e government w i s h e d t o make 
i n t h e f o r e i g n exchange m a r k e t s . Under t h e Exchange 
E q u a l i s a t i o n Fund of 1949, t h e BSL had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o 
e n t e r t h e f o r e i g n exchange market; but i t s f i r s t i n t e r -
v e n t i o n o n l y o c c u r r e d i n 19 53 when i t was a s k e d t o s u p p o r t 
t h e U.S. d o l l a r r a t e a t a minimum o f LL3.20 = $1. The 
exchange e q u a l i s a t i o n f u n c t i o n o f t h e BSL was n e v e r c l e a r l y 
d e f i n e d and v e r y l i t t l e used, and Lebanon has e n j o y e d a 
v i r t u a l l y f r e e l y f l u c t u a t i n g exchange r a t e o v e r t h e l a s t 
t w enty y e a r s . The BSL was a s s i s t e d i n i t s f o r e i g n exchange 
f u n c t i o n by a number o f agreements n e g o t i a t e d w i t h t h e 
F r e n c h government, w h i c h g u a r a n t e e d t h e f r a n c r e s e r v e s h e l d . 
by t h e BSL. The l a t e s t o f t h e s e agreements was t h e one 
o f J a n u a r y 2 4 t h 1948, which, among o t h e r t h i n g s , a l l o w e d 
t h e L e b a n e s e government t o c o n v e r t i t s f r a n c h o l d i n g s i n t o 
g o l d , l e a d i n g t o t h e r a p i d r i s e i n g o l d h o l d i n g commented 
upon p r e v i o u s l y . 
The t h i r d and f i n a l f u n c t i o n o f BSL was t o a c t a s a 
ba n k e r t o t h e c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
t o l o o k a t t h i s f u n c t i o n i n some d e t a i l t o s e e i n what ways 
t h e BSL was a b l e t o i n f l u e n c e t h e development o f t h e 
c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r . An o b v i o u s drawback t o t h e BSL 
a c t i n g a s a b a n k e r ' s bank was t h a t i t was a c o m m e r c i a l bank 
i t s e l f . Thus i f a c o m m e r c i a l bank was i n need o f r e d i s -
c o u n t i n g f a c i l i t i e s , w h i c h t h e BSL p r o v i d e d t h e n t h a t bank 
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was a t t h e same t i m e d e m o n s t r a t i n g t o t h e BSL t h a t i t was 
i n need of f u n d s : t h e s o r t of c o n f i d e n c e s t h a t c o m m e r c i a l 
banks do not n o r m a l l y s h a r e amongst e a c h o t h e r . The BSL 
a c t e d i n t h r e e s p e c i f i c ways t o a s s i s t c o m m e r c i a l banks. 
I t p r o v i d e d r e d i s c o u n t i n g f a c i l i t i e s , on b i l l s c a r r y i n g 
t h r e e s i g n a t u r e s . The d i s c o u n t r a t e u s e d was t h a t s e t by 
t h e Banque de F r a n c e u n t i l 19 53. T h e r e a f t e r i t remained 
a t 3%. S e c o n d l y , t h e BSL was p r e p a r e d t o open l i n e s o f 
c r e d i t f o r c o m m e r c i a l banks. T h e s e c r e d i t s were u s u a l l y 
g r a n t e d f o r up t o a y e a r ' s d u r a t i o n . F i n a l l y t h e BSL was 
p r e p a r e d t o buy b i l l s from banks f o r c a s h on a s e v e n day 
b a s i s , on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e banks would r e p u r c h a s e 
t h e b i l l s a t t h e end o f t h e s e v e n d a y s . T h i s f a c i l i t y was 
d e s i g n e d t o p r o v i d e immediate c a s h f o r banks s u f f e r i n g 
from i l l i q u i d i t y . T h i s l a s t f a c i l i t y was u s e d more t h a n 
t h e o t h e r two by t h e c o m m e r c i a l banks, w h i c h would s u g g e s t 
t h a t s h o r t r u n i l l i q u i d i t y was one o f t h e major problems 
29 
i n t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . 
T h i s l i s t o f f a c i l i t i e s o f f e r e d by t h e BSL t o t h e 
c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r g i v e s t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a 
f a i r l y w ide range o f c o n t r o l was p o s s i b l e and t h a t t h e r e 
was t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r o r d e r l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o e x i s t 
between banks. A c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e f e l l s h o r t o f t h i s . 
Hoss summarising t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e BSL s t a t e s , 
A.E. A s s e i l y , l o c . c i t . , p.169. 
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"The BSL performs a t p r e s e n t some o f t h e f u n c t i o n s 
o f a c e n t r a l bank i n Lebanon - but i t e x e r c i s e s no 
monetary c o n t r o l and a c t s o n l y r e l u c t a n t l y a s a 
l e n d e r o f l a s t r e s o r t . The BSL i s under no l e g a l 
o b l i g a t i o n t o r e g u l a t e t h e money s u p p l y f o r a s p e c i f i e d 
purpose o r i n a s p e c i f i e d manner. Nor i s i t under 
t h e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s c a p a b l e o f r e g u l a t i n g t h e money 
s u p p l y e f f e c t i v e l y . I t s a b i l i t y t o e x e r c i s e e f f e c t i v e 
monetary c o n t r o l i s handicapped by t h e f a c t t h a t i t 
has no j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e o t h e r banks i n Lebanon 
and by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e c u r i t i e s market i s not 
w e l l d e v e l o p e d . . "30 
The i n e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by t h e BSL r e v o l v e s 
around t h e c o m p l i c a t e d n a t u r e of i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h 
o t h e r c o m m e r c i a l banks. I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e BSL was i n a 
r a t h e r u n u s u a l p o s i t i o n . I t was o s t e n s i b l y a c o m m e r c i a l 
bank r e q u i r e d t o c a r r y out c e r t a i n c e n t r a l b a n k i n g f u n c t i o n s . 
To do t h i s s u c c e s s f u l l y i t must, presumably, be a b l e t o 
demonstrate i t s i m p a r t i a l i t y towards a l l o t h e r c o m m e r c i a l 
banks. But t h i s i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o do i f t h e BSL i s 
i t s e l f competing f o r d e p o s i t s and g r a n t i n g a d v a n ces l i k e 
o t h e r c o m m e r c i a l banks. The g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n t h a t a 
c o m m e r c i a l bank a c t i n g a s a c e n t r a l bank, o r a c e n t r a l 
bank a c t i n g a l s o a s a c o m m e r c i a l bank might f i n d i t s e l f 
i n i s a p t l y summarised by J u c k e r - F l e e t w o o d . 
" t h e c e n t r a l bank e i t h e r t h r o u g h t h e b a n k e r s ' a s s o -
c i a t i o n , t h r o u g h s p e c i a l meetings o r even by t h e most 
i n f o r m a l t a l k s , l e t s i t w i s h e s . . . . be known. I f 
t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e c e n t r a l bank i s good and i t has 
t h e c o n f i d e n c e o f t h e ba n k i n g community t h i s i n f o r m a l 
c o n t r o l i s o f t e n f a r r e a c h i n g and e f f i c a c i o u s . 
S. A. Hoss, The R o l e s o f C e n t r a l Banking i n Lebanon, 
Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y o f I n d i a n a , 1961, (Ann Ar b o r : 
M i c h i g a n , U n i v e r s i t y M i c r o f i l m s I n c , 1962) p.110. 
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S h o u l d a c e n t r a l bank i t s e l f be o p e r a t i n g i n t h e 
c o m m e r c i a l f i e l d , i t would e i t h e r f i n d t h a t one 
department must c o n t r o l t h e o t h e r on a par w i t h t h e 
o t h e r banks o r i t would be tempted t o make e x c e p t i o n s 
f o r i t s own department on t h e grounds of g r e a t e r 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . Both p o l i c i e s a r e d i f f i c u l t t o 
e n f o r c e . The former demands a h i g h degree o f 
i m p a r t i a l i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y - and even when t h e 
r e g u l a t i o n s a r e s c r u p u l o u s l y and m e t i c u l o u s l y e n f o r c e d 
t h e r e s t o f t h e b a n k i n g community w i l l f i n d t h i s h a r d 
t o b e l i e v e . The r e s u l t i n g s u s p i c i o n s w i l l make t h e 
t a s k o f t h e c e n t r a l bank even more d i f f i c u l t t h a n 
a l r e a d y i s t h e c a s e . T h i s a p p l i e s doubly t o t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y of e x c e p t i n g t h e c e n t r a l bank's 
c o m m e r c i a l department . . . from t h e r e g u l a t i o n s o f 
monetary c o n t r o l . " 3 1 
T h i s g e n e r a l comment made by J u c k e r - F l e e t w o o d g i v e s 
a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of t h e p o t e n t i a l dangers o f a l l o w i n g a 
c o m m e r c i a l bank t o adopt c e n t r a l bank f u n c t i o n s , l i k e t h e 
BSL. An a l t e r n a t i v e i d e a i s p r e s e n t e d by P r o f e s s o r S a y e r s 
when he p u t s f o r w a r d t h e view t h a t i n some c a s e s a c e n t r a l 
bank s h o u l d d e v e l o p c o m m e r c i a l bank f a c i l i t i e s t o encourage 
t h e growth o f c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g i n t h e c o u n t r y c o n c e r n e d . 
T h i s does not seem t o be a v a l i d argument i n Lebanon a s 
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t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r was a d e q u a t e l y d e v e l o p e d . 
Thus t h e BSL was p l a c e d i n somewhat ambiguous p o s i -
t i o n v i s a v i s t h e c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r . B e c ause o f 
t h i s ambiguous p o s i t i o n t h e BSL was n e v e r a b l e t o e x t e n d 
t o t h e c o m m e r c i a l banks a l l t h e f a c i l i t i e s a t i t s d i s p o s a l . 
T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f r e d i s c o u n t i n g f a c i l i t i e s . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o s u g g e s t , though d i f f i c u l t t o p r o v e 
31. E . E . J u c k e r - F l e e t w o o d , Money and F i n a n c e i n A f r i c a , B a s l e 
C e n t r e f o r Economic and F i n a n c i a l R e s e a r c h S e r i e s B. No. 6, 
(George A l l e n & Unwin, 1964) p.60. 
32. R.S. S a y e r s , C e n t r a l Banking a f t e r Baaehot, (London: O x f o r d 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1957) p.118. 
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c o n c l u s i v e l y , t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e BSL was s u c h t h a t 
i t was u n a b l e and p r o b a b l y U n w i l l i n g t o a p p l y c o n t r o l s on 
t h e c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r , w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n t h e v e r y 
r a p i d , p r o b a b l y o v e r r a p i d , e x p a n s i o n o f b a n k i n g f a c i l i t i e s 
i n t h e 1950-1960 p e r i o d . C e r t a i n l y t h e l a c k o f s p e c i f i c 
c e n t r a l bank c o n t r o l s , s u c h a s r e g u l a t i o n s on t h e s i z e , 
c a p i t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n and b u s i n e s s p u r s u e d by a c o m m e r c i a l 
bank, meant t h a t v i r t u a l l y anyone c o u l d s t a r t a c o m m e r c i a l 
bank. Once i t was s t a r t e d t h e n t h e r e were few ways t h a t 
t h e BSL c o u l d c o n t r o l i t s a c t i v i t i e s , y e t i t was e x p e c t e d 
t o p r o v i d e s h o r t - t e r m c a s h f a c i l i t i e s i f i t became i l l i q u i d . 
I n o t h e r words what c o n t r o l t h e r e was was p r o b a b l y a p p l i e d 
i n t h e wrong p l a c e and was not v e r y e f f e c t i v e anyhow. I n 
c e r t a i n c a s e s t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e BSL a s a c e n t r a l bank 
and a s a c o m m e r c i a l bank c l a s h e d q u i t e d e c i s i v e l y . D u r i n g 
t h e 1948-1960 p e r i o d t h e BSL c a r r i e d out a s m a l l number o f 
r e d i s c o u n t o p e r a t i o n s , w i t h r e d i s c o u n t r a t e s v a r y i n g 
between 5-7% p.a. However a s a normal c o m m e r c i a l bank t h e 
BSL t e n d e d t o expand c r e d i t i n t i m e s o f boom and r e s t r i c t 
c r e d i t i n t i m e s o f s l a c k . Thus r e d i s c o u n t i n g f a c i l i t i e s 
were most r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e a t a t i m e when t h e y were l e a s t 
needed. I n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e government had t o 
i n t e r v e n e t o f o r c e t h e BSL t o accommodate t h e c o m m e r c i a l 
33 
banks. F o r i n s t a n c e t h i s was done i n 19 56 and 19 58. 
T. Y a f i , "A C a s e f o r Banking Reform i n Lebanon", M i d d l e 
E a s t Economic Pape r s , 1958, pp.109-114. 
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T h i s r a t h e r long d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e BSL i s i m p o r t a n t i n 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e g e n e r a l environment i n w h i c h c o m m e r c i a l 
banks d e v e l o p e d p r i o r t o 1964. A s s e i l y h a s c o n c l u d e d t h a t 
" . . . t h e BSL was f u l f i l l i n g i t s purpose a d e q u a t e l y 
and p r o p e r l y . . .^4 
T h i s s t a t e m e n t i s b r o a d l y t r u e i n t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n s o f 
t h e BSL were v e r y l i m i t e d ones. What i s more i m p o r t a n t t o 
our o v e r a l l a n a l y s i s i s t h a t t h e BSL was i n no p o s i t i o n t o 
s u p e r v i s e t h e v e r y r a p i d growth o f t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r 
p r i o r t o 1964 and t h e e x c e s s i v e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f banks i n 
t h i s p e r i o d t e n d e d t o weaken t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r r a t h e r 
t h a n s t r e n g t h e n i t . The numerous banks w h i c h have gone 
i n t o l i q u i d a t i o n s i n c e 1966 s u g g e s t t h a t Lebanon was o v e r -
banked. E a c h l i q u i d a t i o n has c r e a t e d a c e r t a i n c r i s i s o f 
c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r a s a whole, whereas t h e s e 
c r i s e s c o u l d have been a v o i d e d i f a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t r o l s were 
a v a i l a b l e a t a much e a r l i e r d a t e . 
To b r i n g our s u r v e y of b a n k i n g developments up t o 
date, we must now c o n s i d e r t h e p e r i o d from 1964 t o t h e 
p r e s e n t day. T h i s p e r i o d r e p r e s e n t s a t i m e o f c o n s i d e r a b l e 
change. A new c e n t r a l bank was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1964 and 
t h e c o m m e r c i a l banks might be s a i d t o h ave c o n s o l i d a t e d 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n c e t h e n . The t o t a l number o f c o m m e r c i a l 
A.E. A s s e i l y , l o c . c i t . , p.177. 
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banks o p e r a t i n g i n Lebanon r e a c h e d a peak i n t h e 1967-1968 
p e r i o d w i t h a t o t a l of 88 banks r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e C e n t r a l 
Bank owning a t o t a l o f 232 b r a n c h e s between them ( e x c l u d i n g 
3 b r a n c h e s open o n l y d u r i n g t h e summer t o u r i s t s e a s o n ) . 
S i n c e 1968 t h e t o t a l number o f banks i n o p e r a t i o n has 
dropped t o 73. Of t h i s t o t a l 34 a r e c o m p l e t e l y i n d i g e n o u s 
banks; 20 a r e j o i n t l y owned by L e b a n e s e and f o r e i g n 
e lements and 19 a r e c o m p l e t e l y f o r e i g n owned. I t i s 
i n s t r u c t i v e t o note t h a t a l l 17 banks t h a t have dropped 
from t h e l i s t o f r e g i s t e r e d banks s i n c e 1966 were i n d i g e n o u s 
banks. Nine o t h e r s a c q u i r e d a f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n and 
f i v e more came c o m p l e t e l y under f o r e i g n c o n t r o l . Thus i t 
i s t h e i n d i g e n o u s banks a l o n e t h a t have s u f f e r e d by t h e 
e v e n t s o f 1966 onwards. 
O c t o b e r 1966 saw t h e c o l l a p s e o f I n t r a Bank, a t t h a t 
t i m e t h e l a r g e s t c o m m e r c i a l bank i n Lebanon. W h i l s t a 
more d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f t h e c o l l a p s e i s g i v e n i n C h a p t e r 
E i g h t , i t i s i m p o r t a n t a t t h i s s t a g e t o emphasise why t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r bank c o l l a p s e was i m p o r t a n t . I n t r a Bank, l i k e 
many i n d i g e n o u s banks a t t h a t time, had a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
p r o p o r t i o n o f i t s a s s e t s i n v e r y long-term, h i g h - r i s k 
v e n t u r e s and hence i t s l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n was v e r y s e r i o u s 
i n d e e d . A few rumours about I n t r a ' s p o s i t i o n was 
s u f f i c i e n t t o c a u s e a run on t h e bank. The I n t r a Bank 
c l o s u r e a f f e c t e d o t h e r banks i n t h e s y s t e m both d i r e c t l y 
and i n d i r e c t l y . F i r s t l y t h e g e n e r a l u n c e r t a i n t y c a u s e d 
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r uns on o t h e r banks and s e c o n d l y , t h e I n t r a c r a s h v i r t u a l l y 
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f o r c e d t h e C e n t r a l Bank i n t o a c t i o n . I t was c l e a r t h a t 
a number of c o n t r o l s were n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e o v e r a l l b e n e f i t 
o f t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r . I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e C e n t r a l Bank was 
a n x i o u s t o m a i n t a i n a v e r y c l o s e w a t c h on l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s 
w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l banks. From 1968 onwards a l l banks have 
s u b m i t t e d a b r i e f s t a t e m e n t o f t h e i r l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n t o 
t h e C e n t r a l Bank each month and more d e t a i l e d s t a t e m e n t s 
have been s u b m i t t e d e v e r y q u a r t e r . I n a d d i t i o n i n 1969 
t h e C e n t r a l Bank r e q u i r e d a l l c o m m e r c i a l - b a n k s t o d e p o s i t 
5% o f t h e i r t o t a l d e p o s i t s w i t h t h e C e n t r a l Bank i n L e b a n e s e 
36 
pounts. T h i s measure had a t w o - f o l d e f f e c t . I t put 
c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e on l o c a l banks t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
l i q u i d i t y ( i t was r e p o r t e d a t t h e t i m e t h a t even a 5% 
l i q u i d i t y l e v e l was p r o v i n g e m b a r r a s s i n g t o some banks) and 
i t f o r c e d many f o r e i g n banks t o c o n v e r t f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y 
h o l d i n g s i n t o L e b a n e s e pounds t o meet t h e 5% r e q u i r e m e n t . 
T h i s had t h e s i d e e f f e c t o f r e d u c i n g p r e s s u r e on t h e 
L e b a n e s e pound w h i c h was g r a d u a l l y d e p r e c i a t i n g i n l a t e 
37 
1969 and e a r l y 1970. 
3 5. J.N. B r i d g e , "Reforms S t r e n g t h e n Banking", F i n a n c i a l Times 
S u r v e y of Lebanon, November 3 0 t h 1971, p.28. 
36. The d e t a i l e d e f f e c t s of t h e s e p o l i c i e s a r e d i s c u s s e d i n 
C h a p t e r E i g h t . 
37. J.N. B r i d g e , "The L e b a n e s e Pound", I n t e r n a t i o n a l C u r r e n c y 
Review, September/October 1970, p.3. 
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The f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m t h a t has emerged i n 1974, i n t h e 
wake o f c e n t r a l bank refo r m s , i n now a s m a l l e r and s t r o n g e r 
one t h a n t h a t w h i c h e x i s t e d a t t h e h e i g h t of t h e b a n k i n g 
boom i n 1966. T o t a l d e p o s i t s i n t h e b a n k i n g s y s t e m by 
mid-1974 had r i s e n t o a t o t a l o f LL7,819 m i l l i o n (compared 
w i t h LL3,453 m i l l i o n i n September 1 9 6 6 ) . The s q u e e z e on 
l i q u i d i t y a f t e r 1966 a f f e c t e d t h e i n d i g e n o u s banks more 
t h a n t h e f o r e i g n banks. T h i s was f o r two main r e a s o n s . 
F i r s t l y , fewer f o r e i g n banks were i n v o l v e d i n l o n g - t e r m 
s p e c u l a t i v e v e n t u r e s and s e c o n d l y , f o r e i g n banks had 
r e c o u r s e t o t h e i r o v e r s e a s h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r any i n j e c t i o n 
o f l i q u i d a s s e t s t h a t might be n e c e s s a r y . The major r e s u l t 
o f t h e s e two f a c t o r s has been t h a t t h e f o r e i g n banks , a s 
a group, have become more dominant w i t h i n t h e f i n a n c i a l 
s e c t o r . I n terms o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n t h i r t e e n banks h o l d 6 0 % 
of a l l d e p o s i t s ( a l l o f them b e i n g f o r e i g n b a r o n e ) . 
However t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n i n t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r has l e f t 
t h e i n d i g e n o u s banks i n a s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n . Whereas t o t a l 
d e p o s i t s between September 1966 and December 1972 expanded 
by 69%, t h e 34 s u r v i v i n g l o c a l banks i n c r e a s e d t h e i r 
d e p o s i t s by o v e r 7 5%. As has been mentioned a l r e a d y , t h e 
f o r e i g n banks have emerged from t h i s p r o c e s s s t r o n g e r t h a n 
e v e r . A l l f o r e i g n and f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n banks 
a c c o u n t e d f o r 7 1 % o f t o t a l d e p o s i t s i n 1966; now t h e y 
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a c c o u n t f o r 77% o f a l l d e p o s i t s . Thus t h e " s u p r a - t e r r i t o r i a l " 
J.N. B r i d g e , "Reforms S t r e n g t h e n Banking", op. c i t . . p.28. 
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39 c h a r a c t e r o f b a n k i n g i n Lebanon has i n t e n s i f i e d . 
The p e r i o d has a l s o been s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t t h e 
C e n t r a l Bank c r e a t e d i n 1964, has emerged a s a p o t e n t i a l l y 
s t r o n g c o n t r o l l i n g a g ent. 
Thus t h e L e b a n e s e banking s y s t e m i s now a m i x t u r e o f 
e x t r e m e l y l a r g e and e x t r e m e l y s m a l l banks, i n w h i c h most 
but not a l l o f t h e l a r g e banks a r e w h o l l y o r p a r t l y f o r e i g n 
owned. The w i d e v a r i a t i o n i n s i z e i s an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t 
o f t h e L e b a n e s e b a n k i n g system, s i n c e t h e a b i l i t y o f 
i n d i v i d u a l banks t o respond t o c r e d i t o r l i q u i d i t y c r i s e s 
i s v e r y much a f u n c t i o n o f t h e i r s i z e . 
So f a r i n t h i s c h a p t e r t h e t e r m s " f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r " 
and "banking s e c t o r " have been u s e d a l m o s t synonomously. 
T h i s i s b e c a u s e t h e r e h a s not been any s i g n i f i c a n t d e v e l o p -
ment o f what G u r l e y and Shaw c a l l "non-bank f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s " , i n Lebanon. However, two major c a t e g o r i e s 
o f "non-bank f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s " a r e w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g 
h e r e . F i r s t l y t h e r e a r e a number o f i n s t i t u t i o n s c a l l e d 
banks, w h i c h a r e not a c c e p t e d a s s u c h by t h e C e n t r a l Bank. 
When f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n on b a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s f i r s t became 
a v a i l a b l e i n 1966 and 1967, t h e t o t a l number o f banks, 
"approved" by t h e C e n t r a l Bank t o t a l l e d 88, y e t 112 
banks were documented i n t h e Commercial D i r e c t o r y f o r t h a t 
y e a r . Some o f t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s o p e r a t e d a s banks on a 
v e r y s m a l l s c a l e ; p r o b a b l y a c c e p t i n g d e p o s i t s from c e r t a i n 
T h i s t e r m i s u s e d by D. Rowan, " C e n t r a l Banking i n t h e 
Commonwealth", Banca N a z i o n a l e D e l L a v o r o Q u a r t e r l y Review 
A p r i l - J u n e 19 53, p.132. 
171. 
f a m i l i e s and p r o v i d i n g a t y p e o f extended i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e 
i n t h e c o m m e r c i a l s e c t o r . S e c o n d l y , a number of i n s u r a n c e 
companies h a v e been c l a s s i f i e d a s banks. By t h e end o f 1973, 
t h e r e were 13 i n d i g e n o u s i n s u r a n c e companies i n Lebanon 
and o v e r 90 b r a n c h e s and a g e n c i e s o f f o r e i g n i n s u r a n c e 
companies. The t o t a l volume o f a s s e t s i n t h e i n s u r a n c e 
s e c t o r i s unknown. A l l t h a t one c a n s a y i s t h a t f o r e i g n 
i n s u r a n c e companies a r e i n c r e a s i n g r a p i d l y t h e number o f 
i n s u r a n c e o u t l e t s i n Lebanon. T h i s i s l a r g e l y i n r e s p o n s e 
t o not o n l y a demand f o r i n s u r a n c e f a c i l i t i e s i n Lebanon; 
but a l s o a demand i n t h e Middle E a s t a s a whole. Many 
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e Middle E a s t e i t h e r h a v e no o r a t b e s t a 
r u d i m e n t a r y i n s u r a n c e s e c t o r and f o r e i g n companies, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , o p e r a t i n g i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s l o o k t o Lebanon 
a s a b a s e f o r s e c u r i n g i n s u r a n c e f a c i l i t i e s . 
" Although i n s u r a n c e companies a r e not a s i g n i f i c a n t 
s o u r c e o f f i n a n c e , t h e y a r e p o t e n t i a l s o u r c e s o f 
funds t o s p e c i a l i z e c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n d u s t r i a l 
c o r p o r a t i o n s i n t h e c o u n t r y . . ."40 
Whether i n s u r a n c e companies do become s i g n i f i c a n t a s 
s u p p l i e r s o f i n d i r e c t f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t i e s t o t h e do m e s t i c 
market w i l l depend on w h e t h e r i n d i g e n o u s companies c a n 
grow i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f f o r e i g n i n s u r a n c e companies and 
p r o v i d e a v i a b l e d o m e s t i c s e r v i c e . 
40. "The Money Machine: How H e a l t h y " , The M i d d l e E a s t S k e t c h , 
V o l . 1, No. 42, J a n u a r y 1 2 t h 1973. p.48. 
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The S t o c k Exchange i n B e i r u t i s m a i n l y an i n s t r u m e n t 
f o r r e g i s t e r i n g s t o c k s and i s not i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way a 
v e h i c l e f o r r a i s i n g i n v e s t m e n t c a p i t a l . T h i s i s b e c a u s e , 
" . . . s e c u r i t i e s a r e v e r y few, due t o t h e low l e v e l 
of development o f t h e c o r p o r a t e form o f b u s i n e s s i n 
Lebanon. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e f a m i l y - t y p e b u s i n e s s 
a s w e l l a s some o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and d i s c a l f a c t o r s 
h a n d i c a p t h e demand s i d e o f c o r p o r a t e c a p i t a l . . ."41 
Thus, t h e r e a r e i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r , 
o t h e r t h a n t h e r e c o g n i z e d c o m m e r c i a l banks, but t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s a r e , so f a r , o f a v e r y l i m i t e d k i n d . The n e x t 
two c h a p t e r s w i l l d i s c u s s t h e c o m m e r c i a l b a n k i n g s e c t o r 
e x c l u s i v e l y , a l t h o u g h C h a p t e r s E i g h t and Nine w i l l e x t e n d 
t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r t o i n c l u d e t h e 
a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e non-bank f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . 
The development o f t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r , e s p e c i a l l y i n 
t h e 1960's and e a r l y 1970's, h a s been i n f l u e n c e d t o a 
l a r g e e x t e n t by t h e degree of l i q u i d i t y w i t h i n t h e b a n k i n g 
system. I t i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f l i q u i d i t y w h i c h h a s o c c u p i e d 
t h e C e n t r a l Bank most i n i t s d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e b a n k i n g 
s e c t o r . C h a p t e r S i x now goes on t o d i s c u s s t h e i s s u e o f 
l i q u i d i t y i n more d e t a i l . 
M i d d l e E a s t S k e t c h , op. c i t . , p.48. 
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C H A P T E R S I X 
L i q u i d i t y i n t h e Banking S y s t e m 1 
The b a n k i n g s e c t o r i n Lebanon has e x p e r i e n c e d a 
number o f d i f f i c u l t i e s o v e r t h e l a s t decade i n terms o f 
t h e o v e r a l l l i q u i d i t y o f t h e s y s t e m and t h e g e n e r a l 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f l i q u i d a s s e t s and r e - d i s c o u n t i n g f a c i l i t i e s . 
T h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s have been e x p e r i e n c e d o v e r a p e r i o d 
when t h e C e n t r a l Bank has had t h e power t o e s t a b l i s h 
f o r m a l r e s e r v e r e q u i r e m e n t s , b u t h a s not c h o s e n t o do s o . 
The g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n o f l i q u i d i t y i n an u n r e g u l a t e d s y s t e m 
s u c h a s t h i s and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e C e n t r a l Bank t o 
t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r a r e t h e main i s s u e s d e a l t w i t h i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r . 
The a b i l i t y o f an i n d i v i d u a l bank o r a b a n k i n g s y s t e m 
t o redeem l i a b i l i t i e s on demand i s t h e most i m p o r t a n t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a s t a b l e f i n a n c i a l s y stem. T h e r e f o r e , 
one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t c r i t e r i a by w h i c h t o judge a 
T h i s c h a p t e r e x t e n d s some o f t h e i d e a s o r i g i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d 
i n J.N. B r i d g e , " L i q u i d i t y i n t h e L e b a n e s e Banking System", 
B a n k e r s Magazine, V o l . CCVT I , No. 1509, December 1969. 
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b a n k i n g s y s t e m i s i t s a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n a s t a b l e and 
s u f f i c i e n t r a t i o o f l i q u i d a s s e t s a g a i n s t t h e t o t a l volume 
of d e p o s i t s . L i q u i d i t y i n a g e n e r a l s e n s e c a n s i m p l y be 
d e f i n e d a s t h e speed w i t h w h i c h an a s s e t c a n be c o n v e r t e d 
i n t o money. I n p r a c t i c e we can d i s t i n g u i s h between t h o s e 
a s s e t s d e f i n e d a s b e i n g l i q u i d by c o n v e n t i o n , i . e . a c c e p t a b l e 
t o t h e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y a s p a r t o f a l i q u i d a s s e t s r a t i o 
o r we c a n a t tempt t o d i s t i n g u i s h a s s e t s i n t e r m s o f t h e i r 
l i q u i d i t y on a t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n p r a g m a t i c b a s i s . 
I n many c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, t h e 
r a t i o o f l i q u i d a s s e t s t o t o t a l bank a s s e t s i s d e t e r m i n e d 
by law o r c o n v e n t i o n . Not o n l y i s a s p e c i f i c r a t i o i n d i -
c a t e d i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom; but a l s o t h e a s s e t s and 
l i a b i l i t i e s w h i c h a r e e l i g i b l e f o r c a l c u l a t i n g t h e r e s e r v e 
2 . . r a t i o a r e a l s o s p e c i f i e d . I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e i t i s 
e a s y t o r e c o g n i z e w h e t h e r a bank i s i l l i q u i d o r not b a s e d 
on t h e c r i t e r i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o n v e n t i o n . However, 
t h e c a s e i s v e r y much more c o m p l i c a t e d when a c o m m e r c i a l 
b a n k i n g s y s t e m i s f a c e d w i t h t h e need t o e s t a b l i s h a 
c e r t a i n degree o f l i q u i d i t y i n t h e a b s e n c e o f any c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y " r u l e s " . T h i s i s t h e c a s e i n Lebanon where no 
s u c h l e g a l r e q u i r e m e n t s e x i s t . A l t h o u g h t h e C e n t r a l Bank 
has s t a t u t o r y powers t o impose l e g a l r e s e r v e r a t i o s t h r o u g h 
" R e s e r v e R a t i o s : F u r t h e r D e f i n i t i o n s " , Bank o f E n g l a n d 
Q u a r t e r l y B u l l e t i n . V o l . 11, No. 4, Dec. 1971, pp.482-489. 
175. 
t h e Monetary and C r e d i t A c t o f 1963; so f a r i t has not 
c h o s e n t o e x e r c i s e t h e s e powers c o m p l e t e l y , a l t h o u g h 
amendments t o t h e Act i n O c t o b e r 1973 have s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e 
Bank's p o s i t i o n ( s e e C h a p t e r E i g h t ) . A r t i c l e 175 o f t h e 
Monetary and C r e d i t A c t s t a t e s , i n p a r t , 
" . . . t h e C e n t r a l Bank may p e r i o d i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e 
t h e p r o p o r t i o n s w h i c h must e x i s t : 
(1) between t h e amount o f t h e l i q u i d a s s e t s o f a 
bank p r o p e r l y c l a s s i f i e d , on t h e one hand, and t h e 
amount o f i t s o b l i g a t i o n s c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o 
m a t u r i t y , on t h e o t h e r hand.^ 
T h i s p r o v i s i o n p u t s no o b l i g a t i o n on t h e C e n t r a l Bank t o 
e s t a b l i s h mandatory r e s e r v e r a t i o s , nor, s u r p r i s i n g l y , does 
i t o b l i g a t e t h e C e n t r a l Bank t o t r e a t a l l banks e q u a l l y , 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e s e r v e r a t i o s . I t w i l l be shown l a t e r 
t h a t t h e C e n t r a l Bank has e x e r c i s e d i t s a u t h o r i t y w i t h 
r e s p e c t t o r e s e r v e r a t i o s p a r t i a l l y b u t n e v e r i n any 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e manner. 
G i v e n t h i s s i t u a t i o n e a c h bank h a s t o d e c i d e f o r 
i t s e l f what volume o f l i q u i d a s s e t s i t w i l l h o l d a g a i n s t 
t o t a l d e p o s i t s . The problems i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n a r e 
b a s i c a l l y t w o f o l d . F i r s t l y , i f e a c h bank t a k e s s d e c i s i o n 
about i t s own l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a l l 
o t h e r banks, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e l e v e l o f l i q u i d i t y 
a c h i e v e d may be g r e a t e r t h a n i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e s y s t e m 
a s a whole. S e c o n d l y , a p a r t from t h e problem o f t h e 
The Monetary and C r e d i t A c t 1963, D e c r e e No. 13 513, P u b l i s h e d 
i n t h e O f f i c i a l G a z e t t e No. 62, August 5th 1963. ( T r a n s -
l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h by M.H. S a l l o u m ) . 
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l e v e l o f l i q u i d i t y , i n d i v i d u a l banks a r e f a c e d w i t h t h e 
problem of t h e t y p e s o f a s s e t s t h a t c a n be c o n s i d e r e d 
l i q u i d . L e t us c o n s i d e r t h e s e two p o i n t s i n more d e t a i l . 
I n t u i t i v e l y t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e l e v e l o f l i q u i d i t y 
c a n be answered by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e C e n t r a l 
Bank. I f t h e C e n t r a l Bank does not e s t a b l i s h any f o r m a l 
l i q u i d r e s e r v e r a t i o , t h e n presumably e a c h bank has t o 
assume t h a t i t i s o p e r a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l l y . I t s o b j e c t i v e 
view of t h e r i s k a t t a c h e d t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i l l i q u i d i t y 
w i l l be g r e a t e r t h a n i f a l l t h e banks a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y 
under a r u l e g i v e n by t h e C e n t r a l Bank. T h i s i n t u i t i v e 
argument c a n be p r e s e n t e d i n a more r i g o r o u s form. L e t 
us assume t h a t x^ i s t h e amount o f money demanded on c a l l 
from t h e i bank, t h a t A^ r e p r e s e n t s t h e t o t a l a s s e t s o f 
t h 
t h e i bank and L ^ r e p r e s e n t s i t s l i q u i d i t y r a t i o . L e t 
us assume t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f d e f a u l t i s d e f i n e d a s 
f o l l o w s : 
P { X i > A i L 1 > < e 
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L e t us assume f u r t h e r that the demand f o r money a t c a l l i s 
normally d i s t r i b u t e d such that.: 
2 
i s N(p^ o ) 
A i L i s p *" X i a* 
where \^ i s the i n d i c a t e d value which i s the l i m i t e d 
imposed by e . 
V + X .a 
T h i s e x p r e s s i o n w i l l give the l i q u i d i t y r a t i o for the ^th 
bank. Now l e t us repeat the procedure f o r a l l banks. 
Again l e t us assume that a l l banks independently have 
demands f o r money a t c a l l which a r e normally d i s t r i b u t e d . 
Thus, 
2 
Ex^ i s N(np, no ) 
The p r o b a b i l i t y of d e f a u l t i s defined as p r e v i o u s l y : 
P{Ex i > LEA^} < e 
LEA^ = nw + A/n a 
L = ny + Xjn a 
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T h i s e x p r e s s i o n g i v e s t h e l i q u i d i t y r a t i o f o r t h e b a n k i n g 
s y s t e m as a whole. I f t h i s i s d i v i d e d t h r o u g h by n, i t 
c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e a v e r a g e o b t a i n e d i n l e s s t h a n t h e 
term f o r t h e s i n g l e bank. I f a C e n t r a l Bank i s i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e t h e l i q u i d i t y r a t i o f o r t h e s y s t e m 
a s a whole the n t h a t r a t i o w i l l be l e s s t h a n i f e a c h bank 
s e t s i t s own r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y , assuming t h a t t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f d e f a u l t i s t h e same i n e a c h c a s e , and t h a t 
t h e C e n t r a l Bank a c t s r a t i o n a l l y and does not w i s h t o 
e s t a b l i s h e x c e s s i v e l y h i g h l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s . 
Assuming t h e C e n t r a l Bank i s p r e p a r e d t o a c t a s a 
l e n d e r o f l a s t r e s o r t t o t h e b a n k i n g system, t h e n a g i v e n 
l i q u i d i t y r a t i o w i l l a c t a s b o t h a minimum and a maximum 
f o r e a ch bank. I n t h i s c a s e t h e r i s k i s r e d u c e d t o z e r o , 
t h a t i s assuming t h e C e n t r a l Bank has t h e power t o c o v e r 
any r i s k o f d e f a u l t by an i n d i v i d u a l bank. T h e r e f o r e t h e 
l i q u i d i t y r a t i o e s t a b l i s h e d under a C e n t r a l Bank regime 
s h o u l d be l e s s t h a n t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d under a regime where 
a l l banks a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y . 
One o f t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t i f 
banks a r e r e q u i r e d t o h o l d " e x c e s s i v e " volumes o f l i q u i d 
a s s e t s i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a C e n t r a l Bank " r u l e " , t h e n t h i s 
w i l l i n h i b i t growth i n l o n g - t e r m i n v e s t m e n t . I n o t h e r 
words t h e a b s e n c e of a f o r m a l r e s e r v e r a t i o r e q u i r e m e n t 
r e d u c e s t h e t i m e p r o f i l e o f a t y p i c a l bank's p o r t f o l i o . 
I n p r a c t i c e one c a n e x p e c t a c e r t a i n amount o f dependence 
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among banks i n t h a t t h e y may be a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e 
s h o r t - t e r m i n t e r - b a n k l o a n market, and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e i r 
l i q u i d i t y i s dependent on t h e b e h a v i o u r o f o t h e r banks. 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e o w n e r s h i p o f s p e c i f i c a s s e t s by 
c e r t a i n banks may p r e d e t e r m i n e what i s a c c e p t a b l e a s a 
l i q u i d a s s e t f o r t h e s y s t e m a s a whole. T h i s b r i n g s us 
t o t h e second p o i n t w h i c h c o n c e r n s t h e t y p e s o f a s s e t s 
t h a t c a n be c o n s i d e r e d l i q u i d . 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y l i q u i d i t y has been d e f i n e d as t h e speed 
w i t h w h i c h an a s s e t c a n be t u r n e d i n t o c a s h . I n more 
g e n e r a l terms we c a n s e e i t a s a measure o f t h e degree 
t o w h i c h any f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r y c a n meet i t s t o t a l 
l i a b i l i t i e s a t a p a r t i c u l a r moment i n t i m e . However, a 
r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t t h e o r e t i c a l problem emerges i n t h a t any 
p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t may have d i f f e r i n g l i q u i d i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
o v e r t i m e . T h i s problem i s l a r g e l y surmounted i f a C e n t r a l 
Bank d e c l a r e s i t s e l f r e a d y t o r e c o g n i z e c e r t a i n a s s e t s a s 
b e i n g l i q u i d and i s p r e p a r e d t o p r o v i d e c a s h f o r banks on 
t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e a s s e t s . F o r i n s t a n c e i n t h e U n i t e d 
Kingdom s i n c e September 1971 s p e c i f i c a s s e t s have been 
deemed ' e l i g i b l e ' f o r c a l c u l a t i n g r e s e r v e r a t i o r e q u i r e -
ments. T h e s e e l i g i b l e a s s e t s i n c l u d e head o f f i c e b a l a n c e s 
and b a l a n c e s w i t h t h e Bank o f England, Government T r e a s u r y 
B i l l s , money a t c a l l , l o c a l a u t h o r i t y b i l l s e l i g i b l e f o r 
4 
r e d i s c o u n t a t t h e Bank o f England, t o mention a few. T h i s 
" R e s e r v e R a t i o s : F u r t h e r D e f i n i t i o n s " , op. c i t . , p.485. 
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group of a s s e t s i s r e c o g n i z e d a s b e i n g e l i g i b l e i n t h e 
s e n s e t h a t t h e C e n t r a l Bank ( t h e Bank o f E n g l a n d i n t h i s 
c a s e ) i s p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t t h e s e a s s e t s as p a r t o f a 
l i q u i d i t y r e q u i r e m e n t ; but, presumably, and t h i s i s t h e 
more i m p o r t a n t p o i n t , i s p r e p a r e d t o redeem t h e s e a s s e t s 
i n f u l l i n c a s e o f c r i s i s . I n o t h e r words s p e c i f i e d a s s e t s 
o f t h i s s o r t do not l o s e any o f t h e i r l i q u i d i t y i f f i n a n c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s change d r a m a t i c a l l y . 
A problem does e x i s t i f t h e C e n t r a l Bank does not 
r e c o g n i z e s p e c i f i c a s s e t s a s b e i n g l i q u i d . The a c c e p t a -
b i l i t y of an a s s e t a s a l i q u i d a s s e t i s not s o l e l y a 
f u n c t i o n o f i t s m a t u r i t y i n t h i s c a s e . I t s l i q u i d i t y i s 
a l s o a f u n c t i o n o f t h e c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e b a n k i n g com-
munity has i n t h e h o l d e r o f t h e a s s e t . I n o t h e r words, 
two banks may h o l d i d e n t i c a l p o r t f o l i o s of l i q u i d a s s e t s ; 
b ut one may be judged t o be more l i q u i d t h a n t h e o t h e r , 
dependent upon s u b j e c t i v e judgements o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
banks, and t h e a t t e n d e n t economic c i r c u m s t a n c e s . To 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s l a s t p o i n t l e t us c o n s i d e r an example from 
5 
l a b o u r economics. I n a f u l l y employed economy t h e s k i l l s 
o f a w o r k e r a r e l i q u i d i n t h a t a number o f j o b s may be 
a v a i l a b l e i n t o w h i c h t h e w o r k e r c o u l d move. I n an unem-
p l o y e d s t a t e t h e s e same s k i l l s now may become t o t a l l y 
i l l i q u i d i n t h a t t h e r e i s now an e x c e s s s u p p l y o f t h e s e 
A. L e i j o n h u v u d , Keynes and t h e C l a s s i c s , I.E.A. O c c a s i o n a l 
Paper No. 30, J u l y 1969, p.32. 
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s k i l l s on t h e market. So, a l t h o u g h t h e s k i l l s o f t h e 
worker, i . e . h i s a s s e t s , remain unchanged, t h e demand f o r 
t h e s e a s s e t s has changed; t h u s c h a n g i n g t h e l i q u i d i t y of 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t o r s k i l l . I t i s t h i s a d d i t i o n a l 
p e r s p e c t i v e w h i c h prompted Schmoelder t o d e f i n e two t y p e s 
o f l i q u i d i t y : 
a) o b j e c t i v e l i q u i d i t y - t h i s i s b a s e d on t h e a c t u a l 
l i q u i d a s s e t s and c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e . 
b) s u b j e c t i v e l i q u i d i t y - t h i s i s b a s e d on an 
a s s e s s m e n t o f p o t e n t i a l l i q u i d i t y t o be d e r i v e d 
from a p a r t i c u l a r p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n . 
S u b j e c t i v e l i q u i d i t y may have an i n t e r n a l and an e x t e r n a l 
a s p e c t . C e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s t h a t may be adopted by s o c i a l 
groups may r e s t r i c t t h e u s e o f c e r t a i n a s s e t s a s a means 
of l i q u i d i t y . S chmolders i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e drawing 
or a c c e p t i n g o f b i l l s i n o r d e r t o r a i s e money may be 
r e s t r i c t e d i n s u c h a way a s t o c r e a t e a p o s i t i o n of 
l i q u i d i t y , l e s s t h a n t h e ' o b j e c t i v e ' one. T h i s i s an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e i n t e r n a l a s p e c t o f s u b j e c t i v e l i q u i d i t y . 
E q u a l l y a s p e c i f i c groups o f a s s e t s may t a k e on d i f f e r i n g 
l i q u i d i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s b a s e d on e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s , 
s u c h a s b u s i n e s s c y c l e s . An i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r bank 
c r e d i t d u r i n g an upswing i n b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y may encourage 
b a n k e r s t o r e d u c e t h e i r t o t a l l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n ( i n an 
a b s o l u t e s e n s e ) t h u s expanding b u s i n e s s c r e d i t and c r e a t i n g 
G. Schmolders, "The L i q u i d i t y T heory o f Money", K v k l o s , 
V o l . X I I I , No. 3, 1960, pp.345-360. 
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increased purchasing power. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n expecta-
t i o n s and l i q u i d i t y a c t one upon the other, such t h a t a 
lower l e v e l of absolute l i q u i d i t y i s achieved w h i l s t main-
t a i n i n g the s u b j e c t i v e l e v e l of l i q u i d i t y the same, i . e . 
as the t o t a l volume of l i q u i d a s s e t s i s reduced i n c r e a s i n g 
confidence i n the present stock of a s s e t s compensates 
f u l l y f o r the i n i t i a l reduction. On the other hand, 
" . . . l i q u i d i t y disappears . . . by p e s s i m i s t i c 
business expectations, e.g. by spreading f e a r s of 
diminishing p r o f i t s , labour c o n f l i c t s or other 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . . ."7 
One i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t a f i x e d 
r e s e r v e r a t i o requirement cannot be optimal over time. 
I f the r e s e r v e r a t i o requirement i s optimal f o r business 
depressions, i t w i l l mean t h a t t h e r e w i l l be excess 
holdings of l i q u i d r e s e r v e s i n boom periods. Dependent 
on the r a t e s of r e t u r n on l i q u i d a s s e t s t h i s type of 
8 
p o l i c y can have an adverse e f f e c t on bank earnings. 
Any bank seeking to maximise p r o f i t s s u b j e c t to a s p e c i f i c 
l i q u i d i t y c o n s t r a i n t w i l l obviously not l i k e a s i t u a t i o n 
where that l i q u i d i t y c o n s t r a i n t i s g r e a t e r than i s 
necessary f o r the p r e v a i l i n g economic c o n d i t i o n s . E q u a l l y , 
i f i t i s argued t h a t banks provide a s o c i a l l y important 
7. G. Schmolders, op. c i t . , p.354. 
8. R. Goode, and R.S. Thorn, " V a r i a b l e Reserve Requirements 
ag a i n s t Commercial Bank Deposits", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund S t a f f Papers. Vol. V I I , 1959-60, p.9-45. 
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s e r v i c e i n t h a t they provide s a f e deposit f a c i l i t i e s f o r 
depositors and f a c i l i t a t e lending and borrowing operations 
through the process of intermediation, then the l e v e l of 
r e s e r v e r a t i o requirements becomes c r u c i a l . 
The c o n c l u s i o n s from t h i s a n a l y s i s i s that v a r i a b l e 
r e s e r v e r a t i o requirements a r e p r e f e r a b l e to f i x e d r e s e r v e 
f 
r a t i o requirements. Secondly, i f these r a t i o s a r e imposed 
by a C e n t r a l Bank, the l e v e l a t which they operate w i l l 
g e n e r a l l y be lower than i f each bank operates indepen-
dently. E q u a l l y when a bank has to a s s e s s i t s own l e v e l 
of l i q u i d i t y i n d i v i d u a l l y , then i t i s not going to have 
any absolute s c a l e to judge i t s l i q u i d i t y a g a i n s t and, 
t h e r e f o r e s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s as w e l l as o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s 
w i l l play an important part i n determining the l e v e l of 
l i q u i d i t y d e s i r e d by the i n d i v i d u a l bank. 
I t i s a l s o c l e a r from what has been s a i d t h a t i n a 
system where r e s e r v e r a t i o s a r e not s p e c i f i e d , i t w i l l be 
impossible to e s t a b l i s h a common l e v e l of l i q u i d i t y f o r the 
system as a whole. Even i n the United Kingdom where banks 
operate under a r e s e r v e r a t i o r u l e observed l i q u i d i t y 
r a t i o s are not n e c e s s a r i l y the same f o r each bank. I n 
an unregulated system, where s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s may be more 
important, one might expect the divergence from some mean 
to be even g r e a t e r . I n p r a c t i c e t h i s has been the p o s i t i o n 
in Lebanon over the l a s t ten y e a r s . 
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To understand the problems t h a t e x i s t i n Lebanon, i t 
i s necessary to look at the l i q u i d a s s e t s s t r u c t u r e of the 
banking system. 
L i q u i d Assets S t r u c t u r e 
We must examine a l l l i q u i d a s s e t s r a t h e r than the cash 
r a t i o alone. I n Lebanon the volume of cash held by each 
bank, i n l o c a l currency, tends to f l u c t u a t e q u i t e widely. 
T h i s i s because many banks hold f o r e i g n currency deposits, 
which, although not t e c h n i c a l l y defined as cash, can be 
e a s i l y converted i n t o l o c a l currency although some l o s s 
on the exchange may be i n c u r r e d . Most banks appear to be 
more s e n s i t i v e to t h e i r o v e r a l l l i q u i d i t y r a t i o than to 
t h e i r cash r a t i o . 
We have alr e a d y seen t h a t although t h e r e a r e a 
l a r g e number of i n d i v i d u a l banks, t r a n s a c t i o n s a r e h e a v i l y 
concentrated i n a small number of them. The wide v a r i a -
t i o n s i n s i z e and the f a c t t h a t most of the l a r g e r banks 
are t o t a l l y f o r e i g n owned or p a r t i a l l y f o r e i g n owned i s 
an important aspect i n d i s c u s s i n g l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s , s i n c e 
the a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l banks to respond to c r e d i t or 
l i q u i d i t y c r i s e s i s very much a func t i o n of t h e i r s i z e . 
As the banking system as a whole i s not s u b j e c t to 
mandatory r e s e r v e requirements, the r a t i o of l i q u i d a s s e t s 
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to t o t a l deposits i s l a r g e l y an i n v e r s e function of the 
i n d i v i d u a l bank's a b i l i t y to c a l l on surplus funds 
( e i t h e r through a head o f f i c e i n another country, i n the 
case of a foreign-owned bank, or through the C e n t r a l Bank 
i n the case of an indigenous bank). 
I n the absence of a C e n t r a l Bank r u l e , the types of 
a s s e t s which a r e considered by i n d i v i d u a l banks to be 
l i q u i d cannot be defined p r e c i s e l y . However, w i t h i n the 
t 
Lebanese banking system c e r t a i n conventions of a c c e p t a b i l i t y 
have evolved, although i t must be pointed out t h a t they 
do not n e c e s s a r i l y apply e q u a l l y to a l l banks. However 
l i q u i d a s s e t s are normally defined to comprise v a u l t cash, 
inter-bank deposits, net f o r e i g n currency a s s e t s and s h o r t -
9 
term investments abroad. The types of a s s e t s t h a t can 
be considered as l i q u i d i s r e s t r i c t e d by the f a c t t h a t 
t h e r e i s no a c t i v e c a l l money market i n Lebanon and 
t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t i s s u e of short-term government 
d e b t . 1 0 
Net f o r e i g n currency a s s e t s a r e considered as c l o s e 
s u b s t i t u t e s f o r cash, l a r g e l y because t h e r e i s a very 
a c t i v e market f o r f o r e i g n exchanger the Lebanese pound 
has been r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e , although i t has been allowed 
9, T h i s l i s t was i n i t i a l l y compiled from S. Hoss, The Roles 
of C e n t r a l Banking i n Lebanon, Ph.D. t h e s i s , Indiana 
U n i v e r s i t y 1962 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: U n i v e r s i t y Microfilms 
I n c . 1963). 
10. There has been a l i m i t e d i s s u e of government Treasury B i l l s , 
which i s commented upon l a t e r on. 
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to f l u c t u a t e f r e e l y and t h i r d l y the importance of e x p a t r i a t e 
banks, coupled w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l f o r e i g n currency deposits, 
has meant that cash withdrawals may be made i n fo r e i g n 
c u r r e n c i e s . ^ Quite c l e a r l y there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between 
cas h and f o r e i g n currency a s s e t s , as there i s always a; 
for e i g n exchange r i s k involved i n converting these a s s e t s 
to cash. Therefore, banks, from time to time, must be 
a t t e n t i v e to the r a t i o of cash held i n Lebanese pounds. 
1 
Bearing t h i s point i n mind, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to compare 
the r a t i o of cash and inter-bank deposits to t o t a l d e posits. 
Before d i s c u s s i n g some general trends i n l i q u i d i t y , more 
d e t a i l e d f i g u r e s a r e provided f o r 1967, the f i r s t year 
when d e t a i l e d balance sheets were published by a l l banks. 
I t must be remembered t h a t although a l l banks now i s s u e 
annual statements, the convention f o r presenting data a r e 
not c o n s i s t e n t . I n a d d i t i o n the information i s often 
a v a i l a b l e only two y e a r s l a t e r . However, bearing these 
two points i n mind, 64 balance sheets were examined f o r 
the year 1967. One of the f i n d i n g s i s summarized i n 
Table 6.1. 
Thus the o v e r a l l r a t i o of c a s h and inter-bank deposits 
to t o t a l deposits was 4696 i n 1967. T h i s i s a weighted 
average, weighted by the number of banks i n each group and 
t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n , as a group, to t o t a l deposits i n the 
S, Hoss, OP. c i t . , p.39. 
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Table 6.1: The R a t i o of Cash and Inter-Bank Deposits to 
T o t a l Deposits 1967 
No. of banks 
_2L i n sample 
Foreign owned banks 6 5 14 
Indigenous banks 3 8 40 
J o i n t l y owned banks 64 10 
O v e r a l l weighted average 46 
banking system as a whole. What i s more i n s t r u c t i v e i s 
th a t the r a t i o f o r t o t a l l y owned f o r e i g n banks was 65%, 
whereas the r a t i o f o r indigenous banks was only 38%. T h i s 
r a t i o a p p l i e d to 1967, when a f u l l c o l l e c t i o n of balance 
sheets became a v a i l a b l e f o r the f i r s t time. However t h e r e 
ar e two p r i n c i p l e problems involved i n extending t he s e r i e s 
from 1967. F i r s t l y , the accounting conventions used by 
each bank were not, i n i t i a l l y , standardized and hence 
conventional d e f i n i t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t s do vary from 
bank to bank and from y e a r to year. Secondly, some banks 
have had a change of ownership, i n t h a t some wholly-owned 
indigenous banks have become forei g n or j o i n t - p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
banks. Hence the sample groups a r e not c o n s i s t e n t over 
time. Bearing these points i n mind balance sheets f o r the 
period 1967-1973 have been examined. T h i s e x e r c i s e has 
been a s s i s t e d to a c e r t a i n extent by the p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c e 
1970, by the A s s o c i a t i o n of Banks i n Lebanon, of a 
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standardized l i s t of balance sheets. The C e n t r a l Bank a l s o 
began to i s s u e a note on l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s i n 1967 i n i t s 
12 
Annual Report. The f i g u r e f o r 1967 was 46.1%. Although 
the C e n t r a l Bank published no d e t a i l s on how t h i s r a t i o 
was c a l c u l a t e d subsequent d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the C e n t r a l Bank 
confirm t h a t the c a t e g o r i e s of a s s e t s used i n t h i s t h e s i s 
a r e the same as those used by the C e n t r a l Bank ( t h i s of 
course i s u n o f f i c i a l information). The l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s 
from 1967 to 1973 a r e summarized i n Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: L i q u i d i t y R a t i o s . Based on Balance Sheets 









Source: From the procedures explained i n the t e x t . 
Notes: The l i q u i d i t y r a t i o r e f e r s t o the p o s i t i o n of 
December 31st of each year . 
Banque du Liban, Rapport Annuel. 
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Very l i t t l e data e x i s t e d p r i o r to 1967 which would 
allow f o r a long-term assessment of l i q u i d i t y trends. 
However, two sources of information a r e a v a i l a b l e which a r e 
worth mentioning. A s s e i l y c a l c u l a t e d the r a t i o of cash, 
C e n t r a l Bank balances, money a t c a l l and short-term 
commercial b i l l s a g a i n s t t o t a l deposits and produced a 
13 
r a t i o of 42% f o r 1964 and 41% fo r 1965. These r a t i o s 
were c a l c u l a t e d on a r a t i o of l i q u i d a s s e t s which included 
commercial b i l l s and, t h e r e f o r e , o v e r s t a t e the degree of 
l i q u i d i t y i n the system compared w i t h the l a t e r f i g u r e s . 
I f these f i g u r e s a r e standardised by a b s t r a c t i n g commercial 
b i l l s from the numerator the r e v i s e d r a t i o becomes 30% 
for 1964 and 28% f o r 1965. 
S i m i l a r c a l c u l a t i o n s were made by Hoss f o r the period 
14 
19 56-1960. Unfortunately the number of banks t h a t were 
able to supply c o n s i s t e n t data f o r the period was very 
l i m i t e d indeed, although the r a t i o s quoted do correspond 
c l o s e l y w i t h the ones f o r the period 1967-1972 as f a r as 
the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a s s e t s i s concerned. Bearing t h e s e 
points i n mind the data used by Hoss y i e l d e d the following 
r a t i o s : 
1956 36% 
1957 29% 
19 58 34% 
1959 3 5% 
1960 3 7% 
A.E. A s s e i l y , C e n t r a l Banking i n Lebanon, ( B e i r u t : Khayat 
Publishing Co., 1967) p.48-49. 
S. Hoas, l o c . c i t . . p.411 
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These fragmentary f i g u r e s f o r the period 1956-1973 cannot 
obviously be subjected to a very thorough a n a l y s i s , due 
to the i n c o n s i s t e n c y of the data and the changes i n the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of a s s e t s throughout the period. However 
i t does seem as though the general l e v e l of l i q u i d i t y i n 
the banking system declined g r a d u a l l y i n the e a r l y 1960's 
and then i n c r e a s e d q u i t e d r a m a t i c a l l y i n the l a t t e r p a r t 
of the period. T h i s trend i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the hypothesis? 
advanced e a r l i e r , t h a t l i q u i d i t y i n an unregulated banking 
system has a s u b j e c t i v e aspect to i t , such that l i q u i d i t y 
r a t i o s w i l l tend to f a l l i n a boom s i t u a t i o n (which i s 
true of Lebanon i n the period 1959-1966) and w i l l r i s e i n 
a depression (the depression i n t h i s case being the 
c o l l a p s e of the I n t r a Bank i n 1966 coupled w i t h the S i x -
day War i n 1967). 
One i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of the trend i n l i q u i d i t y 
s i n c e 1967 i s t h a t i t i s not only explained i n terms of 
banks a c q u i r i n g more l i q u i d a s s e t s ; but a l s o by the with-
drawal of a c e r t a i n number of h i g h l y i l l i q u i d banks from 
the system during t h i s period. Thus the average l e v e l of 
l i q u i d i t y has r i s e n and a t the same time the d i s p e r s i o n 
aroung the average has probably reduced. 
An i n t e r e s t i n g point a r i s e s from the f i g u r e s quoted 
in Table 6.1. The f o r e i g n banks not only maintain the 
highest r a t i o of l i q u i d a s s e t s , but a l s o presumably, have 
recourse to funds from t h e i r o f f i c e i n other c o u n t r i e s i n 
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case of emergencies. So, on these two counts the fo r e i g n 
banks are more l i q u i d than the l o c a l banks. This s i t u a -
t i o n seems to be r a t h e r incongruous. Why should the foreign 
banks maintain higher l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s when they a r e able 
to c a l l on a s s i s t a n c e from other overseas o f f i c e s ? T h i s 
apparent paradox can be explained i n a t l e a s t two ways. 
F i r s t l y 1967, the f i r s t y e a r f o r which a l i q u i d i t y r a t i o 
was c a l c u l a t e d , was an u n t y p i c a l year. The f a i l u r e of 
I n t r a Bank i n October 1966 coupled w i t h the Middle E a s t e r n 
war of June 1967, c r e a t e d a great deal of u n c e r t a i n t y i n 
the banking system. The banks responded to t h i s uncertainty 
by i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r l i q u i d a s s e t s as much as p o s s i b l e . 
The f i g u r e s f o r 1967 would suggest t h a t the fo r e i g n banks 
were more s u c c e s s f u l than the l o c a l banks i n doing t h i s . 
T h is argument would suggest t h a t i n 1967 the banking system 
attempted to become more l i q u i d . Once the f e a t u r e s which 
caused the d e s i r e f o r more l i q u i d i t y a r e removed one would 
assume t h a t the general l e v e l of l i q u i d i t y would f a l l again. 
T h i s does not seem to have been the case. The second 
explanation, more p l a u s i b l e i n my view, runs on the 
following l i n e s . The l o c a l banks, even a t a 38% r a t i o , 
were i l l i q u i d i n 1967. Therefore the l e v e l achieved by 
the foreign banks, f a r from being an o v e r - l i q u i d l e v e l , 
was the appropriate one f o r the c o n d i t i o n s . Thus the 
s i t u a t i o n a t the end of 1967 was not one where the forei g n 
banks were too l i q u i d but one where the l o c a l banks were 
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not l i q u i d enough. T h i s view can be s u b s t a n t i a t e d by 
co n s i d e r i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of the C e n t r a l Bank i n the 
period from 1967-1969. I n t h i s period eight l o c a l banks 
ceased commercial operations and were brought under the 
c o n t r o l of the C e n t r a l Bank.^ I n each case the reason 
for c l o s u r e was an i n a b i l i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l bank to 
meet the cash demands put upon i t . The l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s 
maintained by the fore i g n banks may seem high i n comparison 
wi t h those i n Western Europe. However a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
portion of the foreign banks' l i q u i d a s s e t s are h e l d i n 
the form of fore i g n currency deposits i n overseas money 
markets. The r e l a t i v e l y high r a t e s of i n t e r e s t earned on 
these deposits seems to compensate f o r any exchange r i s k 
t h a t might e x i s t . I n a d d i t i o n some customers of the 
forei g n banks may demand cash denominated i n fore i g n 
c u r r e n c i e s which removes the exchange r i s k e n t i r e l y . The 
p r e c i s e r a t i o s t h at the fore i g n banks regard as adequate 
in terms of l o c a l currency cash, f o r e i g n currency cash and 
short-term f o r e i g n currency deposits i s impossible to 
determine. Through p r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w s w i t h a number of 
forei g n bankers the o v e r a l l impression conveyed i s t h a t 
exchange r i s k s a r e not an o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n 
determining these r a t i o s and holdings i n the l o c a l 
These c l o s u r e s a r e d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l i n Chapter 
E i g h t . 
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inter-bank market can f u l l y cover any excess demand f o r cash 
by the p u b l i c . I t i s the a c t i v i t i e s of the inter-bank 
market t h a t we now need to go on and co n s i d e r . 
Y i e l d s on L i q u i d A s s e t s 
An important aspect of these l i q u i d a s s e t s i s t h e i r 
earning c a p a c i t y . I n Lebanon t h e r e i s no recognizable 
short-term money market, n e i t h e r i s t h e r e any market f o r 
commercial b i l l s , or short term government s e c u r i t i e s , 
except, as has been noted, f o r a l i m i t e d i s s u e of Treasury 
B i l l s . Therefore most of these l i q u i d a s s e t s have a low 
earning c a p a c i t y , except f o r those short-term deposits 
made by the forei g n banks, i n p a r t i c u l a r , on various 
European money markets. There i s a f a i r l y a c t i v e market 
in inter-bank deposits. The c h i e f f u n c t i o n of t h i s market 
seems to be to provide a d d i t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y to i n d i v i d u a l 
banks experiencing d r a i n s on t h e i r c a s h r e s e r v e s . The 
normal procedure i s f o r a bank, i n need of e x t r a l i q u i d 
resources, t o borrow from a bank t h a t has excess l i q u i d i t y , 
at some agreed r a t e of i n t e r e s t , which i s r e l a t e d to t h a t 
obtainable abroad. T h i s type of t r a n s a c t i o n takes p l a c e i n 
both Lebanese pounds and i n f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s . When 
foreign c u r r e n c i e s a r e borrowed, i t i s normal to deposit 
these w i t h the C e n t r a l Bank and then draw on t h i s balance 
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i n Lebanese pounds. The i n t e r e s t charged f o r loans i n 
foreign c u r r e n c i e s i s u s u a l l y higher than t h a t charged on 
Lebanese currency loans, because i t i s necessary to o f f e r 
holders of fo r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s an inducement to sta y i n 
Lebanon. There i s much l e s s temptation to move excess 
l i q u i d r e s e r v e s of Lebanese currency abroad, because t h i s 
involves an exchange r i s k i n the t r a n s f e r and t h e r e f o r e 
the i n c e n t i v e s to maintain funds i n Lebanon need not be 
so high. This p l a c e s the fo r e i g n banks i n a s l i g h t l y 
more advantageous p o s i t i o n i n the inter-bank market, f i r s t l y , 
because they a r e the l a r g e s t holders of foreign currency 
and t h e r e f o r e tend to earn the higher r a t e s of i n t e r e s t , 
and secondly, because w i t h t h e i r h i g h e r l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s 
they tend to be net lenders i n the market. 
The t o t a l supply of funds to the inter-bank market i s 
p a r t i a l l y determined by the r a t e s of i n t e r e s t obtainable 
on foreign currency a s s e t s abroad. I t has often been the 
p r a c t i c e among bankers i n Lebanon to maintain an e q u a l i t y 
16 
between t h e i r f o r e i g n currency a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s . 
However t h e r e has been an i n c r e a s i n g tendency over the 
l a s t ten yea r s f o r a steady accumulation of net fo r e i g n 
a s s e t s to take p l a c e . This means t h a t bank deposits 
i n i t i a l l y denominated i n Lebanese pounds a r e being 
converted into f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s and deposited i n overseas 
A.E. A s s e i l y , OP. c i t . . p.111. 
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markets. This obviously i m p l i e s t h a t the margin between 
domestic i n t e r e s t r a t e s on inter-bank deposits and s h o r t -
term overseas r a t e s i s s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e to induce t h i s 
s o r t of movement. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y the A s s o c i a t i o n of 
Banks i n Lebanon i n i t s annual report i n 1972 h i g h l i g h t e d 
the r i s e i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s i n the E u r o - d o l l a r market as 
being the major economic f a c t o r behind the rapid r i s e i n 
f o r e i g n currency deposits i n the banking system s i n c e 
17 
1967. T h i s means t h a t the t o t a l flow of funds into the 
inter-bank market i s p a r t i a l l y determined by the general 
18 
l e v e l of i n t e r e s t r a t e s p r e v a i l i n g overseas. A second 
i n f l u e n c e on inter-bank deposits i s the prime discount 
r a t e operated by the C e n t r a l Bank. I f the C e n t r a l Bank 
w i l l rediscount paper a t , say, 5% ( t h i s was the o f f i c i a l 
r a t e on paper possessing two s i g n a t u r e s i n December 1967 f 
i t dropped to 3% i n J u l y 1971), then inter-bank deposits 
must be o f f e r e d a t t h i s , or some lower r a t e to induce 
bankers to take up inter-bank deposits, r a t h e r than 
rediscount b i l l s w i t h the C e n t r a l Bank. So, provided 
there a r e f i r s t c l a s s b i l l s a v a i l a b l e t here i s a c e i l i n g 
to i n t e r e s t r a t e s on inter-bank deposits, v i z t h a t r a t e 
17* A s s o c i a t i o n of Banks i n Lebanon, Annual Report 1972, 
( B e i r u t : Imprimerie Catholique 1973) p.28. 
18. S p e c i f i c r a t e s f o r a long period a r e impossible to obtain? 
but an i n d i c a t i o n of the margin r e f e r r e d to may be deduced 
from the f a c t t h a t inter-bank deposits i n Lebanese pounds 
i n 1967 and 1968 were earning, on average, 3 -- 4%, w h i l s t 
short-term f o r e i g n currency a s s e t s were earning 8 - 9%. 
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a t which the C e n t r a l Bank w i l l discount these b i l l s . 
I n p r a c t i c e the range of i n t e r e s t r a t e s and the flow 
of funds w i t h i n the market are more complicated than these 
few points i n d i c a t e . There i s competition among banks 
for deposits, leading to d i f f e r e n t i a l r a t e s being o f f e r e d 
by d i f f e r e n t banks on s i m i l a r d e posits. E q u a l l y depositors 
are a t t r a c t e d to c e r t a i n banks by non-monetary a t t r i b u t e s , 
19 
primary among which i s the a l l e g e d s o l i d a r i t y of the bank. 
These two f a c t o r s lead to banks competing on d i f f e r e n t 
terms w i t h i n the inter-bank market. The preference 
depositors seem to have f o r f o r e i g n banks means t h a t these 
banks tend to o f f e r lower r a t e s of i n t e r e s t on deposits 
than l o c a l banks and hence f i n d themselves i n a p r i v i l e g e d 
p o s i t i o n i n the inter-bank market. Within the market 
loans may be secured i n Lebanese pounds or i n a s p e c i f i e d 
f o r e i g n currency. Thus the a c t u a l r a t e on the d e p s i t 
w i l l not only r e f l e c t the d i r e c t demand f o r i t ; but a l s o 
and exchange r i s k premium depending on the currency 
involved. Loans i n Lebanese pounds a r e a f f e c t e d by the 
exchange r i s k premium i n the following manner. I f the 
premium i s high t h i s w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e the o v e r a l l 
demand for l o c a l currency loans, thus tending to r a i s e the 
r a t e . I f the premium i s low, t h i s w i l l reduce the demand 
for l o c a l currency loans and thus reduce the r a t e of 
I n a period of bank f a i l u r e s t h i s i s an important a t t r i b u t e 
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i n t e r e s t . We can examine these r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n more 
d e t a i l . F i g u r e 6.1 i n d i c a t e s the supply and demand con-
d i t i o n s i n the forei g n currency market. F i g u r e 6.2 i n d i -
c a t e s the s i t u a t i o n i n the domestic currency market. The 
supply curve (Sf) i n f i g . 6.1 i s i n f i n i t e l y e l a s t i c , 
implying t h a t the t o t a l demand by Lebanese borrowers i s not 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms of the world market. Thus Lebanese 
borrowers can borrow as much as they l i k e a t the p r e v a i l i n g 
r a t e . The demand f o r fo r e i g n currency a s s e t s (Df) i s 
upward sloping i n d i c a t i n g t h a t as the r i s k premium i n c r e a s e s 
t h e r e i s a reduced demand f o r a s s e t s a t a given world 
r a t e . The demand curve (Dd) and the supply curve (Sd) f o r 
l o c a l l i q u i d a s s e t s a r e assumed to r e a c t normally to 
i n t e r e s t r a t e changes. I n i t i a l l y r f = r ^ , i n d i c a t i n g 
t h a t a l l banks have d i s t r i b u t e d t h e i r l i q u i d a s s e t s 
p o r t f o l i o to maximise p r o f i t s . I n t h i s c a s e the f o r e i g n 
exchange r i s k premium i s zero. Now l e t us assume the r i s k 
premium becomes p o s i t i v e . T h i s means the a c t u a l earnings 
on foreign currency a s s e t s i s reduced. T h i s can be 
i n d i c a t e d by reducing the earning r a t e to r ^ ' . The d i f -
ference between r ^ and r ^ ' i n d i c a t e s the r i s k premium. 
Now r , ;> r _ . Th i s w i l l induce banks to sw i t c h to d f 
l o c a l currency a s s e t s thus r a i s i n g the r a t e on these 
20 
a s s e t s . E q u i l i b r i u m w i l l be re s t o r e d when the domestic 
E q u a l l y i f the demand f o r l o c a l currency a s s e t s i s very 
low, t h i s w i l l mean t h a t f o r e i g n banks, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
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r a t e i s j u s t equal to t h a t r a t e i n forei g n markets which 
compensates borrowers a t the o r i g i n a l r a t e r ^ , plus the 
r i s k premium. T h i s i s r a t e r f " i n f i g u r e 1. We can 
introduce r a t e s o f f e r e d to depositors by banks into t h i s 
a n a l y s i s . I f r ' i s taken as the average r a t e payed on 
• savings deposits, then the d i f f e r e n c e between r , and r„, 
a u 
i n the f i r s t case, gives the gross earnings of the bank, 
• (more s p e c i f i c a l l y OL, a r - OL, b r , ) . I f we were to 
d d 
assume the banks in c u r no c o s t s or make no p r o f i t s then 
the e q u i l i b r i u m r a t e r ^ would i n d i c a t e the maximum r a t e 
that banks would be prepared to pay on deposits i n l o c a l 
currency. Quite c l e a r l y i f the fo r e i g n exchange r i s k 
premium i n c r e a s e s , the r a t e t h a t can be o f f e r e d to deposi-
t o r s may a l s o i n c r e a s e . 
The a n a l y s i s presented so f a r has attempted to show 
i n a schematic form the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t e x i s t 
between d i f f e r e n t r a t e s i n the inter-bank market. A 
fu r t h e r i n f l u e n c e on t h i s market i s the volume of sh o r t -
term government debt a v a i l a b l e to the banks. 
Treasury B i l l I s s u e s 
I n 1966 the C e n t r a l Bank made, f o r the f i r s t time, a 
l i m i t e d Treasury B i l l i s s u e , q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those to 
which we a r e accustomed i n the United Kingdom. I t is s u e d 
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LL40 m i l l i o n of b i l l s w i th varying m a t u r i t i e s (20% a f t e r 
one year, 40% a f t e r two years and the remainder a f t e r t h r e e 
y e a r s ) . The r a t e of i n t e r e s t was s e t a t 3%% for the f i r s t 
year, 3^5% f o r the second year and 3%% f o r the t h i r d year. 
Almost a l l of t h i s Treasury B i l l i s s u e , and the subsequent 
i s s u e of LL35 m i l l i o n , was taken up by the foreign banks. 
I t i s g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d that the Treasury B i l l i s s u e was 
aimed l a r g e l y a t the fo r e i g n banks, who, at th a t time, did 
21 
not hold much l o c a l short money. One consequence of 
t h i s i s t h a t l o c a l banks do not hold any paper which i s 
e l i g i b l e f o r rediscounting by the C e n t r a l Bank. 
With such low i n t e r e s t r a t e s on Treasury B i l l s i t 
w i l l be a t once apparent t h a t the inter-bank market 
cannot be p r o f i t a b l e , e s p e c i a l l y as i n t e r e s t r a t e s of up 
to 5% may be obtained on some c l a s s e s of demand deposits 
i n some Lebanese banks. I f the short-term money market 
i s i n need of more government debt to make i t more v i a b l e , 
then t h i s debt w i l l have to be o f f e r e d a t an i n t e r e s t r a t e , 
E 
which i s r e a l i s t i c , i n terms of r a t e s obtaining elsewhere. 
Otherwise i n c r e a s i n g government debt w i l l merely s t i f l e 
the market. 
I n the absence of any s u b s t a n t i a l amount of short 
term government debt, and i n the absence of a high-earning 
c a p a c i t y c a l l money market, most Lebanese banks a r e forced 
The f o r e i g n banks were "encouraged" to p a r t i c i p a t e , which 
explains why the i s s u e was f u l l y taken up a t these low 
r a t e s of i n t e r e s t . 
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to hold a high proportion of t h e i r a s s e t s in l i q u i d form 
to maintain confidence, and t h i s reduces t h e i r earning 
c a p a c i t y on the r e s t of t h e i r a s s e t s . I n a d d i t i o n the 
system described here tends to d i s c r i m i n a t e between 
indigenous banks and foreign banks. I n times of c r i s i s 
the f o r e i g n banks can strengthen t h e i r l i q u i d r e s e r v e s 
e i t h e r by drawing on t h e i r f o r e i g n currency a s s e t s (mostly 
he l d i n the form of E u r o - d o l l a r bonds), or by asking 
t h e i r head o f f i c e abroad f o r reinforcements. Indigenous 
banks do not hold as high a proportion of f o r e i g n currency 
a s s e t s , and do not have the opportunity to c a l l on over-
seas r e s e r v e s . Nor do many indigenous banks hold any 
discountable paper, which they could rediscount through 
the C e n t r a l Bank. The net e f f e c t i s t h a t the indigenous 
banks have to appeal d i r e c t l y to the C e n t r a l Bank f o r a 
loan, i f they become i l l i q u i d a t any time. T h i s i s 
something t h a t has heppened i n c r e a s i n g l y s i n c e 1966. 
Thus the l e v e l s of l i q u i d i t y i n the banking system 
appear to have two major e f f e c t s . F i r s t l y , the absence of 
s p e c i f i c r e s e r v e r a t i o requirements and a reasonable volume 
of government debt a t r e a l i s t i c discount r a t e s , tend to 
favour the f o r e i g n banks, who a r e l e s s dependent on l o c a l 
c o n d i t i o n s . Secondly, the system t h a t has been described 
tends to r e q u i r e a high l e v e l of l i q u i d i t y from each bank, 
which has the e f f e c t of reducing the p o t e n t i a l earning 
c a p a c i t y on advances - again the f o r e i g n banks b e n e f i t 
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here, as they tend to hold more fo r e i g n currency deposits 
than l o c a l banks and can, hence, b e n e f i t from the higher 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s i n European markets without i n c u r r i n g any 
exchange r i s k c o s t . 
I n a d d i t i o n two f a c t o r s need looking a t i n more d e t a i l . 
The s t r u c t u r e of deposits i s a l s o a r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e i n 
determining l i q u i d i t y requirements and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
advances i s conditioned by these same l i q u i d i t y c o n s t r a i n t s . 
I t i s these two i s s u e s which a r e taken up i n the next chapter 
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C H A P T E R S E V E N 
The S t r u c t u r e of Deposits and Advances 
The previous chapter demonstrated t h a t l i q u i d i t y i n 
the banking system i s p a r t i a l l y determined by the s t r u c t u r e 
of d e p o s i t s . I n a d d i t i o n the high l e v e l s of l i q u i d i t y 
observed i n the banking system w i l l i n f l u e n c e the s t r u c t u r e 
of advances. The argument was developed i n the f i r s t 
chapter t h a t i f depositors i n g e n e r a l use the banking 
system as a short-term f a c i l i t y then t h i s w i l l i n h i b i t 
growth i n long-term markets, and may u l t i m a t e l y i n f l u e n c e 
the r a t e of economic development. T h i s general t h e o r e t i c a l 
point can now be studied i n more d e t a i l by a n a l y s i n g the 
s t r u c t u r e of deposits and advances i n Lebanon. 
The main component i n the s t r u c t u r e of t o t a l deposits 
i s savings d e p o s i t s . I n Lebanon these a r e defined as those 
deposits which are redeemable on demand but on which no 
cheques can be drawn. T h i s type of deposit i s very popular 
s i n c e i n t e r e s t i s normally paid on the outstanding balance 
and many commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s a r e s t i l l executed i n c a s h 
making the penalty of not being a b l e to draw cheques on the 
account a s l i g h t one. Normally the r a t e of i n t e r e s t on 
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savings deposits (the i n t e r e s t i s tax fr e e ) i s higher than 
t h a t on demand de p o s i t s . The r a t e s on savings deposits 
have v a r i e d q u i t e c o n s i d e r a b l y over the l a s t decade. By 
mid-1974 savings accounts i n Lebanese pounds were earning 
6-7%, w h i l s t savings accounts i n major f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s 
(predominantly d o l l a r s ) were earning 9-lO%. Again, t h i s 
d i f f e r e n t i a l i n earnings r a t e s r e f l e c t s the exchange r i s k 
premium on converting Lebanese pound deposits to f o r e i g n 
c u r r e n c i e s , to take advantage of money market r a t e s i n 
other c o u n t r i e s . 
I f we define demand deposits as c o n s i s t i n g of "checking" 
and " c u r r e n t " accounts (the d i s t i n c t i o n i n Lebanon between 
these two i s simply t h a t c u r r e n t accounts represent 
' p r o f e s s i o n a l deposits fed g e n e r a l l y by remittances of 
b i l l s ' w h i l s t checking accounts represent 'accounts of 
i n d i v i d u a l s , accounts t h a t a r e g e n e r a l l y fed by remittances 
of f u n d s ) ^ and add these to savings deposits, then we can 
get an idea of the t o t a l volume of funds which can be 
t 
withdrawn on demand, i . e . , without p r i o r n o t i c e . Table 7.1 
shows that f o r the period 1964-1973 savings and demand 
deposits have averaged over 85% of t o t a l deposits, i n every 
y e a r . What i s more i n t e r e s t i n g i s t h a t t h i s percentage 
has g r a d u a l l y been r i s i n g throughout the period. T h i s i s 
demonstrated i n Table 7.2. 
The d e f i n i t i o n s come from S t a t i s t i a u e s Bancaire. I n s t r u c t i o n 
No. 1-62, published by the Lebanese M i n i s t r y of Fina n c e . 
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Table 7.1: Commercial Bank Deposits ( i n LL m i l l i o n ) 
Year 
Qtr. Savings Checking 
1964 
I 571 618 
I I 63 5 619 
I I I 73 5 636 
IV 83 5 641 
196 5 
I 955 665 
I I 1,037 671 
I I I 1,167 665 
IV 1,255 668 
1966 
I 1,393 672 
I I 1,554 707 
I I I 1,719 699 
IV 1,485 548 
1967 
I 1,49 1 531 
I I 1,381 474 
I I I 1,389 491 
IV 1,422 483 
1968 
I 1,506 487 
I I 1,514 511 
I I I 1,626 540 
IV 1,698 544 
1969 
I 1,719 548 
I I 1,922 564 
I I I 2 , 004 537 
IV 2,088 510 
Time T o t a l 
Current Deposits Deposits 
661 427 2,277 
643 404 2,301 
612 401 2,384 
645 3 88 2,509 
660 326 2,606 
641 377 2,726 
633 3 79 2,844 
675 444 3,042 
591 405 3,061 
606 400 3,267 
602 433 3,453 
587 317 2,927 
558 314 2,894 
554 301 2,710 
572 33 7 2,789 
544 276 2,725 
559 283 2,835 
629 288 2,942 
624 301 3,091 
623 269 3,134 
621 298 3,186 
625 145 3,256 
604 136 3,281 
573 143 3,314 
continued over. 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
Year Time T o t a l 
Qtr. Savings Checking Current Deposits Deposits 
1970 
I 2,2 52 496 554 139 3,441 
I I 2,385 515 570 146 3,616 
I I I 2,481 508 583 139 3,711 
I V 2,699 515 616 161 3,991 
1971 
I 2,898 545 623 156 4,222 
I I 3,118 570 671 177 4,536 
I I I 3,2 58 582 713 193 4,746 
IV 3,454 637 718 191 5,000 
1972 
I 3,663 679 747 215 5,304 
I I 3,928 668 821 105 5,522 
I I I 4,110 681 826 167 5,784 
IV 4,295 750 828 177 6,150 
•973 
I 4,451 855 876 204 6,386 
I I 4,532 789 859 207 6,387 
I I I 4,782 815 920 241 6,758 
IV 5,063 837 1,045 295 7,240 
1974 
I 5,470 909 1,147 293 7,819 
Source: B u l l e t i n S t a t i s t i g u e Mensuel. M i n i s t e r e du Plan, 
D i r e c t i o n C e n t r a l e de l a S t a t i s t i q u e . 
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Table 7.2: Demand deposits and savings deposits as a 




1966 87. 7 
1967 88.9 
1968 90. 5 




1973 96. 5 
Source: B u l l e t i n S t a t i s t i g u e Mensuel. N.B. the q u a r t e r l y 
f i g u r e s have been added and divided by four to 
obtain an average f o r the year. 
The f a c t t h a t an i n c r e a s i n g proportion of t o t a l 
deposits a r e t e c h n i c a l l y on demand i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a 
s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n f o r an i n d i v i d u a l bank. Indeed i f 
savings deposits a r e used as a means of f i n a n c i n g p r e d i c -
t a b l e and d i s c r e t e purchases then the demands put upon 
these deposits can be p r e d i c t e d f a i r l y a c c u r a t e l y . Sayers 
emphasises the d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t needs to be made between 
cu r r e n t and deposit accounts i n the United Kingdom and 
in doing so provides general evidence which i s u s e f u l i n 
the present context. Sayers argues t h a t when an i n d i v i d u a l 
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customer switches funds from a c u r r e n t account to a 
deposit or savings account he i s e f f e c t i v e l y making a 
d e c i s i o n about forgoing consumption and i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
u l t i m a t e l y going to i n f l u e n c e aggregate l e v e l s of output 
and employment. The switch from one type of account to 
another has not a l t e r e d the f i n a n c i a l system i n terms of 
i t s t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s , 
" . . . but the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s t o t a l i n genera-
t i n g and supporting the flow of income i s reduced 
by the a c t i o n of s a v i n g " . 2 
Here Sayers i s s t r e s s i n g the f a c t t h at c u r r e n t accounts 
and savings accounts are to be seen as e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
r e p o s i t o r i e s of money: the former concerned w i t h s h o r t -
run expenditure d e c i s i o n s , the l a t t e r w ith longer-term 
expenditure d e c i s i o n s . T h i s i s t r u e by convention, r a t h e r 
than r u l e , i n the United Kingdom. In Lebanon no such 
c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between types of account i s made. 
Savings deposits appear to be t r e a t e d i n every respect 
as demand deposits, t h a t i s apart from being a b l e to draw 
cheques on the deposits. The obvious i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s 
i s t h a t i f such a high percentage of deposits a r e With-
in 
drawable on demand then l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s , of n e c e s s i t y , 
are going to be a t a high l e v e l and consequently banks 
w i l l f i n d t h a t a high proportion of t h e i r loans a r e 
R.S. Sayers, Modern Banking, 6th e d i t i o n , (London: Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y Press 1964), p.229. 
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short-term i n nature, thus reducing the a b i l i t y of any 
bank to lend long. 
I t could be argued i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n to t h i s t h at 
i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l attempt to minimise t h e i r cash holdings 
s u b j e c t to the c o n s t r a i n t t h a t a l l present expenditures 
can be met ( t h i s i s extending the ideas of P a t i n k i n 
developed i n Chapter One.) I f t h i s i s so then i t does 
not r e a l l y matter how deposits are h e l d s i n c e only a 
c e r t a i n proportion w i l l normally be withdrawn from the 
system. The word normally i s emphasised here, s i n c e i t 
seems to be assumed t h a t the notion of a minimum cash 
balance r e f e r s to d i s c r e t e and p r e d i c t a b l e expenditure 
pat t e r n s . However, i t could be argued i n the Lebanese 
case that s u f f i c i e n t u n c e r t a i n t y has been generated over 
the l a s t decade f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to wish to i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
p o t e n t i a l cash balances by holding easily-redeemable 
deposits i n the banking system. In other words, the 
preference f o r savings accounts over say, time deposits, 
represents some s o r t of precautionary demand f o r money. 
A f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Table 7.1 bears out the 
points made above. Since 1964 savings deposits have 
expanded a t a r e l a t i v e l y f a s t e r r a t e than a l l other 
deposits. I f i n t e r e s t earned on accounts was r e s p o n s i b l e 
for t h i s growth, then one would expect a corresponding 
i n c r e a s e i n time deposits, where the i n t e r e s t r a t e s a r e 
normally higher than savings deposits. No such i n c r e a s e 
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i s observable suggesting t h a t w h i l s t a r a t e of return on 
a deposit i s d e s i r a b l e the l i q u i d i t y of the deposit i s 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r . I t seems t h e r e f o r e that 
the immediate redeemability of the savings deposits (plus 
i t s earning c a p a c i t y ) i s c r u c i a l i n a banking system 
which has witnessed a number of bank c l o s u r e s over the 
l a s t eight y e a r s . Thus the c r u c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
deposits i n Lebanon, as f a r as the depositor i s concerned, 
i s the ease with which the deposit can be redeemed. T h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c appears to predominate over any i n t e r e s t 
r a t e advantages o f f e r e d by time deposits. 
An a d d i t i o n a l complicating f a c t o r which a f f e c t s a l l 
deposits i s that deposits may be denominated i n f o r e i g n 
c u r r e n c i e s . The f a c t t h a t foreign currency deposits 
have been accepted by Lebanese banks f o r many yea r s and 
a l s o t h at the Banking Secrecy Law has provided anonymity 
has. meant t h a t f o r e i g n currency deposits have always been 
an important c o n s t i t u e n t of t o t a l d e p o s i t s . Separate 
data f o r foreign currency deposits i s not a v a i l a b l e , 
although separate f i g u r e s were i s s u e d from 1955 to 1962. 
However, estimates of t o t a l foreign currency deposits and 
time deposits a r e provided by the I.M.F. i n t h e i r 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s . The problem i s to 
a b s t r a c t the domestic time deposits element from t h i s 
t o t a l ; to achieve a f i g u r e f o r f o r e i g n currency deposits 
along ( i n c l u d i n g time deposits denominated i n f o r e i g n 
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c u r r e n c i e s ) . The f i g u r e s f o r time deposits provided by 
the C e n t r a l Bank include foreign currency time deposits 
and, ther e f o r e , i n t h i s case, a method i s needed to 
a b s t r a c t the f o r e i g n time deposit element. I f we take 
the time deposit f i g u r e s f o r 1962, i . e . the l a s t year when 
separate f i g u r e s f o r f o r e i g n currency deposits were issued, 
we can see t h a t f o r e i g n currency time deposits represented 
n e a r l y 43% of t o t a l time d e p o s i t s . 3 I f we assume t h a t 
the r a t i o of f o r e i g n currency time deposits to domestic 
time deposits has remained approximately constant s i n c e 
1962, then the f i g u r e s f o r t o t a l time deposits can be 
reduced by approximately 40%, to give an estimate of 
domestic currency time deposits. I f t h i s estimate i s 
taken away from the aggregate f i g u r e f o r f o r e i g n currency 
and time deposits provided by I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l 
S t a t i s t i c s , then a f i g u r e f o r f o r e i g n currency deposits 
alone i s obtained. These f i g u r e s a r e reproduced i n 
Table 7.3. This r a t h e r complicated procedure f o r 
obtaining a f i g u r e f o r foreign currency deposits can be 
j u s t i f i e d , from a t e c h n i c a l point of view, on the grounds 
th a t the time deposit element i n t o t a l f o r e i g n currency 
deposits i s not l a r g e and even i f the r a t i o of domestic 
to foreign currency deposits has changed f a i r l y d r a m a t i c a l l y 
3. The f i g u r e f o r t o t a l time deposits i s taken from I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s and the one f o r f o r e i g n 
currency time deposits from Banque de S y r i e et du Liban, 
Rapport 1963. 
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Table 7.3: Foreign Currency Deposits 1964-1974 
( m i l l i o n s Lebanese pounds). 
1964 1969 
I n.a. I 1641 
I I 807 I I 1833 
I I I 927 I I I 1896 
IV 103 8 IV 1976 
1965 1970 . 
I 1194 I 2068 
I I 1217 I I 2160 
I I I 1344 I I I 2286 
IV 1539 IV 2493 
1966 1971 
I 1553 I 2632 
I I 1758 I I 2849 
I I I 1915 I I I 3095 
IV 1695 IV 3246 
1967 1972 
I 1679 I 3347 
I I 1568 I I 3634 
I I I 1589 I I I 3823 
IV 1618 IV 3999 
1968 1973 
I 1696 I 4269 
I I 1790 I I 4305 
I I I 1862 I I I 4598 
IV 1560 IV 493 5 
1974 
I 53 50 
Source: I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s , w i t h the 
procedures for a b s t r a c t i n g domestic time deposits 
described in the t e x t . 
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s i n c e 1962, t h i s would not a l t e r , s u b s t a n t i a l l y , the 
f i g u r e s produced i n Table 7.3. 
The presence of foreign currency deposits i n the 
deposit s t r u c t u r e of the Lebanese banks adds another 
dimension to t h i s s t r u c t u r e . Foreign currency deposits 
a r e important, f i r s t l y because of the c o n s i d e r a b l e 
entrepot trade through B e i r u t which often r e q u i r e s d i r e c t 
f i n a n c i n g i n a currency other than Lebanese pounds and, 
secondly, because B e i r u t has become i n some senses a 
f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e of the Middle E a s t . I f t o t a l deposits 
are compared w i t h f o r e i g n currency deposits t h i s w i l l 
give some i n d i c a t i o n of the importance of the l a t t e r . 
The r a t i o between the two i s s e t out i n Table 7.4. The 
most n o t i c a b l e f e a t u r e i s that during the period 1964-1973 
foreign currency deposits have g r a d u a l l y become a more 
important element i n t o t a l d e posits. The share of forei g n 
currency deposits i n t o t a l deposits has r i s e n from 3 5% at 
the beginning of 1964 to 68% by the end of 1973. The 
one period when forei g n currency deposits s u f f e r e d a 
set-back was a t the end of 1968 and during 1969. Th i s 
was l a r g e l y due to an order from the C e n t r a l Bank to a l l 
commercial banks to deposit 5% of t h e i r t o t a l deposits 
i n the C e n t r a l Bank i n l o c a l currency. T h i s forced many 
banks to move out of foreign c u r r e n c i e s i n t o Lebanese 
pounds. However, b a r r i n g t h i s short r e v e r s e there has 
been a gradual upward trend. There a r e two points t h a t 
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Table 7.4: T o t a l Bank Deposits and Foreign Currency 
Deposits 1964-1973 
(1) (2) 
T o t a l Deposits Foreign Currency Col. (2) as a 
Deposits % of Col. (1) 
1964 
I 2277 n.a. 
I I 2301 807 3 5,07 
I I I 2384 927 38.8 
IV 2509 1038 41.4 
1965 
I 2606 1194 45.8 
I I 2726 1217 44.6 
I I I 2844 1344 47.2 



















I 2894 1679 58.0 
I I 2710 1568 57.8 
I I I 2789 1589 57.0 
IV 2725 1618 59.3 
1968 
I 283 5 1696 59.8 
I I 2942 1790 60.8 
I I I 3091 1862 60.2 
IV 3134 1560 49.7 
1969 
I 3186 1641 51.5 
I I 32 56 1833 56.3 
I I I 3281 1896 57.8 
IV 3314 1976 59.6 
continued over 
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Table 7.4 (continued) 
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I 7819 53 50 68.4 
Sources: As f o r Tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
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can be made about t h i s t r e n d . F i r s t l y , t h e t r e n d shows 
t h a t as t o t a l deposits have expanded a lower r e l a t i v e 
volume of l o c a l currency deposits are e n t e r i n g the system. 
The expansion i n t o t a l deposits appears t o be l a r g e l y due 
t o the f o r e i g n currency element. This i s t o be expected 
since B e i r u t has become a centre f o r short-term deposits 
e s p e c i a l l y from the Gulf o i l s t a t e s . I n c o u n t r i e s such as 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Qatar t h e r e are very l i m i t e d 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r d i r e c t investment and, t h e r e f o r e , l o c a l 
deposits tend t o be channelled abroad by the commercial 
4 
banks i n t o such centres as B e i r u t . As we have already 
seen, B e i r u t also has the a t t r a c t i o n o f p r o v i d i n g complete 
anonymity f o r i t s depositors under the Banking Secrecy Law 
of 19 56. However the second p o i n t t h a t has t o be made i s 
t h a t w h i l s t t o t a l deposits are expanding, because of 
increasing f o r e i g n currency deposits, t h e expansion of 
l o c a l deposits has been very s l i g h t . This means t h a t t h e 
amount of borrowing on l o c a l currency deposits has not 
expanded a t the same r a t e as t o t a l deposits. I n general 
terms t h i s means t h a t t o t a l deposits, i n the Lebanese 
economy, are not n e c e s s a r i l y a good i n d i c a t o r of the 
p o t e n t i a l expansion of advances t o the domestic economy. 
Apart from f o r e i g n currency deposits c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
This net o u t f l o w o f funds from the Gulf i s commented on 
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n Kuwait Currency Board; S i x t h Annual Report, 
1967. 
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must be given t o deposits i n l o c a l currency held by non-
Lebanese. These deposits may represent temporary t r a d i n g 
balances h e l d by f o r e i g n merchants i n Lebanon or the 
balances of e x p a t r i a t e s l i v i n g i n Lebanon. The fundamental 
problem of these s o r t s o f deposits i s t h a t the commercial 
banks as a whole are under no o b l i g a t i o n t o h o l d f o r e i g n 
currency assets against these deposits. Indeed i t would be 
extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r the banks t o assess the volume of 
f o r e i g n currency reserves necessary t o cover withdrawals 
of these deposits ( t h i s i s assuming t h a t the withdrawal 
u l t i m a t e l y requires the bank t o redeem th e deposit i n the 
currency o f the country o f the d e p o s i t o r ) . U l t i m a t e l y the 
Central Bank w i l l f e e l a d r a i n on i t s f o r e i g n assets i f 
there i s a r a p i d r e p a t r i a t i o n of t h i s type o f deposit over 
a short period of time. This d r a i n on C e n t r a l Bank reserves 
may u l t i m a t e l y a f f e c t the balance of payments. The extent 
t o which these a f f e c t s are possible i s dependent on the 
s i z e of these deposits i n t o t a l deposits. Unfortunately, 
no f i g u r e s f o r l o c a l currency deposits h e l d by non-
Lebanese e x i s t . 
From the p o i n t o f view of t h e arguments already 
presented i n t h i s chapter, l o c a l currency deposits h e l d by 
non-Lebanese w i l l tend t o r e s t r i c t the volume of l o c a l 
lending s t i l l more. I f these deposits are u l t i m a t e l y 
redeemable on demand i n currencies other than Lebanese 
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pounds, then the banks are v i r t u a l l y forced i n t o t h e p o s i t i o n 
of a c q u i r i n g short-term assets i n f o r e i g n c urrencies, 
r a t h e r than lending l o c a l l y . Thus an estimate of t o t a l 
deposits i n l o c a l currencies h e l d by l o c a l depositers i s 
necessary t o e s t a b l i s h the extent o f i n t e r n a l lending by 
the banking system. The Bank of Lebanon has estimated i n 
a number of i t s annual rep o r t s t h a t t o t a l deposits held 
by non-residents does not exceed about 1596. Assuming the 
m a j o r i t y of non-resident accounts are h e l d i n f o r e i g n 
currencies t h i s means t h a t non-Lebanese l o c a l currency 
deposits probably do not exceed 5% o f t o t a l deposits. 
Bearing t h i s "guesstimate" i n mind, we can now see t h a t 
about 21% of t o t a l deposits are l o c a l currency deposits 
5 
h e l d by r e s i d e n t s . 
C l a s s i f y i n g deposits by deposit holders and by type 
of currency i s important t o our a n a l y s i s . When des c r i b i n g 
the r a t e a t which c r e d i t can be expanded i t i s conventional 
t o look a t the t o t a l volume of deposits, then c a l c u l a t e a 
bank m u l t i p l i e r based on c e r t a i n assumptions about cash 
and l i q u i d i t y reserve requirements. Thus i f i t i s necessary 
f o r an i n d i v i d u a l bank t o maintain a given cash reserve, 
t o t a l deposits (X) w i l l be r e l a t e d t o t h e bank's cash 
deposits (C) i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: 
X = WC (1) 
where (K = the r e c i p r o c a l o f the cash r a t i o . 
This f i g u r e i s derived from the 68% o f t o t a l deposits h e l d 
i n f o r e i g n c urrencies, plus t h e 5% h e l d by non-Lebanese i n 
l o c a l currency. 
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The term P< can also be used t o denote a general 
l i q u i d i t y requirement. I f there i s an increase i n cash 
deposits and t h e p u b l i c ' s preference f o r cash remains 
constant, then expression (1) w i l l determine the extent 
t o which deposits may be expanded i n r e l a t i o n t o the given 
l i q u i d i t y requirement. More s p e c i f i c a l l y the incremental 
gain can be s p e c i f i e d as: 
A X = PC AC (2) 
For a multi-bank system the expansion of t o t a l deposits i s 
given as: 
A x = c + ( l - fc ) A C + ( l = ) 2 a c ... ( l - fee ) V e (3) 
which i n t h e l i m i t approaches equation ( 2 ) . This i s the 
c o n v e n t i a l way i n which t h e bank m u l t i p l i e r i s o f t e n 
analysed. 6 The i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t a l l 
money not h e l d as a l i q u i d i t y reserve i s a v a i l a b l e f o r 
loaning. I n a d d i t i o n i t i s i m p l i c i t here t h a t we are 
dealing w i t h a s i n g l e currency. Neither o f these two 
p o i n t s apply i n Lebanon. Deposits are denominated i n 
numerous currencies and i t i s not possible t o assume t h a t 
banks loan a l l cash deposits i n excess of basic l i q u i d i t y 
requirements. Even i f a l l deposits were i n l o c a l c u rrencies, 
t h i s does not imply t h a t the system w i l l be f u l l y loaned. 
The extent t o which new deposits are created w i l l be 
dependent on (a) v i a b l e o u t l e t s f o r new deposits, and 
The a n a l y s i s presented here f o l l o w s t h a t presented i n 
W.T. Newlyn, Theory o f Money, (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
Press 196 5), pp. 13-16. 
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(b) the r a t e o f r e t u r n on a l t e r n a t i v e assets. We w i l l 
r e t u r n t o the f i r s t p o i n t l a t e r i n t h i s chapter. The second 
p o i n t i s important i n t h e Lebanese case since t h e r e are 
considerable o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r investment i n short-term 
assets i n overseas money market. The obvious o b j e c t i o n 
t o t h i s p o i n t i s t h a t t h e r e i s always a r i s k o f c a p i t a l 
loss through currency a p p r e c i a t i o n i f deposits are converted 
i n t o f o r e i g n c urrencies. This i s always l i k e l y i n Lebanon 
where the currency has operated on a f r e e market since 
1949. However the m a j o r i t y of deposits are denominated i n 
f o r e i g n currencies i n t h e f i r s t place and, t h e r e f o r e , 
t h e currency r i s k works the oth e r way round. There i s a 
grea t e r gain t o be had from i n v e s t i n g i n d o l l a r and s t e r l i n g 
markets, than converting d o l l a r and s t e r l i n g deposits i n t o 
Lebanese pounds and c r e a t i n g loans i n t e r n a l l y . The gain 
i s t w o f o l d . I n the f i r s t place there i s no chance of 
c a p i t a l loss through f l u c t u a t i o n s i n t h e exchange r a t e and 
secondly t h e assets acquired i n overseas markets tend t o 
be short term, whereas i n t e r n a l loans may be longer-term 
and have a higher r i s k premium attached t o them. I n addi-
t i o n the evidence a v a i l a b l e from 1960-1974 suggests t h a t t h e 
earning r a t e on overseas assets has been higher than t h a t 
on i n t e r n a l loans. This has l a r g e l y been due t o the h i g h 
i n t e r e s t - r a t e l e v e l s i n European money markets, e s p e c i a l l y 
t h e Eurodollar market. Bearing these p o i n t s i n mind we can 
r e t u r n t o the an a l y s i s o f t h e simple bank m u l t i p l i e r presented 
e a r l i e r . T o t a l deposits c o n s i s t o f l o c a l currency deposits 
( X L) and f o r e i g n currency deposits ( X^,). I n a d d i t i o n 
l o c a l currency deposits and f o r e i g n currency deposits may be 
held by both residents and non-residents. I t i s very 
d i f f i c u l t t o assess t o what extent the ownership of a 
deposit can i n f l u e n c e i t s behaviour. Therefore, we w i l l 
assume i n i t i a l l y t h a t the ownership of deposits does not 
in f l u e n c e the way a bank d i s t r i b u t e s i t s p o r t f o l i o . The 
l i q u i d i t y r a t i o cannot be s p e c i f i e d f o r the system as a 
whole, since no l e g a l requirements are s p e c i f i e d by the 
Cen t r a l Bank. However, each bank has a s u b j e c t i v e view o f 
what l e v e l o f l i q u i d i t y i s necessary a t any one time. This 
s u b j e c t i v e view o f l i q u i d i t y may i n f a c t be d i f f e r e n t f o r 
f o r e i g n currency deposits than f o r l o c a l currency deposits. 
Let us assume a bank holds 50% f o r e i g n currency deposits 
and 50% l o c a l deposits. I f the bank only creates advances 
on the l o c a l deposit element then the f o r e i g n currency 
element w i l l be e n t i r e l y covered by short-term f o r e i g n 
assets, i . e . t h e r e w i l l complete l i q u i d i t y i n one element 
of the deposits. This means t h a t , a t t h e very l e a s t , two 
separate l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s need t o be s p e c i f i e d f o r the 
s i n g l e bank. Thus: 
X = X L • Xp (4) 
and d e f i n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t o t a l deposits and 
cash holdings we have, 
X = tfS^ + ( 5 ) 
222. 
1 2 
where o< and 0< are r e c i p r o c a l s o f t h e l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s 
f o r l o c a l deposits and f o r e i g n currency deposits. However 
we can assume t h a t f o r e i g n currency deposits (Xp) are f u l l y 
l i q u i d i n t h a t no domestic c r e d i t expansion takes place on 
the basis o f them, so equation (5) could read as f o l l o w s : 
X = C* 1^ + Xp (6) 
The t o t a l expansion i n deposits f o r the s i n g l e bank i s 
defined as: 
A x = C K 1 ^ x L + (7) 
For a multi-bank system the problem becomes more d i f f i c u l t . 
1 2 
I f 0< and are p a r t i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e r a t i o s , then they 
w i l l only apply t o one bank and, t h e r e f o r e , the a c t u a l 
expansion o f deposits may depend c r u c i a l l y on the order i n 
which the banks are influenced. However, r e t u r n i n g t o 
equation ( 7 ) , two important p o i n t s emerge. The t o t a l volume 
of domestic c r e d i t a v a i l a b l e t o the economy i s going t o 
depend f i r s t l y on the r e l a t i v e sizes o f domestic and f o r e i g n 
currency deposits i n any one bank's p o r t f o l i o , and secondly 
on the s u b j e c t i v e l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s a p p l i e d t o each set o f 
2 
deposits. I f fc< takes a value o f 100% then an increase 
i n f o r e i g n currency deposits, r e l a t i v e l y , w i l l reduce the 
t o t a l volume o f domestic c r e d i t , unless banks respond by 
lowering t h e l i q u i d i t y requirement (tyC ) on domestic 
currency deposits. From Table 7.4 i t can be seen t h a t t h i s 
r a t i o between t o t a l deposits and f o r e i g n currency deposits 
has indeed been r i s i n g over t h e l a s t decade, which suggests 
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t h a t the impact o f the t r i p l i n g o f t o t a l deposits from 
1964 t o 1973, noted i n Table 7.1, has probably had very 
l i t t l e e f f e c t on the t o t a l a v a i l a b i l i t y of medium-term 
c r e d i t i n the domestic economy. 
However, the p a t t e r n of advances tends t o i l l u s t r a t e 
a s l i g h t l y more complicated p i c t u r e than t h i s . 
Advances 
Data i s presented i n Tables 7.5 and 7.6 on t h e t o t a l 
volume of advances on an annual basis since 1966 and a 
s e c t o r a l breakdown o f these advances from t h e same year. 
This s e c t o r a l breakdown was provided by the Ce n t r a l Bank 
7 
f o r the f i r s t time i n 1964. Estimates were prepared p r i o r 
t o 1964 by the American Embassy i n B e i r u t but the c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n s used do not make i t easy t o l i n k t he two s e r i e s . 
I n f a c t , t he f i r s t f i g u r e s prepared by the Central Bank 
were not c o n s i s t e n t and t h e breakdown shown i n Table 7.6 
can only, reasonably, be extended back t o 1966. The 
t r a d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i n g o f overseas and domestic commercial 
a c t i v i t y i s very obvious from t h e f i g u r e s presented i n 
Table 7.6. I n no year since 1966 have commercial loans 
dropped below 53% and toward t h e end o f the pe r i o d under 
study were r i s i n g t o a t o t a l o f nearly 60%. The d e c l i n e 
Banque du Liban, Rapport Annuel 1964. 
224. 
Table 7.5: T o t a l Deposits and Advances 1966-1973 
(1) (2) Col.(2) as a % 
T o t a l Deposits T o t a l Advances o f Col. (1) 
1966 2927 2293.2 78 
1967 2725 2257.1 83 
1968 3134 2018.1 64 
1969 3314 2027.4 61 
1970 3991 2084.1 52 
1971 5000 2613.7 52 
1972 6150 3216.3 52 
1973 6387 3678.1 57 
Sources: As f o r Table 7.1 and Banque du Liban, Rapport 
i n the r a t i o o f advances t o deposits noted i n Table 7.5 
i n d i c a t e s two t h i n g s . F i r s t l y , i t p o i n t s t o the extremely 
i l l i q u i d s i t u a t i o n t h a t e x i s t e d i n 1966 and 1967 t h a t l e d 
t o the considerable changes i n the f i n a n c i a l s ector i n 
1968, and secondly p o i n t s t o the inc r e a s i n g volume o f 
f o r e i g n currency deposits i n t h e system, e s p e c i a l l y since 
1969. For instance the 100% increase i n f o r e i g n currency 
deposits between the beginning o f 1969 and end o f 1971 was 
matched only by a 56% increase i n t o t a l deposits, or, more 
t o the p o i n t , a 13% increase i n domestic currency deposits. 
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deposits and the major emphasis on commercial loans, an 
i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of Table 7.6 i s t h a t advances t o 
the i n d u s t r i a l sector have been g r a d u a l l y r i s i n g r e l a t i v e l y , 
since 1966. I n 1966, 12.6% o f a l l advances went t o the 
i n d u s t r i a l sector, whereas 20.6% o f a l l advances was 
a l l o c a t e d t o i n d u s t r y i n 1973. One major explanation f o r 
t h i s move has been the increasing optimism f e l t about t h e 
development o f the Lebanese economy. The u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
i n the f i n a n c i a l sector i n 1966, plus the c o n t i n u i n g 
c o n f l i c t s w i t h I s r a e l i n t o which Lebanon was i n e v i t a b l y 
drawn, i f not d i r e c t l y , i n d i r e c t l y i n the sense t h a t t h e 
continuous warfare reduced confidence i n the economy. 
This confidence appeared t o r e t u r n from 1971 onwards, and 
t h i s appears t o have encouraged a move i n t o i n d u s t r i a l 
f i n a n c i n g by the commercial banks. However what loans 
th e r e are, are normally provided on a r e v o l v i n g basis 
and o f t e n demand considerable c o l l a t e r a l , e i t h e r r e a l 
estate o r personal guarantees. These f a c t o r s g e n e r a l l y 
conspire against innovation i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector. 
The r e v o l v i n g c r e d i t system reduces the time horizon 
over which i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s can be planned w i t h s a f e t y 
and the present c o l l a t e r a l demands are not designed t o 
encourage new i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Even though t h e r e has been an expansion i n i n d u s t r i a l 
advances over t h e l a s t f i v e years, t h e r e i s no evidence 
t h a t t h i s expansion i s spread evenly over a l l banks. 
What general evidence t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e suggests t h a t 
foreign and indigenous banks appear to have a very s i m i l a r 
advances to t o t a l deposits r a t i o . However, there i s no 
information on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of those advances between 
s e c t o r s and between types of banks. A l l the evidence 
that i s a v a i l a b l e points to the f o r e i g n banks g e n e r a l l y 
adopting a c o n s e r v a t i v e a t t i t u d e t o advances i n that they 
concentrate on commercial loans. I f t h i s i s g e n e r a l l y 
true, i t means t h a t the indigenous banks are mainly 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the r e l a t i v e l y f a s t e r growth of i n d u s t r i a l 
advances. But has t h i s expansion i n t o i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c e 
been achieved a t the expense of l i q u i d i t y ? W h i l s t the 
C e n t r a l Bank continues not to have complete c o n t r o l over 
l i q u i d i t y ratios,, the l o c a l banks can become more i l l i q u i d 
without i n c u r r i n g the d i r e c t d i s p l e a s u r e of the C e n t r a l 
Bank. The evidence f o r t h i s type of a s s e r t i o n i s not 
r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e , but what data t h e r e i s seems to point 
i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . S i n c e 1970 t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of Banks 
i n Lebanon have published standardized balance sheets 
f o r a l l "approved" banks. I f the top nine indigenous 
banks (accounting f o r 65% of deposits amongst the l o c a l 
banks) are compared i n terms of t h e i r l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s 
f o r 1970 and 1972, then they experienced a d e c l i n e i n 
l i q u i d i t y from 47.6% of t o t a l a s s e t s i n 1970 to 44.0% of 
t o t a l a s s e t s i n 1972. At the same time the f o r e i g n banks 
and j o i n t - p a r t i c i p a t i o n banks decreased t h e i r l i q u i d i t y 
228. 
from approximately 59% of t o t a l assets t o 54% of t o t a l 
8 
assets. Thus the whole system became less l i q u i d but 
the absolute f a l l i n l i q u i d i t y amongst l o c a l banks has 
been greater, suggesting t h a t they have been an important 
element i n the extension of i n d u s t r i a l loans i n t h i s 
period. 
The changing s t r u c t u r e o f deppsits and advances are 
presented i n Table 7.7. This t a b l e i n i t i a l l y gives a 
misleading p i c t u r e , since the t o t a l growth i n deposits 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o f o r e i g n banks i s the lowest o f the t h r e e 
categories employed i n the t a b l e . 
However, as Central Bank l e g i s l a t i o n since 1970 
has made the establishment o f new f o r e i g n banks d i f f i c u l t , 
but the establishment o f j o i n t ventures easy (see Chapter 
E i g h t ) , the growth i n " f o r e i g n banking" has occurred 
i n the j o i n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n sector. Again Table 7.7 shows 
a r a p i d r i s e i n advances. This would seem t o lend support 
t o the e a r l i e r a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e most r a p i d growth i n 
advances i s o c c u r r i n g i n the f o r e i g n sector. 
To summarise t h i s discussion on advances some mention 
needs t o be made o f i n t e r e s t rates on advances. From the 
beginning o f 1974 commercial loan r a t e s on medium-term 
loans have v a r i e d between 8% and 12%, although from A p r i l 
Association of Banks i n Lebanon, Balance Sheets o f the 
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1974 s p e c i a l r a t e s of 8.5% and 9=5% have a p p l i e d to 
s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r i a l and t o u r i s t p r o j e c t s negotiated through 
the new National Bank f o r I n d u s t r i a l and T o u r i s t i c Develop-
ment. As t h i s p a r t i c u l a r bank i s constrained i n i t s 
lending operations by i t s c a p i t a l ( s i n c e i t does not, 
yet, accept deposits from the p u b l i c ) , i t i s u n l i k e l y 
t h a t these lower r a t e s w i l l have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on 
the other commercial banks. Short-term loans tend to be 
9 
o f f e r e d a t 9-10%. 
Two f a c t o r s seem to emerge from the d i s c u s s i o n s i n 
t h i s chapter. F i r s t l y , s i n c e 1966, t h e r e has been a 
ra p i d r i s e i n t o t a l deposits, such t h a t by mid-1974 t o t a l 
d eposits i n the banking s e c t o r had more than doubled 
s i n c e 1966. Secondly, t h e r e has been an even more r a p i d 
i n c r e a s e i n f o r e i g n currency d e p o s i t s . T h i s means t h a t 
the growth of l o c a l currency deposits has been slower than 
the r a t e of growth of t o t a l d e posits. At the same time 
advances to the domestic economy have grown i n l i n e w i t h 
t o t a l deposits, implying e i t h e r t h a t some domestic c r e d i t 
expansion i s backed by foreign currency deposits or t h a t 
l o c a l banks, i n p a r t i c u l a r , a r e becoming more i l l i q u i d 
as they respond to the demand f o r advances i n the domestic 
market. 
Information on i n t e r e s t r a t e s was p r i v a t e l y secured. 
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Th i s chapter has a l s o emphasised the r o l e t h a t the 
C e n t r a l Bank might play i n expanding domestic c r e d i t . We 
now need to turn to look i n more d e t a i l a t the r o l e of 
monetary c o n t r o l w i t h i n the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r . 
C H A P T E R E I G H T 
Monetary Control and the F i n a n c i a l Sector 
T h i s chapter examines the r o l e s of the C e n t r a l Bank 
i n r e l a t i o n to the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r i n the period s i n c e the 
establishment of the C e n t r a l Bank in 1964. I t w i l l be 
argued i n t h i s chapter t h a t the powers granted to the 
C e n t r a l Bank have never been f u l l y e x e r c i s e d and th a t 
consequently t h i s has a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d the development 
of the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r . 
The Monetary and C r e d i t Act of 1964 l a i d down the 
co n d i t i o n s under which the new C e n t r a l Bank of Lebanon 
1 
would operate. The mam mission of the new C e n t r a l Bank 
was to safeguard the monetary system i n order to provide 
a b a s i s f o r long l a s t i n g economic and s o c i a l progress 
( A r t i c l e 70). I n i t s general form the C e n t r a l Bank of 
Lebanon v a r i e s l i t t l e from many other c e n t r a l banks i n 
developing c o u n t r i e s . I t i s run by a Governor, three 
Deputy Governors and a C e n t r a l C o u n c i l . 
The Monetary and C r e d i t Act, Decree No. 13 513 (The O f f i c i a l 
Gazette No. 62 August 8th, 1962) - E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n 
by M.H. Salloum. 
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The Governor and the Deputy Governors are appointed by 
the M i n i s t e r of Finance and serve for s i x - and f i v e - y e a r 
periods r e s p e c t i v e l y ( A r t i c l e 18). The C e n t r a l C o u n c i l 
decides the general p o l i c y of the Bank. Th i s C o u n c i l 
c o n s i s t s of the Governor, two deputy governors and the 
d i r e c t o r s - g e n e r a l of the M i n i s t r y of Finance and the 
M i n i s t r y of National Economy ( A r t i c l e 28). The C e n t r a l 
C o u n c i l i s a l s o a s s i s t e d by a C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee 
whose membership i s drawn from various s e c t o r s of the 
economy. 
The functions of the C e n t r a l Bank, as l a i d down i n 
the Monetary and C r e d i t Act a r e those normally a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h C e n t r a l Banks: ( i ) s o l e note i s s u e r ; ( i i ) govern-
ment banker; ( i i i ) banker to the commercial banks, and 
( i v ) the s o l e a u t h o r i t y f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n i n foreign 
exchange markets. I n a d d i t i o n the Monetary and C r e d i t 
Act defined more p r e c i s e l y the "proper" business of 
commercial banks. New r e g u l a t i o n s came i n t o f o r c e i n 
the Act r e s t r i c t i n g banks a c t i v i t i e s i n r e a l e s t a t e 
investments ( A r t i c l e 153); the granting of loans to 
D i r e c t o r s of the bank concerned ( A r t i c l e 152) and the 
r e g u l a r i z a t i o n of procedures f o r granting loans. The 
C e n t r a l Bank of Lebanon, i n 1964, began i t s operations i n 
a f i n a n c i a l system which up to that date had been t o t a l l y 
unregulated. However, the broad range of i s s u e s covered 
by the Monetary and C r e d i t Act do seem to suggest t h a t 
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c o n s i d e r a b l e concern was a l r e a d y being f e l t about what 
the e f f e c t s of the continuance of an unregulated system 
might be. 
There has been c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n i n economic 
l i t e r a t u r e on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g c e n t r a l 
banks i n developing banking systems. As Sayers has 
commented, 
"Looking back i t i s impossible to r e s i s t the s t a t e -
ment t h a t the foundation of c e n t r a l banks has been 
p a r t l y a matter of fashion „ . . 
T h i s d e s i r e f o r c e n t r a l banks i n many developing c o u n t r i e s 
was explained by Newlyn and Rowan i n the following terms. 
I t d e r i v e s from, 
" . . . the c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n t h a t e x i s t e d i n the 
minds of many i n d i v i d u a l s between the d e s i r e f o r 
p o l i t i c a l independence on the one hand and f i n a n c i a l 
independence on the other. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t c o l o n i e s which a t t a i n the s t a t u s of 
Dominions a r e u s u a l l y not slow to e s t a b l i s h c e n t r a l 
banks and t h a t those t e r r i t o r i e s which know themselves 
to be approaching dominion s t a t u s should give b i r t h 
to proposals to c r e a t e c e n t r a l bank i n s t i t u t i o n s . . 
W h i l s t Lebanon i n 1963 was not emerging into some 
independent p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s , i t i s obviously r e l e v a n t to 
ask whether the establishment of a c e n t r a l bank a t t h a t 
time was an appropriate a c t i o n . One b a s i c c r i t i c i s m of 
new c e n t r a l banks i s t h a t they are often expected to e i t h e r 
2, R.S. Sayers ( e d i t o r ) Banking, in the B r i t i s h Commonwealth, 
(London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press 19 52) p . x i . 
3. W.T. Newlyn and D.C. Rowan, Money and Banking i n C o l o n i a l 
ftfrica, (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press 1954) p.267. 
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operate i n an un s o p h i s t i c a t e d f i n a n c i a l environment or 
they are expected to c r e a t e the appropriate environment 
f o r themselves. T h i s p a r t l y stems from a p a r t i c u l a r 
concept of c e n t r a l bank a c t i v i t y derived from experiences 
i n Europe and America. An i n t e r e s t i n g case i n point 
a r e the arguments put forward by Newlyn and Rowan i n the 
case of N i g e r i a . I n considering the case f o r a c e n t r a l 
bank, Newlyn and Rowan conclude, 
" . . . The view that a c e n t r a l bank can promote 
economic s t a b i l i t y by monetary management i s , to 
put matters t e r s e l y , nothing but an i l l u s i o n . . ."4 
The main reasons f o r t h i s c o n c l u s i o n were: ( i ) the 
co n s i d e r a b l e dependence of the Nigerian economy on ext e r -
n a l d e s t a b i l i z i n g f o r c e s , ( i i ) the g e n e r a l l y underdeveloped 
nature of the banking and f i n a n c i a l system. Yet the case 
f o r a c e n t r a l bank i s not al t o g e t h e r discarded by Newlyn and 
Rowan. T h e i r argument f o r a c e n t r a l bank i s i n s t e a d based 
on the need f o r an i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
f o s t e r i n g economic development, 
" . . . The case f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a c e n t r a l bank thus 
r e s t s on the c o n t r i b u t i o n such an i n s t i t u t i o n might 
make to economic development . . ." 5 
They argue fu r t h e r , 
" . . . t h a t the c e n t r a l banking c o n t r i b u t i o n would be 
gr e a t e s t where the p a r t i c u l a r t a s k s of reform were 
4. W„T. Newlyn and D.C. Rowan, op. c i t . , p.271. 
5. I b i d . , p.271. 
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the development of the indigenous banks, the i n t e -
g r a t i o n of the e x p a t r i a t e and indigenous banks, the 
development of a l o c a l s e c u r i t i e s market and the 
development of a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t . . ." 6 
Thus c e n t r a l banking, here, i s seen more i n terms of the 
c o n t r o l the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s might have over the growth 
and development of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n the 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r and the disbursement of t o t a l f i n a n c i a l 
resources over time. T h i s type of point i s emphasised 
by P a t r i c k when he says, 
" . . . The monetary a u t h o r i t i e s have an important 
i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g r o l e i n encouraging the 
establishment of a wide a r r a y of f i n a n c i a l markets 
(and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to operate i n these 
markets) which a l l o c a t e saving c o m p e t i t i v e l y to the 
most productive i n v e s t o r s . One important approach 
i s . . . . by c l e a r i n g away impeding i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
and other o b s t a c l e s of a l e g a l or customary nature. 
The f i n a n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s can c r e a t e an environment 
which i s conducive to growth both of the r e a l 
economy and of the f i n a n c i a l system . . . " 7 
Bearing i n mind these r a t h e r c o n f l i c t i n g views on the 
r o l e s of a c e n t r a l bank, then assessment of performance 
becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t . One way out would be to 
take the view expressed by Nevin, 
" . . . For the underdeveloped t e r r i t o r i e s of the 
world the u s e f u l n e s s or otherwise of a c e n t r a l bank 
must t h e r e f o r e be a s s e s s e d f i r s t and foremost i n 
terms of i t s a b i l i t y to a s s i s t the process of economic 
growth and c a p i t a l formation; the c o n t r i b u t i o n i t 
can make to the r e g u l a t i o n , d i r e c t i o n and guidance 
of such c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s as may e x i s t a t the 
time must be a secondary and l e s s e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . 
I b i d , p.272. 
H.T. P a t r i c k , " F i n a n c i a l Development and Economic Growth i n 
Underdeveloped Countries", Economic Development and C u l t u r a l 
Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 1966, p.186. 
E. Nevin, C a p i t a l Funds i n Underdeveloped Countries, (London 
Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1961) p.24. 
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However t h i s view of Nevin's seems to have a b a s i c f a u l t 
i n i t . I t seems to assume t h a t the promotion of growth 
and c a p i t a l formation i s somehow independent of the 
c o n t r o l and r e g u l a t i o n of c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s * , I t has 
been one of the contentions of t h i s t h e s i s that the 
s t r u c t u r e of the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r of the f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u -
ments generated by that s e c t o r can a f f e c t d i r e c t l y events 
in the r e a l s e c t o r and hence c e n t r a l bank c o n t r o l cannot 
be s a i d to be more important i n one respect than the 
other when the two are inter-dependent. Perhaps a more 
pragmatic view i s the one expressed by A s s e i l y i n a n a l y s i n g 
whether a C e n t r a l Bank was required i n Lebanon. He argues 
f i n a l l y t h a t i n terms of the t r a d i t i o n a l functions of a 
c e n t r a l bank, the new C e n t r a l Bank i n Lebanon had no more 
power than the a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d Banque de S y r i e et du 
Liban (BSL). However, the main b e n e f i t of the c r e a t i o n of 
the C e n t r a l Bank must be seen i n the f a c t t h a t f o r the 
f i r s t time a f i n a n c i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e was c l e a r l y defined, 
which i n the f u t u r e would have the power to a s s i s t i n the 
9 
f i n a n c i n g of economic development of the country. A s s e i l y 
came to these c o n c l u s i o n s almost as soon as the C e n t r a l 
Bank was c r e a t e d . Ten y e a r s on more emphasis can now be 
placed on the second aspect of h i s c o n c l u s i o n s . 
A.E. A s s e i l y , C e n t r a l Banking i n Lebanon, ( B e i r u t ; Khayat 
Book and P u b l i s h i n g Co. 1967), e s p e c i a l l y Chapter F i v e . 
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There do not appear to be any unique set of c r i t e r i a 
by which to judge the performance of a c e n t r a l bank. 
Most w r i t e r s when d i s c u s s i n g the r o l e s of c e n t r a l banks 
in developing economies appear to conclude that there a r e 
at l e a s t two r o l e s : ( i ) developmental and ( i i ) r e g u l a t o r y . 
We are of the view that these r o l e s cannot be separated 
e n t i r e l y and, t h e r e f o r e , i t i s not appropriate to judge 
the c e n t r a l bank as an agency f o r a s s i s t i n g i n the 
f i n a n c i n g of economic development, independently of i t s 
r o l e as a r e g u l a t o r of the f i n a n c i a l system. Quite 
c l e a r l y a c e n t r a l bank through the i s s u e of new f i n a n c i a l 
instruments can expand the t o t a l volume of f i n a n c i a l 
resources, but e q u a l l y f i n a n c i a l resources can be 
increased i n a r e g u l a t o r y fashion i f the c e n t r a l bank 
introduces new l e g a l c o n d i t i o n s which a r e conducive t o 
f i n a n c i a l growth. Bearing these b a s i c points i n mind, we 
are i n a p o s i t i o n to analyse more p r e c i s e l y the i n f l u e n c e s 
that the C e n t r a l Bank of Lebanon has had on the f i n a n c i a l 
s e c t o r s i n c e 1964. 
The problems faced by the new C e n t r a l Bank were 
numerous, but probably the most obvious was the unregulated 
growth of the banking s e c t o r s i n c e the mid 1950's. The 
Banking Secrecy Law, coupled with a minimum of r e s t r i c -
t i o n s on the development of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s r e s u l t e d 
in a rapid growth of banking i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Lebanon, as 
noted i n Chapter F i v e . 
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". . . I n the narrow c r e d i t market of Lebanon t h i s 
tended to produce an undue measure of competition, 
to s t r a i n the p r o f i t prospects of many banks, and, 
i n the absence of c o n t r o l , to s t e e r some of them i n t o 
unhealthy investment p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s . The 
acute competition and the supremacy of the f o r e i g n 
and f o r e i g n - c o n t r o l l e d banks prevented a number of 
banks - too small to be v i a b l e - from growing. The 
supply of q u a l i f i e d managers, e s p e c i a l l y at the top 
l e v e l s , f a i l e d to keep pace w i t h the ra p i d i n c r e a s e 
in the number of banks. As a r e s u l t , the q u a l i t y of 
management among the newly-emerging banks i n e v i t a b l y 
d e t e r i o r a t e d . . ."1° 
Given t h i s s i t u a t i o n , how can the system be regulated. 
One obvious point would be to impose r e s e r v e requirements 
on a l l banks, as the C e n t r a l Bank had the power to do 
under A r t i c l e 175 of the Monetary and C r e d i t Act. However 
there were two immediate drawbacks to t h i s type of regula-
t i o n . F i r s t l y i t was recognized t h a t the foreign banks 
were dominant i n the banking s e c t o r and t h a t a s p e c i f i c 
r e s e r v e r a t i o requirements would a f f e c t , adversely, the 
s m a l l e r l o c a l banks r a t h e r than the l a r g e r f o r e i g n banks, 
s i n c e i t was known th a t the f o r e i g n banks tended to have 
a more l i q u i d t o t a l a s s e t s p o r t f o l i o anyhow. Thus s p e c i f i c 
r e s e r v e r a t i o s might have the a f f e c t of squeezing out 
small indigenous banks, and i t was the C e n t r a l Bank's 
b e l i e f a t that time that the small indigenous banks were 
in need of p r o t e c t i o n r a t h e r than d e s t r u c t i o n . Secondly, 
the s t i p u l a t i o n s of the Banking Secrecy Law made i t 
S.A. Hoss, "The (Lebanese) Banking System s i n c e 1966", The 
Banker, January 1972, p.66. 
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extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r the C e n t r a l Bank to obtain a c c u r a t e 
information on the t o t a l a s s e t s s t r u c t u r e of the banking 
s e c t o r . P r i o r to the establishment of the C e n t r a l Bank, 
the A s s o c i a t i o n of Banks i n Lebanon had fought b i t t e r l y 
w i t h the M i n i s t r y of Finance to ensure t h a t the Banking 
Secrecy Law was not v i o l a t e d by the new C e n t r a l Bank 
l e g i s l a t i o n . The compromise that was reached was t h a t a 
separate Banking Control Commission should be s e t up to 
a c t as an i n s p e c t o r a t e of banks' a s s e t s ( A r t i c l e s 148-151). 
T h i s compromise meant t h a t the C e n t r a l Bank could not be 
f u l l y informed about the a s s e t s of the banks, s i n c e the 
c o n t r o l commission was an autonomous body w i t h i n the 
C e n t r a l Bank.1*" Thus the b a s i c information on which 
re s e r v e r a t i o s could have been s p e c i f i e d simply was not 
a v a i l a b l e . Even i f the information had been a v a i l a b l e a 
f u r t h e r problem e x i s t e d i n t h a t r e s e r v e r a t i o s were to be 
s p e c i f i e d on the b a s i s of Lebanese currency deposits 
( A r t i c l e 76), which presumably could have the e f f e c t of 
i n c r e a s i n g the banks' preference f o r f o r e i g n currency 
deposits, which obviously could have some e f f e c t on the 
forei g n exchange market as w e l l as the generation of 
domestic c r e d i t . Thus on a number of scores the imposition 
of s t r i c t r e s e r v e r a t i o s did not seem appropriate. 
A.E. A s s e i l y , op... _ c i t . , p.16-17. 
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Within the Monetary and C r e d i t Act, there were a 
number of a r t i c l e s which a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e g u l a r i z e d the 
banking system. These included new minimum c a p i t a l 
requirements f o r new banks (LL3 m i l l i o n ) and even the 
d i r e c t permission of the C e n t r a l Bank to open a new 
bank ( A r t i c l e 128). So the C e n t r a l Bank did have power 
to stop the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of banks; but had f a r l e s s 
power to deal, i n the short-term a t l e a s t , w ith the 
al r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d banks. 
I t could be argued t h a t those who dr a f t e d the 
Monetary and C r e d i t Act were not r e a l l y aware of the 
cond i t i o n s to which i t was to be app l i e d . I t i s c e r t a i n l y 
t r u e that complete information on the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
banking s e c t o r was not a v a i l a b l e ; but i t could a l s o be 
argued that l e g i s l a t o r s were conscious of the b e n e f i t s of 
a l a i s s e z - f a i r e banking system, which encouraged net 
c a p i t a l inflows and put B e i r u t a t the c e n t r e of the 
f i n a n c i a l map i n the Middle E a s t , and did not wish to 
ci r c u m s c r i b e i t s a c t i v i t i e s too much through l e g i s l a t i o n . 
As i s often the case, i t took a c r i s i s f o r people to 
r e a l i z e t h a t monetary c o n t r o l was v i t a l f o r the fu t u r e 
p r o s p e r i t y of the banking system. 
The I n t r a C r i s i s 
By the end of 1965, I n t r a Bank, e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1951, 
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was the l a r g e s t and the f a s t e s t growing bank i n Lebanon. 
I t achieved t h i s p o s i t i o n through a very a g g r e s s i v e 
campaign to secure deposits and an adventurous investment 
p o l i c y under the guidance of i t s founder, Youssef Beidas. 
The accounts of I n t r a ' s a f f a i r s i n p r i n t a r e now voluminous 
12 
and there i s no attempt here to add to the long l i s t . 
What we are concerned with i s the impact t h a t the I n t r a 
c l o s u r e had on monetary c o n t r o l , During 1966 I n t r a found 
i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to manage i t s h i g h l y d i v e r s i f i e d 
p o r t f o l i o of investments. By t h i s period i t had equity 
shareholdings i n nine i n d u s t r i a l concerns (6 Lebanese? 
2 French and 1 E n g l i s h ) ,- ten banks (4 Lebanese; 3 B r a z i l i a n , 
1 Nigerian, 1 Swiss and 1 i n Dubai); s i x t e e n r e a l e s t a t e 
and insurance companies (4 Lebanese, 8 French, 3 Swiss 
and 1 E n g l i s h ) ; nine t o u r i s t and communications companies 
(8 Lebanese, 3 E n g l i s h , 2 French, 2 Swiss and 1 I r a q i ) . 
I n Lebanon i t had a majority shareholding i n Middle E a s t 
A i r l i n e s , the B e i r u t port a u t h o r i t y , and many companies 
dealing i n l i g h t manufacturing, h o t e l s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
radio communications, l i c e n s e d gambling, t e l e v i s i o n 
broadcasting, manufacturing of c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s , 
heavy c o n t r a c t i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n , banking, insurance, 
shipping and r e a l e s t a t e . Thus on the a s s e t s s i d e I n t r a 
I n p a r t i c u l a r the comprehensive report to the Chairman 
of I n t r a Bank by Kidder, Peabody and Co. Ltd., December 1969. 
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had b u i l t up a very complex i l l i q u i d p o r t f o l i o , which 
required c o n s i d e r a b l e management s k i l l s to maintain i t s 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . On the l i a b i l i t i e s s i d e I n t r a Bank was 
very a c t i v e i n s e c u r i n g deposits in the Arabian Gulf, 
e s p e c i a l l y from Kuwait, I n order to maintain a high 
growth r a t e on deposits, i n t e r e s t r a t e s on savings account-
went as high as 9%, when comparable r a t e s i n other banks 
13 
were in the 3% - 6% range. Thus a b a s i c imbalance was 
s t r u c k between a p o r t f o l i o of long-term i l l i q u i d i n v e s t -
ments and a p o r t f o l i o of short-term, v o l a t i l e deposits 
( v o l a t i l e i n the sense t h a t a. s h i f t i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s i n , 
say, European markets would cause l a r g e w i t h d r a w a l s ) . 
Given t h i s s i t u a t i o n i t only took the s m a l l e s t rumours 
about managerial i n e f f i c i e n c y to cause a run on the bank 
and on October 14th 1966 I n t r a suspended i t s payments. 
Both before the c r i s i s and immediately afterwards I n t r a 
Bank requested no a s s i s t a n c e from the C e n t r a l Bank. I t 
i s l a r g e l y assumed t h a t no requests were made simply 
because Beidas, as chairman of I n t r a , did not approve of 
the s e t t i n g up of the C e n t r a l Bank. The immediate conse-
quences of the I n t r a c o l l a p s e were an outflow of funds 
from a l l l o c a l banks and a net gain by foreign banks as 
people s h i f t e d deposits int o what were considered " s a f e r " 
T his was one of the f a c t s uncovered by the Kidder, Peabody 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
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banks. Again, the amount of information a v a i l a b l e to the 
C e n t r a l Bank on the p r e c i s e degree of i l l i q u i d i t y i n 
each bank was very l i m i t e d and hence the amount of 
a s s i s t a n c e that the C e n t r a l Bank was able to give was 
a l s o l i m i t e d . 
Temporary arrangements concerning the drawing r i g h t s 
of I n t r a depositors were e s t a b l i s h e d by the C e n t r a l Bank 
and i n May 1967 a package of measures were brought forward 
to deal w i t h the wider-ranging long-term problems of the 
14 
whole of the banking s e c t o r . Two major weapons were 
added to the C e n t r a l Bank armoury by t h i s new l e g i s l a t i o n : 
the Banking Control Commission and the Higher Banking 
Commission. The Banking Control Commission was given the 
t a s k of s u p e r v i s i n g the day to day a c t i v i t i e s of a l l the 
commercial banks and i m p l i c i t i n t h i s move was t h a t more 
d e t a i l e d information on banking a c t i v i t i e s would have to 
be fur n i s h e d by the banks to the Control Commission. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Control Commission was required to 
reg u l a t e a l l banks with regard to t h e i r l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n ; 
t h e i r general solvency and t h e i r compliance with e x i s t i n g 
r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s governing the banking sector.''" 5 The 
Control Commission had d i r e c t a c c e s s to the Higher Banking 
14. The l e g i s l a t i o n c o n s i s t e d of a s e r i e s of amendments to 
the Monetary and C r e d i t Act (Law No. 28167) 
15. S. Hoss, op. c i t . , p.67. 
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16 Commission, who had the u l t i m a t e power to reduce or 
i n c r e a s e C e n t r a l Bank f a c i l i t i e s to i n d i v i d u a l banks, to 
ban s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s , to appoint a c o n t r o l l e r to an 
i n d i v i d u a l bank or, even, s t r i k e a bank o f f the l i s t of 
approved banks. Looking into the future the Higher 
Banking Commission a l s o had the task c f c o n s o l i d a t i n g 
the banking p o s i t i o n over an eighteen-month period, i . e . 
to the end of 1968. They had the powers to suggest 
c l o s u r e s , voluntary l i q u i d a t i o n s and mergers, based on 
the a d vice of the Control Commission. 
I f a bank was deemed to be non-viable i t could be 
taken over by the Higher Banking Commission and placed i n 
the hands of the Banque de C r e d i t Agricole, I n d u s t r i e l 
et F o n c i e r (B.C.A.I.F.) who then l i q u i d a t e d a l l a s s e t s 
and paid o f f a l l l i a b i l i t i e s on the behalf of the govern-
ment. Thus B.C.A.I.F. became the r e c i p i e n t of ten banks 
17 
i n t h i s fashion by the end of 1968. Voluntary l i q u i d a -
t i o n got r i d of four f u r t h e r banks. The bank merger p o l i c y 
16. T h i s c o n s i s t e d of the Governor of the C e n t r a l Bank; one 
Deputy-Governor; the d i r e c t o r - g e n e r a l of the M i n i s t r y of 
Finance; one member of the Control Commission (nominated 
by the A s s o c i a t i o n of Banks i n Lebanon), the President of 
the Deposit Insurance Organization and a judge. 
17. These banks were Banque de i'Economie Arabe; the National 
Co-operative Bank; the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Arab Bank; Bank of 
Lebanon and the Middle E a s t ; Lombard Bank Lebanon; the 
P r o f e s s i o n a l C r e d i t Bank; C r e d i t Hypothecaire L i b a n a i s ; 
Banque Al-Ahli; the Union National Bank and the Banque 
d'Epargne. These ten banks had t o t a l a s s e t s amounting to 
about LL400 m i l l i o n on take-over. 
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was not s u c c e s s f u l s i n c e t h e major aspect o f t h e p o l i c y 
t a x exemptions f o r merging banks, where one o f t h e banks 
had a c a p i t a l i s a t i o n o f l e s s t h a n LL3 m i l l i o n , h a r d l y had 
any a f f e c t on s m a l l banks who ware n o t p r o f i t a b l e o r 
l a r g e r banks, who might have been encouraged t o merge; 
b u t found no i n c e n t i v e s i n t h e l e g i s l a t i o n t o do so. 
However, t h e l e g i s l a t i o n o f May 1967 d i d g e t r i d o f 
j 
f o u r t e e n s m a l l banks and encouraged a f u r t h e r two t o merge 
I n a d d i t i o n t h e C e n t r a l Bank imposed a f i v e y e a r ban on 
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f new banks (which e x p l a i n s why j o i n t -
p a r t i c i p a t i o n banks have become so i m p o r t a n t i n t h e l a s t 
seven y e a r s ) and i n t r o d u c e d a d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e scheme. 
The N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r D e p o s i t I n s u r a n c e 
The c r e a t i o n o f a d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e system by t h e 
C e n t r a l Bank was i n t e n d e d t o a t t a c k t h e b a s i c problem o f 
l a c k o f c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e b a n k i n g system. The b a s i c 
advantage o f a d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e system i s t h a t i t tends 
t o s t o p t h e "wave" e f f e c t s o f i n d i v i d u a l bank c l o s u r e s . 
I f , t h r o u g h a d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e scheme, an i n d i v i d u a l 
bank's i n s o l v e n c y can be p r e v e n t e d from a f f e c t i n g o t h e r 
banks, t h e n c o n f i d e n c e can be m a i n t a i n e d i n t h e o t h e r 
p a r t s o f t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r . Secondly, and t h i s i s 
i m p o r t a n t i n t h e Lebanese c o n t e x t , d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e 
schemes t e n d t o i n c r e a s e t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f d e p o s i t i n g 
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i n l o c a l banks. I t i s o f t e n a s s e r t e d t h a t f o r e i g n banks 
j 
secure d e p o s i t s on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e i r l a r g e f o r e i g n 
a s s e t s a c t as a s o r t o f i n s u r a n c e on t h e d e p o s i t . I f 
l o c a l banks a r e a b l e t o o f f e r an i n s u r a n c e system, t h e n 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r advantage t h e f o r e i g n banks may have i s 
r e d u c e d - ^ 
D e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e schemes a r e r e p u t e d t o have a number 
o f advantages f o r d e v e l o p i n g banking systems. As was 
o u t 
p o i n t e d / i n I n d i a a t t h e t i m e o f t h a t c o u n t r y ' s acceptance 
o f an i n s u r a n c e scheme, 
"I n s u r a n c e o f bank d e p o s i t s i s i n t e n d e d t o g i v e a 
measure o f p r o t e c t i o n t o d e p o s i t o r s , i n p a r t i c u l a r 
t h e s m a l l d e p o s i t o r , from t h e r i s k o f l o s s o f 
t h e i r s a v i n g s i n t h e event o f a bank's i n a b i l i t y t o 
meet i t s l i a b i l i t i e s . Such p r o t e c t i o n i n c r e a s e s t h e 
c o n f i d e n c e o f d e p o s i t o r s , reduces t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f 
p a n i c k y w i t h d r a w a l s and g e n e r a l l y c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e 
s t a b i l i t y and o r d e r l y g r o w t h o f t h e b a n k i n g system 
as a whole . . . . and t h e r e b y t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n o f 
t h e s a v i n g s o f t h e people, r i c h and poor . . ."19 
So d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e does not o n l y have n e g a t i v e aspects 
t o i t ( p r e v e n t i n g p a n i c ) b u t a l s o p o s i t i v e aspects t o i t 
( i n c r e a s i n g c o n f i d e n c e , p r o m o t i n g t h e g r o w t h o f f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n c r e a s i n g t h e f l e x i b i l i t y o f monetary 
20 
p o l i c y ) . Given t h e s e advantages o f d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e 
18. J.A. M a r l i n , "Deposit I n s u r a n c e i n Lebanon", p r i v a t e l y 
c i r c u l a t e d paper, J u l y 1968. 
19„ " E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e D e p o s i t I n s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n " , 
Reserve Bank o f I n d i a B u l l e t i n . December 1961, p . l . 
20. J.A. M a r l i n , "Deposit I n s u r a n c e Around t h e World", 
p r i v a t e l y c i r c u l a t e d paper, J u l y 1968. 
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i t i s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t o n l y t h e U.S.A., Canada and I n d i a 
had implemented schemes p r i o r t o t h e one i n Lebanon. The 
c r u c i a l f a c t o r seems t o be how e x t e n s i v e t h e i n s u r a n c e 
s h o u l d be. The amendments t o t h e Monetary and C r e d i t 
Act i n 1967 s e t up a N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r D e p o s i t 
In s u r a n c e , owned e q u a l l y by t h e government o f Lebanon 
and t h e banks. Each bank holds a LL100,000 share i n t h e 
company and pays an annual f e e , computed on t h e b a s i s o f 
i t s t o t a l d e p o s i t s . The ensuing t o t a l i s t h e n matched by 
a government c o n t r i b u t i o n . A l l d e p o s i t s up t o a v a l u e o f 
LL30,000 a r e i n s u r e d under t h e scheme. The system i s 
c o n t r o l l e d by a ten-man d i r e c t o r a t e (seven from t h e banks, 
t h r e e from t h e government); b u t t h e r e a r e some doubts 
about how t h e b a n k i n g w i l l r e a c t t o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f 
t h e p r i v a t e banks " s i t t i n g i n judgement" as i t were on 
o t h e r banks. The d e p o s i t i n s u r a n c e system has h a r d l y 
been t e s t e d s i n c e i t was e s t a b l i s h e d , so i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o say what b e n e f i t s i t has had. W h i l s t t h e r e may have 
been no d i r e c t b e n e f i t s , t h e r e has p r o b a b l y been a number 
o f i n d i r e c t b e n e f i t s , p r i m a r y among th e s e b e i n g t h e 
s u b j e c t i v e c o n f i d e n c e f e l t i n t h e b a n k i n g system as a 
whole. 
Monetary C o n t r o l Since 1967 
The I n t r a c r i s i s o f 1966 and t h e package o f measures 
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i n 1968 showed how weak t h e o r i g i n a l Monetary and C r e d i t 
Act was, w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d t h e C e n t r a l Bank. I t was o n l y 
when t h e C e n t r a l Bank demonstrated t o t h e government how 
weak i t s p o s i t i o n was i n t h e f a c e o f major c r i s e s l i k e 
I n t r a , t h a t new l e g i s l a t i o n was d r a f t e d t o improve 
c o n t r o l . The monetary c o n t r o l t h a t has been d i s c u s s e d 
so f a r has been l a r g e l y o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e k i n d . Law 28/67 
r e a l l y c o n t a i n e d a number o f " o n c e - a n d - f o r - a l l " measures 
designed t o secure a sound base f o r t h e Lebanese b a n k i n g 
system. We now need t o go on and l o o k more c l o s e l y a t t h e 
monetary c o n t r o l t h a t t h e C e n t r a l Bank has been a b l e t o 
e x e r c i s e o v e r t h e b a n k i n g system on a c o n t i n u i n g b a s i s . 
F i r s t amongst t h e s e c o n t r o l s a r e r e s e r v e r a t i o s . 
The o r i g i n a l Monetary and C r e d i t A ct gave t h e C e n t r a l 
Bank power t o impose l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s on t h e banks? 
b u t t h e p r e c i s e a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s t o be assessed i n 
d e t e r m i n i n g such r a t i o s were never s p e c i f i e d . E q u a l l y , w i t 
ve r y l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o t h e C e n t r a l Bank 
p r i o r t o 1967 on t h e a s s e t s / l i a b i l i t i e s s t r u c t u r e o f t h e 
banking system, t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s was a 
f u t i l e t a s k . However, i n June 1969 t h e C e n t r a l Bank 
r e q u i r e d a l l banks t o d e p o s i t 5% o f t h e i r cash ( i n 
Lebanese pounds) i n t h e C e n t r a l Bank, r a i s e d t o 1% i n 
1 9 7 2 . 2 1 * 
I n some sense t h i s i s analogous t o t h e s p e c i a l d e p o s i t 
scheme i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, a l t h o u g h t h e reasons f o r 
i n s t i t u t i n g t h e scheme a r e r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t . 
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A f u r t h e r s e t o f amendments t o t h e Monetary and C r e d i t 
Act approved i n October 1973, i n c r e a s e d t h e powers o f 
t h e C e n t r a l Bank t o e s t a b l i s h mandatory l i q u i d r e s e r v e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s ; b u t so f a r t h i s measure has not been a c t e d 
upon. The advantages o f a c h i e v i n g some c o n s i s t e n t 
d e f i n i t i o n o f l i q u i d r e s e r v e s f o r t h e b a n k i n g system a r e 
many. However p r i m a r y amongst them i s t h e f a c t t h a t 
mandatory r e s e r v e r e q u i r e m e n t s , e s p e c i a l l y i f each bank 
h o l d s t h e minimum r e q u i r e d # makes o t h e r C e n t r a l Bank 
p o l i c i e s more easy t o a f f e c t . I f a bank h o l d s excess 
l i q u i d a s s e t s and the C e n t r a l Bank a t t e m p t s t o decrease 
domestic c r e d i t t h r o u g h open market o p e r a t i o n s , t h e n t h i s 
p o l i c y may not have any a f f e c t on domestic c r e d i t , i f . 
t h e banks as a whole choose t o run-down t h e i r l i q u i d 
r e s e r v e s . C l e a r l y t h e r e i s a l i m i t t o how o f t e n t h i s can 
be done; b u t i f t o t a l government debt i n s t r u m e n t s a r e 
l i m i t e d i t may be s u f f i c i e n t t o make t h e r e s t r i c t i o n a r y 
22 
p o l i c y a b o r t i v e . E q u a l l y , mandatory r e s e r v e r e q u i r e m e n t s 
would reduce t h e s u b j e c t i v e view o f what l e v e l o f l i q u i d i t y 
i s necessary i n an u n r e g u l a t e d banking system (as 
demonstrated i n Chapter S i x ) and hence would i n c r e a s e 
t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r expanding domestic c r e d i t . 
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f l e g a l r e s e r v e r a t i o s i s not an 
end i n i t s e l f . I t i s a means by w h i c h a C e n t r a l Bank 
A.B. Cramp, Monetary Management; P r i n c i p l e s and P r a c t i c e , 
S t u d i e s i n Economics No. 6 ( e d i t e d by C. C a r t e r ) , (Londons 
George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1971) p.59. 
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a t t e m p t s t o c r e a t e a more r e g u l a t e d f i n a n c i a l system. I n 
t h e case o f Lebanon, l e g a l r e s e r v e r e q u i r e m e n t s m i g h t 
have t h e a f f e c t o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between f o r e i g n banks 
and l o c a l banks. I t i s well-known (and p a r t l y e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n a f a c t u a l manner i n Chapter S i x ) t h a t t h e l o c a l banks 
a r e g e n e r a l l y l e s s l i q u i d t h a n t h e f o r e i g n banks and hence 
l i q u i d r e s e r v e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e g o i n g t o show up weaknesses 
i n t h e i n d i g e n o u s banks b e f o r e t h e y a f f e c t t h e f o r e i g n 
banks. I t i s p r o b a b l y f o r t h i s reason more t h a n any 
o t h e r t h a t t h e C e n t r a l Bank has adopted a c a u t i o u s approach 
t o t h i s q u e s t i o n o f l e g a l r e s e r v e r e q u i r e m e n t s . Secondly 
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a t u r e o f b a n k i n g i n B e i r u t makes i t 
v e r y d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e C e n t r a l Bank t o d e f i n e p r e c i s e l y 
what e l i g i b l e a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s s h o u l d be. There 
i s s i m p l y t h e problem o f how you t r e a t t h e v e r y l a r g e 
f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t element i n t o t a l d e p o s i t s . 
Thus w i t h t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f l i q u i d i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s 
s t i l l t a x i n g t h e C e n t r a l Bank, t h e Bank i s unable t o move 
i n t o o t h e r areas o f monetary c o n t r o l such as t h e c o n t r o l 
o f i n t e r e s t r a t e s o r t h e c o n t r o l o f p u b l i c debt o p e r a t i o n s . 
T h i s serves t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e p o i n t made e a r l i e r i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r t h a t t h e r e i s an inter-dependence between t h e 
c o n t r o l o f c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r o l e o f t h e C e n t r a l 
Bank i n t h e p r o m o t i o n o f economic development. Monetary 
c o n t r o l i n Lebanon has l a r g e l y developed out o f a number 
o f ad hoc p o l i c i e s by t h e government t o c o u n t e r a c t a 
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s e r i e s o f f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n t h e system, u s i n g t h e 1963 
Monetary and C r e d i t Act as a base. There i s no doubt 
t h a t t h e presence o f t h e C e n t r a l Bank has had a r e g u l a t i n g 
e f f e c t on t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r ; b u t so f a r i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o see what permanent e f f e c t s t h e C e n t r a l Bank has had on 
t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r t o g e n e r a t e funds f o r 
development w i t h i n Lebanon. I t i s t o t h i s q u e s t i o n o f t h e 
p r o v i s i o n o f f i n a n c e t h a t we now t u r n i n Chapter Nine. 
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C H A P T E R N I N E 
The F i n a n c i n g o f Development i n Lebanon 
One o f t h e b a s i c p o i n t s t h a t has been e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
t h i s t h e s i s i s t h a t t h e arrangements o r i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t 
e x i s t by which savings a r e c o n v e r t e d i n t o l o a n a b l e funds 
a v a i l a b l e f o r investment w i l l d etermine how e f f e c t i v e a 
g i v e n volume o f savin g s i s i n terms o f c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n . 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , emphasis has been l a i d on a number o f 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s , such as t h e narrowness o f t h e 
domestic market, t h e d u a l n a t u r e o f t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e 
s t r u c t u r e , t h e e x i s t e n c e o r n o n - e x i s t e n c e o f c a p i t a l 
markets t o name a few. I n a d d i t i o n i t has a l s o been 
demonstrated t h a t monetary c o n t r o l t h r o u g h t h e C e n t r a l 
Bank can have an e f f e c t on t h e " e f f i c i e n c y " o f any 
g i v e n f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . T h i s c h a p t e r b r i n g s t o g e t h e r 
t h e numerous p o i n t s t h a t have been made i n p r e v i o u s 
c h a p t e r s t o see what e f f e c t s d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e s 
and f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u m e n t s may have on economic develop-
ment . 
H i c k s , i n d i s c u s s i n g some o f t h e monetary aspects o f 
gr o w t h processes, p o i n t s t o t h e importance o f f i n a n c i a l 
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i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n t h a t t h e y , t h r o u g h a c q u i r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , 
a r e a b l e t o narrow t h e margins between l e n d i n g and 
b o r r o w i n g r a t e s , such t h a t a g i v e n volume o f savi n g s i s 
more p r o d u c t i v e t h a n i n an i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e s i t u a t i o n . 
H i c k s goes on t o say, 
" . . . The b e g i n n i n g o f a process o f expansion . . . 
might occur because o f r e a l f a c t o r s . . . r a i s i n g 
t h e r e a l . . . r a t e o f p r o f i t . But i t might a l s o 
occur because o f f i n a n c i a l improvements, d i m i n i s h i n g 
t h e s i z e o f o u r 'gap'; t h e r e b y p e r m i t t i n g access 
t o funds f o r improvements whi c h c o u l d have been 
made e a r l i e r , i f t h e necessary funds had been f o r t h -
coming. I t i s n o t sa v i n g s o n l y t h a t a r e r e q u i r e d , 
b u t a channel o f communication between p o t e n t i a l 
s a v i n g s and p o t e n t i a l r e a l i n v e s t m e n t . . . 
I t i s t h i s "channel o f communication", as Hicks r e f e r s t o 
i t , w h i c h we can v i s u a l i z e as our f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r . T h i s 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r c o n s i s t s o f a number o f f i n a n c i a l i n t e r -
m e d i a r i e s , g e n e r a t i n g f i n a n c i a l i n s t r u m e n t s c o n t r o l l e d , i n 
some sense by a monetary a u t h o r i t y . I t i s t h e i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s e t h r e e , as d e f i n e d i n v a r i o u s 
ways i n t h e p r e c e d i n g e i g h t c h a p t e r s , w h i c h w i l l d e t ermine 
t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f any g i v e n volume o f savi n g s i n terms o f 
a f i n a l amount o f c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n . 
We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t by c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a , i t 
c o u l d be argued t h a t Lebanon possesses a mature f i n a n c i a l 
system, i n t h a t t h e f i n a n c i a l i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s r a t i o (F.I.R.) 
i s i n excess o f u n i t y . E q u a l l y we have seen, on Ku r o s a k i ' s 
J. H i c k s , C a p i t a l and Growth, (London: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, 1969) p.290 n. 
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c r i t e r i a , Lebanon has many o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f an 
under-developed f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e . A major aspect o f 
t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f a n a l y s i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l o f t h e Lebanese 
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r i s t h e f a c t t h a t d e p o s i t s i n t h e b a n k i n g 
system a r e p r e d o m i n a n t l y i n f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s and t h e 
uses made o f i n s u r a n c e f a c i l i t i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , a r e 
l a r g e l y exogenous t o t h e domestic economy. Thus t h e 
f i n a n c i a l c a p a b i l i t y o f t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r perhaps ought 
t o be measured i n terms o f domestic c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t s o r , 
perhaps, a l l d e p o s i t s h e l d by r e s i d e n t s . I f t h e f o r m e r 
measure i s used t o t a l d e p o s i t s i n mid-1974 would amount t o 
LL2469 m i l l i o n o r on t h e l a t t e r measure LL6646 m i l l i o n 
( t a k i n g 85% o f a l l d e p o s i t s t o be owned by Lebanese: 
2 
t h i s i s t h e f i g u r e used by t h e C e n t r a l Bank i n 1973 ) . I n 
b o t h cases t h e F.I.R. drops c o n s i d e r a b l y ; t o 0.4 i n t h e 
f i r s t p l a c e and about u n i t y i n t h e second. However, t h e r e 
does seem t o be evidence t h a t t h e growth o f t o t a l d e p o s i t s 
( i n c l u d i n g f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t s ) has been p a r a l l e l e d 
by an equal g r o w t h o f advances. Now i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t 
t h e growth o f advances has been based s o l e l y on l o c a l 
c u r r e n c y d e p o s i t s ; w h i c h would have l e d t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
l o s s i n l i q u i d i t y , as suggested i n c h a p t e r seven. As t h e 
C e n t r a l Bank has not been a c t i v e i n w i n d i n g up a l o t o f 
banks over t h e l a s t few years and has i n f a c t imposed 
2, Banque du L i b a n , Rapport s u r 1'Annee. 1573. 
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more s t r i n g e n t l i q u i d i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s on t h e f i n a n c i a l 
s e c t o r , t h e n i t must be assumed t h a t some domestic c r e d i t 
t 
expansion has t a k e n p l a c e on t h e b a s i s o f f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y 
d e p o s i t s . 
One q u e s t i o n t h a t has not been answered i s whether 
t h e expansion i n advances r e p r e s e n t s t h e t o t a l demand f o r 
l o a n a b l e funds, o r whether t h e r e i s , i n some sense, an 
u n s a t i s f i e d demand f o r f i n a n c e ; a demand w h i c h i s 
u n s a t i s f i e d because o f s t r i c t u r e s w i t h i n t h e f i n a n c i a l 
i 
system. We can see, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t any f i n a n c i a l system 
' 3 may be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y g r o w t h - i n d u c e d o r g r o w t h - i n d u c i n g . 
A g r o w t h - i n d u c e d f i n a n c i a l system i m p l i e s t h a t t h e f i n a n c i a l 
system responds t o demands put upon i t . Such a system may 
be r e f e r r e d t o as a demand-pulling one. I n t h i s case t h e 
t 
f i n a n c i a l system may behave i n v a r i a n t l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o 
g r o w t h i n r e a l o u t p u t o r may i n f a c t i n h i b i t g r o w t h i n 
r e a l o u t p u t . I n t h i s second case i t i s assumed t h a t t h e 
demands put upon t h e f i n a n c i a l system i n f a c t cannot be 
met and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s an element o f u n s a t i s f i e d 
demand. I n t h i s way e n t r e p r e n e u r s w i s h i n g t o expand o u t p u t 
i n c e r t a i n s e c t o r s may f i n d t h a t t h e necessary f i n a n c i a l 
s e r v i c e s a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e expansion 
may be a b o r t i v e . As we have seen, t h e reasons f o r t h i s 
non a v a i l a b i l i t y o f f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s may be many. 
i 
P a r t o f t h i s a n a l y s i s i s based on t h a t p r e s e n t e d by 
H.T. P a t r i c k , " F i n a n c i a l Development and Economic Growth 
i n Underdeveloped C o u n t r i e s " , Economic Development and 
C u l t u r a l Change. V o l . 14, No. 1, January 1966. 
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R e s t r i c t i v e b a n k i n g l e g i s l a t i o n may n o t a l l o w f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o expand a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r a t e . There 
may be a demand f o r l o n g - t e r m loans by e n t r e p r e n e u r s 
w h i c h f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s cannot meet due t o t h e h i g h 
r i s k and i l l i q u i d i t y problems. I n t h i s c o n t e x t i t i s 
i m p o r t a n t t o no t e t h e emphasis p l a c e d by many development 
economists on t h e c r e a t i o n o f development banks t o 
p r o v i d e l o n g - t e r m f i n a n c e t o i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e . 
Such development banks n o r m a l l y r e q u i r e government s u p p o r t 
f o r t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and may not develop i n c o u n t r i e s 
where t h e government wishes t o adopt a n e u t r a l r o l e i n 
development. F i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s may not be a b l e t o 
m o b i l i z e i n d i v i d u a l s avings a t a s u f f i c i e n t r a t e t o keep 
up w i t h e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l demand. I n t h i s case some 
r a t i o n i n g procedure w i l l be r e q u i r e d , e i t h e r t h r o u g h 
r a i s i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s o r r e s t r i c t i n g loans t o t h e ve r y 
s h o r t term. I n e i t h e r case t h e r a t e o f investment w i l l 
be Slowed down w i t h a consequent r e d u c t i o n i n r e a l economic 
g r o w t h . F i n a l l y a problem w h i c h i s v e r y r e l e v a n t i n t h e 
M i d d l e East i s t h e a t t i t u d e o f Muslims t o i n t e r e s t charges. 
When usury i s a g a i n s t r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e s t h i s may i n h i b i t 
t h e g r o w t h o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and u l t i m a t e l y r e a l 
o u t p u t . A l t h o u g h t h i s i s a problem i n t h e Mi d d l e East i t 
appears not t o be i m p o r t a n t i n Lebanon. A g r o w t h - i n d u c i n g 
f i n a n c i a l system i s a system w h i c h a c t i v e l y i n f l u e n c e s t h e 
p a t t e r n o f i n v e s t m e n t i n an economy and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e 
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c o m p o s i t i o n o f f i n a l o u t p u t . Again such a s i t u a t i o n may 
be r e f e r r e d t o as a s u p p l y - p u s h i n g one. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n 
t h e f i n a n c i a l system may have two r o l e s : t o d i v e r t 
r e sources from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t o modern s e c t o r s ; and 
a c t i v e l y t o s t i m u l a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s i n t h i s s e c t o r t o 
t a k e up a l l t h e loans t h a t a r e on o f f e r . A l l t h i s i m p l i e s 
i 
t h a t t h e f i n a n c i a l system i s a b l e t o p r o v i d e a l l t h e 
s e r v i c e s .entrepreneurs may r e q u i r e b e f o r e t h e s e s e r v i c e s 
a r e c a l l e d upon. This s l i g h t l y unusual s i t u a t i o n may be 
d e s c r i b e d i n two d i f f e r e n t ways. F i r s t l y a f i n a n c i a l 
system may develop i n response t o demands p u t upon i t by, 
say, t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . The r a t e o f savings i n 
t h i s s e c t o r may be s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e f o r f i n a n c i a l i n s t i -
t u t i o n s t o be a b l e t o o f f e r a d d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s 
t o t h e nascent i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . The o p p o r t u n i t y o f 
a v a i l a b l e f i n a n c e may encourage e n t r e p r e n e u r s i n t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r t o r e v i s e t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t p l a n s i n an 
upward d i r e c t i o n hence p r o v i d i n g a more p o s i t i v e impetus 
t o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . 
Secondly t h e f i n a n c i a l system may a c q u i r e funds w h i c h 
a r e v e r y much i n excess o f t h e p r e s e n t investment o u t l e t s . 
I n t h i s case t h e f i n a n c i a l system w i l l expand w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o t h e funds d e p o s i t e d i n t o i t ? b u t may f i n d i n s u f f i c i e n t 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o loan t h e money i n t e r n a l l y . I t c o u l d be 
argued t h a t t h i s i s t r u e o f Lebanon toda y ; t h a t t h e f i n a n c i a l 
f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e i n B e i r u t encourage a r e g i o n a l i n f l o w 
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o f funds i n excess o f t h e domestic economy's a b s o r p t i v e 
c a p a c i t y . I n t h i s case t h e banks move funds i n t o overseas 
4 
markets. However as t h e domestic a b s o r p t i v e c a p a c i t y 
o f t h e economy expands, t h e n more demands w i l l be p ut on 
t h e f i n a n c i a l system r e q u i r i n g a s w i t c h i n g back from 
overseas markets t o domestic markets. However i f domestic 
markets t e n d t o o f f e r l o n g - t e r m low p r o f i t a b i l i t y p r o j e c t s 
and overseas markets o f f e r s h o r t - t e r m h i g h p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
a s s e t s , t h e n t h i s s w i t c h i n g back w i l l not occur. I t 
appears as though Lebanon i s i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h i s t y p e 
o f s c e n a r i o . The i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n can now 
be d i s c u s s e d more f u l l y i n terms o f t h e Lebanese Six-Year 
Development Plan, 1972-1977. 
The Lebanese Six-Year Development Plan c a l l s f o r a 
7% r e a l g rowth i n gross domestic p r o d u c t from 1972 t o 1977. 
The o v e r a l l investment r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e Plan i s 
LL7,200 m i l l i o n i n 1969 p r i c e s , o u t o f whi c h 24% w i l l be 
p u b l i c s e c t o r i n v e s t m e n t s . To a c h i e v e t h e 7% g l o b a l g r o w t h 
t a r g e t r e q u i r e s an annual i n v e s t m e n t i n p u t o f 18% o f 
5 
G.D.P. I n f a c t i n vestment averaged 2 1 % per annum over 
4. J.N. B r i d g e , " F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e and Development i n Saudi-
A r a b i a " , Proceedings o f t h e Seminar f o r A r a b i a n S t u d i e s , 
V o l . 4, 1974. pp.10-17. 
5. U n i t e d N a t i o n s Economic and S o c i a l O f f i c e i n B e i r u t , 
(UNESOB), The Lebanese "Six-Year Development Plan 
1972-1977" ; An Assessment, O c c a s i o n a l Paper No. 2, 
B e i r u t : March 1973, p.13. 
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t h e 1964-1969 p e r i o d . T h i s i m p l i e s a f a l l i n t h e gross 
m a r g i n a l c a p i t a l - o u t p u t r a t i o from 4.50 fro m 1964-1969 
t o 2.55 from 1972-1977. However UNESOB suggest t h a t as 
most p r o j e c t s i n t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r i n v e s t m e n t programme 
appear t o have a h i g h gross m a r g i n a l c a p i t a l - o u t p u t r a t i o ; 
t h e n t h i s p r e d i c t e d f a l l i s p r o b a b l y t o o o p t i m i s t i c . I f 
a gross m a r g i n a l c a p i t a l o u t p u t r a t i o o f 3.00 i s assumed 
t h e n investment must average 2 1 % o f G.D.P. f o r t h e 1972-1977 
p e r i o d . We can l o o k a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s t o t a l 
i nvestment programme f o r t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r b o t h i n 
terms o f p u b l i c i n v e s t m e n t and p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t . 
The p u b l i c s e c t o r i s expected t o i n v e s t LL1,740 m i l l i o n 
from 1972-1977, o r an average o f LL290 m i l l i o n per annum -
t o t a l budgeted e x p e n d i t u r e i n 1971 amounted to-LL774 m i l l i o n , 
o f w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e l y LL100 m i l l i o n c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d 
7 
as investment e x p e n d i t u r e s . I t i s v e r y u n l i k e l y t h a t 
t h i s r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n p u b l i c s e c t o r i n v e s t m e n t necessary 
t o meet t h e Plan's t a r g e t s can be f i n a n c e d t h r o u g h d i r e c t 
revenues. The i n e f f i c i e n c i e s o f t h e d i r e c t t a x a t i o n system 
i n Lebanon a r e well-known, and, p o l i t i c a l l y , i n d i r e c t t a x e s 
8 
a r e d i f f i c u l t t o r a i s e . T h i s means t h a t t h e in v e s t m e n t 
programme w i l l have t o be f i n a n c e d t h r o u g h a b o r r o w i n g 
6- I b i d . , p.13. 
7. M i n i s t r y o f P l a n n i n g , Budget Est i m a t e s 1972. 
8. I n p a r t i c u l a r Dr. Saba, as M i n i s t e r o f Finance, a t t e m p t e d 
t o i n c r e a s e customs d u t i e s t o r a i s e LL6 5 m i l l i o n i n revenues 
i n 1971 and had t o w i t h d r a w h i s measures as i t . r e s u l t e d i n 
a s e r i e s o f s t r i k e s and b o y c o t t s . 
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programme. Lebanon has a l r e a d y had r e c o u r s e t o o t h e r 
Arab sources f o r investment f i n a n c e and, i n t e r n a l l y , t h e 
Treasury b o r r o w i n g l i m i t has been r a i s e d t o LL200 m i l l i o n ; 
b u t i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e necessary i n c r e a s e i n funds 
can be expected t o come d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e s e sources. 
Here t h e r o l e o f t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r can be analysed. 
One obvious p o i n t i s t h a t t h e government c o u l d i n c r e a s e 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y i t s b o r r o w i n g r e q u i r e m e n t by i s s u i n g s e c u r i t i e s 
t o t h e p u b l i c t h r o u g h t h e banking system. A t p r e s e n t 
e s t i m a t e s t h i s c o u l d i n v o l v e up t o LL200 m i l l i o n p er annum, 
almost t w i c e t h e o u t s t a n d i n g volume o f t r e a s u r y b i l l s i n 
e x i s t e n c e . However, f o r such b o r r o w i n g t o be s u c c e s s f u l , 
t h e s e c u r i t i e s have t o be o f f e r e d a t r a t e s w h i c h a r e 
c o m p e t i t i v e w i t h r a t e s i n s h o r t - t e r m markets. E q u a l l y 
r e d i s c o u n t i n g f a c i l i t i e s must be a v a i l a b l e a t t h e C e n t r a l 
Bank f o r any banks t h a t t a k e up t h i s k i n d o f medium-term 
paper. 
I t may be t h a t i n p u r e l y f i n a n c i a l terms t h e volume 
o f p u b l i c s e c t o r b o r r o w i n g envisaged i s q u i t e a c c e p t a b l e 
t o t h e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r ( i n c u r r e n t terms, t h e b o r r o w i n g 
r e q u i r e m e n t would r e p r e s e n t 2.4% o f t o t a l d e p o s i t s ) ; b u t 
i t i s d o u b t f u l whether p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , such an i n c r e a s e 
i n p u b l i c s e c t o r b o r r o w i n g would be accepted. The g e n e r a l 
r e l u c t a n c e o f t h e b a n k i n g s e c t o r t o h o l d t h e two t r e a s u r y 
b i l l i s s u e s i s i n d i c a t i v e o f t h i s . A l t h o u g h i t must be 
a d m i t t e d i n t h e case o f t h e t r e a s u r y b i l l i s s u e s , t h e 
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r a t e s o f f e r e d were not competitive with other short-term 
r a t e s . 
I f the f i n a n c i n g of the p u b l i c s e c t o r investment 
programme i s going to be d i f f i c u l t , then t h i s i s doubly 
true of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r programme. T o t a l p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r investments a r e expected to t o t a l LL5,460 m i l l i o n 
over the 1972-1977 period, or LL910 m i l l i o n per annum a t 
1969 p r i c e s . From the data t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e on t o t a l 
advances i t i s impossible to say what proportion of t o t a l 
advances a r e new, i n the sense that they represent a nett 
a d d i t i o n to c a p i t a l formation. I n the f i r s t p lace 
advances include loans to finance c u r r e n t expenditure and, 
secondly, loans on the c a p i t a l expenditure s i d e include 
finance f o r replacement investment. 
Thus i t i s impossible to say what proportion of the 
growth i n t o t a l advances represents an a d d i t i o n to c a p i t a l 
formation. There i s only one i n d i c a t o r that we can use 
to t r y and quantify the argument presented here. By 
looking a t the growth of t o t a l advances from 1970-1973 
(Table 7.7) we can see t h a t the t o t a l growth i n each year 
has been l e s s than the p r e d i c t e d average of LL910 m i l l i o n 
required by the Plan, and i t must a l s o be recognized t h a t 
the Plan requirements a r e i n 1969 p r i c e s , whereas the data 
i n Table 7.7 are i n c u r r e n t p r i c e s . 
The f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n of deposits w i t h i n the banking 
system i s going to r e q u i r e some system whereby medium-term 
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and long-term loans become more a t t r a c t i v e to i n d i v i d u a l 
banks. New investment obviously has a r i s k aspect to i t 
and banks w i l l wish to be compensated f o r s a c r i f i c i n g 
l i q u i d i t y and p o s s i b l y a c q u i r i n g more u n c e r t a i n t y . I t i s 
u n l i k e l y t h a t d i r e c t lending by the banks can provide the 
appropriate quantity of finance f o r i n d u s t r i a l developments 
and, therefore, medium and long-term lending i n s t i t u t i o n s 
a r e required; who would borrow d i r e c t l y from the banking 
system and i s s u e i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t i e s f o r i n d u s t r i a l 
investment. Such i n s t i t u t i o n s would r e q u i r e to be supported 
by government guarantees c o n s i d e r i n g the r i s k involved. 
As Nevin has commented, 
". . . I t i s inherent i n an under-developed economy 
that the r i s k attached to investment i n l o c a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s i s l a r g e ; p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s cannot 
reasonably be expected e i t h e r to a s s e s s the extent 
of t h i s r i s k f a i r l y , or to take i t e n t i r e l y on t h e i r 
own shoulders. I t i s a proper function of govern-
ment i n such circumstances to provide some guarantee 
a g a i n s t these r i s k s ; i t i s the only o r g a n i z a t i o n 
which i s able to spread i t s own r i s k over the e n t i r e 
economic l i f e of the community, and i t i s i n f a c t 
the only part of the system whose funct i o n i s to 
accept the u n c e r t a i n t i e s inherent i n the development 
of the economy as a whole . . ."9 
The problems inherent i n the development of medium-term 
loans c e n t r e around the time p r o f i l e of deposits and 
advances. Given a c e r t a i n degree of v o l a t i l i t y i n deposits 
(as demonstrated i n Chapter Seven), the banking system w i l l 
E. Nevin, C a p i t a l Funds i n Underdeveloped Countries, 
(London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1963), p.75. 
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obviously be r e l u c t a n t to extend loaning f a c i l i t i e s beyond 
the short-term, say l e s s than one y e a r ] Thus as deposits 
i n the banking system grow there i s no commensurate growth 
in medium-term and long-term loaning f a c i l i t i e s . This 
discrepancy i n time p r o f i l e s can be bridged with the 
c r e a t i o n of s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , backed by C e n t r a l 
Bank guarantees on t h e i r a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s . These 
guarantees are important i f the new f i n a n c i a l intermediary 
wishes to a t t r a c t deposits from the banking system i t s e l f . 
T h i s involvement w i t h the banking system i s important i n 
t h a t i t discourages the development of a dual f i n a n c i a l 
system: the p r i v a t e banks on the one hand and the govern-
ment c o n t r o l l e d and backed medium-term and long-term 
loaning i n s t i t u t i o n s on the other; both pursuing t h e i r 
separate b u s i n e s s e s . One suggestion f o r developing these 
two types of f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s together was put 
forward by A s s e i l y i n 1966.^° He suggested t h a t a medium-
term investment bank should be c r e a t e d t h a t would accept 
deposits from the commercial banks and i s s u e i n return a 
cash c e r t i f i c a t e w ith a maturity date, both negotiable 
and discountable a t the C e n t r a l Bank. Thus i f a bank 
wished to i n c r e a s e i t s l i q u i d r e s e r v e s i t could discount 
the cash c e r t i f i c a t e at the C e n t r a l Bank, without d i r e c t l y 
a f f e c t i n g the lending a b i l i t i e s of the investment bank. 
A.E. A s s e i l y , C e n t r a l Banking i n Lebanon, (Beirut? Khayat 
Book and P u b l i s h i n g Co. 1967) pp.125-127. 
The i n t e r e s t r a t e o f f e r e d on the deposits with the 
investment bank would have to be competitive with e x i s t i n g 
short-term r a t e s i n world money markets, but, presumably, 
lending r a t e s would not have to be equ a l l y high, i f the 
government were prepared to s u b s i d i z e medium- and long-term 
loans, by reducing the c o s t s of borrowing. 
This type of "bridging" mechanism i s by no means a 
new idea; but i t does serve to i l l u s t r a t e one very 
important point; t h a t i s t h a t some form of government 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s almost i n e v i t a b l e i f a medium- and long-
term investment bank i s to become a v i a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n . 
So the extent to which such finance i s a v a i l a b l e i s very 
much dependant on the a t t i t u d e of the government. Quite 
c l e a r l y the commercial banks w i l l not c r e a t e t h i s f a c i l i t y 
e n t i r e l y on t h e i r own w i t h i n the period of time being 
discussed, thus the onus r e s t s w i t h the government through 
the C e n t r a l Bank. This i s why the absence of any remarks 
about f i n a n c i a l arrangements w i t h i n the Six-Year Plan i s 
qu i t e remarkable. 
The one development t h a t i s worth mentioning i n some 
d e t a i l i s the establishment of the National Bank f o r 
I n d u s t r i a l and T o u r i s t i c Development. T h i s bank was 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1973 with an i n i t i a l c a p i t a l of LL60 m i l l i o n , 
l a r g e l y subscribed by the government. I t ' s Board of 
D i r e c t o r s includes r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from a number of 
indigenous banks and i n conception t h i s bank i s intended 
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to be a f o c a l point f o r i n d u s t r i a l investment w i t h i n the 
indigenous banking s e c t o r . By the end of 1973 some 
LL10 m i l l i o n of loans had been approved; but t h i s 
represents l e s s than 1% of loans extended by the commercial 
banks as a w h o l e . 1 1 An a l t e r n a t i v e to t h i s s o r t of l o c a l 
development i s the c r e a t i o n of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l develop-
ment bank. An e a r l y example of t h i s was the proposed 
Arab Development Bank suggested i n the 19 50's and now 
developed as the Arab Fund f o r S o c i a l and Economic 
Development. This type of Fund, along with the longer-
e s t a b l i s h e d Kuwait Fund, have the c a p a c i t y to o f f e r long-
term loans a t below market r a t e s f o r i n d u s t r i a l and 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e investments. One of the p r i n c i p l e problems 
of u t i l i s i n g such Funds i s the question of a c c e s s . 
Although both Funds have experts who screen a p p l i c a t i o n s , 
i t i s not c l e a r whether s m a l l - s c a l e p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s 
a r e accorded equal treatment w i t h semi-public and p u b l i c 
bodies. T h i s problem does not apply only to s m a l l - s c a l e 
i n d u s t r i e s i n Lebanon; i t i s much more a problem f o r a l l 
developing c o u n t r i e s . As a recent U.N.-sponsored report 
s t a t e d , 
" . . . The problem of f i n a n c i n g i n d u s t r i a l develop-
ment w i l l not be solved unless indigenous, r e g i o n a l 
and n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s capable of m o b i l i s i n g and 
ch a n n e l l i n g funds to ind u s t r y and of studying and 
promoting i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s are c r e a t e d . There 
The Arab Economist, Vol. VI, March 1974, No. 62, p.46. 
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e x i s t s at present, i n the Arab c o u n t r i e s , s e v e r a l 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , but these have not, as 
yet, played an important r o l e i n f i n a n c i n g or 
e s t a b l i s h i n g Arab i n d u s t r i e s because of t h e i r very 
s t r u c t u r e , shortage of funds and the nature of t h e i r 
c r e d i t p o l i c i e s . . ."12 
The s i t u a t i o n i n Lebanon at the present time i s t h a t i n 
t o t a l funds w i t h i n the banking s e c t o r a r e probably s u f f i c i e n t 
to meet a l l development requirements, but these requirements 
are l a r g e l y long-term i n nature, w h i l s t the funds deposited 
in the banking system a r e short-term i n nature. I n 
a d d i t i o n there i s a f u r t h e r complicating f a c t o r i n that a 
l a r g e proportion of these funds a r e denominated i n fore i g n 
c u r r e n c i e s . Thus the t o t a l funds w i t h i n the banking 
s e c t o r overestimate the extent to which the f i n a n c i a l 
s e c t o r i s capable of i n c r e a s i n g domestic c a p i t a l formation. 
I f banks tend to concentrate on the short-term end of the 
market, then t h e i r r o l e i n the f i n a n c i n g of development 
w i l l be l i m i t e d and e q u a l l y t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i l l a f f e c t 
the r a t e a t which the economy can develop. 
12. "Financing Arab I n d u s t r i a l Development", paper p r e p a r e d by 
the I n d u s t r i a l Development Centre f o r Arab S t a t e s , Libya, 
f o r the T h i r d Conference on I n d u s t r i a l Development f o r 
Arab S t a t e s , A p r i l 1974, (United Nations I n d u s t r i a l 
Development Organization Document No. IDC3/1P/2, A p r i l 
1974), p.5. 
268. 
C H A P T E R T E N 
Summary And Conclusions 
Part I of t h i s t h e s i s developed a number of ideas, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those of Goldsmith, Gurley, Shaw and McKinnon 
to show that f i n a n c i a l development could have an e f f e c t 
on r e a l growth. Part I I of t h i s t h e s i s has described 
recent developments i n the Lebanese f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r and 
has sought to prove that the f i n a n c i a l developments t h a t 
have occurred have not been conducive to r e a l resource 
growth. This c o nclusion stems from two main points. 
F i r s t l y the i n t e r n a t i o n a l nature of the f i n a n c i a l system 
has exposed the Lebanese f i n a n c i a l system to strong and 
persuasive exogenous f a c t o r s . This coupled with a non-
e x i s t e n t and then h e s i t a n t form of c e n t r a l bank c o n t r o l 
has c r e a t e d a f i n a n c i a l system l a r g e l y exogenous to the 
domestic economy and u n t i l q u i t e r e c e n t l y , unregulated. 
The approach in t h i s t h e s i s has been a pragmatic one. 
There i s no one body of economic theory t h a t can be c a l l e d 
upon to e x p l a i n the complicated i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
f i n a n c i a l growth and economic development. I n t h i s vein 
the view of Hicks, that, 
" . . . Underdevelopment economics i s a v a s t l y 
important su b j e c t , but i t i s not a formal or t h e o r e t i c a l 
s u b j e c t . I t i s a p r a c t i c a l s u b j e c t which must expect 
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to c a l l upon any branch of theory ( i n c l u d i n g non-
economic, f o r instance s o c i o l o g i c a l , theory) which 
has any relevence to i t , " l 
i s important. The d i s c u s s i o n on the various f a c t o r s 
i n f l u e n c i n g f i n a n c i a l growth, contained i n Part I , ended 
with the con c l u s i o n t h a t only a country-by-country approach 
to f i n a n c i a l development could p o s s i b l y capture the many 
f a c t o r s involved. This approach has been adopted i n 
Part I I and the t h e s i s has demonstrated t h a t w h i l s t 
f i n a n c i a l growth i n Lebanon i n terms of t o t a l deposits i n 
the banking system, has been rapid, f i n a n c i a l deepening, 
in terms of the range of f i n a n c i a l instruments o f f e r e d 
by the f i n a n c i a l system, has not occurred. This has 
r e s u l t e d i n a f i n a n c i a l system which has the o v e r a l l 
c a p a b i l i t y to finance economic development w i t h i n Lebanon, 
but has not generated the range of instruments to make 
t h i s c a p a b i l i t y e f f e c t i v e . This s i t u a t i o n has r e s u l t e d 
from the growth of a l a r g e l y unregulated banking system, 
with the majority of the deposits denominated i n forei g n 
c u r r e n c i e s . These foreign currency deposits have had an 
e f f e c t on l i q u i d i t y , the s t r u c t u r e of advances and the 
general impacts of c e n t r a l bank p o l i c y . F a r from f o r e i g n 
banks and f o r e i g n currency deposits having a p o s i t i v e 
2 
e f f e c t on the banking system, as implied by Goldsmith, 
1. J . Hicks, C a p i t a l and Growth, (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
Press 1969) p.3-4. 
2. Chapter Three, page 78. 
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they have r e s u l t e d i n the development of a f i n a n c i a l 
system which i s l a r g e l y exogenous to the Lebanese economy. 
The b a s i c conclusions from a l l t h i s are that a more 
d e c i s i v e form of c e n t r a l bank p o l i c y i s required. Regula-
t i o n s concerning foreign currency holdings need to be 
strengthened, p o s s i b l y r e q u i r i n g banks to hold matching 
deposits i n Lebanese pounds. This might have the e f f e c t 
of reducing f o r e i g n currency deposits; but presumably, 
the only l o s s here would be forei g n exchange earnings, 
estimated a t about $100 m i l l i o n per annum and t h i s l o s s 
would not be complete. The gain would be that a f i n a n c i a l 
system would be c r e a t e d t h a t would be more inward-looking 
in i t s investment p o l i c i e s , which should be to the b e n e f i t 
of the Lebanese economy. An a l t e r n a t i v e would be to 
provide a s o r t of banking " f r e e zone" or d o l l a r market 
in B e i r u t , as proposed by Hoss i n 1974. 
" . . . One of the requirements f o r the development 
of the banking s e c t o r and w i t h i t the f i n a n c i a l 
market, i n Lebanon, i s the c r e a t i o n i n t h i s country 
of an Arab d o l l a r market s i m i l a r to the Asian d o l l a r 
market s e t up i n Singapore and the E u r o - d o l l a r 
market . . . we mean a market f o r t r a d i n g i n the 
various major world c u r r e n c i e s , not only the U.S. 
d o l l a r , although t h i s d o l l a r i s l i k e l y to be a t the 
c e n t r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , as 
i t has always been i n the European and Singapore 
markets. The s e t t i n g up of the required market 
depends, to a l a r g e extent, on the establishment of 
what may be l o o s e l y c a l l e d a 'banking f r e e zone' based 
on the exemption of bank deposits belonging to non-
r e s i d e n t s and made out i n forei g n c u r r e n c i e s from 
i n t e r e s t tax, s t a t u t o r y r e s e r v e and deposit insurance 
charges."3 
S. Hoss, i n a speech d e l i v e r e d to the Lebanese Management 
A s s o c i a t i o n , as reported i n Monday Morning, 2 5th February 
1974. 
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Hoss went on to argue that the "key" to Lebanese develop-
ment lay i n the growth of a f i n a n c i a l system capable of 
a c t i n g i n a r e g i o n a l c a p a c i t y f o r surplus o i l funds. 
This only seems to be h a l f of the p i c t u r e . Lebanon, a t 
the present time, i s probably the best equipped of 
middle-eastern c o u n t r i e s to take advantage of surplus 
o i l funds, but t h i s advantage c r e a t e s disadvantages i n 
the domestic market, as has been o u t l i n e d i n the l a s t 
four chapters. Unless there i s some p h y s i c a l separation 
of non-resident f o r e i g n currency deposits, then the 
Lebanese f i n a n c i a l system w i l l continue to be a f f e c t e d 
by the behaviour of world short-term money markets to 
the obvious disadvantage of domestic c a p i t a l formation. 
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Appendix 1 
Law of September 3, 1956, on banking secrecy 
A r t i c l e 1. Banks e s t a b l i s h e d in Lebanon under the form 
of j o i n t - s t o c k companies as w e l l as foreign banks; branches 
are s u b j e c t to p r o f e s s i o n a l secrecy on c o n d i t i o n t h a t they 
obtain the s p e c i a l r e l a t i v e a u t h o r i z a t i o n from the finance 
m i n i s t e r . 
The Bank of A g r i c u l t u r e , I n d u s t r i a l and Real E s t a t e 
C r e d i t i s not s u b j e c t to the p r o v i s i o n s of the present law. 
A r t i c l e 2. Managers and employees of the banking 
establishments r e f e r r e d to i n the f i r s t a r t i c l e as w e l l as 
persons who a r e acquainted through t h e i r q u a l i t y or t h e i r 
function, by one means or another, w i t h bank books, 
operation and banking correspondence, are bound to 
absolute secrecy, i n favour of the bank's c l i e n t s , and 
cannot d i s c l o s e to anyone whatsoever, p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l 
or an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , m i l i t a r y or j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y , 
c l i e n t s ' names, t h e i r a s s e t s and f a c t s of which they are 
aware, except w i t h the c l i e n t ' s w r i t t e n a u t h o r i z a t i o n , or 
h i s h e i r s ' or h i s legatees', or i n case he should be 
declared bankrupt, or i n the event of a dispute between 
the c l i e n t and the bank r e s u l t i n g from banking r e l a t i o n s . 
A r t i c l e 3. Banking establishments r e f e r r e d to i n the 
f i r s t a r t i c l e are authorized to open to t h e i r c l i e n t s code 
number deposit accounts whose owner i s known only to the 
bank's d i r e c t o r or h i s proxy. 
The i d e n t i t y of the holder of a code number deposit 
account cannot be revealed except w i t h h i s w r i t t e n a u t h o r i -
z a t i o n , or h i s h e i r s ' or legatees', or i n case he should 
be declared bankrupt, or i n the event of a dispute between 
the c l i e n t and the bank r e s u l t i n g from banking r e l a t i o n s . 
The l e t t i n g of s a f e s can a l s o be e f f e c t e d under code 
number in the same con d i t i o n s . 
A r t i c l e 4. No s e i z u r e can be made on the holdings 
lodged as deposits with the banking establishments, 
r e f e r r e d to i n the f i r s t paragraph, without the w r i t t e n 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n of t h e i r owners. 
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A r t i c l e 5. The a u t h o r i z a t i o n r e f e r r e d to i n the 
preceding a r t i c l e s may be s t i p u l a t e d beforehand i n every 
c o n t r a c t , and may not be withdrawn except by the common 
accord of a l l the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s . 
A r t i c l e 6. The present law i s no bar to the organiza-
t i o n , only among the banks r e f e r r e d to i n the f i r s t 
a r t i c l e , of exchanges under the s e a l of se c r e c y of 
information r e l a t i n g to t h e i r c l i e n t s ' debtor account i n 
order to safeguard the s e c u r i t y of t h e i r investments. 
A r t i c l e 7. The banking establishments r e f e r r e d to i n 
the f i r s t a r t i c l e may not oppose the p r o f e s s i o n a l s e c r e c y 
cre a t e d by the present law to requests which j u d i c i a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s should formulate i n t h e i r proceedings r e l a t i n g 
to unlawful growth of wealth i n i t i a t e d i n execution of 
L e g i s l a t i v e Degree No. 38 of February 18, 1953 and of the 
law of A p r i l 14, 19 54. 
A r t i c l e 8. Any i n t e n t i o n a l breach to the requirements 
of the present law s h a l l make i t s author l i a b l e to a term 
of imprisonment of between three months and one year. 
The beginning of execution i s s u b j e c t to the same penalty. 
P u b l i c a c t i o n may not be s e t into motion except upon the 
complaint of the i n j u r e d party. 
A r t i c l e 9. A l l p r o v i s i o n s contrary to the present law 
or i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s tenor a r e abrogated. 
A r t i c l e 10. The p r o v i s i o n s of the present law s h a l l be 




C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Banks Operating i n Lebanon: 1974 
Foreign Banks (Non Arab) 
1. Banco d i Roma 
2. Banque Nationale de P a r i s ( I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l e ) 
3. The B r i t i s h Bank of the Middle E a s t 
4. Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. 
5. The Chase Manhattan Bank 
6. F i r s t National C i t y Bank 
7. The Chartered Bank 
8. Bank Saderat I r a n 
9. Moscow Narodny Bank Limited 
10. Bank of America (National T r u s t and Savings 
A s s o c i a t i o n ) 
11. Habib Bank (Overseas) Limited 
12. The Bank of Nova S c o t i a 
Foreign Banks (Arab) 
13. Arab Bank Limited 
14. R a f i d a i n Bank 
15. Saudi National Commercial Bank 
16. Jordan National Bank 
17. Arab A f r i c a n Bank 
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Lebanese Banks (SAL) with Majority P a r t i c i p a t i o n s of 
Foreign (Non Arab) Banks 
18. Banque Francase pour l e Moyen-Orient 
19. Banque Liba n o - F r a n c a i s e 
20. Banque Sabbagh 
21. Banque G. Trad ( C r e d i t Lyonnais) 
22. Banl al-Mashrek 
23. S o c i e t y Generale Libano-Europeenne de Banque 
24. The F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank of Chicago (Lebanon) 
2 5. The Royal Bank of Canada (Middle E a s t ) 
26. C o n t i n e n t a l Development Bank 
27. C r e d i t S u i s s e (Middle E a s t ) 
28. S o c i e t e Nouvelle de l a Banque de S y r i e et du Liban 
29. R i f Bank 
30. United Bank of Lebanon and Pakistan 
31. L i t e x Bank 
32. Trans-Orient Bank 
33. The B r i t i s h Bank of the Lebanon. 
Lebanese Banks (SAL) w i t h M a j o r i t y P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Foreign 
(Arab) Banks 
34. Banque Misr-Liban 
3 5. The Arab Libyan T u n i s i a n Bank 
Other Lebanese Banks (SAL 
36. Banque Tohme 
37. S o c i e t e B a n c a i r e du L i b a n 
3 8. Banque L i b a n a i s e pour l e Commerce 
39. Banque du Liban & d'Outremer 
40. F e d e r a l Bank of Lebanon 
41. The National Bank For I n d u s t r i a l & T o u r i s t i c 
Development 
42. Banque de l a Mediterranee 
43. Banque Chartouni 
44. Banque Saradar 
45. Bank of B e i r u t & The Arab Countries 
46. The Lebanese Arab Bank 
47. Banque J . L a t i & F i l s 
48. B e i r u t Riyad Bank 
49. Investment and Finance Bank 
50. Banque Pharaon & Chiha 
51. Banque de C r e d i t National 
52. Mebco Bank (M.E. Banking Co.) 
53. Banque Byblos 
54. Advances & Commerce Bank (Adcom Bank) 
55. Banque de Financement 
56. Banque de 1 ' I n d u s t r i e et du T r a v a i l 
57. Banque L i b a n o - B r e s i l i e n n e 
58. C r e d i t L i b a n a i s 
59. Banque Beyrouth pour l e Commerce 
60. Banque Audi 
61. Banque Nasr L i b a n o - A f r i c a i n e 
62. Bank of Kuwait & The Arab World 
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63 . Banque Joseph Geagea 
64. Banque du C r e d i t Populaire 
65. Banque Majdalany 
66. Commercial Business Bank 
67. Bank of B e i r u t 
68. Banque des Cedres 
69. P r o s p e r i t y Bank of Lebanon 
70. Rabiya Bank 
71. Jammal Investment Bank 
72. Banque de l ' E s s o r Economique L i b a n a i s 
73. Banque L i b a n a i s e des Emigres 
74. L i b e r a l Bank 
75. Banque de l a Bekaa 
76. Banque de C r e d i t A g r i c o l e 
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